We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation.

I. Introduction

Political change often takes place in the midst of uncertainty and turmoil, which sometimes brings to power the most radical factions, such as
the militant Jacobins during the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution or the Nazis during the crisis of the Weimar Republic. The events leading up to the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia illustrate both the dynamics of repression resulting from the desire of ruling elites to prevent the empowerment of extremist—and sometimes also of moderate—elements in society and how such extremist fringe groups can ascend to power.

Russia entered the twentieth century as an absolute monarchy but started a process of limited political reforms in response to labor strikes and civilian unrest in the aftermath of its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5. Despite the formation of political parties (for the first time in Russian history) and an election with a wide franchise, the tsar still retained control, in part relying on repression against the leftist groups, his veto power, the right to dissolve the parliament (the Duma), full control of the military and cabinet appointments, and his ability to rule by decree when the Duma was not in session (Pipes 1995). This may have been partly motivated by the fear of further strengthening the two major leftist parties, Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats (i.e., communists, consisting in turn of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks), which together controlled about two-fifths of the 1906 Duma and explicitly targeted a revolution.1

World War I created the opening that the Bolsheviks had been looking for, bringing to power the Provisional Government in the February Revolution of 1917 and then, later, the moderate Social Revolutionary Alexander Kerensky. Additional military defeats of the Russian army in the summer of 1917, the destruction of the military chain of command by Bolshevik-led soldier committees, and Kerensky’s willingness to enter into an alliance with Social Democrats to defeat the attempted coup by the army during the Kornilov affair strengthened the Bolsheviks further. Though in the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917 they had only a small fraction of the vote, the Bolsheviks successfully exploited their control of Petrograd Soviets to outmaneuver the more popular Social Revolutionaries, first entering into an alliance with so-called Left Social Revolutionaries and then coercing them to leave the government so as to form their own one-party dictatorship.

1 Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democrats, recognized that a revolution was possible only by exploiting turmoil. In the context of the 1906 Duma, he stated, “Our task is . . . to use the conflicts within this Duma, or connected with it, for choosing the right moment to attack the enemy, the right moment for an insurrection against the autocracy” (Lenin 1965, 237). Later, he argued, “the Duma should be used for the purposes of the revolution, should be used mainly for promulgating the Party’s political and socialist views and not for legislative ‘reforms,’ which, in any case, would mean supporting the counterrevolution and curtailing democracy in every way” (Lenin [1907] 1972).
This episode illustrates both the possibility of a series of transitions bringing to power some of the most radical groups and the potential implications of the concerns of moderate political transitions further empowering radical groups. Despite a growing literature on political transitions, the issues we have just emphasized in the context of the Bolshevik Revolution cannot be studied with existing models because they necessitate a dynamic stochastic model in which several groups can form temporary coalitions, potentially leading to a sequence of political transitions away from current power holders. Such a model, if tractably developed, could also shed further light on key questions in the literature on regime transitions, including those concerning political transitions with several heterogeneous groups, gradual enfranchisement or disenfranchisement, and the interactions between regime dynamics and coalition formation.\footnote{These types of political dynamics are not confined to episodes in which extreme left groups might come to power. The power struggles between secularists and religious groups in Turkey and more recently in the Middle East and North Africa are also partly motivated by concerns on both sides that political power will irrevocably—or at least persistently—shift to the other side.}

In this paper, we develop a framework for the study of dynamic political economy in the presence of stochastic shocks and changing environments, which we then apply to an analysis of the implications of potential shifts of power to radical groups during tumultuous times and to the problem of institutional experimentation. The next example provides a first glimpse of the type of abstraction we will utilize.

Example 1. Consider a society consisting of $n$ groups, spanning from $-l < 0$ (left-wing) to $r > 0$ (right-wing), with group 0 normalized to contain the median voter. For example, with $n = 3$, we can think of the rightmost player as corresponding to the Russian tsar, the middle player to moderate groups, and the leftmost group to Bolsheviks. The stage payoff of each group depends on current policies, which are determined by the politically powerful coalition in the current “political state.” Suppose that there are $2n - 1$ political states, each specifying which of the “extreme” players are repressed and excluded from political decision making. With $n = 3$, the five states are $s = 2$ (both moderates and Bolsheviks are repressed and the tsar is the dictator), $1$ (Bolsheviks are repressed), $0$ (nobody is repressed and power lies with moderates), $-1$ (the tsar is repressed or eliminated), and finally $-2$ (the tsar and moderates are repressed, i.e., a Bolshevik dictatorship). Since current policies depend on the (political) state, we can directly define stage payoffs as a function of the current state for each player, $u_i(s)$ (which is inclusive of repression costs, if any). Suppose that starting in any state $s \neq -2$, a stochastic shock can bring the Bolsheviks to power and this shock is more likely when $s$ is lower.
In addition to proving the existence and characterizing the structure of pure-strategy equilibria, this framework enables us to establish the following types of results. First, in the absence of stochastic shocks bringing Bolsheviks to power, \( s = 0 \) (no repression or democracy) is stable in the sense that moderates would not like to initiate repression; but \( s > 0 \) may also be stable, because the tsar may prefer to incur the costs of repression to implement policies more in line with his preferences. Second, and more interestingly, moderates may also initiate repression starting with \( s = 0 \) if there is the possibility of a switch of power to Bolsheviks. Third, and paradoxically, the tsar may be more willing to grant political rights to moderates when Bolsheviks are stronger, because this might make a coalition between the latter two groups less likely (this is an illustration of what we refer to as “slippery slope” considerations and shows the general nonmonotonocities in our model: when Bolsheviks are stronger, the tsar has less to fear from the slippery slope). Finally, there is strategic complementarity in repression: the anticipation of repression by Bolsheviks encourages repression by moderates and the tsar.

Though stylized, this example communicates the rich strategic interactions involved in dynamic political transitions in the presence of stochastic shocks and changing environments. Against this background, the framework we develop will show that, under natural assumptions, we can characterize the equilibria of this class of situations fairly tightly and perform comparative statics, shedding light on these and a variety of other dynamic strategic interactions.

Formally, we consider a generalization of the environment discussed in the example. Society consists of \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) players (groups or individuals) and \( s = 1, 2, \ldots, m \) states, which represent both different economic arrangements with varying payoffs for different players and different political arrangements and institutional choices. Stochastic shocks are modeled as (stochastic) changes in environments, which encode information on preferences of all players over states and the distribution of political power within states. This approach is general enough to capture a rich set of permanent and transitory (as well as both anticipated and

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3 By “slippery slope” considerations we refer to the following type of situation: a “winning coalition” (a sufficiently powerful group of players) does not move to a state \( z \) starting from \( s \) even though all of its members would obtain strictly greater state utility in \( z \) than in \( s \). This happens because a move from \( s \) is expected to shift power to another winning coalition, which will then start a move to another sequence of states that are less preferred by some members of the initial winning coalition.

4 This result also provides a new perspective on why repression may differ markedly across societies. For example, Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution repressed the leftists, and thereafter the rightists and centrists, while the extent of repression of either extreme has been more limited in the United Kingdom. Such differences are often ascribed to differences in “political culture.” Our result instead suggests that (small) differences in economic interests or political costs of repression can lead to significantly different repression outcomes.
unanticipated) stochastic shocks depending on the current state and environment. Players care about the expected discounted sums of their utilities, and on the basis of their political power, they make joint choices among feasible political transitions. Our key assumption is that both preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy a natural single-crossing (increasing differences) property: we assume that players and states are "ordered," and higher-indexed players relatively prefer higher-indexed states and also tend to have greater political power in such states. (Changes in environments shift these preferences and distribution of political power but maintain increasing differences.)

Our notion of equilibrium is *Markov voting equilibrium* (MVE), which comprises two natural requirements: (1) that changes in states should take place if there exists a subset of players with the power to implement them and who will obtain higher continuation utility (along the equilibrium path) by doing so and (2) that strategies and continuation utilities should depend only on payoff-relevant variables and states. Under these assumptions, we establish the existence of pure-strategy equilibria. Furthermore, we show that the stochastic path of states in any MVE is monotone between shocks: as long as there is no exogenous shock, the path of states remains monotone (theorem 8). Though this result does not imply that the institutional path is monotone everywhere, it does imply that the direction of society’s institutional path changes only when shocks arrive. Coupled with our assumption that there is a finite number of shocks, this result also ensures that a limit state exists, though this limit state (and thus the long-run equilibrium institution that the society eventually converges to) depends on the exact timing and realizations of shocks (theorems 1 and 3). Although MVE are not always unique, we also provide sufficient conditions that ensure uniqueness (theorems 2 and 4). We further demonstrate a close correspondence between these MVE and the pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of our environment (theorem 5).

Despite the generality of the framework described here and the potential countervailing forces highlighted by example 1, we also establish some comparative static results. Consider, for example, a change in environment that leaves preferences or the allocation of political power in any of the states $s_1, \ldots, s_0$ unchanged but potentially changes them in states $s = s' + 1, \ldots, m$. The result is that if the steady state of equilibrium dynamics described above, $x$, did not experience change (i.e., $x \leq s'$), then the new steady state emerging after the change in environment can be no

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5 Formally, we assume “increasing differences” rather than single crossing, but in the informal discussion, we use the two terms interchangeably.

6 In what follows, we use MVE for both the singular (Markov voting equilibrium) and plural (Markov voting equilibria).
smaller than this steady state (theorem 6). Intuitively, before the change, a transition to any of the smaller states \( s \leq x \) could have been chosen but was not. Now, given that preferences and political power did not change for these states, they have not become more attractive. An interesting and novel implication of this result is that in some environments, there may exist critical states, such as a “sufficiently democratic constitution,” and if these critical states are reached before the arrival of certain major shocks or changes (which might have otherwise led to their collapse), there will be no turning back (see corollary 1). This result provides a different interpretation of the durability of certain democratic regimes than the approaches based on “democratic capital” (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2009): a democracy will survive forever if it is not shocked or challenged severely while still progressing toward the “sufficiently democratic constitution/state” but will be reversed if there is a shock before this state is reached.

The second part of the paper applies our framework to two new and substantive applications. The first is the emergence and implications of radical politics, in the context of which we establish the results mentioned at the end of example 1 above. The second is a model of collective experimentation over different sets of institutions. Neither application can be studied without the tools developed in this paper.

Our paper is related to several literatures. First, our previous work, in particular, Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2012), took one step in this direction by introducing a model for the analysis of the dynamics and stability of different political rules and constitutions. However, that approach not only heavily relied on the absence of shocks (thus ruling out stochastic changes in political power or preferences) but also focused on environments in which the discount factor is sufficiently close to one that all agents just care about the payoff from a stable state (which will emerge and persist) if such a state exists. Here, in contrast, it is crucial that political change and choices are motivated by the entire path of payoffs.

Second, several papers on dynamic political economy and on dynamics of clubs emerge as special cases of our paper. Among these, Roberts (1999) deserves special mention as an important precursor to our analysis.

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7 In contrast, some of the higher-ranked states may have become more attractive, which may induce a transition to a higher state. In fact, somewhat surprisingly, transition to a state \( s \geq s' + 1 \) can take place even if all states \( s = s' + 1, \ldots, m \) become less attractive for all agents in society.

8 In Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2010), we studied political selection and government formation in a population with heterogeneous abilities and allowed stochastic changes in the competencies of politicians. Nevertheless, this was done under two assumptions, which significantly simplified the analysis and made it much less applicable: stochastic shocks were assumed to be very infrequent and the discount factor was taken to be close to one. Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2011) took a first step toward introducing stochastic shocks, but only confined to the exogenous emergence of new extreme states (and without any of the general characterization or comparative static results presented here).
Roberts studies a dynamic model of club formation in which current members of the club vote on whether to admit new members or exclude some of the existing ones; members’ preferences satisfy single-crossing type assumptions (see also Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev 2001). Our setup and results generalize, extend, and strengthen Roberts’s in several dimensions. First, Roberts focuses on a stationary model without shocks, whereas we allow for nonstationary elements and rich stochastic shocks. Second, we allow for fairly general distributions of political power across states, which is crucial for our focus, while Roberts assumes majority rule for every club. Third, we prove existence of pure-strategy equilibria and provide conditions for uniqueness—results that do not have equivalents in Roberts’s study. Fourth, we provide a general characterization of the structure of MVE, which in turn paves the way for our comparative static results—again results that have no equivalents in Roberts’s paper. Fifth, we show the relationship between this equilibrium concept and MPE of a fully specified dynamic game. Finally, we show how our framework can be applied to a political economy problem, providing new and interesting insights in this instance. Gomes and Jehiel’s (2005) paper, which studies dynamics in a related environment with side transfers, is also noteworthy but does not include stochastic elements or similar general characterization results.

Third, our motivation is also related to the literature on political transitions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b, 2001) consider environments in which institutional change is partly motivated by a desire to reallocate political power in the future to match the current distribution of power. Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis is simplified by focusing on a society consisting of two social groups (and in Acemoglu and Robinson [2006] with three social groups). In Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Fearon (2004), Powell (2006), Padró i Miquel (2007), Hirshleifer, Boldrin, and Levine (2009), and Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010), anticipation of future changes in political power leads to inefficient policies, civil war, or collapse of democracy. There is a growing literature that demonstrates inefficiencies in environments in which current political decisions affect the future allocation of political power or bargaining power (see Fearon 1996; Besley and Coate 1998; Powell 2006; Acharya and Ortner 2013).

Fourth, there is a small literature on strategic use of repression, which includes Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a), Gregory, Schroder, and Sonin (2011), and Wolitzky (2011). None of the papers discussed in the previous three paragraphs study the issues we focus on or make progress toward a general framework of the sort presented here.

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Finally, our approach is related to but quite different from the study of games with strategic complementarities (see Milgrom and Roberts [1990] and Vives [1990] for early contributions, Echenique [2004] for the relationship of such games to games with unique equilibria, and Chassang [2010] for games with strategic complementarities and private information). As in this literature, we impose a joint order over players and strategies and utilize an increasing differences assumption. However, crucially, ours is not a game of strategic complementarities, there are no “monotone” comparative statics (as evidenced by the slippery slope considerations discussed in fn. 3 and the type of results already mentioned in fn. 7 above), and the mathematical arguments underlying our results and their logic are very different.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present our general framework and introduce the concept of MVE. Section III contains the analysis of MVE. We start with the stationary case (without shocks), then extend the analysis to the general case in which shocks are possible, and then compare the concepts of MVE to MPE in a properly defined dynamic game. We also establish several comparative static results that hold even at this level of generality; this allows us to study the society’s reactions to shocks in applied models. Section IV applies our framework to the study of radical politics and to the problem of institutional experimentation. Section V presents conclusions. Appendix A contains some important lemmas and proofs of the main theorems. Appendix B, which is available online, contains additional proofs, several extensions, and examples.

II. General Framework

Time is discrete and infinite, indexed by $t \geq 1$. The society consists of $n$ players (representing individuals or groups), $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. The set of players is ordered, and the order reflects the initial distribution of some variable of interest. For example, higher-indexed players may be richer, more pro-authoritarian, or more right-wing on social issues. In each period, the society is in one of the $h$ environments $E = \{E^1, \ldots, E^h\}$, which determine preferences and the distribution of political power in society (as described below). We model stochastic elements by assuming that, at each date, the society transitions from environment $E$ to environment $E'$ with probability $\pi(E, E')$. Naturally, $\sum_{E' \in E} \pi(E, E') = 1$. We make the following assumption.

**Assumption 1** (Ordered transitions). If $1 \leq x < y \leq h$, then $\pi(E^x, E^y) = 0$.

Assumption 1 implies that there can be at most only a finite number of shocks. It also stipulates that environments are numbered so that only transitions to higher-numbered environments are possible. This numbering convention is without loss of generality and enables us to use the convention that once the last environment, $E^h$, has been reached,
there will be no further stochastic shocks. In what follows, we will call the pair \( (\mathcal{E} = \{ E^1, \ldots, E^q \}, \{ \pi_{E^i, E^j} \}) \) a stochastic environment. In other words, a stochastic environment is a collection of environments and transition probabilities such that assumption 1 is satisfied.

We model preferences and the distribution of political power by means of states, belonging to a finite set \( S = \{ 1, \ldots, m \} \). The set of states is ordered: loosely speaking, this will generally imply that higher-indexed states provide both greater economic payoffs and more political power to higher-indexed players. An example would be a situation in which higher-indexed states correspond to less democratic arrangements, which are both economically and politically better for more “elite” groups. The payoff of player \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) in state \( s \in S \) and environment \( E \in \mathcal{E} \) is \( u_{E, i}(s) \).

To capture relative preferences and power of players in different states, we will frequently make use of the following definition.

**Definition 1 (Increasing differences).** Vector \( \{ w_i(s) \} \) satisfies the increasing differences condition if for any agents \( i, j \in A \) such that \( i > j \) and any states \( x, y \in B \) such that \( x > y \),

\[
w_i(x) - w_i(y) \geq w_j(x) - w_j(y).
\]

The following is one of our key assumptions.

**Assumption 2 (Increasing differences in payoffs).** In every environment \( E \in \mathcal{E} \), the vector of (stage) payoffs, \( \{ u_{E, i}(s) \} \), satisfies the increasing differences condition.

Note that payoffs \( \{ u_{E, i}(s) \} \) are directly assigned to combinations of states and environments. An alternative would be to assign payoffs to some other actions, for example, “policies,” which are then selected endogenously by the same political process that determines transitions between states. This is what we do in Section IV: under fairly weak conditions, the current state will determine the choice of action (policy), so payoffs will then be indirectly defined over states and environments. Here we are thus reducing notation by directly writing them as \( \{ u_{E, i}(s) \} \).

Assumption 2 is the first of our two most substantive assumptions. It essentially imposes that we can think of political conflict in this society

\[10\] In particular, assumption 1 does not preclude the possibility that the same environment will recur several times. For example, the possibility of \( q \) transitions between \( E^1 \) and \( E^2 \) can be modeled by setting \( E^1 = E^2, E^i = E^2, \) etc. It also does not mean that the society must reach \( E^1 \) on every path: e.g., it is permissible to have three environments with \( \pi(E^1, E^2) = \pi(E^2, E^3) > 0 \) and all other transition probabilities equal to zero.

\[11\] The implicit assumption that the set of states is the same for all environments is without any loss of generality.

\[12\] This in principle allows for a setup in which the group in power chooses a different policy than its bliss point because of some (endogenous) constraints, such as the “no revolution constraint” in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b, 2006). We do not explicitly discuss this possibility to keep the exposition focused.
as taking place over a “single-dimensional” issue for which all agents have well-defined preferences. In particular, if we think of this single-dimensional issue as representing a left-right divide, then this assumption implies that agents can also be ordered in terms of their left versus right stance; and as we go to more right-wing agents, they obtain increasingly greater additional utility from the implementation of policies further to the right. Though restrictive, this is exactly the type of assumption that is employed in the majority of static models of political economy in order to obtain general existence and characterization results (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 2000). Technically, it is a key input into the following result: despite the fact that agents care not only about a single policy but also about the entire future sequence of policies, they can still be ranked from left to right, and any move to a further right state that is preferred by an agent will also be preferred by all agents to his right.

We model the distribution of political power in a state flexibly using the notion of winning coalitions. This captures information on which subsets of agents have the (political) power to implement economic or political change, here corresponding to a transition from one state to another. We denote the set of winning coalitions in state \( s \) and environment \( E \) by \( W_E, s \) and impose the following standard assumption.

**Assumption 3 (Winning coalitions).** For environment \( E \in \mathcal{E} \) and state \( s \in S \), the set of winning coalitions \( W_E, s \) satisfies the following properties:

1. monotonicity: if \( X \subset Y \subset N \) and \( X \in W_E, s \) then \( Y \in W_E, s \);
2. properness: if \( X \in W_E, s \) then \( N \setminus X \notin W_E, s \);
3. decisiveness: \( W_E, s \neq \emptyset \).

The first part of assumption 3 states that if some coalition has the capacity to implement change, then a larger coalition also does. The second part ensures that if some coalition has the capacity to implement change, then the coalition of the remaining players, its complement, does not (effectively ruling out “submajority rule”). Finally, the third part, in light of the monotonicity property, is equivalent to \( N \in W_E, s \), and thus states that if all players want to implement a change, they can do so. Several common models of political power are special cases. For example, if a player is a dictator in some state, then the winning coalitions in that state are all those that include him; if we need unanimity for transitions, then the only winning coalition is \( N \); if there is majoritarian voting in some state, then the set of winning coalitions consists of all coalitions with an absolute majority of the players.

Assumption 3 puts minimal and natural restrictions on the set of winning coalitions \( W_E, s \) in each given state \( s \in S \). Our main restriction on the distribution of political power will be, as discussed in the introduction, the requirement of some “monotonicity” of political power: that higher-indexed players have no less political power in higher-indexed
states. We first introduce the notion of a quasi-median voter (see Acemoglu et al. 2012).

Definition 2 (Quasi-median voter). A player ranked \( i \) is a quasi-median voter (QMV) in state \( s \) (in environment \( E \)) if for any winning coalition \( X \in W_E, \min X \leq i \leq \max X \).

Let \( M_E,s \) denote the set of QMVs in state \( s \) in environment \( E \). Then by assumption 3, \( M_E,s \neq \emptyset \) for any \( s \in S \) and \( E \in E \); moreover, the set \( M_E,s \) is connected: whenever \( i < j < k \) and \( i, k \in M_E,s \), \( j \in M_E,s \). In many cases, the set of QMVs is a singleton, \( |M_E,s| = 1 \). Examples include one player as a dictator, that is, \( X \in W_E \) if and only if \( i \in X \) (and then \( M_E,s = \{ i \} \)); and majoritarian voting among sets containing odd numbers of players, or a weighted majority in voting with “generic weights” (see the discussion below and also Sec. IV on the meaning of this term). An example in which \( M_E,s \) is not a singleton is the unanimity rule.

The following assumption ensures that the distribution of political power is “monotone” over states.

Assumption 4 (Monotone quasi-median voter property). In any environment \( E \in E \), the sequences \( \{ \min M_E,s \}_{s \in S} \) and \( \{ \max M_E,s \}_{s \in S} \) are non-decreasing in \( s \).

The essence of assumption 4 is that political power (weakly) shifts toward higher-indexed players in higher-indexed states. To see this, we can rewrite \( \min M_E,s = \max_{X \in W_E} \min_{i \in X} i \). Thus \( \min M_E,s \) corresponds to the minimal (“critical”) left-wing agent whose support is needed to get a winning coalition. Assumption 2 implies that if \( \min M_E,s \) supports a change from \( s \) to some \( s' > s \), then all agents in \( M_E,s \) will also do so. Similarly, \( \max M_E,s = \min_{X \in W_E} \max_{i \in X} i \) is the minimal right-wing agent needed for a winning coalition, and if \( \max M_E,s \) supports a change from \( s \) to some \( s' < s \), then all others in \( M_E,s \) will also do so.\footnote{We thank an anonymous referee for this helpful intuition.} Clearly, if \( M_E,s \) is a singleton in every state, this assumption is equivalent to \( M_E,s \) being nondecreasing (where \( M_E,s \) is treated as the single element). Therefore, in words, the monotone QMV property says that higher states are more likely to include right-wing players and less likely to include left-wing players in a winning coalition, thus shifting political power toward right-wing players in states that are further to the right.\footnote{This assumption holds in a variety of applications, including the ones we present in Sec. IV and Roberts’s (1999) model mentioned in the introduction.}

Assumption 4 is our second key assumption. To see its role, observe that assumption 2 alone is not sufficient to ensure that dynamic preferences satisfy single crossing (or increasing differences)—that an agent necessarily prefers states further to the right if a more left-wing agent does so. The reason is that even though her stage payoff is greater in this state,
her political power may be lower, leading to a significantly lower continuation utility. Assumption 4 rules this possibility out as it imposes that this right-wing agent may lose power only to agents further to the right, thus implying that agents further to the left will lose even more political power. Hence, assumptions 2 and 4 jointly ensure that if an agent prefers to move to a state to the right, then all agents to her right will also do so, thus implying that dynamic preferences satisfy increasing differences.

For some applications, one might want to restrict feasible transitions between states that the society may implement; for example, it might be realistic to assume that only transitions to adjacent states are possible. To incorporate these possibilities, we introduce the mapping \( F = F_E : S \rightarrow 2^S \), which maps every \( x \in S \) into the set of states to which society may transition. In other words, \( y \in F_E(x) \) means that the society may transition from \( x \) to \( y \) in environment \( E \). We do not assume that \( y \in F_E(x) \) implies \( x \in F_E(y) \), so certain transitions may be irreversible. We impose the following assumption.

Assumption 5 (Feasible transitions). For each environment \( E \in E \), \( F_E \) satisfies the following:

1. For any \( x \in S \), \( x \in F_E(x) \).
2. For any states \( x, y, z \in S \) such that \( x < y < z \) or \( x > y > z \), if \( z \in F_E(x) \), then \( y \in F_E(x) \) and \( z \in F_E(y) \).

The key requirement, encapsulated in the second part, is that if a transition between two states is feasible, then any transition (in the same direction) between intermediate states is also feasible. Special cases of this assumption include the following: (a) any transition is possible: \( F_E(x) = S \) for any \( x \) and \( E \); (b) one-step transitions: \( y \in F_E(x) \) if and only if \( |x - y| \leq 1 \); (c) one-directional transitions: \( y \in F_E(x) \) if and only if \( x \leq y \).

Finally, we assume that the discount factor, \( \beta \in [0, 1) \), is the same for all players and across all environments. To recap, the full description of each environment \( E \in E \) is given by a tuple \( (N, S, \beta, \{u_{E,i}(s)\}_{i \in N}, \{W_{E,i}\}_{i \in N}, \{F_E(s)\}_{s \in S}) \).

Each period \( t \) starts with environment \( E_{t-1} \in E \) and with state \( s_{t-1} \) inherited from the previous period; nature determines \( E_t \) with probability distribution \( \pi(E_{t-1}, \cdot) \), and then the players decide on the transition to any feasible \( s_t \) as we describe next. We take \( E_0 \in E \) and \( s_0 \in S \) as given. At the end of period \( t \), each player receives the stage payoff

\[
\nu^t_i = u_{E_t,i}(s_t).
\]

15 In an earlier version, we also allowed for costs of transitions between states, which we now omit to simplify the exposition.

16 Throughout the paper, we use lower indices, e.g., \( E_t \), to denote the period, and upper indices, e.g., \( E^t, \ldots, E \), to denote different environments.
Denoting the expectation at time $t$ by $E_t$, the expected discounted utility of player $i$ can be written as

$$V_t^i = u_{E_t}(s_t) + E_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta^k u_{E_{t+k}}(s_{t+k}).$$

The timing of events within each period is as follows:

1. The environment $E_{t-1}$ and state $s_{t-1}$ are inherited from period $t-1$.
2. There is a change in environment from $E_{t-1}$ to $E_t \in \mathcal{E}$ with probability $\pi(E_{t-1}, E_t)$.
3. Society (collectively) decides on state $s_t$ subject to $s_t \in F_{E_t}(s_{t-1})$.
4. Each player gets stage payoff $v_t^i$ given by (1).

We omit the exact sequence of moves determining transitions across states (in step 3) as this is not required for the MVE concept. The details of the game form will be introduced when we study the noncooperative foundations of MVE.

MVE will be characterized by a collection of transition mappings $\phi = \{\phi_e : S \rightarrow S\}_{e \in \mathcal{E}}$. With $\phi$, we associate continuation payoffs $V^\phi_{E_t}(s)$ for player $i$ in state $s$ and environment $E_t$, which are recursively given by

$$V^\phi_{E_t}(s) = u_{E_t}(s) + \beta \sum_{E' \in \mathcal{E}} \pi(E_t, E') V^\phi_{E'}(\phi_{E'}(s)).$$

As $0 \leq \beta < 1$, the values $V^\phi_{E_t}(s)$ are uniquely defined by (2).

**Definition 3 (Markov voting equilibrium).** A collection of transition mappings $\phi = \{\phi_e : S \rightarrow S\}_{e \in \mathcal{E}}$ is a Markov voting equilibrium if the following three properties hold:

1. feasibility: for any environment $E \in \mathcal{E}$ and for any state $x \in S$, $\phi(x) \in F_E(x)$;
2. core: for any environment $E \in \mathcal{E}$ and for any states $x, y \in S$ such that $y \in F_E(x)$,
   $$\{i \in N : V^\phi_{E_t}(y) > V^\phi_{E_t}(\phi_E(x))\} \notin W_{E_t};$$
3. status quo persistence: for any environment $E \in \mathcal{E}$ and for any state $x \in S$,
   $$\{i \in N : V^\phi_{E_t}(\phi_E(x)) \geq V^\phi_{E_t}(x)\} \notin W_{E_t}.$$
y ≠ φ_{b}(x) is supported by a winning coalition in x over φ_{b}(x) prescribed by the transition mapping φ_{e}. This is analogous to a “core” property: no alternative should be preferred to the proposed transition by some “sufficiently powerful” coalition of players; otherwise, the proposed transition would be blocked. Of course, in this comparison, players should focus on continuation utilities, which is what (3) imposes. Property 3 requires that it takes a winning coalition to move from any state to some alternative, that is, to move away from the status quo. This requirement singles out the status quo if there is no alternative strictly preferred by some winning coalition.

Definition 4 (Monotone transition mappings). A transition mapping φ : S → S is called monotone if for all x, y ∈ S such that x ≥ y, we have φ(x) ≥ φ(y). A set of transition mappings \{φ_{e} : S → S\}_{E∈E} is monotone if each mapping φ_{e} is monotone.

We prove that there always exists a monotone MVE (an MVE with a monotone transition mapping), and we can provide sufficient conditions under which all MVE are monotone. In particular, whenever the MVE is unique (Theorem 2), it is monotone.

In what follows, we refer to any state x such that φ_{a}(x) = x as a steady state or stable in E. With some abuse of notation, we will often suppress the reference to the environment and use, for example, u_{i}(s) instead of u_{E_{i}}(s) or φ instead of φ_{E}. This causes no confusion. Throughout the paper, we say that a property holds generically if it holds for all parameter values, except possibly for a subset of Lebesgue measure zero (see Halmos [1974] and example 3).17 Loosely speaking, a property holds generically if, whenever it does not hold, “almost all” perturbations of the relevant parameters restore it.

III. Analysis

In this section, we analyze the structure of MVE. We first prove existence of monotone MVE in a stationary (deterministic) environment. We then extend these results to situations in which there are stochastic shocks. After establishing the relationship between MVE and MPE of a dynamic

17 The key feature that genericity ensures for us is the following: For any agent i and any set of mappings \{φ_{E_{i}} : S → S\}_{E∈E}, we have that generically the continuation values that solve (2) satisfy V_{E_{i}}^{s}(x) ≠ V_{E_{j}}^{s}(y) for any E ∈ E and any x, y ∈ S with x ≠ y. In other words, V_{E_{i}}^{s}(x) = V_{E_{j}}^{s}(y) can be true only for a nongeneric set of parameter values. That this property holds generically is established in the proof of Theorem 2. Here it suffices to note that for any discount factor β > 0 and any transition probabilities \{π(E, E')\}_{E∈E}, V_{E_{i}}^{s}(x) and V_{E_{j}}^{s}(y) are given by different linear combinations of the payoffs \{u_{E_{i}}(s)\}_{s∈S}. Thus V_{E_{i}}^{s}(x) = V_{E_{j}}^{s}(y) can hold only for a set of parameters given by the union of a finite number of hyperplanes, which has Lebesgue measure zero in the set of feasible payoffs \{u_{E_{i}}(s)\}_{s∈S}. This then immediately implies that the set of all parameters, (β, \{π(E, E')\}_{E∈E}, \{u_{E_{i}}(s)\}_{s∈S}) for which V_{E_{i}}^{s}(x) = V_{E_{j}}^{s}(y) is also of Lebesgue measure zero.
game representing the framework of Section II, we present comparative static results for our general model.

A. Nonstochastic Environment

We first study the case without any stochastic shocks or, equivalently, the case of only one environment \([|\mathcal{E}| = 1]\) and thus suppress the subscript \(E\).

For any mapping \(\phi : S \to S\), the continuation utility of player \(i\) after a transition to \(s\) has taken place is given by

\[
V^i_s(s) = u_i(s) + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta^k u_i(\phi^k(s)),
\]

where \(\phi^k\) is the \(k\)th iteration of \(\phi\) (with \(\phi^0(s) = s\)).

The critical role of assumption 2 in our analysis can be seen from a simple but important observation (see lemma 2 in App. A): when assumption 2 holds and \(\phi\) is monotone, continuation utilities \(\{V^i_s(s)\}_{i \in N}^{s \in S}\) satisfy increasing differences. This result is at the root of the central role of QMVs in our model. As is well known, median voter type results do not generally apply with multidimensional policy choices. Since our players are effectively voting over infinite-dimensional choices, that is, a sequence of policies, a natural conjecture would have been that such results would not apply in our setting either. The reason they do has an intuition similar to why voting sequentially over two dimensions of policy, over each of which preferences satisfy single-crossing or increasing differences, does lead to the median voter type outcomes. By backward induction, the second vote has a well-defined median voter, and then given this choice, the median voter over the first one can be determined. Loosely speaking, our recursive formulation of today’s value enables us to apply this reasoning between the vote today and the vote tomorrow, and the fact that continuation utilities satisfy increasing differences is the critical step in this argument.

The role of assumption 4, in turn, is related to the monotonicity of \(\phi\). That political power shifts to the right in states that are further to the right ensures that \(\phi\) is monotone. This together with the observation on continuation utility satisfying increasing differences under the monotonicity of \(\phi\) enables us to establish the following theorem.18

**Theorem 1 (Existence).** There exists a monotone MVE. Moreover, in any MVE \(\phi\) the equilibrium path \(s_0, s_1 = \phi(s_0), s_2 = \phi(s_1), \ldots\) is monotone, and there exists a limit state \(s_\infty = s_{n+1} = \cdots = s_{n}\).

18 The actual technical argument is more involved and makes use of several key lemmas, stated and proved in App. A, where the proofs of all our main theorems are presented.
The next theorem provides sufficient conditions for generic uniqueness of monotone MVE. We say that preferences are simple-peaked if for every $i \in N$ there exists $x \in S$ such that whenever for states $y, z \in S$, $z < y \leq x$ or $z > y \geq x$, $u_i(z) < u_i(y)$.

**Theorem 2 (Uniqueness).** The MVE is (generically) unique if
1. for every $s \in S$, $M_s$ is a singleton or
2. only one-step transitions are possible and preferences are single-peaked.

Though somewhat restrictive, several interesting applied problems satisfy one or the other parts of the conditions of this theorem. Since theorem 1 established existence of a monotone MVE, under the conditions of theorem 2, the unique MVE is monotone.

Neither the conditions nor the genericity provision in theorem 2 can be dispensed with as shown by the next two examples.

**Example 2 (Example with two MVE).** Suppose that there are three states $A$, $B$, and $C$ and two players 1 and 2. The decision-making rule is unanimity in all states. Payoffs are given by

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{id} & A & B & C \\
1 & 20 & 5 & 10 \\
2 & 10 & 5 & 20.
\end{array}
\]

Then, with $\beta$ sufficiently close to one (e.g., $\beta = 0.9$), there are two MVE, both of which are monotone. In one, $\phi_1(A) = \phi_1(B) = A$ and $\phi_1(C) = C$. In another, $\phi_2(A) = A$ and $\phi_2(B) = \phi_2(C) = C$.

In view of theorem 2, multiple equilibria arise here because preferences are not single-peaked, and there is more than one QMV in all states. Example B1 in online Appendix B shows that making preferences single-peaked is by itself insufficient to restore uniqueness.

**Example 3 (Multiple MVE for nongeneric utilities).** There are two states $A$ and $B$ and two players 1 and 2. Player 1 is the dictator in both states. Payoffs are given by

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text{id} & A & B \\
1 & 20 & 20 \\
2 & 15 & 25.
\end{array}
\]

For any discount factor $\beta$, there exist three equilibria: two monotone MVE (given by $\phi_1(A) = \phi_2(B) = A$ and $\phi_1(A) = \phi_2(B) = B$) and a non-monotone (in fact, cyclic) MVE $\phi_3$ given by $\phi_3(A) = B$ and $\phi_3(B) = A$. However, any perturbation of the payoffs of player 1 removes the non-monotone equilibrium and one of the monotone ones, restoring uniqueness.
B. Stochastic Environments

We now extend our analysis to stochastic environments, that is, to the case in which there are stochastic shocks closing changes in environments.\textsuperscript{19} This will enable us to deal with “nonstationarities” in the economic environment, for example, because the distribution of political power or economic preferences will change in a specific direction in the future. By assumption 1, environments are ordered as $E^1, E^2, \ldots, E^h$ so that $\pi(E^i, E^j) = 0$ if $i > j$. This means that when (and if) we reach environment $E^h$, there will be no further shocks, and the analysis from Section III.A will apply thereafter.

Our approach uses backward induction from environment $E^h$ to characterize equilibrium transition mappings in lower-indexed environments. Here we outline this argument heuristically. Take an MVE $\phi_{E^h}$ in environment $E^h$ (its existence is guaranteed by theorem 1). Suppose that we have characterized an MVE $\{\phi_{E^k}\}_{E^k \in \{E^{k+1}, \ldots, E^h\}}$ for some $k = 1, \ldots, h - 1$; let us construct $\phi_{E^k}$ that would make $\{\phi_{E^k}\}_{E^k \in \{E^{k+1}, \ldots, E^h\}}$ an MVE in $\{E^k, \ldots, E^h\}$. Continuation utilities in environment $E^k$ are

$$V_{E^k, s}^o(s) = u_{E^k, s}(s) + \beta \sum_{E' \in \{E^{k+1}, \ldots, E^h\}} \pi(E^k, E') V_{E'^i, s}^o(\phi_{E'}(s))$$

$$= u_{E^k, s}(s) + \beta \sum_{E' \in \{E^{k+1}, \ldots, E^h\}} \pi(E^k, E') V_{E'^i, s}^o(\phi_{E'}(s))$$

$$+ \beta \pi(E^k, E^i) V_{E^i, s}^o(\phi_{E^i}(s)).$$

By induction, we know $\phi_{E^i}$ and $V_{E^i, s}^o(\phi_{E^i}(s))$ for $E^i \in \{E^{i+1}, \ldots, E^h\}$. We next show that there exists $\phi_{E^k}$ that is an MVE given continuation values $\{V_{E^i, s}^o(\phi_{E^i}(s))\}_{E^i \in \{E^{k+1}, \ldots, E^h\}}$ from (5). Denote

$$\tilde{U}_{E^k, s}(s) = u_{E^k, s}(s) + \beta \sum_{E' \in \{E^{k+1}, \ldots, E^h\}} \pi(E^k, E') V_{E'^i, s}^o(\phi_{E'}(s)), \quad (6)$$

and let $\tilde{\beta} = \beta \pi(E^k, E^k)$.\textsuperscript{20} Then rearrange equation (5), where

$$V_{E^k, s}^o(s) = \tilde{U}_{E^k, s}(s) + \tilde{\beta} V_{E^k, s}^o(\phi_{E^k}(s)).$$

\textsuperscript{19} Formally, a stochastic environment is a collection of environments and transition probabilities, $\mathcal{E} = (\{E^1, \ldots, E^h\}, \{\pi_{E^k}\}_{E^k \in \mathcal{E}})$ such that assumption 1 is satisfied for each environment $E^k$, $k = 1, \ldots, h$. We use the term stationary environment when we wish to stress the distinction from a stochastic environment.

\textsuperscript{20} Intuitively, $\tilde{U}_{E^k, s}(s)$ is the expected utility of agent $i$ from staying in state $s$ as long as the environment remains the same, and following the MVE play thereafter (i.e., after a change in environment). The continuation utility from such a path is therefore

$$\tilde{V}(s) = u_{E^k, s}(s) + \beta \sum_{E' \in \{E^1, \ldots, E^h\}} \pi(E^k, E') V_{E'^i, s}^o(\phi_{E'}(s)) + \beta \pi(E^k, E^k) \tilde{V}(s),$$

and thus $\tilde{U}_{E^k, s}(s) = (1 - \tilde{\beta}) \tilde{V}(s)$. 

Since \( \{\tilde{U}_{s_{i}(s)}\}_{i \in N} \) satisfy increasing differences, we can simply apply theorem 1 to the modified environment

\[
\tilde{E} = (N, S, \tilde{\beta}, \{\tilde{U}_{s_{i}(s)}\}_{i \in N}, \{W_{s_{i}}\}_{s \in S}, \{F_{s}(s)\}_{s \in S})
\]

to characterize \( \phi_{\tilde{E}} \). Then by definition of MVE, since \( \{\phi_{E}\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}(E^{1}, \ldots, E^{3})} \) was an MVE, we have that \( \{\phi_{E}\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}(E^{1}, \ldots, E^{3})} \) is an MVE in \( \mathcal{E}^{k} \), proving the desired result. Proceeding inductively, we characterize an entire MVE \( \phi = \{\phi_{E}\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}(E^{1}, \ldots, E^{3})} \) in \( \mathcal{E}^{1} = \mathcal{E} \). This argument establishes the following theorem.²¹

**Theorem 3 (Existence).** There exists an MVE \( \phi = \{\phi_{E}\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}} \). Furthermore, there exists a limit state \( s_{1} = s_{k+1} = \cdots = s_{n} \) (with probability one), but this limit state depends on the timing and realization of stochastic shocks and the path to a limit state need not be monotone everywhere.

This theorem establishes that a limit state exists, and more importantly, this limit state (and the resulting equilibrium path) generally depends on the exact timing and sequence of shocks. The path to the limit state need not be monotone everywhere, but we show below (theorem 8) that it is monotone between shocks; that is, it is monotone in any time interval in which there are no shocks. The following theorem provides sufficient conditions for uniqueness in the stochastic case.²²

**Theorem 4 (Uniqueness).** The MVE is (generically) unique if at least one of the following conditions holds:

1. For every environment \( E \in \mathcal{E} \) and any state \( s \in S \), \( M_{E} \) is a singleton.
2. In each environment, only one-step transitions are possible; each player’s preferences are single-peaked; and moreover, for each state \( s \) there is a player \( i \) such that \( i \in M_{E} \) for all \( E \in \mathcal{E} \) and the peaks (for all \( E \in \mathcal{E} \) of \( i \)'s preferences do not lie on different sides of \( s \).

The first sufficient condition is the same as in theorem 2, while the second strengthens the one in theorem 2: it would be satisfied, for example, if players’ bliss points (most preferred state) and the distribution of political power do not change “much” as a result of shocks. Uniqueness of MVE again implies that this MVE is monotone.

**C. Noncooperative Game**

We have so far presented the concept of MVE without introducing an explicit noncooperative game. This is partly motivated by the fact that several plausible noncooperative games would underpin the notional

²¹ The proof is again in App. A. In addition, example B2 in online App. B shows that the limits state does depend on the realization of shocks.

²² The difficulty here is that as shown, e.g., by example B3 in online App. B, single-peakedness is not necessarily inherited by continuation utilities.
MVE. We now provide one plausible and transparent noncooperative game and formally establish the relationship between the MPE of this game and the set of MVE.

For each environment $E \in \mathcal{E}$ and state $s \in S$, let us introduce a protocol $\theta_{E,s}$, which is a finite sequence of all states in $F \setminus \{s\}$ capturing the order in which different transitions are considered within the period. Then the exact sequence of events in this noncooperative game is as follows:

1. The environment $E_{t-1}$ and state $s_{t-1}$ are inherited from period $t-1$.
2. Environment transitions are realized: $E_t = E \in \mathcal{E}$ with probability $\pi(E_{t-1}, E)$.
3. The first alternative, $\theta_{E_{t-1}, (j)}$ for $j = 1$, is voted against the status quo $s$. That is, all players are ordered in a sequence and must support either the “current proposal” $\theta_{E_{t-1}, (j)}$ or the status quo $s$.
   
   If the set of those who supported $\theta_{E_{t-1}, (j)}$ is a winning coalition—that is, it is in $W_{E_{t-1}, 1}$—then $s_t = \theta_{E_{t-1}, (j)}$; otherwise, this step repeats for the next $j$. If all alternatives have been voted and rejected for $j = 1, \ldots, |F| - 1$, then the new state is $s_t = s_{t-1}$.
4. Each player gets a stage payoff given by (1).

We study (pure-strategy) MPE of this game. Each MPE induces (an equilibrium behavior that can be represented by) a set of transition mappings $\phi = \{\phi_E\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}}$. Here $\phi_E(s)$ is the state to which the equilibrium play transitions starting with state $s$ in environment $E$.

**Theorem 5 (MVE vs. MPE).**

1. For any MVE $\phi$, there exists a set of protocols $\{\theta_{E,s}\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}}$ such that there exists an MPE that induces $\phi$.
2. Conversely, if for some set of protocols $\{\theta_{E,s}\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}}$ and some MPE $\sigma$ the corresponding transition mapping $\phi = \{\phi_E\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}}$ is monotone, then it is an MVE.

This theorem thus establishes the close connection between MVE and MPE. Essentially, any MVE corresponds to an MPE (for some protocol), and conversely, any MPE corresponds to an MVE, provided that this MPE induces monotone transitions.

**D. Comparative Statics**

In this subsection, we present a general comparative static result. Throughout, we assume that parameter values are generic and all MVE are unique (e.g., the sufficient conditions for uniqueness in theorem 4 are satisfied).

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23 To avoid the usual multiplicity problems with equilibria in voting games, we assume sequential voting for some fixed sequence of players. See Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2009) for a solution concept that would refine out unnatural equilibria in voting games with simultaneous voting.
We say that environments \( \tilde{E}^i \) and \( \tilde{E}^3 \) coincide on \( S' \subset S \) if, for each \( i \in N \) and for any state \( x \in S' \), we have \( u_{\tilde{E}^i}(x) = u_{\tilde{E}^3}(x) \), \( W_{\tilde{E}^i,x} = W_{\tilde{E}^3,x} \), \( F_{\tilde{E}^i} = F_{\tilde{E}^3} \) (in the sense that for \( x, y \in S' \), \( y \in F_{\tilde{E}^i}(x) \Leftrightarrow y \in F_{\tilde{E}^3}(x) \)). The next result shows that there is a simple way of characterizing the equilibrium transition mapping of one environment at the steady state of the other. For this result, we will assume that MVE is unique (e.g., the assumptions of theorem 4 are satisfied for all subsets \( S' \subset S \)).

**Theorem 6** (General comparative statics). Suppose that environments \( E^4 \) and \( \tilde{E}^3 \) coincide on \( S' = [1, s] \subset S \) and that there is a unique MVE in both environments. For MVE \( \phi_{E^4} \) in \( E^4 \), suppose that \( \phi_{E^4}(x) = x \) for some \( x \in S' \). Then for MVE \( \phi_{\tilde{E}^3} \) in \( \tilde{E}^3 \) we have \( \phi_{\tilde{E}^3}(x) \geq x \).

The theorem says that if \( x \) is a steady state in environment \( E^1 \) and environments \( E^4 \) and \( \tilde{E}^3 \) coincide on a subset of states \( [1, s] \) that includes \( x \), then the MVE in \( E^4 \) will either stay at \( x \) or induce a transition to a greater state than \( x \). Of course, the two environments can be swapped: if \( y \in S' \) is such that \( \phi_{E^4}(y) = y \), then \( \phi_{\tilde{E}^3}(y) \geq y \). Moreover, since the ordering of states can be reversed, a similar result applies when \( S' = [s, m] \) rather than \([1, s]\).

The intuition for theorem 6 is instructive. The fact that \( \phi_{E^4}(x) = x \) implies that in environment \( E^4 \), there is no winning coalition wishing to move from \( x \) to \( y < x \). But when restricted to \( S' \), economic payoffs and the distribution of political power are the same in environment \( E^3 \) as in \( E^1 \), so in environment \( \tilde{E}^3 \) there will also be no winning coalition supporting the move to \( y < x \). This implies \( \phi_{\tilde{E}^3}(x) \geq x \). Note, however, that \( \phi_{\tilde{E}^3}(x) > x \) is possible even though \( \phi_{E^4}(x) = x \), since the differences in economic payoffs or distribution of political power in states outside \( S' \) may make a move to higher states more attractive for some winning coalition in \( \tilde{E}^3 \). Interestingly, since the difference between two environments outside \( S' \) is left totally unrestricted, this last possibility can happen even if in environment \( E^4 \) payoffs outside \( S' \) are lower for all players (this could occur, e.g., because even though all players’ payoffs decline outside \( S' \), this change also removes some slippery slope previously discouraging a winning coalition from moving to some state \( z > x \)).

Theorem 6 compares MVE in two distinct environments \( E^4 \) and \( \tilde{E}^3 \) (or two distinct stochastic environments, \( E \) and \( \tilde{E} \), as noted in fn. 24). In this

\(^{24}\) The theorem immediately extends to the case in which we consider two stochastic environments \( E = \{E^1, \ldots, E^n\} \) and \( \tilde{E} = \{\tilde{E}^1, \tilde{E}^3, \ldots, \tilde{E}^n\} \) (i.e., with only the initial environments being different), and assume that \( \pi((E', E^i) = \pi((E^k, E') \) for any \( k > 1 \); and \( \pi((E, E') = \pi((E', E) \) for any \( E, E' \in \{E^1, \ldots, E^n\} \). A similar result can also be established without uniqueness. For example, one can show that if for some \( x \in S' \), for each MVE \( \phi_{E^i} \) in \( E^i \), \( \phi_{E^i}(x) \geq x \), with at least one MVE \( \phi \) such that \( \phi_{E^i}(x) = x \), then all MVE \( \phi_{\tilde{E}^i} \) in \( \tilde{E}^i \) satisfy \( \phi_{\tilde{E}^i}(x) \geq x \). Because both the statements of these results and the proofs are more involved, we focus here on situations in which MVE are unique.
sense, we can think of it as a comparative static with respect to an
unanticipated shock (taking us from one environment to the other). The
next corollary states a similar result when there is a stochastic transition
from one environment to another.

**Corollary 1.** Suppose that \( \mathcal{E} = \{E^1, E^2\} \), \( E^1 \) and \( E^2 \) coincide on \( S' = [1, s] \subset S \), and the MVE is unique in both environments. Suppose also that
for MVE \( \phi = (\phi_{E^1}, \phi_{E^2}) \) in \( \mathcal{E} \) and some \( x \in S' \), \( \phi_{E^1}(x) = x \), and this state \( x \)
is reached before a switch from environment \( E^1 \) to \( E^2 \) occurs at time \( t \).
Then \( \phi_{E^2} \) is such that along the equilibrium path in environment \( E^2 \),
we have \( s \geq x \) for all \( t \geq t \).

This corollary states that if steady state \( x \) is reached before a shock
changes the environment—in a way that only higher states are affected
as a result of this change in environment—then following the shock,
society can only move further in the direction of the shock (or stay where
it was); in particular, the equilibrium will never involve moving back to a
lower state than \( x \). A straightforward implication is that the only way
society can stay in the set of states \( [1, x - 1] \) is not to leave the set before
the shock arrives.

An interesting application of this corollary is when we consider \( x \) as a “minimal sufficiently democratic state,” states to the right of \( x \) as fur-
ther refinements of democracy, and environment \( E^2 \) as representing (the
strengthening of) a threat to democracy. Then the corollary implies that
this threat to democracy may disrupt the emergence of this minimal
democracy if it arrives early. But if it arrives late, after this minimal dem-
ocratic state—which thus can be considered as a “democratic thresh-
hold”—has already been reached, it would not create a reversal. Interest-
ingly, and perhaps paradoxically, corollary 1 implies that such a threat,
if it arrives late, may act as an impetus for additional transitions in a
further democratic direction, even though it would have prevented the
emergence of this minimum democratic state had it arrived early.

Example B4 in online Appendix B demonstrates that the requirement
that \( E^1 \) and \( E^2 \) coincide for some states cannot be dispensed with, in part
because when this assumption is relaxed, slippery slope considerations
can lead to counterintuitive dynamics.

Further comparative statics results are also provided in Appendix B.
First, we show in theorem B1 that when the discount factor is sufficiently
low and two environments coincide on a subset of states, the equilibrium
path is monotone everywhere (i.e., it does not change direction even as
shocks arrive), and as a result, equilibrium paths with and without shocks
can be ranked.

In theorem B2, we show that if the sets of winning coalitions in some
states to the right \( (x > s) \) change such that the sets of QMVs expand
further toward the right (e.g., because some players on the right become
additional veto players), then the transition mapping is unaffected for states on the left that are not directly affected by the change (i.e., $x < s$).

Applied to the dynamics of democratization, this theorem implies that an absolute monarch’s decision of whether to move to a constitutional monarchy is not affected by the power that the poor will be able to secure in this new regime provided that the monarch himself still remains a veto player.

E. Monotone versus Nonmonotone MVE

We have so far focused on monotone MVE. In many interesting cases this is without loss of generality, as the following theorem establishes.

**Theorem 7 (Monotonicity of MVE).** All MVE are generically monotone if

1. in all environments, the sets of QMVs in two different states have either zero or exactly one player in common: for all $E \in E$, $x, y \in S$: $x \neq y \Rightarrow |M_{E, x} \cap M_{E, y}| \leq 1$, or

2. in all environments, only one-step transitions are possible.

The first part of the theorem weakens the first condition in theorems 2 and 4 that the set of QMVs in each state is a singleton, while the second part requires only that there are one-step transitions (relative to the stronger conditions in these previous theorems). As a result, the conditions in theorem 7 are strictly weaker than those in theorems 2 and 4.

Example B5 in Appendix B shows that we cannot simultaneously dispense with both conditions in theorem 7.

Our last result in this section shows that even if nonmonotone MVE exist, they will still induce paths that are monotone except for possible changes in direction due to shocks. In particular, we say that mapping $\phi = \{\phi_E\}_{E \in E}$ induces paths that are **monotone between shocks** if, for any $E \in E$ and $x \in S$, $\phi_E(x) \geq x$ implies $\phi_{E'}(x) \geq \phi_{E'}(x)$; in other words, the MVE generates paths that are monotone as long as the environment does not change because of an exogenous shock. The next theorem shows that all equilibrium paths are monotone between shocks.

**Theorem 8 (Monotone paths).** Any MVE $\phi$ (not necessarily monotone) generically induces paths that are monotone between shocks.

F. Infinitely Many Environments

Our analysis so far has been conducted under the assumption of a finite number of environments, which greatly simplified the analysis and enabled sharp results. Here, we show that a monotone MVE exists even with infinitely many environments (shocks). In particular, we assume that we have countably many environments $E = \{E^1, E^2, \ldots\}$ with tran-
position probabilities $\pi(E, E')$ and such that assumption 1 holds (and assumptions 2–5 for each $E'$). The proof of this theorem, like those of all remaining results in the paper, is provided in online Appendix B.

**Theorem 9** (Existence with infinitely many environments). Suppose that utilities are bounded in all environments (i.e., there exists $M > 0$ such that, for every $E \in \mathcal{E}$, $s \in S$, and $i \in N$, $|u_{E_i}(s)| < M$). Then there exists a monotone MVE.

### IV. Applications

In this section, we discuss two applications of our general framework. The first one, on radical politics, is the most detailed. We then discuss a model of experimentation over institutions.

#### A. Radical Politics

In this subsection, we apply our general framework to the study of radical politics, already briefly introduced in example 1 in the introduction. We first describe the initial environment, $E^1$. There is a fixed set of $n$ players $N = \{-l, \ldots, r\}$ (so $n = l + r + 1$), which we interpret as groups of individuals with the same preferences (e.g., ethnicities, economic interests, or ideological groupings) that have already solved their within-group collective action problem.

The weight of each group $i \in N$ is denoted by $g_i$ and represents, for example, the number of individuals within the group and thus the group’s political power. Throughout this subsection, we assume “genericity” of $\{g_i\}$, in the sense that there are no two disjoint combinations of groups with exactly the same weight.$^{25}$ Group 0 is chosen such that it contains the median voter. Individuals in group $i$ have preferences (net of repression costs) given by

$$w_i(p) = -(p - b_i)^2,$$

where $p$ is the policy choice of society and $b_i$ is the political bliss point of group $i$. We assume that $\{b_i\}$ is increasing in $i$, which ensures that preferences satisfy increasing differences (assumption 2). For example, those with a high index can be interpreted as the “rich” or “right-wing” groups that prefer the pro-rich (pro-right-wing) policy.

As in example 1, the set of states is $S = \{-l - r, \ldots, l + r\}$, and so the total number of states is $m = 2l + 2r + 1 = 2n - 1$. States correspond

$^{25}$ See Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) for an extended discussion of this assumption.
to different combinations of political rights. Political rights of certain
groups can be reduced by repression (which is potentially costly as de-
scribed below). The set of groups that are not repressed in state $s$ is
denoted by $H_s$, where $H_s = \{-l, \ldots, r+s\}$ for $s \leq 0$ and $H_s = \{-l+s, \ldots, r\}$
for $s > 0$. Only the groups that are not repressed participate in politics.
This implies that in state 0, which corresponds to “democracy” (with no
repression of any group), group 0 contains the median voter. In states
below 0, some groups with right-wing preferences are repressed, and in
the leftmost state $s = -l - r$, only the group $-l$ participates in decision
making (hence, all other groups are repressed). Similarly, in states above
0, some of the left-wing groups are repressed (in rightmost state $s = l + r$,
only group $r$ has power). This structure ensures that assumption 4 is
satisfied, and we also assume that all transitions across states are feasible,
so that assumption 5 also holds.

Policy $p$ and transitions across states are decided by a simple majority
of those individuals who have political rights (i.e., belong to groups that
are not repressed). This implies that policy will always be chosen as the
political bliss point of the QMV (given political rights), $b_{Ms}$. Our assump-
tions so far (in particular, the genericity of $\gamma_s$) ensure that $M_s$ contains
a single group. The cost of repressing agents in group $j$ is denoted by $C_j$ and
is assumed to be incurred by all players. So, stage payoffs are given by

$$u_i(s) = w_i(p) - \sum_{j \in H_s} \gamma_j C_j$$

$$= -(b_{Ms} - b_i)^2 - \sum_{j \in H_s} \gamma_j C_j.$$  

In what follows, we refer to the leftmost group $-l$ as radicals. We
assume that the radical group $-l$ is smaller than the next group, $\gamma_{-l} < \gamma_{-l+1}$, which implies that radicals can implement their preferred policy
only if they repress all the groups in society.\footnote{We could allow for the repression of any combination of groups, thus having to consider $2^n - 1$ rather than $2^n - 1$ states but choose not to do so to save on notation. Partial repression of some groups could also be allowed, with similar results.}

We model power shifts by introducing $h$ “radical” environments,
$R^{l-r}, \ldots, R^{l-r+h-1}$, each with probability $\lambda_j$ for $j = 1, \ldots, m$ at each
date starting from $E_1$. Environment $R^j$ is the same as $E_1$, except that in
environment $R^j$, if the current state is one of $-l-r, \ldots, j$, the radical
group, $-l$, acquires the ability to force a transition to any other state (in
the process incurring the costs of repression). In particular, the radicals
can choose to “grab power” by repressing all other groups and transi-
tioning to state \( s = -l - \kappa \). Therefore, in state \( s \), the probability of the radicals having an opportunity to grab power is \( \mu_s = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \lambda_j \), which is naturally (weakly) decreasing in \( s \).

We also assume that in each period in any of the environments \( R_j \), there is a probability \( \nu \) of returning to the initial environment, \( E \). This is equivalent to a transition to the “final” environment \( E^f \) identical to \( E \) in terms of payoffs and winning coalitions (but there will be no further possibility of radicals coming to power after that). Clearly, \( \nu = 0 \) corresponds to a permanent shock, and as \( \nu \) increases, the expected length of the period during which radicals can dictate transitions declines. Note, however, that if radicals grab power permanently the first time they get the opportunity and impose a transition to state \( s = -l - r \) (in which they are the dictator), then they will remain in power even after there is a transition to environment \( E^f \).

The next proposition uses theorems 1 and 2 to establish the existence of a unique MVE and then characterizes it in a baseline environment in which there is no possibility of a radical takeover of power. The environment without radicals can be represented by \( E^f \) (since from \( E^f \) there is no further transition and thus no possibility of a radical takeover of power), and we use this convention to avoid introducing further notation.

**Proposition 1** (Equilibria without radicals). Without the possibility of radicals grabbing power (i.e., in environment \( E^f \)), there exists a unique MVE represented by \( \phi_{E^f} : S \rightarrow S \). In this equilibrium:

1. Democracy is stable: \( \phi_{E^f}(0) = 0 \).
2. For any costs of repression \( \{C_j\}_{j \in N} \), there is never more repression than in the initial state; that is, if \( s < 0 \), then \( \phi_{E^f}(s) \in [s, 0] \); and if \( s > 0 \), then \( \phi_{E^f}(s) \in [0, s] \).
3. Consider repression costs parameterized by \( k \): \( C_j = k C_j^* \), where \( \{C_j^*\} \) are positive constants. There exists \( k^* > 0 \) such that if \( k > k^* \), then \( \phi_{E^f}(s) = 0 \) for all \( s \); and if \( k < k^* \), then \( \phi_{E^f}(s) \neq 0 \) for some \( s \).

Without radicals, democracy is stable because the median voter knows that she will be the one setting policy in the future (and can do so without incurring any cost of repression). This does not mean, however, that there is no repression starting in any state. Rather, other states may also be stable, meaning that agents can pay the cost of repression and stay away from \( s = 0 \). For instance, starting from a situation in which there is repression of the left, the QMV in that state may not find it beneficial to reduce repression because this will typically lead to policies further...

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28 In the context of the Bolshevik Revolution, this corresponds to assuming that in some possible environments (i.e., with some probability), Bolsheviks would be able to grab control with Kerensky in power but not necessarily with some government further to the right.
to the left (relative to the political bliss point of the QMV). But this type of repression is also limited by the cost of repression. If these costs are sufficiently high, then repression becomes unattractive starting from any state, and democracy becomes the only stable state.

The next proposition shows how political dynamics change when there is a risk of a radical takeover of power. This and the following proposition both utilize theorems 3 and 4 to establish the existence of a unique MVE in the presence of shocks (which potentially shift power to radicals) and then use the same backward induction approach outlined in Section III.B (for establishing theorem 3) to characterize behavior before the arrival of shocks as a function of the continuation play after the arrival of shocks.

**Proposition 2 (Radicals).** There exists a unique MVE. Suppose that when the society is at state $s$, there is a transition to environment $R^z$ (where $z \geq s$) so that radicals can grab power. Then, when they have the opportunity, the radicals move to state $s = -l - r$ (repressing all other groups) under a wider set of parameters when (a) they are more radical (meaning their ideal point $b_-$ is lower, i.e., further away from 0) and (b) they are “weaker” (i.e., $z$ is smaller) in the sense that there is a smaller set of states in which they are able to control power.

This proposition is intuitive. When they have more radical preferences, radicals value more the prospect of imposing their political bliss point and are thus willing to incur the costs of repressing all other groups to do so. Radicals are also “more likely” to repress all other groups when they are “weaker” because when $z$ is lower, there is a greater range of states in which they cannot control future transitions, encouraging an immediate transition to $s = -l - r$.

To state our next proposition, we return to the (counterfactual) expected continuation utility of a group from permanently staying in a state $s \in S$ until a shock changes the environment and following the MVE play thereafter. This continuation utility was defined in Section III.B (in particular, fn. 20), and it is given (up to a scalar factor $1 - \beta(1 - \mu_s)$) by

$$\tilde{U}_i(s) = u_i(s) + \beta \sum_{s = -l - r}^{l_0 + l - 1} \lambda_i V_{R^z}(s).$$

**Proposition 3 (Repression by moderates anticipating radicals).** The transition mapping before radicals come to power, $\phi^{E^1}_{E^1}$, satisfies the following properties.

1. If $s \leq 0$, then $\phi^{E^1}_{E^1}(s) \geq s$.

29 Observe also that $\{\tilde{U}_i(s)\}$ are defined only in terms of strategies played in environments $R^z$ and $E^1$ and do not depend on strategies played in $E^1$. Hence, they can be computed directly as functions of the underlying parameters.
2. If \( \tilde{U}_0(0) < \tilde{U}_0(s) \) for some \( s > 0 \), then there is a state \( x \geq 0 \) such that \( \phi_{x'}(x) \geq x \). In other words, there exists some state in which there is an increase in the repression of the left in order to decrease the probability of a radical takeover of power.

3. If for all states \( y > x \geq 0 \), \( \tilde{U}_M(y) < \tilde{U}_M(x) \), then for all \( s \geq 0 \), \( \phi_{x'}(s) \leq s \).

In other words, repression of the left never increases when the cost of repression increases (e.g., letting \( C_j = kC^*_j \), repression weakly declines when \( k \) increases).

The first part of the proposition indicates that there is no reason for repression of the right to increase starting from states below \( s = 0 \); rather, in these states the tendency is to reduce repression. However, the second part shows that if the median voter (in democracy) prefers a more repressive state when she could counterfactually ensure no further repression unless radicals come to power (which she cannot do because she is not in control in that state), then there is at least one state \( x \) from which there will be an increase in repression against the left (which does not necessarily have to be \( s = 0 \)).

An implication of this result is that, once the threat of radical disappears, there will be a decline in repression starting in state \( x > 0 \). The third part of the proposition provides a sufficient condition for the opposite result.

The next proposition is a direct consequence of our general comparative statics results given in theorem 6 and shows how these results can be applied to reach substantive conclusions in specific settings.

**Proposition 4 (Comparative statics of repression).** Suppose that there is a state \( s \geq 0 \) (i.e., democracy or some state favoring the right), which is stable in \( \tilde{E} \) for some set of probabilities \( \{ \mu_j \} \). Consider a change from \( \{ \mu_j \} \) to \( \{ \mu'_j \} \) such that \( \mu'_j = \mu_j \) for \( j \geq s \). Then there will be (weakly) less repression of the left after the change, that is, \( \phi_{x'}(s) \leq \phi_{x'}(s) = s \).

The intuition is the same as theorem 6: if the probabilities of a radical takeover of power change, but only in states that already had repression against the left, and we are in a stable state without repression against the right, then this can only reduce repression. If there is now a lower likelihood of a radical grab of power, then this leads to less repression. But, paradoxically, even if there is a higher likelihood of such a grab, there may be less repression as the slippery slope considerations become less powerful.

Our final result deals with strategic complementarity in repressions. To state this result, consider a change in the costs of repression so that it becomes cheaper for radicals to repress right-wing groups. In particular, the stage payoff function of radicals changes to

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30 Notably, even if there are slippery slope considerations (as defined in fn. 3) making some types of repressions undesirable, these will not be sufficient to prevent all repression.
\[ u_{s}(s) = -(b_{M} - b_{l})^{2} - \rho \sum_{j} \gamma_{j} C_{j} \]

for \( s < 0 \) and \( \rho \in [0, 1] \). Clearly, \( \rho = 1 \) corresponds to our baseline environment, and a decrease in \( \rho \) implies that radicals can repress right-wing groups with less cost to themselves. Then we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 5 (Strategic complementarity).** Suppose that \( \lambda_{z} = 0 \) for all \( z > 0 \) (meaning that radicals can seize power only if they are not currently repressed). Consider a change in the radicals’ repression costs to \( \rho' < \rho \) and denote the MVE before and after the change by, respectively, \( \phi \) and \( \phi' \). Then if \( \phi_{\rho}(s) > s \) for some \( s \geq 0 \), then \( \phi'_{\rho}(s) > s \).

Put differently, the proposition implies that if \( \phi_{\rho}(0) > 0 \), then \( \phi'_{\rho}(0) > 0 \), so that repression of the radicals is more likely when they themselves have lower costs of repressing other groups. At the root of this result is a strategic complementarity in repression: anticipating greater repression by radicals in future radical environments, the current political system now becomes more willing to repress the radicals. One interesting implication of this result is that differences in repression of opposite ends of the political spectrum across societies may result from small differences in (institutional or social) costs of repression rather than a “culture of repression” in some countries. Thus, the repression of first left- and then right-wing groups in early twentieth-century Russia, contrasted with a lack of such systematic repression in Britain, may not just be a reflection of a Russian culture of repression, but a game-theoretic consequence of the anticipation of different patterns of repression in different political states in Russia.

**B. Institutional Experimentation**

Our second application is one of collective experimentation over institutions. In many institutional reforms, which are marred with uncertainty, a key concern of incumbent decision makers is the possibility that they may lose political control and may not be able to reverse certain aspects of prior reforms even if these turn out to be highly detrimental. These issues are illustrated, for example, by trade-offs postsocialist countries faced during their transitions. A key uncertainty of this process concerned the optimal sequencing of institutional reforms, particularly concerning property rights protection and privatization (e.g., Roland 2000). An attractive strategy under such uncertainty might be experimentation, for example, starting with the privatization of some large state-owned enterprises. But this early privatization may then cause both the establish-
ment of politically powerful strong vested interests and also backlash from voters depending on its efficiency and distributional consequences.\footnote{Indeed, Hellman (1998) observes that big winners from the early stage of reforms later became major obstacles to the next stage of reform. In Russia, banks created at the beginning of the reform process were later strongly opposed to government attempts to bring down inflation (Shleifer and Treisman 2000).}

Formally, there are again several players (representing groups) indexed by $i = 1, \ldots, n$. The stage payoff of player $i$ in state $s$ when policy $p$ is implemented is given by

$$w_i(s, p) = B_i - (b_i - p)^2,$$

where $b_i$ is its bliss point and $B_i$ denotes utility from state $s$, which is shared by all players (e.g., quality of government or public goods provision) and will be modeled below. We assume that $b_i$ is increasing in $i$, which ensures that assumption 2 holds.

We assume that there are $n$ states and that in state $i < n$, player $i$ is the unique QMV (decision maker) and sets the policy and decides on transitions to a different state. The value of parameter $B$ in these states is also known and assumed, for simplicity, to be weakly increasing in $i$: $B_1 \leq B_2 \leq \cdots \leq B_{n-1}$.

In state $n$, policy is chosen by player $n$, but the value of $B_n$ and the identity of the decision maker in state $n$ are not known ex ante. In particular, $B_n$ takes the value $B^h$ with probability $\gamma$ and the value $B' < B^h$ with probability $1 - \gamma$. Moreover, we simplify the discussion by assuming that in state $n$, player $n$ always decides the policy but controls transitions only with probability $\mu$ (i.e., player $n$ is the unique QMV, or $M_n = n$), and with probability $1 - \mu$, it is player $n - 1$ who retains control over transitions (i.e., $M_n = n - 1$). This structure ensures that assumption 4 holds. Again for simplicity, we also assume that $B_n$ and $M_n$ are independent and that the society always learns about $B_n$ and $M_n$ at the same time.\footnote{Both assumptions can be relaxed relatively straightforwardly. For example, we could assume that $n - 1$ is initially in control, but every period agent $n$ may succeed in consolidating power.}

Learning takes place in two ways. First, if society moves to state $n$, the true values of $B_n$ and $M_n$ will be revealed. Second, in each period, there is probability $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ that these values will be revealed even when society is not in state $n$. This could occur, for example, because there is passive learning from another country in the midst of a similar experiment, or current political dynamics will provide insights about what will happen in state $n$. The initial environment is denoted by $E^0$ and society starts in one of the states $1, \ldots, n - 1$. The realizations of $B_n$ and $M_n$ define four
additional environments $E^{k,n-1}$, $E^{l,n-1}$, $E^{k,n}$, and $E^{l,n}$. An MVE is therefore a collection of five mappings $\phi_0$, $\{\phi_{e,m}\}$, that satisfy definition 3.

Several comments are in order. First, this model is related to that in Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and particularly to Strulovici’s (2010) important paper on strategic experimentation by voting, but with a crucial difference. In both of these models, learning is about individual idiosyncratic preferences, whereas in our paper learning is about characteristics of different states that affect all individuals. In this sense, the experimentation occurs over institutions rather than over individual preferences. Second, the assumptions are meant to capture the uncertainty over both the payoff implications of moving to new states (which have not been tried yet) and the uncertainty over who controls political power in these states. For instance, in addition to the postsocialist transition example discussed above, we can think of state $n$ as corresponding to a reform deregulating a particular industry. The benefits of deregulation will be learned after it has been tried, but other evidence or research may reveal its value even without active experimentation. There is also some possibility that industry insiders may be able to amass significant power and prevent a reversal of this deregulation even if it is revealed to be a failure. The rest of the players are ranked in terms of their dislike of this deregulation, and the assumption that when industry insiders capture the power over the form of regulation, transitions are controlled by the neighboring group is made for simplicity.

The next proposition follows directly from theorems 3 and 4 by verifying that our baseline assumptions are satisfied.

**Proposition 6.** In the environment described above, there exists a unique MVE given by the monotone mappings $\phi_0$, $\{\phi_{e,m}\}$.

The key question in this model is whether there will be experimentation with state $n$. Experimentation is represented by $\phi_0(n-1) = n$, that is, by whether there will be a move to state $n$ while there is uncertainty about its payoff and power implications. We assume in what follows that

$$B^l < B_{n-1} + (b_n - b_{n-1})^2 < B^h.$$  

This ensures that group $n - 1$ would prefer to move to state $n$ if it knew that $B_n = B^h$, but not when $B_n = B^l$. Then from increasing differences (assumption 2), we also have that group $n$ strictly prefers state $n$ when $B_n = B^h$ (but may or may not do so if $B_n = B^l$).

**Proposition 7.** Let

$$Y = \frac{\gamma \cdot B^h - (b_n - b_{n-1})^2 - B_{n-1}}{1 - \gamma \cdot B_{n-1} + (b_n - b_{n-1})^2 - B^l}. $$
i. Suppose that \( B_{n-1} - (b_n - b_{n-1})^2 > B' \). Then \( \phi_1(n) = n - 1 \) and \( \phi_\ast(n) = n \), and there is experimentation if and only if \( Y > 1 - \beta(1 - \lambda) \). This condition does not depend on \( \mu \); experimentation will take place for a wider set of parameter values when \( \beta \) is higher or \( \lambda \) is lower.

ii. Conversely, suppose that \( B_{n-1} - (b_n - b_{n-1})^2 < B' \). Then \( \phi_{1,n-1}(n) = n - 1 \) and \( \phi_\ast(n) = n \) otherwise. Society experiments if and only if \( Y > \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{b_{n-1}} \right) \), which holds for a wider set of parameter values when \( \lambda \) is lower or \( \mu \) is lower. Moreover, if \( \lambda + \mu \geq 1 \), then an increase in \( \beta \) makes the set of parameter values for which experimentation takes place smaller; and if \( \lambda + \mu < 1 \), the effect of \( \beta \) is nonmonotone: it is inverse U-shaped, reaching a local maximum in the interior and local minima at \( \beta = 0 \) and 1.

The decision by group \( n - 1 \) to experiment therefore depends on \( Y \), which is, very intuitively, the ratio of potential gain from being in state \( n \) with \( B_n = B' \), as compared to the baseline ("safe option") of \( B_{n-1} \), to (the absolute value of) the potential loss if \( B_n = B' \), weighted, naturally, with the probabilities of the two outcomes, \( \gamma \) and \( 1 - \gamma \), respectively \( (Y > 1 \text{ if and only if } Y > 1 - \beta(1 - \lambda)(1 - \beta + \beta\mu)/(1 - \beta) \), which holds for a wider set of parameter values when \( \lambda \) is lower or \( \mu \) is lower. Moreover, if \( \lambda + \mu \geq 1 \), then an increase in \( \beta \) makes the set of parameter values for which experimentation takes place smaller; and if \( \lambda + \mu < 1 \), the effect of \( \beta \) is nonmonotone: it is inverse U-shaped, reaching a local maximum in the interior and local minima at \( \beta = 0 \) and 1.

The results are different in the second case, where group \( n \) prefers state \( n \) regardless of the realization of \( B_n \) and will stay in this state if it can. In this case, experimentation is risky and need not happen even if \( Y > 1 \) (provided that \( \lambda \neq 0 \)): in this case, instead of taking a chance, group \( n - 1 \) may find it prudent to wait and find out the value of \( B_n \). These considerations are more pronounced if the likelihood of group \( n \) seizing power is higher, so experimentation is less likely for high \( \mu \). The comparative statics with respect to \( \beta \) is ambiguous because of two effects. On the one hand, similar to the previous case, a higher discount factor decreases the significance of one period of experimentation, and this makes experimentation more likely. On the other hand, a higher discount factor also makes wait-
ing to learn $B$, without taking risks more attractive. It turns out that for low $\lambda$ and $\mu$, the first effect dominates; for high $\lambda$ and $\mu$ (or high $\beta$), the second one does.

The next result shows that the response of experimentation to changes in riskiness of the experiment is potentially nonmonotone.

**Proposition 8.** Suppose $\mathbb{E}B_n - (b_n - b_{n-1})^2 > B_{n-1}$, $\lambda, \mu > 0$, and $\beta$ is sufficiently close to one. For a fixed $\mathbb{E}B_n$ and $\gamma$, vary the spread $\Delta = B^h - B^l$. Then the decision to experiment is nonmonotone in $\Delta$: there exist two thresholds $\Delta_1 < \Delta_2$ such that there is experimentation if $\Delta < \Delta_1$ or $\Delta > \Delta_2$, but no experimentation if $\Delta \in (\Delta_1, \Delta_2)$.

If the spread between $B^h$ and $B^l$ is small, then the downside risk from experimentation for group $n - 1$ is small, even if this experimentation leads to society being stuck forever in state $n$; hence experimentation takes place for small $\Delta$. As this spread increases, the downside risk to group $n - 1$ becomes substantial because, when it controls political power, group $n$ will prefer to stay in state $n$ permanently; in this case, group $n - 1$ prefers to wait rather than experiment. However, if this spread becomes sufficiently large, the interests of groups $n - 1$ and $n$ become aligned; in this case, the effective risk of having to stay in state $n$ forever disappears, and experimentation again takes place. Overall, therefore, experimentation is less likely to take place when the downside risk is moderate but more likely when this risk is low or high, because this risk also affects the nature of the conflict of interest between groups.

**V. Conclusion**

This paper has provided a general framework for the analysis of dynamic political economy problems, including democratization, extension of political rights, or repression of different groups. The distinguishing feature of our approach is that it enables an analysis of nonstationary, stochastic environments (which allow for anticipated and unanticipated shocks changing the distribution of political power and economic payoffs) under fairly rich heterogeneity and general political or economic conflict across groups.

We assume that the payoffs either are defined directly on states or can be derived from states, which represent economic and political institutions. For example, different distribution of property rights or adoption of policies favoring one versus another group corresponds to different states. Importantly, states also differ in their distribution of political power; as states change, different groups become politically pivotal (and in equilibrium different coalitions may form). Our notion of equilibrium is a Markov voting equilibrium, which requires that economic and political changes—transitions across states—should take place if there exists a sub-
set of players with the power to implement such changes and who will obtain higher expected discounted utility by doing so.

We assume that both states and players are “ordered” (e.g., states go from more right-wing to more left-wing, or less to more democratic, and players are ordered according to their ideology or income level). Our most substantive assumptions are that, given these orders, stage payoffs satisfy a “single-crossing” (increasing differences) type assumption, and the distribution of political power also shifts in the same direction as economic preferences (e.g., individuals with preferences further to the right gain relatively more from moving toward states further to the right, and their political power does not decrease if there is a transition toward such a state).

Under these assumptions, we prove the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and show that a steady state always exists (though it generally depends on the order and exact timing of shocks). We also provide some comparative static results that apply at this level of generality. For example, if there is a change from one environment to another (with different economic payoffs and distribution of political power) but the two environments coincide up to a certain state $s'$ and before the change the steady state of equilibrium was at some state $x \leq s'$, then the new steady state after the change in environment can be no smaller than $x$.

We then use this framework to study the dynamics of repression in the presence of radical groups that can stochastically grab power depending on the distribution of political rights in society. We characterize the conditions under which the presence of radicals leads to greater repression (of less radical groups) and identify a novel strategic complementarity in repression. We also provide an application to the problem of collective experimentation over different institutions.

Our framework can be extended and applied in several different directions, which constitute an interesting area for future research. The first is to incorporate greater individual-level heterogeneity, which can change over time (e.g., a type of “social mobility”), a topic we are actively pursuing. More challenging is the study of problems in which heterogeneity cannot be reduced to a single dimension, which opens the door for more complex strategic interactions and dynamics—and a broader set of applications. Some of the important applications of the framework we have proposed, which constitute interesting areas for future research, go beyond political economy and include problems in organizational economics (in particular focusing on the internal politics of the firm) and international relations (relationships between countries and dynamics of secessions and civil wars).
Appendix A

**Lemmas**

We start with a number of lemmas, which play a central role in establishing important properties of MVE and form the foundation of all of our main proofs.

**Lemma 1.** Suppose that vector \( \{ w_i(\cdot) \} \) satisfies increasing differences on \( N \times \{ x, y \} \) for some \( x, y \in S \). Let

\[
P = \{ i \in N : w_i(y) > w_i(x) \},
\]

and take any \( s \in S \). Then \( P \in W \), if and only if \( M_s \subseteq P \). A similar statement is true for relations \( \geq, <, \) and \( \leq \).

**Proof.** "If": Suppose \( M_s \subseteq P \), so for each \( i \in M_s, w_i(y) > w_i(x) \). Consider two cases. If \( y > x \), then increasing differences implies that \( w_i(y) > w_i(x) \) for all \( j \geq \min M_s \). On the other hand, \( \min M_n, n \) is a winning coalition (if not, \( i = M_s - 1 \) would be a QMV by definition, but such \( i \notin M_s \)). If \( y < x \), then, similarly, \( w_j(y) > w_j(x) \) for all \( j \leq \max M_s \), which is a winning coalition for similar reasons. In either case, \( P \) contains a subset \( \{ \min M_s, n \} \) or \( \{ 1, \max M_s \} \) that is a winning coalition, and thus \( P \in W \).

"Only if": Suppose \( P \in W \). Consider the case \( y > x \). Let \( i = \min P \); then increasing differences implies that for all \( j \geq i, w_j(y) > w_j(x) \). This means that \( P = \{ i, n \} \) and is thus a connected coalition. Since \( P \) is winning, we must have \( i \leq j \leq n \) for any \( j \in M_s \) by definition of \( M_s \), and therefore \( M_s \subseteq P \). The case in which \( y < x \) is similar, so \( M_s \subseteq P \).

The proofs for relations \( \geq, <, \) and \( \leq \) are similar and are omitted. QED

For each \( s \in S \), let us introduce the binary relation \( >, \) on the set of \( n \)-dimensional vectors to designate that there exists a winning coalition in \( s \) strictly preferring one payoff vector to another. Formally,

\[
w^1 > w^2 \iff \{ i \in N : w^1_i > w^2_i \} \in W_s.
\]

The relation \( \geq, \) is defined similarly. Lemma 1 now implies that if a vector \( \{ w_i(x) \} \) satisfies increasing differences, then for any \( s \in S \), the relations \( >, \), and \( \geq, \) are transitive on \( \{ w_i(x) \}_{i \in S} \). Notice that for this result, we need only two assumptions: Assumption 3 on winning coalitions in state \( s \) ensures existence of the (nonempty) set of QMVs \( M_s \), and we need vector \( \{ w_i(x) \}_{i \in S} \) to satisfy increasing differences.

**Lemma 2.** Suppose assumption 2 holds. Then, for a mapping \( \phi : S \to S \), the vector \( \{ V^\phi_i(x) \}_{i \in S} \) given by (4), satisfies increasing differences if

1. \( \phi \) is monotone or
2. for all \( x \in S, |\phi(x) - x| \leq 1 \).

**Proof.** Part 1: Take \( y > x \) and any \( i \in N \). We have

\[
V^\phi_i(y) - V^\phi_i(x) = u_i(y) + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta^k u_k(\phi^k(y)) - u_i(x) - \sum_{k=1}^n \beta^k u_k(\phi^k(x)) = [u_i(y) - u_i(x)] + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta^k [u_k(\phi^k(y)) - u_k(\phi^k(x))].
\]
The first term is (weakly) increasing in $i$ if $\{u_i(s)\}_{s \in S}$ satisfies increasing differences, and the second is (weakly) increasing in $i$ as $\phi^i(y) \geq \phi^j(x)$ for $k \geq 1$ because of the monotonicity of $\phi$. Consequently, (4) is (weakly) increasing in $i$.

Part 2: If $\phi$ is monotone, then part 1 applies. Otherwise, for some $x < y$ we have $\phi(x) > \phi(y)$, and this means that $\gamma = x + 1$; there may be one or more such pairs. Notice that for such $x$ and $y$, we have $\phi(x) = y$ and $\phi(y) = x$. Consider

$$V^s_i(y) - V^s_i(x) = \left[ u_i(y) + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta^{2k-1} u_i(x) + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta^{2k} u_i(y) \right]$$

$$- \left[ u_i(x) + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta^{2k-1} u_i(y) + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta^{2k} u_i(x) \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \left( u_i(y) - u_i(x) \right);$$

this is (weakly) increasing in $i$.

Let us now modify stage payoffs and define

$$\tilde{u}_i(x) = \begin{cases} u_i(x) & \text{if } \phi(x) = x \text{ or } \phi^i(x) \neq x \\ (1 - \beta) V(x) & \text{if } \phi(x) \neq x = \phi^i(x). \end{cases}$$

Consider mapping $\tilde{\phi}$ given by

$$\tilde{\phi}(s) = \begin{cases} \phi(x) & \text{if } \phi(x) = x \text{ or } \phi^i(x) \neq x \\ x & \text{if } \phi(x) \neq x = \phi^i(x). \end{cases}$$

This $\tilde{\phi}$ is monotone and $\{\tilde{u}_i(x)\}_{s \in S}$ satisfies increasing differences. By part 1, the continuation values $\{V^s_i(x)\}_{s \in S}$ computed for $\phi$ and $\{\tilde{u}_i(x)\}_{s \in S}$ using (4) satisfy increasing differences as well. But by construction, $V^s_i(x) = V^s_i(x)$ for each $i$ and $s$, and thus $\{V^s_i(x)\}_{s \in S}$ satisfies increasing differences. QED

**Lemma 3 (Monotone deviation principle).** Suppose that $\phi: S \rightarrow S$ is feasible (part 1 of definition 3) and monotone but the core property (part 2 of definition 3) is violated. Then there exist $x, y \in S$ such that $y \in F(x)$,

$$V^s_i(y) > V^s_i(\phi(x)),$$

and the mapping $\phi': S \rightarrow S$ given by

$$\phi'(s) = \begin{cases} \phi(s) & \text{if } s \neq x \\ y & \text{if } s = x \end{cases}$$

is monotone.

**Proof.** Existence of $x, y \in S$ such that $y \in F(x)$ and (A1) holds follows from failure of part 2 of definition 3. We show that for some pair of such $x, y$, (A2) is monotone.

Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for each $x, y \in S$ such that $y \in F(x)$ and (A1) holds, $\phi'$ given by (A2) is not monotone. Take $x, y \in S$ such that $|y - \phi(x)|$ is minimal among all pairs $x, y \in S$ such that $y \in F(x)$ and (A1) holds (informally, we consider the shortest deviation). By our assertion, $\phi'$ is not monotone. Since $\phi$ is monotone and $\phi$ and $\phi'$ differ by the value at $x$ only, there are two possibilities:

either for some $z < x$, $y = \phi'(z) < \phi(z) \leq \phi(x)$ or for some $z > x$, $\phi(z) \leq \phi(x) < \phi'(z) = y$. Assume the former (the latter case may be considered similarly). Let $s$ be
defined by
\[ s = \min \{ z \in S : \phi(z) > y \}; \]
in the case under consideration, the set of such \( z \) is nonempty (e.g., \( x \) is its member, and \( z \) found earlier is one as well), and hence state \( s \) is well defined. We have \( s < x \); since \( \phi \) is monotone, \( \phi(s) \leq \phi(x) \).

Notice that a deviation in state \( s \) from \( \phi(s) \) to \( y \) is monotone: indeed, there is no state \( z \) such that \( z < s \) and \( y < \phi(z) \leq \phi(s) \) by construction of \( s \), and there is no state \( z > s \) such that \( \phi(s) \leq \phi(z) < y \) as this would contradict \( \phi(s) > y \). Moreover, it is feasible, so \( y \in \bar{F}(s) \); this is automatically true if \( y = s \); if \( y > s \), this follows from \( s < y < \phi(s) \); and if \( y < s \), this follows from \( y = \phi(x) \) and \( y < s \leq x \). By assertion, this deviation cannot be profitable, that is, \( V^e(y) > V^e(\phi(s)) \). By lemma 2, since \( y < \phi(s) \), \( V^e_{\max}(y) \leq V^e_{\max}(\phi(s)) \). Since \( s < x \), assumption \( 4 \) implies (for \( i = \max M_i \)) \( V^e(y) \leq V^e(\phi(s)) \).

On the other hand, (A1) implies \( V^e(y) > V^e(\phi(x)) \). We therefore have
\[ V^e(\phi(s)) > V^e(\phi(x)), \tag{A3} \]
and thus, by lemma 2, since \( \phi(s) < \phi(x) \) (we know \( \phi(s) \leq \phi(x) \), but \( \phi(s) = \phi(x) \) would contradict \( [A3] \)),
\[ V^e(\phi(s)) > V^e(\phi(x)). \]

Notice, however, that \( y < \phi(s) < \phi(x) \) implies that \(|\phi(s) - \phi(x)| < |y - \phi(x)| \). This contradicts the choice of \( y \) such that \( |y - \phi(x)| \) is minimal among pairs \( x, y \in S \) such that \( y \in \bar{F}(x) \) and (A1) is satisfied. This contradiction proves that our initial assertion was wrong, and this proves the lemma. QED

**Lemma 4 (No double deviation).** Let \( a \in [1, m - 1] \), and let \( \phi_1 : [1, a] \to [1, a] \) and \( \phi_2 : [a + 1, m] \to [a + 1, m] \) be two monotone mappings that are MVE on their respective domains. Let \( \phi : S \to S \) be defined by
\[ \phi(s) = \begin{cases} 
\phi_1(s) & \text{if } s \leq a \\
\phi_2(s) & \text{if } s > a. 
\end{cases} \tag{A4} \]

Then exactly one of the following is true:
1. \( \phi \) is an MVE on \( S \);
2. there is \( z \in [a + 1, \phi(a + 1)] \) such that \( z \in F(a) \) and \( V^e(z) > V^e(\phi(a)) \);
3. there is \( z \in [\phi(a), a] \) such that \( z \in F(a + 1) \) and \( V^e(z) > V^e(\phi(a + 1)) \).

**Proof.** We show first that if part 1 is the case, then 2 and 3 are not satisfied. We then show that if part 1 does not hold, then either 2 or 3 is satisfied, and we complete the proof by showing that 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive.

First, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that both parts 1 and 2 hold. Then 2 implies that for some \( z \in [a + 1, \phi(a + 1)] \) such that \( z \in F(a) \), \( V^e(z) > V^e(\phi(a)) \); but this contradicts that \( \phi \) is MVE, so part 1 cannot hold. We can similarly prove that if 1 holds, then 3 is not satisfied.

Second, suppose that part 1 does not hold. Notice that for any \( x \in S, \phi(x) \in F(x) \) and \( V^e(\phi(x)) \geq V^e(x) \), because these properties hold for \( \phi_1 \) if \( x \in [1, a] \) and for \( \phi_2 \) if \( x \in [a + 1, m] \). Consequently, if \( \phi \) is not MVE, then the reason is that the (core)
condition in definition 3 is violated. Lemma 3 then implies existence of a monotone deviation, that is, \( x, y \in S \) such that \( y \in F(x) \) and \( V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi(x)) \). Since \( \phi_1 \) and \( \phi_2 \) are MVE on their respective domains, we must have that either \( x \in [1, a] \) and \( y \in [a + 1, m] \) or \( x \in [a + 1, m] \) and \( y \in [1, m] \). Assume the former; since the deviation is monotone, we must have \( x = a \) and \( a + 1 \leq y \leq \phi(a + 1) \). Hence, we have \( V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi(a)) \), and this shows that part 2 holds. If we assumed the latter, we would similarly get that part 3 holds. Hence, if part 1 does not hold, then either 2 or 3 does.

Third, suppose that both parts 2 and 3 hold. Let

\[
x \in \arg\max_{z \in [a, a + 1]} V^\phi_{\text{min}}(z),
\]

\[
y \in \arg\max_{z \in [u(x) + 1]} V^\phi_{\text{max}}(z);
\]

then \( x \geq a + 1 > a \geq y \). By construction, \( V^\phi_{\text{min}}(x) > V^\phi_{\text{min}}(y) \) and \( V^\phi_{\text{max}}(y) > V^\phi_{\text{max}}(x) \) (the inequalities are strict because they are strict in parts 2 and 3). But this violates the increasing differences that \( \{V^\phi(s)\}_{s \in S} \) satisfies as \( \phi \) is monotone (indeed, \( \min M_{i} \leq \max M_{i-1} \) by assumption 4). This contradiction proves that parts 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive, which completes the proof. QED

Lemma 5 (Extension of equilibrium). Let \( \tilde{S} = [1, m - 1] \). Suppose that \( \phi : \tilde{S} \rightarrow \tilde{S} \) is a monotone MVE and that \( F(m) \neq \{m\} \). Let \( a = \max\left(\arg\max_{b \in \{m - 1, m\}} V^\phi_{\text{max}}(b)\right) \). \( \text{(A5)} \)

If

\[
V^\phi(a) > u(m)/(1 - \beta),
\]

then mapping \( \phi' : S \rightarrow S \) defined by

\[
\phi'(s) = \begin{cases}
\phi(s) & \text{if } s < m \\
a & \text{if } s = m
\end{cases}
\]

is a monotone MVE. A similar statement, mutatis mutandis, applies for \( S = [2, m] \).

Proof. Mapping \( \phi' \) satisfies property 1 of definition 3 by construction. Let us show that it satisfies property 2. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that this is not the case. By lemma 3, there are states \( x, y \in S \) such that

\[
V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi'(x)),
\]

and this deviation is monotone. Suppose first that \( x < m \); then \( \gamma \leq \phi(m) = a \leq m - 1 \). For any \( z \leq m - 1 \), \( (\phi')^k(z) = \phi(z) \) for all \( k \geq 0 \), and thus \( V^\phi(z) = V^\phi(z) \); therefore, \( V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi(z)) \). However, this would contradict that \( \phi \) is an MVE on \( S \). Consequently, \( x = m \). If \( y < m \), then \( \text{(A7)} \) implies, given \( a = \phi(m) \),

\[
V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(a).
\]

Since the deviation is monotone, \( y \in [\phi(m - 1), m - 1] \); but then \( \text{(A8)} \) contradicts the choice of \( a \) in \( \text{(A5)} \). This implies that \( x = y = m \), so \( \text{(A7)} \) may be rewritten as
But since
\[ V^S(m) = u(m) + \beta V^a(a), \] 
(A9) implies
\[ u(m) \geq (1 - \beta) V^a(a). \]  
This, however, contradicts (A6), which proves that \( \phi^* \) satisfies property 2 of definition 3.  
To prove that \( \phi^* \) is an MVE, we need to establish that it satisfies property 3 of definition 3, that is,
\[ V^a(\phi(x)) \geq V^a(x) \] 
for each \( x \in S \). If \( x \in S \) (i.e., \( x < m \)), then \( (\phi^*)^k(x) = \phi^k(x) \) for any \( k \geq 0 \); so (A11) is equivalent to \( V^a(\phi(x)) \geq V^a(x) \), which is true for \( x < m \), because \( \phi^* \) is an MVE on \( S \). It remains to prove that (A11) is satisfied for \( x = m \). In this case, (A11) may be rewritten as
\[ V^a(a) \geq V^a(m). \]  
Taking (A10) into account, (A12) is equivalent to \( (1 - \beta) V^a(a) \geq u(m) \), which is true, provided that (A6) is satisfied. We have thus proved that \( \phi^* \) is an MVE on \( S \), which completes the proof. QED

Proofs of Theorems 1–8

Proof of Theorem 1

We prove this result by induction by the number of states. For any set \( X \), let \( \Phi^X \) be the set of monotone MVE, so we have to prove that \( \Phi^X \neq \emptyset \).

Base: If \( m = 1 \), then \( \phi : S \to S \) given by \( \phi(1) = 1 \) is a monotone MVE for trivial reasons, so \( \Phi^S \neq \emptyset \) is \( |S| = 1 \).

Induction step: Suppose that if \( |S| < m \), then \( \Phi^S \neq \emptyset \). Let us prove this if \( |S| = m \). Consider the set \( A = [1, m - 1] \), and for each \( a \in A \), consider two monotone MVE \( \phi^*_i : [1, a] \to [1, a] \) and \( \phi^*_j : [a + 1, m] \to [a + 1, m] \). Without loss of generality, we may assume that
\[ \phi^*_i \in \max_{\phi^{1, \ldots, [a]} \in \Phi^{a+1}} V^a_{\max,V^{a+1}}(z), \]
\[ \phi^*_j \in \max_{\phi^{a+1, \ldots, m-1}} V^a_{\max,V^{a+1}}(z). \]
(whenever \( \phi(a), [a] \cap F(a + 1) = \emptyset \) or \([a + 1, \phi(a + 1)] \cap F(a) \) are empty, we pick any \( \phi^*_i \) or \( \phi^*_j \), respectively). For each \( a \in A \), define \( \phi^a : S \to S \) by
\[ \phi^a(x) = \begin{cases} \phi^*_i(x) & \text{if } s \leq a \\ \phi^*_j(x) & \text{if } s > a. \end{cases} \]

Let us define function \( f : A \to \{1, 2, 3\} \) as follows. By lemma 4, for every split \( S = [1, a] \cup [a + 1, m] \) given by \( a \in A \) and for MVE \( \phi^*_i \) and \( \phi^*_j \), exactly one of three
properties holds; let $f(a)$ be the number of the property. Then, clearly, if for some $a \in A$, $f(a) = 1$, then $\phi^a$ is a monotone MVE by construction of function $f$.

Now let us consider the case in which for every $a \in A$, $f(a) \in \{2, 3\}$. We have the following possibilities.

First, suppose that $f(1) = 2$. This means that (since $\phi^1(1) = 1$ for $a = 1$)

$$\arg \max_{z \in [2, \phi^1(2)]} V^a_{\min b}(z) \subset [2, \phi^1(2)].$$

Let

$$b \in \arg \max_{z \in [2, \phi^1(2)]} V^a_{\min b}(z)$$

and define $\phi^0 : S \to S$ by

$$\phi^0(s) = \begin{cases} b & \text{if } s = 1 \\ \phi^1(s) & \text{if } s > 1; \end{cases}$$

let us prove that $\phi^0$ is an MVE. Notice that (A13) and (A14) imply

$$V^a_{\min b}(b) > V^a_{\min b}(1).$$

By lemma 2, since $b > 1$,

$$V^0(b) > V^1(1).$$

Notice, however, that

$$V^0(1) = u(1)/(1 - \beta),$$

and also $V^0(b) = V^1(b)$; therefore, (A16) may be rewritten as

$$V^0(b) > u(1)/(1 - \beta).$$

By lemma 5, $\phi^0 : S \to S$ defined by (A15) is an MVE.

Second, suppose that $f(m - 1) = 3$. In this case, using the first part of lemma 5, we can prove that there is an MVE similarly to the previous case.

Finally, suppose that $f(1) = 3$ and $f(m - 1) = 2$ (this already implies $m \geq 3$); then there is $a \in \{2, m - 1\}$ such that $f(a - 1) = 3$ and $f(a) = 2$. Define, for $s \in S \setminus \{a\}$ and $i \in N$,

$$V^s_{\nu}(s) = \begin{cases} V^{\nu_{s-1}}_{\nu}(s) & \text{if } s < a \\ V^{\nu_{a}}_{\nu}(s) & \text{if } s > a. \end{cases}$$

Let us first prove that there exists

$$b \in ([\phi^a_{\nu}^{-1}(a - 1), a - 1] \cup [a + 1, \phi^a_{\nu}(a + 1)]) \cap F(a)$$

such that

$$V^0(b) > u(a)/(1 - \beta),$$

and let $B$ be the set of such $b$ so
Indeed, since \( f(a - 1) = 3 \),

\[
\text{arg} \max_{x \in [a^{-1}(a - 1), a - 1]} V^{\phi^{-1}}(z) \subset [\phi^{-1}(a - 1), a - 1].
\]  

(A18)

Let

\[
b \in \text{arg} \max_{x \in [a^{-1}(a - 1), a - 1]} V^{\phi^{-1}}(z).
\]

(A19)

Then (A18) and (A19) imply

\[V^{\phi^{-1}}_{\max}(b) > V^{\phi^{-1}}_{\max}(a)\].

(A20)

By lemma 2, since \( b < a \),

\[V^{\phi^{-1}}(b) > V^{\phi^{-1}}(a)\].

(A21)

We have, however,

\[V^{\phi^{-1}}(a) = V^{\phi \phi^{-1}}(a) = u(a) + \beta V^{\phi^{-1}}(\phi^{-1}(a)) \geq u(a) + \beta V^{\phi^{-1}}(a)\]

\((V^{\phi^{-1}}(a) = V^{\phi \phi^{-1}}(a))\) by definition of \( \phi^{-1} \), and the inequality holds because \( \phi^{-1} \) is an MVE on \([a, m]\). Consequently, (A20) and (A21) imply (A17). (Notice that using \( f(a) = 2 \), we could similarly prove that there is \( b \in [a + 1, \phi^*(a + 1)] \) such that \([A17]\) holds.)

Let us now take some QMV in state \( a, j \in M \) and state \( d \in B \) such that

\[d = \text{arg} \max_{b \in B} V^{\phi}(b)\],

(A22)

and define monotone mapping \( \phi : S \to S \) as

\[\phi(s) = \begin{cases} 
\phi^{-1}(s) & \text{if } s < a \\
d & \text{if } s = a \\
\phi^{*}(s) & \text{if } s > a
\end{cases}\]

(note that \( V^{\phi}(s) = V^{\phi}(s) \) for \( x \neq a \). Let us prove that \( \phi \) is an MVE on \( S \).

By construction of \( d \) in (A22), we have that \( b \in [\phi^{-1}(a - 1), \phi^{*}(a + 1)] \cap F(a) \) implies

\[V^{\phi}(b) \succ V^{\phi}(d)\].

This is automatically true for \( b \in B \), whereas if \( b \not\in F(a) \setminus B \) and \( b \neq a \), the opposite would imply \( V^{\phi}(b) \succ u(a) / (1 - \beta) \), which would contradict \( b \not\in B \), finally, if \( b = a \), \( V^{\phi}(a) \succ V^{\phi}(d) \) is impossible, as this would imply \( u(a) \succ (1 - \beta) V^{\phi}(d) \), contradicting (A17), given the definition of \( d \) in (A22). Now, lemma 5 implies that \( \phi = \phi|_{[1, a]} \) is an MVE on \([1, a]\).
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that \( \phi \) is not an MVE. Since \( \phi \) is made from MVE \( \phi^* \) on \( [1, a] \) and MVE \( \phi^* \) on \( [a + 1, m] \), properties 1 and 3 of definition 3 are satisfied, and by lemma 4 there are only two possible monotone deviations that may prevent \( \phi \) from being an MVE. First, suppose that for some \( y \in [a + 1, \phi^*_a(a + 1)] \cap F(a) \),

\[
V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(d).
\]

(A23)

However, this would contradict (A22) (and if \( y \notin B \), then (A23) is impossible as \( d \in B \)). The second possibility is that for some \( y \in [d, a] \cap F(a + 1) \), we have

\[
V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi^*_a(a + 1)).
\]

This means that \( V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(y) > V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(\phi^*_a(a + 1)) \). At the same time, for any \( x \in [a + 1, \phi^*_a(a + 1)] \cap F(a) \), we have

\[
V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(x) \leq V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(\phi^*_a(a + 1))
\]

(otherwise lemma 2 would imply a profitable deviation to \( x \)). This implies that for any such \( x \), \( V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(y) > V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(x) \). Now, recall that

\[
\phi^*_i \in \arg \max_{\phi^* \in \mathcal{M}_i \cap F(a)} V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(z).
\]

This means that there is \( z \in [\phi^*_i(a), a] \cap F(a) \) such that

\[
V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(z) \geq V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(y),
\]

and thus for any \( x \in [a + 1, \phi^*_a(a + 1)] \cap F(a) \),

\[
V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(z) > V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(x).
\]

But \( \phi^*_i = \phi^* \) on the left-hand side, and \( \phi = \phi^* \) on the right-hand side. We therefore have that the following maximum is achieved on \( [\phi^*(a), a] \):

\[
\arg \max_{\phi^* \in \mathcal{M}_i \cap F(a)} V^\phi_{\max_{\mathcal{M}_i}}(z) \in [\phi^*(a), a],
\]

that is, that part 3 in lemma 4 holds. But this contradicts that \( f(a) = 2 \). This contradiction completes the induction step, which proves existence of a monotone MVE for any \( S \).

Finally, suppose that \( \phi \) is a monotone MVE; take any \( s_i \). If \( \phi(s_i) \geq s_i \), then monotonicity implies \( \phi^2(s_i) \geq \phi(s_i) \) and so on, and thus the sequence \( \{\phi^k(s_i)\} \) is weakly increasing in \( k \). It must therefore have a limit. A similar reasoning applies if \( \phi(s_i) < s_i \), which completes the proof. QED

Proof of Theorem 2

We need to establish that the equilibrium is generically unique. For the purpose of this proof and other proofs in the paper, we call the set of parameters generic if \( \beta \) and \( \{\pi(E, E')\}_{E \in \mathcal{E}}, \) satisfy the following: For any agent \( i \) and any set of mappings \( \{\phi_i : S \rightarrow S\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \) the continuation values that solve (2) are such that for any environment \( E \in \mathcal{E} \) and any two different states \( x, y \in S \), \( V^\phi_{\pi_i}(x) \neq V^\phi_{\pi_i}(y) \). In other words, this says that an agent is never indifferent between two states, regardless of continuation paths that will follow. Note that even though the statement involves continuation values, it is in fact an assumption on primitives, because the solution to (2) is uniquely determined by the primitives on the model. Indeed, one can rewrite (2) as \((I + \Omega) V^\phi_{\pi_i}(s) = \mu_i(s)\), where \( I \) is the \( mh \times mh \) identity
matrix, and \( \Omega \) is a matrix the elements of which depend on \( \beta \) and \( \{ \pi(E, E') \}_{E', E} \). The matrix \( \Omega \) defines a contraction mapping (in the sup norm), and thus \( I + \Omega \) is invertible, and \( V^\alpha_\beta(s) = (I + \Omega)^{-1} w_{E,i}(s) \). This gives us no more than \( n \times m^h \times h \times m(m-1)/2 \) linear conditions on utilities \( \{ w_{E,i}(s) \} \), which proves that the set of parameter values for which the condition above fails indeed has Lebesgue measure zero in both the set of feasible payoffs \( \{ w_{E,i}(s) \}_{E,i} \) for fixed \( \beta \) and \( \{ \pi(E, E') \}_{E', E} \) and in the set of all parameters \( \{ \beta, \{ \pi(E, E') \}_{E', E} \}, \{ w_{E,i}(s) \}_{E,i} \} \).

From now on, suppose that parameters satisfy the above condition. Under either of the assumptions of this theorem, any MVE is monotone; this follows from theorem 7, which is proved below.

Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there are two MVE \( \phi_1 \) and \( \phi_2 \); then they are monotone by the argument above. Without loss of generality, assume that \( m \) is the minimal number of states for which this is possible; that is, if \( |S| < m \), then the MVE is unique. Obviously, \( m \geq 2 \). Consider the set \( Z = \{ x \in S | \phi_1(x) \neq \phi_2(x) \} \), and denote \( a = \min Z, b = \max Z \). Without loss of generality, assume that \( \phi_1 \) and \( \phi_2 \) are enumerated such that \( \phi_1(a) < \phi_2(a) \).

Let us first show that if \( \phi_1(x) = x \) or \( \phi_2(x) = x \), then \( x = 1 \) or \( x = m \). Indeed, suppose first that \( \phi_1(x) = x \) and consider \( \phi_2(x) \). If \( \phi_2(x) < x \), then \( \phi_2[1, x] \neq \phi_2[1, x] \) are two MVE for the set of states \([1, x] \), which contradicts the choice of \( m \). If \( \phi_2(x) > x \), we get a similar contradiction by considering \([x, m] \) and if \( \phi_2(x) = x \), we get a contradiction by considering \([1, x] \) if \( a < x \) and \([x, m] \) if \( a > x \). The case in which \( \phi_2 = x \) may be considered similarly. At this point, the proofs for the two parts diverge.

Part 1: Let us first prove that the following is true (auxiliary result): \( a < m; b > 1 \); if \( x \in \max \{ 2, a \}, \delta \), then \( \phi_i(x) < x \leq \phi_i(x) \); if \( x \in \min \{ b, m - 1 \}, \delta \), then \( \delta(x) \leq x < \delta(x) \).

Assume first, to obtain a contradiction, that \( a = m \). Then \( Z = \{ m \} \), so \( \phi_1[1, a] = \phi_2[1, a] \); in this case, \( \phi_1(m) \neq \phi_2(m) \) is impossible for generic parameter values (see the definition above). We would get a similar contradiction if \( b = 1 \), which proves that \( a = m \) and \( b > 1 \), thus proving the first part of the auxiliary result.

Let us now show that for \( x \in [a, b] \backslash \{ 1, m \} \), we have that either \( \phi_1(x) < x < \phi_2(x) \) or \( \phi_2(x) < x < \phi_1(x) \). Indeed, neither \( \phi_1(x) = x \) nor \( \phi_2(x) = x \) is possible. If \( \phi_1(x) < x \) and \( \phi_2(x) < x \), then \( \phi_1[1, x] \) and \( \phi_2[1, x] \) are two different MVE on \([1, x] \), which is impossible; we get a similar contradiction if \( \phi_1(x) > x \) and \( \phi_2(x) > x \). This also implies that if \( a < x \), then \( x \in Z \).

We now prove that for any \( x \in Z \), \( \phi_1(x) < \phi_2(x) \). Indeed, suppose that \( \phi_2(x) > \phi_1(x) \) (equality is impossible as \( x \in Z \)); then \( x > a \geq 1 \). If \( x < m \), then, as we proved, we must have \( \phi_2(x) < x < \phi_1(x) \); and if \( x = m \), then \( \phi_2(m) < \phi_1(m) = m \). In either case, \( \phi_2(x) < x \); and since \( \phi_2(a) > \phi_1(a) \geq 1 \), then by monotonicity of \( \phi_1 \) there must be \( \gamma; \leq a < \gamma < x \leq m \) such that \( \phi_2(\gamma) = \gamma \); but we proved that this is impossible. Hence, \( \phi_2(x) < \phi_1(x) \) for any \( x \in Z \), and using the earlier result, we have \( \phi_1(x) < x < \phi_2(x) \) for any \( x \in Z \backslash \{ 1, m \} \).

To complete the proof of the auxiliary result, it suffices to show that \( \phi_1(1) = 1 \) and \( \phi_2(m) = m \). Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that \( \phi_1(1) > 1 \). We then have \( \phi_2(1) > 1 \); then \( \phi_2(1) \geq 2 \) and \( \phi_2(1) \geq 2 \) and thus \( \phi_1[1, a] \) and \( \phi_2[1, a] \) are MVE on \([1, a] \); and since \( b \geq 1 \), they must be different, which would again contradict the choice of \( m \). We would get a similar contradiction if \( \phi_2(m) = m \). This completes the proof of the auxiliary result.

To complete the proof of the theorem, notice that the auxiliary result implies, in particular, that \( Z = [a, b] \cap S \), so \( Z \) has no "gaps." We define function \( g: Z \rightarrow \{ 1, 2 \} \) as follows. If \( V^\alpha_\beta(\phi_1(x)) > V^\alpha_\beta(\phi_2(x)) \), then \( g(x) = 1 \); and if \( V^\alpha_\beta(\phi_1(x)) < V^\alpha_\beta(\phi_2(x)) \), then \( g(x) = 2 \) (the case \( V^\alpha_\beta(\phi_1(x)) = V^\alpha_\beta(\phi_2(x)) \) is ruled
out by the genericity assumption).\textsuperscript{55} Intuitively, $g$ picks the equilibrium (left or right) that agent $M$ prefers.

Let us prove that $g(a) = 2$ and $g(b) = 1$. Indeed, suppose that $g(a) = 1$; since $a < m$, we must have $\phi_1(a) < \phi_2(a)$ (with equality if $a = 1$ and strict inequality otherwise). Consider two cases. If $a > 1$, then for $x < a$, $\phi_1(x) = \phi_2(x)$; and since $\phi_i(a) < a$, then $V^*_M(\phi_i(a)) = V^*_M(\phi_2(a))$. But $g(a) = 1$ would imply that $V^*_M(\phi_i(a)) > V^*_M(\phi_2(a))$, and thus $V^*_M(\phi_i(a)) > V^*_M(\phi_2(a))$, which contradicts that $\phi_i$ is an MVE. If $a = 1$, then $g(a) = 1$ would imply that $V^*_M(1) > V^*_M(\phi(1))$. But $\phi_i(1) = 1$, which means $u_{i0}(1)/(1 - \beta) > V^*_M(\phi_i(1))$; thus $u_{i0}(1) + \beta V^*_M(\phi_i(1)) > V^*_M(\phi_i(1))$. The left-hand side equals $V^*_M(1)$, and thus we have $V^*_M(1) > V^*_M(\phi_i(1))$. This contradicts that $\phi_i$ is an MVE, thus proving that $g(a) = 2$. We can similarly prove that $g(b) = 1$.

Clearly, there must be two states $s, s + 1 \in Z$ such that $g(s) = 2$ and $g(s + 1) = 1$. For such $s$, let us construct mapping $\phi$ as follows:

$$\phi(x) = \begin{cases} \phi_1(x) & \text{if } x \leq s, \\ \phi_2(x) & \text{if } x > s; \end{cases}$$

then $\phi(s) \leq s < \phi_2(s)$ (the first inequality is strict unless $s = 1$) and $\phi(s + 1) \geq s + 1 > \phi_1(s + 1)$ (the first inequality is strict unless $s + 1 = m$), which implies, in particular, that $\phi$ is monotone. Now, $g(s) = 2$ implies that $\phi_2(s) > \phi_1(s)$. But $V^*_M(\phi_1(s)) = V^*_M(\phi_2(s))$ and $V^*_M(\phi_1(s)) = V^*_M(\phi_2(s))$, and thus $V^*_M(\phi_2(s)) > V^*_M(\phi_2(s))$ (note also that $s + 1 \leq \phi_2(s) \leq \phi_2(s + 1)$). Similarly, $g(s + 1) = 1$ implies $V^*_M(\phi_1(s + 1)) > V^*_M(\phi_2(s + 1))$. But this contradicts lemma 4 for mapping $\phi$ (since $\phi(s) > s$ and $\phi(s + 1) < s + 1$). This contradiction completes the proof.

Part 2: If for some $x$, $\phi_i(x) < x < \phi_2(x)$ or vice versa, then for all $i \in M$, there must be both a state $x_1 < x$ and a state $x_2 > x$ such that $u_i(x_1) > u_i(x)$ and $u_i(x_2) > u_i(x)$; which contradicts the assumption in this case. Since for $1 < s < m, \phi_i(x) \neq x$, we get that $\phi_i(x) = \phi_i(x)$ for such $x$. Let us prove that $\phi_i(1) = \phi_2(1)$. If this is not the case, then $\phi_1(1) = 1$ and $\phi_2(1) = 2$ or vice versa. If $m = 2$, then monotonicity implies $\phi_2(2) = 2$; and if $m > 2$, then, as proved earlier, we must have $\phi_i(x) = x + 1$ for $1 < s < m$ and $\phi_i(m) = m$. In both cases, we have $\phi_i(x) = \phi_2(x) > 1$ for $1 < s < m$. Hence, $V^*_M(2) = V^*_M(2)$ for all $i \in M$. Since $\phi_i$ is an MVE, we must have $u_i(1)/(1 - \beta) > V^*_M(2)$ for $i \in M$; and since $\phi_2$ is an MVE, we must have $V^*_M(2) \geq u_i(1)/(1 - \beta)$. This is possible only if $V^*_M(2) = u_i(1)/(1 - \beta)$, which is equivalent to $V^*_M(2) = V^*_M(1)$. However, if parameter values are generic according to the definition above, this cannot be true, and this proves that $\phi_i(1) = \phi_2(1)$. We can likewise prove that $\phi_i(m) = \phi_i(m)$, thus establishing uniqueness. QED

Proof of Theorem 3

The existence is proved in the text. Since, on the equilibrium path, there is only a finite number of shocks from some period $t$ on, the environment will be the same, say $E$. Since $\phi_\beta$ is monotone, the sequence \{s_k\} has a limit by theorem 1. The fact that this limit may depend on the sequence of shock realizations is shown by example B2. QED

Proof of Theorem 4

Part 1: Without loss of generality, suppose that $h$ is the minimal number for which two monotone MVE $\phi = \{\phi_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{E}}$ and $\phi^* = \{\phi_k^*\}_{k \in \mathbb{E}}$ exist. For generic
parameter values, if we take \( \bar{E} = \{ E^2, \ldots, E^k \} \) with the same environments \( E^2, \ldots, E^k \) and the same transition probabilities, we will have a unique monotone MVE \( \phi = \{ \phi_f \}_{f \in F} = \{ \phi_g \}_{g \in G} \) by assumption. Now, with the help of transformation used in Section III.B in the proof of theorem 3, we get that \( \phi_f \) and \( \phi_g \) must be MVE in a certain (stationary) environment \( \bar{E} \). However, by theorem 2 such an MVE is unique, which leads to a contradiction.

Part 2: The proof is similar to that of part 1. The only step is that we need to verify that we can apply part 2 of theorem 2 to the (stationary) environment \( \bar{E} \). In general, this will not be the case. However, it is easy to notice (by examining the proof of part 2 of theorem 2) that instead of single-peakedness, we could require a weaker condition: that for each \( s \in S \) there is \( i \in M \) such that there do not exist \( x < s \) and \( y > s \) such that \( u_i(x) \geq u_i(s) \) and \( u_i(y) \geq u_i(s) \).

We can now prove that if \( \{ u_i(s) \}_{i \in N} \) satisfy this property and \( \phi \) is an MVE, then \( (V^i(s))_{i \in N} \) also does. Indeed, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some \( s \in S \), there are \( x < s \) and \( y > s \) such that \( V^i(x) \geq V^i(s) \) and \( V^i(y) \geq V^i(s) \); without loss of generality, we may assume that \( x_i \) and \( y_i \) minimize \( |x_i - s| \) and \( |y_i - s| \) among such \( x_i \) and \( y_i \).

Consider the case \( \phi(s) > s \). This implies that for all \( i \in M \), there is \( a > s \) such that \( u_i(a) > u_i(s) \) and therefore for all \( i \in M \) and all \( a < s, u_i(z) < u_i(s) \). Moreover, for all \( i \in M \), \( u_i(z) < V^i(s)/(1 - \beta) \). Take \( j = \max M \), and let \( z = x_j \). We cannot have \( \phi(z) \leq z \), because then \( V^i(\phi(z)) \geq V^i(s) \) would be impossible. Thus, \( \phi(z) > z \), and in this case we must have \( \phi(z) > s \). To see this, notice that \( V^i(z) = u_i(z) + \beta V^i(\phi(z)) \). If \( \phi(z) < s \), then \( V^i(z) \geq V^i(s) \) and \( u_i(z) < V^i(s)/(1 - \beta) \), implying \( V^i(\phi(z)) > V^i(s) \) and thus contradicting the choice of \( z = x_j \). If \( \phi(z) = s \), then \( V^i(z) = u_i(z) + \beta V^i(\phi(z)) \) contradicts \( V^i(z) \geq V^i(s) \) and \( u_i(z) < V^i(s)/(1 - \beta) \). Consequently, \( \phi(z) > s \). Monotonicity of \( \phi \) implies \( s < \phi(z) \leq \phi(s) \). Now, \( V^i(z) \geq V^i(s) \) and \( u_i(z) < u_i(s) \) imply \( V^i(\phi(z)) > V^i(\phi(s)) \) (and, in particular, \( \phi(z) < \phi(s) \)). Since \( j = \max M \), we have \( V^i(\phi(z)) > V^i(\phi(s)) \). Since \( s < \phi(z) < \phi(s) \), \( \phi(z) \in F_i \), and therefore a deviation in \( s \) from \( \phi(s) \) to \( \phi(z) \) is feasible and profitable. This contradicts that \( \phi \) is an MVE. We would get a similar contradiction if we assumed that \( \phi(s) < s \).

Finally, assume \( \phi(s) = s \). Then take any \( i \in M \), and suppose, without loss of generality, that for any \( a < s, u_i(a) < u_i(s) \). Then, since, for all such \( a, \phi(s) \leq s \) for all \( k \geq 1 \), we must have \( V^i(a) < V^i(s) \), which contradicts the assertion. This proves the auxiliary result.

We have thus proved that under the assumptions of the theorem, the environment \( \bar{E} \) constructed in the proof of theorem 3 satisfies the requirements of part 2 of theorem 2. The rest of the proof follows immediately. QED

Proof of Theorem 5

Part 1: It suffices to prove this result for the stationary case. For each \( s \in S \) take any protocol such that if \( \phi(s) \neq s \), then \( \theta([F_{s-1}]) = 1 \) (i.e., the desired transition is the last one to be considered). We claim that there is a strategy profile \( \phi \) such that if, for state \( s, \phi(s) = s \), then no alternative is accepted; and if \( \phi(s) \neq s \), then no alternative is accepted until the last stage, and in this last stage, the alternative \( \phi(s) \), is accepted.

Indeed, under such a profile, the continuation strategies are given by (4). To show that such an outcome is possible in equilibrium, consider first periods in which \( \phi(s) = s \). Consider the subgame reached if no alternatives were accepted before the last one. Since by property 3 of definition 3 \( V^i(\phi(s)) \geq V^i(s) \), it is a best response for players to accept \( \phi(s) \). Let us now show, by backward induction, that if stage \( k, 1 \leq k \leq |F_{s-1}|-1 \), is reached without any alternatives accepted, then
there is an equilibrium in which \( \phi(s) \) is accepted in the last stage. The base was just proved. The induction step follows from the following: if, at stage \( k \), alternative \( y = \theta(k) \) is under consideration, then accepting it yields a vector of payoffs \( V^\phi(y) \), and rejecting it yields, by induction, \( V^\phi(\phi(s)) \). Since by property 2 of definition 3 \( V^\phi(y) \succ V^\phi(\phi(s)) \), it is a best response to reject the alternative \( y \). Consequently, \( \phi(s) \) will be accepted by induction. This proves the induction step, and therefore, \( \phi(s) \) is the outcome in a period that started with \( s \). Now consider a period in which \( \phi(s) = s \). By backward induction, we can prove that there is an equilibrium in which no proposal is accepted. Indeed, the last proposal \( \theta([F] - 1) \) may be rejected because \( V^\phi(\theta([F] - 1)) \succ V^\phi(s) \) by property 2 of definition 3. Going backward, if for some stage \( k \), \( s \) is the outcome once \( \theta(k) \) was rejected, sufficiently many players may reject \( \theta(k) \) because \( V^\phi(\theta(k)) \succ V^\phi(s) \). This proves that in periods in which \( \phi(s) = s \), it is possible to have an equilibrium in which no proposal is accepted. Combining the equilibrium strategies for different initial \( s \) in the beginning of the period, we get an MPE that induces transition mappings \( \phi(s) \).

Part 2: If the transition mapping is monotone, then continuation utilities \( \{V_{i,S}^\phi(s)\}_{s \in S} = \{V_{i,S}^\phi(s)\}_{s \in S} \) satisfy increasing differences for any \( E \in E \) by lemma 2. Again, the proof that \( \phi \) is an MVE reduces to the stationary case. For each state \( s \), we consider the set \( J \subset \{1, \ldots, |F| - 1\} \) of stages \( k \), where the alternative under consideration, \( \theta(k) \), is accepted if this stage is reached. Naturally, \( \phi(s) = s \) if and only if \( J = \emptyset \); and if \( J \neq \emptyset \), then \( \phi(s) = \theta(\min J) \). Moreover, one can easily prove by induction that for any \( j, k \in J \) such that \( j \leq k \), \( V^\phi(\theta(j)) \geq V^\phi(\theta(k)) \) (this follows from transitivity of \( \geq \), established in lemma 1), and thus for any \( j \in J \), \( V^\phi(\theta(j)) \geq V^\phi(s) \).

Take any \( s \in S \). Property 1 of definition 3 holds trivially, because only states in \( E \) are considered as alternatives and may be accepted. Let us show that property 2 holds. First, consider the case \( \phi(s) = s \). Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some \( y \in E, V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(s) \). Suppose that this \( y \) is considered at stage \( k \). But, then, if stage \( k \) is reached, a winning coalition of players must accept \( y \), because rejecting it leads to \( s \). Then \( k \in J \), contradicting \( J = \emptyset \) for such \( s \). Second, consider the case \( \phi(s) \neq s \). Again, suppose that for some \( y \in E, V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi(s)) \); notice that \( y \neq s \), because \( V^\phi(\phi(s)) = V^\phi(\theta(\min J)) \geq V^\phi(s) \). Let \( k \) be the stage in which \( y \) is considered. If \( k < \min J \), then \( y \) is considered before \( \phi(s) \), then a winning coalition must accept \( y \), which implies \( k \in J \), contradicting \( k < \min J \). If, on the other hand, \( k > \min J \), then notice that \( k \in J \) (otherwise, \( V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi(s)) \) is impossible). If \( k > \max J \), then we have \( V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi(s)) = V^\phi(\theta(\min J)) \geq V^\phi(s) \), which means that this proposal must be accepted, so \( k \in J \), a contradiction. If \( k < \max J \), then we can take \( \ell = \min \{J \cap \{k + 1, |F| - 1\}\} \). Since \( V^\phi(y) > V^\phi(\phi(s)) = V^\phi(\theta(\min J)) \geq V^\phi(\theta(\ell)) \), it must again be that \( y \) is accepted, so \( k \in J \), again a contradiction. In all cases, the assertion that such a \( y \) exists leads to a contradiction, which proves that property 2 holds.

Finally, we show that property 3 of definition 3 holds. This is trivial if \( \phi(s) = s \). Otherwise, we already proved that for all \( j \in J \), \( V^\phi(\theta(j)) \geq V^\phi(s) \); in particular, this is true for \( j = \min J \). Consequently, \( V^\phi(\phi(s)) \geq V^\phi(s) \). This completes the proof that \( \phi \) is an MVE. QED

Proof of Theorem 6

Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that \( \phi_E(x) < x \). Then \( \phi_E|_E \) and \( \phi_E|_E \) are mappings from \( E \) to \( S \) such that both are MVE on the restricted environment \( E \), which is identical to \( E \). Moreover, these MVE are different, as \( \phi_E(x) = x > \phi_E(x) \). However, this violates uniqueness, completing the proof. QED
Proof of Corollary 1

Consider an alternative set of environments $E' = \{E^0, E^2\}$, where $E^0$ coincides with $E^2$ on $S$, but the transition probabilities are the same as in $E$. Clearly, $\phi'$ defined by $\phi_{i\ell} = \phi_{i\ell} = \phi_{i\ell}$ is an MVE in $E'$. Let us now consider environments $E^0$ and $E'$ obtained from $E'$ and $E$, respectively, using the procedure from Section III.B. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that $\phi_{i\ell}(x) < x$; then environments $E^0$ and $E'$ coincide on $[1, x]$ by construction. Theorem 6 then implies that, since $\phi_{i\ell}(x) = x$, then $\phi_{i\ell}(x) \geq x$ (since $\phi_{i\ell}$ and $\phi_{i\ell}$ are the unique MVE in $E^0$ and $E'$, respectively). But by the definition of $\phi'$, $x < \phi_{i\ell}(x) = \phi_{i\ell}(x) < x$, a contradiction. This contradiction completes the proof. QED

Proof of Theorem 7

Take generic parameter values (see the proof of theorem 2).

Part 1: It suffices to prove this result in stationary environments. By theorem 8, there are no cycles, and thus for any $x \in S$, the sequence $x, \phi(x), \phi^2(x), \ldots$ has a limit. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that MVE $\phi$ is nonmonotone, which means that there are states $x, y \in S$ such that $x < y$ and $\phi(x) > \phi(y)$. Without loss of generality we can assume that $x$ and $y$ are such that the set $Z = \{x, \phi(x), \phi^2(x), \ldots ; y, \phi(y), \phi^2(y), \ldots\}$ has the fewest different states. In that case, mapping $\phi$ is monotone on the set $Z \\setminus \{x, y\}$, which implies that $\{V_{i\ell}\}_{i\in Z}$ satisfies increasing differences. By property 2 of definition 3 applied to state $x$, we get

$$V_{\max, i\ell}(\phi(x)) \geq V_{\max, i\ell}(\phi(y)). \tag{A24}$$

and if we apply it to state $y$,

$$V_{\min, i\ell}(\phi(y)) \geq V_{\min, i\ell}(\phi(x)). \tag{A25}$$

Since $\max M_i < \min M_i$ by assumption, (A24) implies

$$V_{\min, i\ell}(\phi(x)) \geq V_{\min, i\ell}(\phi(y)).$$

For generic parameter values, this inequality is strict and thus contradicts (A25).

Part 2: Again, consider stationary environments only. If $\phi$ is nonmonotone, then for some $x, y \in S$ we have $x < y$ and $\phi(x) > \phi(y)$, which in this case implies $\phi(x) = y = x + 1$ and $\phi(y) = x$. However, if parameters are generic, this contradicts theorem 8. This contradiction completes the proof. QED

Proof of Theorem 8

It suffices to prove that within any stationary environment $E$, a path that starts with any state $i$ is monotone. We first rule out cycles, where for some $x, \phi(x) \neq x$, but $\phi^k(x) = x$ for some $k > 1$. Without loss of generality, let $k$ be the minimal one for which this is true and $x$ be the highest element in the cycle. In this case, we have, for any $i \in N$:

$$V_i(x) - V_i(\phi(x)) = u_i(x) + \beta V_i(\phi(x)) - V_i(\phi(x))$$

$$= u_i(x) - (1 - \beta) V_i(\phi(x))$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \frac{(1 - \beta)^j}{1 - \beta} [u_i(x) - u_i(\phi^j(x))].$$
which is increasing in $i$, since each term is increasing in $i$ as $x > \phi(x)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, k - 1$. This means that $\{V(x)\}_{i=1}^{n(x)}$ satisfies the increasing differences. Because of that, property 3 of definition 3, when applied to state $x$, implies that $V(\phi(x)) \geq V(x)$ for all $i \in M$. However, if we take $y = \phi^{-1}(x)$ (so $\phi(y) = x$), then property 2 of definition 3 would imply that $V(x) \geq V(\phi(x))$ for at least one $i \in M$. Increasing differences implies that $V(x) \geq V(\phi(x))$ for at least one $i \in M$, and therefore, for such $i$, $V(x) = V(\phi(x))$. This cannot hold for generic parameter values; this contradiction proves that cycles are ruled out.

Now, to prove that any path is monotone, assume the opposite, and take $x$ that generates the shortest nonmonotone path (i.e., such that the sequence $x, \phi(x), \phi^2(x), \ldots$ has the fewest different states). In that case, either $\phi(x) > x$ but $\phi^2(x) < \phi(x)$ or vice versa; without loss of generality consider the former case. Denote $y = \phi(x)$; then the sequence $y, \phi(y), \phi^2(y), \ldots$ is monotone by construction of $x$. Consequently, $\{V(x)\}_{i=1}^{n(x)}$ satisfies increasing differences. By property 3 of definition 3 applied to state $y$, for all $i \in M$, $V(\phi(y)) \geq V(y)$; for generic parameter values, this inequality is strict. Since $\phi(y) < y$, this is true for $i \in [1, \max M]$; now, $x < y$ implies max $M \leq \max M$, and therefore, for all $i \in M$, $V(\phi(y)) > V(y)$. However, this contradicts property 2 of definition 3, applied to state $x$. This contradiction completes the proof. QED

References


