Papers
(See Publications for the published papers, and CV for the complete list.)
Culture and Communication
with Rajiv Sethi
Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks
with Stephen Morris
Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining
with Alp Simsek
(see below for an earlier version)
Pretrial Negotiations under Optimism
(with Susana Wasserman)
Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Infinite Games
(with Jonathan Weinstein)
Forthcoming in Journal of Mathematical Economics
Communication with Unknown Perspectives
with Rajiv Sethi
Econometrica, Vol. 84, No. 6 (November, 2016), 2029–2069
This is a longer version
Common Belief Foundations of Global Games
(with Stehen Morris and Hyun Shin)
(Accepted to Journal of Economic Theory)
Durable Bargaining Power and Stochastic Deadlines
(with Alp Simsek; mostly incorporated in "Drability, Deadline and Election Effects in Bargaining")
Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World
(with Daron Acemoglu and Victor Chernozhukov)
(Mostly incorporated in TE paper "Fragility of Asymptotic Agrreement under Bayesian Learning")
Generic uniqueness of rationalizable actions
Most results have been published in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007): "A structure theorem for rationalizability...", Econometrica.
Finite-order Implications of Any Equilibrium [Substantially revised]
(with Jonathan Weinstein)
Most results have been published in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007): "A structure theorem for rationalizability...", Econometrica.
Optimism, deadline effect, and stochastic deadlines
Obsolete: incorporated into "Durability of bargaining power and stochastic deadlines" by Simsek and Yildiz
Sequential bargaining without a common prior on the recognition process
Muhamet Yildiz