

Special Education and English Language Learner Students in Boston Charter Schools: Impact and Classification

Elizabeth Setren*

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Abstract

Special education and English Language Learners experience large achievement gaps and account for a disproportionate amount of school spending. The question of whether and how well charter schools serve special needs students remains one of the most controversial in the charter school debate. This paper uses admissions lotteries to estimate the effects of Boston charter school enrollment on special needs students' achievement and special needs classification. Charter schools remove special needs classifications and move special education students into more inclusive classrooms at a rate over two times higher than traditional public schools. Charter attendance boosts achievement similarly for special needs and non-special needs students. Charters also increase the likelihood that special needs students meet high school graduation requirements and earn a state merit scholarship. Even the most disadvantaged special needs students benefit from charter attendance. Reclassification explains under 26 percent of the achievement gains for special needs students. The results suggest that special needs students can achieve gains without the traditional set of special needs services in the charter environment.

*Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Email: esetren@mit.edu. I am grateful to Joshua Angrist, Parag Pathak, and Amy Finkelstein for their guidance and support. I also thank David Autor, Esther Dufo, Ben Olken, Magne Mogstad, Sarah Cohodes, Peter Hull, Christopher Walters, Sarah Cordes, Sydnee Caldwell, Mayara Felix, Natalie Obergruber, and the participants in the MIT Public Finance Lunch, MIT Labor Lunch, the Association for Education Finance and Policy Conference, and the Evidence Based Economics Summer Meeting for their comments. Special thanks go to Carrie Conaway, Cliff Chuang, Eleanor Rounds-Bloom, and the staff of the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education for data, suggestions, and assistance. Thanks also to Annice Correia and Eryn Heying for administrative support and Anthony Yu, Alex Jucta, Xialing Zhang, Veronica Salazar, and Hazal Can for assistance preparing the lottery records. This work was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship.

1 Introduction

Schools spend over twice as much per pupil educating special education students and English Language Learners (ELLs) compared to other students (e.g. Hayes et al. (2013); Chambers, Parrish, and Harr (2004)). Yet in Massachusetts special needs students have achievement gaps at least double the size of the low-income and black-white achievement gaps. Urban, high poverty districts have large and growing special needs student populations: fifty percent of Boston Public School students have either a special education or ELL status. Despite special needs students' increasing prevalence, higher costs, and low academic achievement, little causal evidence exists for which school practices and models serve them well.

Lower enrollment rates of special needs students in charters compared to district schools have led to the common perception that charters underserve special education and ELL students (Government Accountability Office, 2012; Boston Globe Editorial Board, 2015; Massachusetts Teachers Association, 2015). Critics question whether charter schools have the capacity to provide special needs services because charters lack the economies of scale of traditional public school districts. These concerns call into question whether the growing evidence that urban charters generate gains for lottery applicants, particularly for low-performing students, extends to special needs students. Perhaps urban charters' remarkable achievement gains are generated in part by a tendency to focus on non-special needs students.¹

This paper uses the first comprehensive lottery dataset for an entire city's charter sector, covering over 89 percent of enrollment in Boston's elementary, middle, and high school charters. I report new lottery-based estimates of charter effectiveness for over 7,500 special needs charter applicants. I also document striking differences in special needs classification practices in Boston charter and traditional public schools.

Special needs classification, a process managed by individual schools, legally obligates schools to provide services and accommodations to help special needs students succeed academically. Charter enrollment nearly doubles the likelihood that a student in special education at the time of the lottery loses this classification. Moreover, charters remove ELL classifications three times as often. Charters are also three times more likely than traditional public schools to move special education students into

¹A growing literature documents lottery-based evidence that urban charter schools general large gains in Boston, Chicago, Denver, and New York (Angrist, Pathak, and Walters, 2013; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2011; Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Hoxby, Kang, and Murarka, 2009; Dobbie and Fryer, 2011; Angrist et al., 2016; Walters, 2014; Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2015)

general education classrooms. These classification changes happen at the beginning of the school year following the lottery and therefore cannot be attributed to learning gains.

Although charter enrollment reduces time spent receiving services and exposure to special needs teachers, Boston charters generate large achievement gains for their special needs students. These gains are similar to those made by non-special needs students in charter schools. Charters also significantly increase the likelihood that special needs students meet a key high school graduation requirement, become eligible for a state merit scholarship, and take an AP exam. Special education students in charters score on average 115.7 points higher on the SAT than their traditional public school counterparts.

Charters generate academic gains even for the most disadvantaged charter applicants. Special needs students who scored in the bottom third on their state exams in the year of the lottery experience gains of over 0.24 standard deviations in math. English Language Learners with the lowest baseline scores have the largest English exam gains. Students with the most severe needs at the time of the lottery – special education students who spent the majority of their time in substantially separate classrooms and ELLs with beginning English proficiency – perform significantly better in charters than in traditional public schools.

Evidence from a multiple endogenous variable estimation finds that reclassification has a weak positive effect on test scores. The weak positive correlation between individual charter schools' reclassification effects and special needs achievement gains supports this finding. Reclassification can explain 1 to 25 percent of the achievement gains and there is no evidence that reclassification hinders student outcomes. At the same time, charter practices that predict gains for general education students also predict gains for special needs students.

My study is the first to my knowledge to study the causal effects of charter enrollment on special needs classification and achievement. This paper also contributes to the effectiveness of special needs classification and practices literature. Earlier research on ELL classification and bilingual education finds mixed effects (Chin, Daysal, and Imberman, 2013; Pope, 2016; Matsudaira, 2005; Robinson-Cimpian and Thompson, 2015). Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) find that special education classification boosts math outcomes by analyzing students who move in and out of special education programs, but these movements are not random.²

The next section provides background on Boston charter schools, discusses the special needs classification process, and describes the data analyzed here. Section 3 details my empirical strategy and

²Other work focuses on how financial incentives effect special education classification (Cullen, 2003; Kubik, 1999). Cullen and Rivkin (2003) overviews the classification incentives and stratification in school choice programs.

reports the effect of charter enrollment on special needs classification. Section 4 reports the academic effects of charter enrollment and Section 5 investigates mechanisms. The final section concludes.

2 Background and Data

2.1 Boston’s Charter Sector

Massachusetts uses a rigorous charter authorization and monitoring process. Since the state first allowed charters in 1995, it has unauthorized 18 schools (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2014). The state also restricts the number of charter schools and the number of students they can enroll.

Massachusetts urban charters are also characterized by the prevalence of No Excuses pedagogy (Angrist, Pathak, and Walters, 2013). This approach utilizes strict discipline, a long school day and year, selective teacher hiring, frequent testing, high expectations, teacher feedback, data-driven instruction, and tutoring (Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 2003; Carter, 2000). Past studies have documented a strong positive relationship between the use of No Excuses practices and charter school gains for the average lottery applicant in both NYC and Boston (Dobbie and Fryer, 2011; Angrist, Pathak, and Walters, 2013), but little is known about the effect of these practices on special education and ELL students specifically.

2.2 Special Needs Classification Processes

The special education classification process begins when a parent, teacher, or school staff requests an evaluation for a student. This can happen at any grade or age. After a request, the district or a private psychologist conducts an evaluation. The school holds a meeting with the parent(s) to decide the student’s classification. If the student is classified, the school develops an Individualized Education Program (IEP) that details the supports the student will receive. Students are designated to full, partial, or substantial separate classroom inclusion. Students in full inclusion spend less than 21% of their time outside of the general education classroom. Partial inclusion students spend between 21% to 60% of their time in a separate setting, and substantially separate students spend over 60% of their time receiving special education services. Schools are required to re-evaluate students’ classification and level of services every three years.

Massachusetts public schools survey the parent(s) of all new students, including those coming from

within the same district, to identify students whose primary language at home is not English.³ Once identified, these students take an English Proficiency exam. A licensed ELL teacher or administrator interprets the test to decide whether the student will be classified as ELL and to determine the set of services they will receive. Every Spring, ELL students take a state standardized English proficiency exam, and their teachers and ELL specialists evaluate their results to reconsider their ELL status and services.

Schools aim to improve English language ability of ELL students so that they no longer need the ELL classification and services. This goal of removing classification does not exist for special education students; rather, schools aim to provide the proper set of supports to enable the child succeed academically.

2.3 Classification Incentives

The financial and accountability incentives for special needs classification go in opposite directions and impact charters more than traditional public school districts. The state and local school funding formula in Massachusetts does not include special education enrollment to discourage overclassification. As a result, the formula disincentivizes special education classification due to higher costs for special education services. The funding formula includes lagged ELL enrollment, but districts face financial disincentives to classify students if the costs of services exceed additional funding. Smaller school districts, including charter school districts, face relatively larger disincentives because of economies of scale for providing special needs services.

Accountability incentives encourage schools to properly classify special needs students. The state inspects schools for proper identification of special needs and provision of services. The state accountability system considers the outcomes of special needs students in addition to overall student performance, which incentivizes providing the proper set of services for this group of students to succeed academically.⁴ Charter schools face higher accountability standards and the threat of de-authorization, so these incentives affect charters more acutely than traditional public schools.

³The survey is offered in 28 languages and administered by specially trained professionals (including teachers, principals, and guidance counselors). The training aims to detect if families falsely report English proficiency.

⁴This might also incentivize overclassification to increase the performance of special education students as a whole. The state inspections and financial disincentives counter this incentive.

2.4 Data and Sample

To study the effect of charter attendance for special needs students, this paper uses the admissions lotteries of 30 Boston elementary, middle, and high charter schools from the 2003-04 to 2014-15 school years. These schools account for 89 percent of Boston charter entry grade enrollment in 2012-13. Schools are excluded from the study if they closed,⁵ declined to participate,⁶ had insufficient records,⁷ did not have any oversubscribed lotteries,⁸ or serve alternative students.⁹ Appendix Table A1 describes the schools and application cohorts in the sample.

I match lottery records to state administrative education data for detailed student demographics, enrollment, and outcomes. This data provides both baseline characteristics of students from the time of the lottery and post-lottery outcomes. It includes special education status, disability type, and level of classroom inclusion for special education students and ELL status, native language, and test scores on the annual English proficiency exam for ELLs. I categorize ELL students as beginning, intermediate, or advanced English proficient using their English proficiency exam scores and state guidelines for the amount of services to provide ELLs. I study students with special needs classifications at the time of the lottery because special needs status can change over time. Throughout the paper, mentions of special education and ELL students refer to those with baseline classifications. Similarly, analysis by level of inclusion or English proficiency refers to baseline characteristics. More details about the data and matching procedure appears in the Data Appendix.

This paper's main analysis estimates the impact of charter school attendance on academic outcomes for students by their pre-lottery special needs status. As a result, applicants who are not enrolled in Massachusetts public schools the year of the lottery are excluded because they do not have a pre-lottery special needs status. This excludes 95.4% of pre-k applicants and 70.7% of kindergarten applicants. These excluded applicants are used to investigate the effect of attending a charter school on special needs initial classification.

⁵Uphams Corner Charter School closed in 2009. Fredrick Douglas Charter School and Roxbury Charter High School both closed in 2005.

⁶Kennedy Academy for Health Careers (formerly Health Careers Academy) and Helen Davis Leadership Academy (formerly Smith Leadership Academy) declined to participate

⁷Boston Renaissance and Dudley Street Neighborhood Charter School had insufficient records.

⁸UP Academy Dorchester opened in 2013-14 and did not have an oversubscribed lottery.

⁹Boston Day and Evening Academy Charter serves alternative students, including those who are overage for high school, dropouts, and students with behavioral and attendance issues. In addition to serving a different population than the other Boston charters, Boston Day and Evening Academy uses rolling admissions instead of a lottery, making the school not appropriate for this paper's empirical strategy.

2.5 Representation of Special Needs Students

Until recently, special needs students have been underrepresented among students applying to and attending charters. In 2010, the Massachusetts state legislature passed a law that required charter schools to increase efforts to recruit and retain special education and ELL students. Figure A1 shows that the special education application gap has narrowed for both middle and high school. In Spring 2004, 22.1 percent of BPS students in 4th and 5th grades had a special education status. Comparatively, only 17.0 percent of charter applicants in those grades had a special education status. By the Spring 2014 lottery, the prevalence of special education students in middle school charter lotteries was similar to BPS: 21.6 and 23.1 percent respectively. The gap also closed for high school, with 20.3 percent of applicants with a special education status in charters, compared to 19.5 percent of BPS 8th graders. Gaps in enrollment have also narrowed. Figure A1 shows that gaps between BPS and charters remain in middle school special education enrollment in entry grades, but special education students are overrepresented in 9th grade in charters.¹⁰

Gaps in ELL application and enrollment rates in BPS compared to charters were historically larger, but they have also narrowed. Figure A2 shows that in Spring 2004, ELL students were almost three times more prevalent in BPS than in charter middle and high school lotteries. In the past decade, ELLs have become more prevalent in BPS, and the gap has closed. By Spring 2014, ELLs have similar prevalence in BPS and charters: 24 percent in each for high school and 30 and 27 percent respectively for middle school.

Differences between the application and enrollment trends result from parental choices in response to other school options and the sibling lottery preference. Figures A1 and A2 show that the enrollment gaps have reversed for special education students in high school. The trends are noisier for ELL students, but the middle school ELL enrollment gap has almost halved from 18.0 percent at its peak in 2007 to 9.3 percent in 2014. Similarly, the high school ELL enrollment gap has halved from 9.5 percent in 2009 to 4.3 percent in 2014. Because ELL students were historically underrepresented in charters, the sibling lottery preference means that ELL students have a lower likelihood of getting a charter offer compared to non-ELL students. This likely contributes to the current ELL enrollment gap.

By Spring 2014, students across the pre-lottery levels of special education classroom inclusion and English language proficiency are, for the most part, similarly represented in charter lotteries and BPS as shown in Figures A3 and A4. Small gaps remain for substantially separate inclusion students in

¹⁰I do not display the application and enrollment trends for elementary school charters because a low proportion of pre-k and kindergarten charter applicants have a pre-lottery special needs status.

middle school and high school and for beginning English speakers in high school.¹¹

3 Classification

3.1 Empirical Framework

I use charter lottery offers as instruments to estimate the causal effect of attending charter schools in a two-stage least squares setup. The second-stage equation links charter school attendance with outcomes as follows:

$$y_{ig} = \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_j \delta_j d_{ij} + X_i' \theta + \tau C_{ig} + \epsilon_{igt} \quad (1)$$

where y_{ig} is the outcome of interest for student i in grade g . The terms α_t and β_g represent outcome year and grade effects. The d_{ij} are dummy variables for all combinations of charter school lotteries (indexed by j) present in the sample (henceforth referred to as experimental strata). These experimental strata control for the fact that the set of school applications determines the probability of receiving an offer. Baseline demographic characteristics from the year of the lottery, represented by vector X_i , include gender, race, subsidized lunch status, ELL, special education, and a female-minority interaction.

The treatment variable, C_{ig} , equals one if the student enrolled in a charter any time following the lottery and until the time schools reported special needs classification.¹² For models testing charter effects on English proficiency exam scores, high school graduation, and college preparation measures, C_{ig} indicates charter enrollment between the lottery and the test or graduation date. Standard errors are clustered on the school, grade, and year of the outcome. The parameter τ captures the causal effect

¹¹Students with developmental delay are slightly over-represented in middle school charter lotteries. Students with autism and intellectual disabilities are slightly underrepresented in middle school charter lotteries relative to BPS. For the past ten years, there has been similar representation for students with physical, health, sensory, neurological, communication, and multiple disabilities in middle school lotteries. Students with learning disabilities have been similarly represented in middle school lotteries since Spring 2009.

Students with learning disabilities are over-represented in high school charter lotteries relative to BPS. Students with autism and developmental delay are slightly underrepresented in high school charter lotteries. All other disability types were similarly represented in high school charter lotteries compared to BPS by Spring 2014. Over the past ten years, students with physical, health, sensory, neurological, and multiple disabilities have been similarly represented in high school charter lotteries and in BPS.

Students who speak Haitian Creole have been similarly represented in charter lotteries and BPS for the past ten years. Chinese speaking students remain underrepresented in charter lotteries. Spanish speaking students historically were underrepresented in lotteries and now apply to charters at similar rates as their prevalence in BPS.

Subsidized lunch status students were historically underrepresented in charter lotteries, but became similarly represented in middle school charter lotteries by Spring 2011 and in high school lotteries by Spring 2006.

Further information about application trends for these subgroups is available at the request of the author.

¹²Students for whom C_{igt} equals zero enroll in non-charter public schools, including traditional public schools, pilot schools, exam schools, and innovation schools. For simplicity, I refer to this group by the most common type: traditional public schools.

of charter school enrollment. I estimate the model separately for each baseline special needs status: special education, ELL, and non-special needs.

When estimating the math or English exam effects, C_{ig} represents years spent in a charter from the time of the lottery to the the test date. Students take exams in grades 3 through 8 and grade 10, so elementary and middle school applicants who appear in multiple testing grades contribute multiple observations to the estimation. To account for this, the standard errors, ϵ_{igst} , are clustered on the unique student identifier in addition to the school, grade, and year of the test. For math and English test results, the parameter τ estimates the causal effect of a year of charter school attendance.

I use two instruments for charter attendance: whether a student receives a random offer on the day of the lottery (immediate offer) or whether a student receives an offer from the randomly-ordered waitlist (waitlist offer). Z_{1i} is equal to one if the applicant received an immediate offer to attend a charter and zero otherwise. Z_{2i} designates whether the applicant received a waitlist offer. Appendix Table A1 details the schools and application cohorts with immediate and waitlist offers.

The first stage equation for the instrumental variables estimation is:

$$C_{ig} = \lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_j \mu_j d_{ij} + X_i' \Gamma + \pi_1 Z_{1i} + \pi_2 Z_{2i} + \eta_{igst}, \quad (2)$$

where π_1 and π_2 capture the effects of receiving immediate or waitlist offers on charter attendance. Like the second-stage equation, the first stage includes year and grade effects, experimental strata dummies, and baseline demographic controls.

Because they are randomly assigned, charter offers are likely to be independent of student background and ability within experimental strata. The pre-lottery demographics and test scores are similar for offered and non-offered students, as shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. Differences in baseline characteristics by offer status are small, mostly statistically insignificant, and the p-values from joint tests are high. The subset of students with baseline special needs also have comparable characteristics across offer status, as seen in Columns (6) and (7) for special education and Columns (9) and (10) for ELL.

Differences between charter applicants and Boston Public School (BPS) students are documented in the first two columns of Table 1. Lottery applicants are less likely to have a special education status than BPS students. The charter applicant pool has a smaller proportion of substantially separate and full inclusion special education students and similar rates of partial inclusion students. The two populations have similar rates of ELL students (though as discussed above, this is not historically

true). All levels of English proficiency are more represented in charter applicants than in BPS students. Lottery applicants have slightly higher baseline test scores compared to BPS students (0.042 and 0.093 standard deviations in math and English respectively). The baseline test score positive selection for special needs students ranges from 0.08 standard deviations to 0.21 standard deviations.

Special needs applicants have substantially lower baseline test scores on average than the full lottery applicant pool as described in Columns (5) and (8) of Table 1. This achievement gap is large, particularly for special education students. Compared to the full lottery applicant sample, the baseline math scores are 0.595 standard deviations lower for special education students and 0.329 standard deviations lower for ELL students. The special needs achievement gaps are larger for baseline English scores.

3.2 Special Needs Classification

Receiving a lottery offer increases the time spent in charters and the likelihood of enrolling in a charter. These first stage estimates, which are strong for both special and non-special needs students, appear in Table A2. Special needs middle school applicants with immediate and waitlist offers spend over a year and 0.66 years longer respectively in charters compared to those without offers. Elementary and high school special needs applicants who receive offers also spend substantially more time in charters. Immediate and waitlist offers also boost the likelihood that special needs students will enroll in charters one year after the lottery by over 58 and 35 percentage points respectively. The first stage for charter enrollment does not equal one because some students with offers elect to go to traditional public schools and some students without offers ultimately enroll by moving off of a waitlist after our data was collected.

Charters remove special needs classifications and move special education students to more inclusive settings at the time of enrollment¹³ at a higher rate than traditional public schools. Column (2) of Table 2 shows that relative to their counterparts who attend traditional public schools, elementary and middle school special education charter students are 19.0 and 16.1 percentage points more likely to have their special education classification removed.¹⁴ Middle school charters even remove special education status from students with more severe disabilities: students from substantially separate classrooms

¹³Data is collected on October 1st. Given this short time span, schools likely do not have sufficient time to alter the initial classification given at the time of enrollment before the reporting date.

¹⁴I consider students to have their classifications removed if they had a classification the year of the lottery, have no classification on the October 1st following the lottery, and continue to have no classification for the next two years. Students who have their classification removed and then reinstated are coded as keeping their classification. I follow the same practice for changes in classroom inclusion.

are 14.0 percentage points less likely to keep their special education status in a charter compared to a traditional public school. Charter high schools change classifications of incoming special education students at a similar rate to traditional public high schools.¹⁵

Charters move elementary and middle school special education applicants to more inclusive classrooms over 29 percentage points more often than traditional publics, a pattern documented in Column (10) of Table 2. This means that students spend more time in a general education classroom and less time receiving services outside of the mainstream classroom. Middle school charters move students across all ranges of need to more inclusive settings. For elementary schools, charters move students with the most severe needs to full inclusion classrooms (see Column (4) and (8) of Table 2). Overall, high school charters do not move special education students to more inclusive settings at significantly higher rates, but they are 47.0 percentage points more likely to move partial inclusion classroom students to a full inclusion or general education classroom.

In all school levels, charters remove ELL status at the time of enrollment at a substantially higher rate than traditional public schools. Ninety percent of elementary ELL applicants who enroll in traditional public schools remain ELL by the following fall, but as shown in Table 3, 19.8 percentage points fewer elementary school ELL applicants maintain their ELL classification in charters. Compared to traditional public schools, applicants to charter middle and high schools are respectively 32.8 and 37.4 percentage points less likely to keep their ELL classifications. Students with intermediate and advanced English proficiency drive the differences in classification. In both types of schools, those with beginning English proficiency rarely have their ELL classification removed at the time of enrollment.

Furthermore, charters classify new enrollees to Massachusetts public schools as special needs less often than traditional public schools. New students in pre-k and kindergarten do not have pre-lottery special needs classifications. Only 1.4 percent of applicants who attend a traditional public school become classified as special education at the time of enrollment.¹⁶ Attending a charter leads to an even lower special education classification rate close to zero (see Column (2), Panel A of Table 2). The difference comes largely from fewer students receiving full inclusion status in charters (see Column (8), Panel A of Table 2).¹⁷ Traditional public schools designate 63.7 percent of non-native English speakers,

¹⁵Applicants from substantially separate classrooms are substantially less likely to remain classified as special education in a charter high school. It is surprising that students receiving special education services for more than 60% of the time prior to the lottery would transition to receiving no services. The effect fades away in the 2009-10 through 2013-14 school years.

¹⁶The state actively recruits students with special needs for early intervention pre-k that starts at age 3. Therefore, a large portion of students who qualify for special education services at a young age already have a classification at the time of the lottery.

¹⁷Analogous analysis of initial classification for new students could not be conducted on middle and high school

the potential candidates for ELL services, as ELL. The rate is 26.1 percentage points lower in charters (see Panel A of Table 3). These classification and inclusion effects appear to persist for two years, as shown in Tables A3 and A4, though with less precision.¹⁸

3.3 Explanations for Reclassification Effects

Learning gains cannot justify the classification differences because the special needs status changes occur at the beginning of the school year following the lottery. At this point, schools have not had time to generate substantial learning gains. The differential special needs classification for new pre-k and kindergarten students implies that charters have a lower preference for classification compared to traditional public schools. Massachusetts law requires schools to assess the English proficiency of all incoming non-native English speaking students. Therefore, schools assess all incoming ELLs, but charters remove ELL classification 3.1 times more often than traditional public schools. This supports the idea that charters have lower preference for classification.

Unlike English language proficiency, Massachusetts does not require schools to assess all new enrolled students for special education needs. Because schools do not evaluate each student, factors other than schools' classification preferences could contribute to different classification practices. Better transfer of student records, which include special education information, between BPS district schools compared to between BPS district schools and charter schools plays a major role in special education classification changes.

As a result, charters learn of special needs classifications from voluntary parental reporting before they receive school records.¹⁹ The initial reliance on parental reporting could contribute to fewer students maintaining their special education classifications in charters. A survey conducted by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education that resulted from this study found that the most common reason for special education classification removal was parent(s) not

applicants because few students have no special education classification at application and then become classified after the lottery.

¹⁸The time of enrollment and two years after the lottery sample sizes are different because data from the most recent lottery is included in the former, but not the latter, and some students attrit from the sample if they move out of state or to private school. The estimates for the Fall after the lottery are similar in magnitude and significance if the sample is restricted to those who appear in the data after two years.

¹⁹Starting in late Fall 2012, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education began using a new data reporting system called Edwin Analytics. This system aims to make student data accessible to their schools in a more efficient and timely manner. The charter schools began using this system at varying times. Even with the new system, charter schools rarely have the special education classification information of their students before the school year started. For students that notify the school of a special education status, charter schools report difficulty getting important documentation about students' special education needs and services including their evaluations and Individualized Education Programs (IEPs).

disclosing.²⁰ The reasons why parents decline reporting special education status could include stigma, individual preferences, not knowing their child received special education services, assuming the school received the records, and not understanding what special education means. Additionally, parents can refuse their child’s special education classification. Parental refusal of special needs status could differ in charters compared to traditional public schools.

The data transfer issues and differences in parental reporting and preferences likely contribute to the increased use of inclusion in charter schools. Charters’ preference for high levels of special education inclusion, often cited in charter schools’ annual reports, likely also play a role in higher levels of inclusion. Additionally, the relatively smaller size of charter schools make it less likely for them to have the economies of scale to provide substantially separate and partial inclusion services to students compared to traditional public schools.

3.4 Special Needs Inputs and Implications of Special Needs Reclassification

Reclassified special needs students have substantially different educational experiences than those that remain classified. Schools are only legally obligated to provide special education or ELL services to students with special needs classifications. Therefore, the higher rate of classification removal in charter schools likely results in baseline special needs students receiving fewer special education and ELL services. Additionally, students who are moved to more inclusive classrooms spend less time receiving services. Classification differences likely contribute to the large differences in special needs educational inputs between charter and BPS.

Students who enroll in charters experience lower special education and ELL staff-to-student ratios (Columns (4) and (6) of Table A5). Lottery applicants who enrolled in BPS have roughly 1.9 special education and 1.5 ELL staff per 100 students. Charter treated compliers experienced 1.1 and 1.3 fewer special education and ELL staff respectively. Lower counts of special needs teachers drives the lower special needs staff-to-student ratio in charters.

Despite charters having fewer classified special needs students, they employ mostly similar proportions of special needs specialists²¹ and content support teachers.²² The similar rates of specialists in

²⁰The survey investigated all cases of special education classification removal in the 2012-13 through 2014-15 school years. All sample charters participated. Forty-nine percent of the cases cited parent(s) not disclosing. The other reasons include unknown (12 percent), record error (12), student found ineligible for services after lottery by BPS (8), student transferred out of charter soon after enrolling (7), parent declined services (7), student determined ineligible by charter (3), and charter gave services later in the year (2).

²¹Special needs specialists include special education and ELL directors who oversee service provision, special education diagnosticians, therapists, and counselors.

²²Content support teachers coach teachers in how to better serve those with special education needs or limited English

charters and traditional public schools suggest that either specialists work with students who remain classified more intensively or that they also serve students without special needs classifications.

Charters also spend 44 percent less on special education instructional spending compared to BPS (shown in Table A6).²³ See Table A6 for detailed BPS and charter school expenditure and grant information.

4 Academic Effects

Charter enrollment leads to two effects for special needs students: higher likelihood of reclassification and exposure to the charter school environment. The charter school environment and reclassification could have complementary or opposing effects. The high academic and strict behavior standards common in Boston charter schools could leave special needs students behind or motivate them to meet higher expectations. Special needs students could thrive in a more inclusive classroom environment or fall behind without the specialized services they previously received.

Prior research suggests no effect or limited gains from ELL classification removal (Chin, Daysal, and Imberman, 2013; Pope, 2016; Matsudaira, 2005) except Robinson-Cimpian and Thompson (2015) who estimate a negative effect on when lower ability ELLs marginally qualify for classification removal. To the best of my knowledge, no causal evidence exists for special education classification removal.

In this section, I present causal estimates the effect of charter enrollment on special needs' students outcomes which bundles the two treatments of reclassification and charter environment. In Section 6, I estimate the academic effects of reclassification and the charter environment.

4.1 Charter School Effects

Charter school attendance has large positive effects for math and English state exam scores for special needs students. Table 4 documents the large and statistically significant gains for elementary, middle, and high school special needs applicants. A year of charter attendance increases math test scores by over 0.240 standard deviations for middle and high school special education applicants and by 0.309 standard deviations for elementary school special education applicants. ELL students score over 0.306 standard deviations higher on math in charters relative to traditional public schools.

proficiency in the classroom or teach alongside another teacher, providing additional attention and differentiation. They could more broadly help students without special education or ELL statuses who might also benefit from the additional attention or a more accessible learning environment. In particular, these interventions could help students with baseline special education and ELL statuses who had their classification removed.

²³Districts do not report ELL specific school expenditures.

Charters generate English score gains of 0.177 and 0.200 standard deviations for special education and ELL middle school applicants (shown in Panel B of Table 4). Elementary special education and ELL applicants had English exam charter gains of 0.478 and 0.360 standard deviations respectively (see Panel A of Table 4). While English exam estimates for high schools are noisier, they are also positive.

Positive charter effects are, with few exceptions, statistically similar for special needs and non-special needs students; however, point estimates for ELLs are larger and become statistically significantly different than non-special needs effects when all grade levels are pooled together.

One year of charter attendance for a special needs student narrows the special needs achievement gap. Most notably, after one year in a charter, ELL charter students score higher on the math exam than non-special needs students in traditional public schools for elementary and high school (seen by adding Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 and comparing to the non-special needs traditional public school mean in Column (5)). The larger gap between special education and non-special needs students narrows substantially as well. With one year of charter enrollment, the special education gap for math decreases by 27 percent for middle and high school students and by 48 percent for elementary school students. Charter attendance also narrows the gap for English, though by a lower proportion.

The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (shown in Table A7) have comparable estimates to the two-stage least squares. This suggests that the OLS is unbiased. Therefore, there is not significant selection into complying with the results of the lottery: accepting a charter offer if it is received and not attending a charter if the student does not receive an offer.

The reduced form or intent to treat estimates (shown in Table A8) also have comparable estimates to the two-stage least squares. Therefore, even without accounting for lottery compliance, randomly assigned charter offers have a strong positive relation to test scores.

The effects of charter attendance accumulate in the first two years and then level off. The first year of charter attendance generates gains of 0.397 and 0.457 standard deviations in math for special education and ELL middle school applicants respectively (see Figure A5, Panel B). The charter enrollment effect nearly doubles for special education students and grows by 1.6 times for ELLs in the second year (see Figure A5, Panel C). After the third year, the charter effects stabilize: effects in the second and third years are comparable (see Figure A5, Panel D).²⁴

The annual English proficiency exam – which schools use to reevaluate ELL students' classification

²⁴This analysis focuses on middle school applicants because they take the state standardized exam in the three years following the lottery. The test schedule for elementary and high school applicants does not lend itself to this analysis.

and services – also suggests that charter schools improve English skills for ELLs. Attending a charter makes students less likely to take the English proficiency exam because charters remove ELL status at higher rates than traditional public schools (see Column (2) of Table A9). Charters likely remove classification from the ELLs with relatively higher English proficiency: leading to negative selection. Therefore if traditional public schools and charters have the same effect on English language proficiency, charters would have a negative effect on English proficiency scores. Instead, charter students perform similarly or significantly better compared to traditional public school students: suggesting positive charter effects on English proficiency (see Column (4) of Table A9).

Charters also have positive effects on longer-term outcomes that likely have a strong, lasting link to human capital and future earnings through educational attainment. Panel A of Table 5 shows that charter special education and ELL students are 24.4 and 36.7 percentage points respectively more likely to reach a key high school graduation requirement: reaching proficiency on the 10th grade math and English exams.²⁵ Students who do not meet this requirement need to fulfill remedial coursework to graduate. Therefore, fulfilling this requirement keeps students on the path towards high school graduation and enables them to take more college preparation courses.

Charters also boost the likelihood that special education students and ELL students will become eligible for the Adams state merit college scholarship by 11.3 percentage points and 28.7 percentage points each. The Adams Scholarship awards free tuition to Massachusetts public universities based on 10th grade math and English exams and has stricter conditions than the proficiency graduation requirement.

Evidence in Panel B of Table 5 suggests that charter enrollment has positive effects on college preparation exams for special needs students. Special needs charter and traditional public school students take the SAT at similar rates, but charter enrollment leads special education students to score 115.3 points higher on the SAT. Special education and ELL students are 36.3 and 40.3 percentage points more likely to take at least one AP exam in charters compared to in traditional public schools. However, there is no significant effect of charter enrollment on scoring a 3 or higher, which is required to earn college credit. Columns (7) and (8) of Table 5 show the effects across special needs status are not statistically significantly different.

Charter enrollment dramatically lowers the likelihood that special education and ELL students will graduate high school in four years by 36 percentage points (see Panel C of Table 5). Given the gains

²⁵This requirement is called Competency Determination.

in reaching the proficiency graduation requirement, this is surprising. However, special needs students are similarly likely to graduate within five years in charters than in traditional public schools. Special needs students in charters and traditional public schools also have similar five-year high school dropout rates. Angrist et al. (2016) suggest that students could take longer to graduate from charters because they need additional time to meet charters' rigorous graduation requirements or because they choose to save money by remaining in high school for an additional year rather than seeking remediation at a community college.

4.2 Heterogeneity

Charters generate test score gains for even the most disadvantaged special needs students. Panel A of Table 6 shows gains of 0.256 standard deviations in math for special education students with the highest need. Students with less severe needs, those who apply from partial and full inclusion classrooms, also experience gains of 0.328 and 0.269 standard deviations respectively. English exam gains for special education students are positive and of similar magnitude across level of inclusion, but they are imprecise for substantially separate and partial inclusion students.

Those with the lowest level of English proficiency experience math and English test score gains of over 0.400 standard deviations in charters as seen in Panel B of Table . Charters also generate math and English test score gains for ELLs with intermediate and advanced English proficiency.

Baseline test scores provide an alternative approach to analyze whether charters benefit the neediest students. Column (2) of Table 7 shows that the bottom third of special education students, as measured by their combined pre-lottery math and English exams, score 0.255 standard deviations higher in math and 0.189 in English in charter schools. Column (4) shows that charters also have positive effects for the bottom third of ELLs. While the higher-baseline performing students also experience charter gains, the bottom third of ELLs experience the largest gains for English. The cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for treated and untreated charter compliers in Figure A5 show charters boost student performance across the test score distribution.

Charter gains are strongest for those with specific learning disabilities, which are the most common disability type among charter applicants (see Table A10).²⁶ The estimates for other types of disabilities

²⁶Federal law 34 C.F.R. §§300.7 and 300.541 defines specific learning disability as “a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calculations, including conditions such as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia.” Of the lottery applicants with a special education status, 40% of them have a specific learning disability. The severity of learning disabilities varies across lottery applicants: at the time of the lottery, thirty-seven percent come from a full inclusion

were imprecise. Charters generate significant math and English gains for ELLs who speak Spanish and Haitian Creole, the most common native languages of applicants after English (shown in Table A11). While the other native languages are not prevalent enough to estimate alone, ELLs who speak a language other than Spanish or Haitian Creole experience significant gains in math.

5 Mechanisms

5.1 Reclassification and School Environment

Do the academic gains documented above stem from general charter school practices that affect all attendees or from reclassification? Legal requirements and best practices operate under the assumption that special needs students need services and accommodations to succeed. Does charter reclassification help or hinder special needs students?

The similar charter achievement effects for special needs and non-special needs students suggest that general charter school practices have a consistent effect for both groups. However, the similar effect sizes could mask differences in the mechanisms that led to the gains. For example, positive effects of general charter school practices for special needs students could outweigh negative effects of reclassification.

Empirical Strategy

To answer these questions, I estimate the effect of reclassification in charters and in traditional public schools and the effect of charter enrollment without reclassification. This estimation requires quasi-random variation in charter enrollment and in student reclassification in charters and in traditional public schools. Unlike the lottery which randomly offers students seats at charters, schools non-randomly make reclassification decisions based upon students' needs.

To address this selection in reclassification, I harness school-specific variation in reclassification rates and pre-lottery characteristics of charter applicants. I use individual charter lottery offers and the interaction of these offers with students' pre-lottery reclassification likelihood (see the Data Appendix for a detailed explanation of the index's estimation) as instruments for charter enrollment, classroom, 44% from partial inclusion, and 19% from substantially separate classrooms.

classification removal, and the interaction of charter enrollment and classification removal.²⁷ ²⁸ The individual charter lottery offers randomize not only whether students can enroll in charters, but also student exposure to different reclassification rates. The interaction of individual charter offers with students' reclassification likelihood captures variation in classification removal for similar students. In a constant effects framework, these instruments identify causal effects for charter compliers. Heterogeneous effects across the interacted characteristics make the estimates difficult to interpret (Kline and Walters, forthcoming; Hull, 2015; Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad, forthcoming).

The second stage equation links charter attendance and reclassification to test score outcomes as follows:

$$y_{ig} = \tau_1 C_{ig} + \tau_2 R_i + \tau_3 C_{ig} X R_{ig} + \gamma I_i + \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_j \delta_j d_{ij} + X_i' \theta + \epsilon_{igts} \quad (3)$$

where y_{ig} is the test score of student i in grade g . I estimate the three endogenous variables C_{ig} (years in charter), R_i (an indicator for reclassification by October 1st following the lottery), and $C_{ig} X R_{ig}$ (their interaction). I also control for pre-lottery reclassification likelihood (I_i), year and grade effects, experimental strata, and a vector of pre-lottery demographic characteristics. Middle school applicants have multiple observations – one for each grade in which they take the exam – so I cluster standard errors by student and the school, grade, and year of the test. I estimate each model separately for the different types of reclassification and restrict the sample to students with the corresponding baseline special needs status.

The first stage equations for the two-stage least squares estimation are:

$$C_{ig} = \sum_k \rho_k Z_{ki} + \sum_k \psi_k Z_{ki} X I_i + \varphi I_i + \lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_j \mu_j d_{ij} + X_i' \Gamma + \eta_{igst}, \quad (4)$$

$$R_i = \sum_k \varsigma_k Z_{ki} + \sum_k \vartheta_k Z_{ki} X I_i + \varphi I_i + \lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_j \mu_j d_{ij} + X_i' \Gamma + \eta_{igst}, \quad (5)$$

where ρ_k and ς_k represent the effect of receiving an offer, Z_{ki} , from charter school k on charter attendance and reclassification respectively. ψ_k and ϑ_k capture the effects of a one standard deviation

²⁷Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, and Pathak (2014); Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007); Kline and Walters (forthcoming); Cohodes (2015) also interact site-specific indicators and baseline characteristics with random or quasi-randomly assigned offers to generate new instruments to identify models with multiple endogenous variables.

²⁸Student sorting into charter schools based on reclassification rates also poses a potential threat to the use of school interactions as instruments. There is no clear evidence of this: the average predicted reclassification index of applicants is not correlated with charter reclassification effects for special education increased inclusion and ELL classification removal.

increase in pre-lottery reclassification likelihood, I_i , on charter attendance and reclassification for students with offers at charter school k . The new set of instruments yield charter effect estimates similar to the main estimates (see Columns (1) and (8) of Table 8).

Reclassification

Before estimating the fully saturated model with charter attendance, reclassification, and charter attendance interacted with reclassification, I estimate equation (3) with just charter attendance and reclassification as endogenous variables (see Columns (2) and (9) of Table 8). The new instruments adequately identify the endogenous variables: charter and special education classification removal have strong first stage F-statistics (all above 10). The ELL estimation has strong first stage F-statistics of 27 for classification removal and relatively weaker F-statistics for charter attendance.

Charter enrollment has similar positive effects in the double and single endogenous variable models. Special education classification removal has large positive, but noisy point estimates so I cannot rule out negative reclassification effects. Special needs classification removal results and special education increased classroom inclusion have similar results for the multiple endogenous variable specifications, so I only present special education classification removal estimates. ELL classification removal has a significant 0.258 standard deviation effect on English test scores and a positive point estimate for math. The over-id test rejects the constant effects model for ELL classification removal, indicating substantial effect heterogeneity across charter schools and weakening the validity of the estimates.

To address the over-id problem, I use offer status and indicator for an offer at a charter with above median historical reclassification rates as alternative instruments. This approach yields similar point estimates for ELL classification removal without the over-id problem, but with large standard errors.²⁹

Next I run the fully saturated model with charter enrollment, reclassification, and the interaction of charter enrollment and reclassification. Unlike the estimates above which showed the combined effect of reclassification in charters and traditional public schools, this specification separates the two. Special education classification removal in charters has a null effect, suggesting similar positive effects of reclassification in charters and traditional public schools (see Column (3) of Table 8). The ELL fully saturated model has weak first stage F-statistics and therefore no definitive interpretation for their relative effect in charters versus traditional public schools (shown in Column (10) of Table 8).

The noisy two-stage least squares estimates suggest that classification removal has a positive effect

²⁹Estimates using these and other alternative instruments available at the request of the author

on special needs students' test scores. For increased precision, I estimate the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) version of equation (3) with the same lottery applicant sample. The similarity of the OLS and two-stage least squares estimates for the effect of charter attendance on test scores and on classification removal (compare Table 4 to Table A7 and Tables 2 and 3 to Tables A12 and A13) suggests that the OLS estimates are unbiased.

OLS yields similar, but more precise estimates compared to the two-stage least squares estimation (see Columns (4) and (11) of Table 8). Holding special needs classification constant, one year in a charter boosts math and English test scores of special needs lottery applicants by 0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations on average. Classification removal increases math test scores by 0.239 and 0.166 standard deviations for special education and ELL students respectively. English test scores increase by 0.321 and 0.196 standard deviations for special education and ELL students after classification removal. Special education classification removal has a similar effect in charters and traditional public schools. For ELLs, reclassification in charters has a smaller positive effect relative to reclassification in traditional public schools.

A back of the envelope calculation reveals that reclassification can explain anywhere from 0.9 to 25.4 percent of the effect of charter enrollment on test scores. Using the OLS point estimates, I calculate the upper and lower bound of the effect of charter classification removal on scores. I scale the upper and lower bound by the charter reclassification effect: the percent of applicants who were reclassified in charters, but would have kept their reclassification in a traditional public school. The scaled bounds range from 0.003 to 0.063 standard deviations for special education and ELL reclassification.

The back of the envelope calculation shows that reclassification in charter schools does not fully explain the academic charter effects. Visualizations of the relationship between school and cohort-level reclassification and academic effects provide additional insight into the effect of reclassification. I estimate individual charter school cohort academic effects using the following

$$y_{ig} = \sum_t \sum_s \rho_{st} C_{igs} + X_i' \theta_2 + \alpha_{2t} + \beta_{2g} + \sum_j \delta_{2j} d_{ij} + \epsilon_{igt} \quad (6)$$

where y_{ig} represents student i 's test score in grade g and C_{igs} denotes the years student i spent in charter school s by grade g . Similarly, I estimate individual charter cohort reclassification effects using

$$r_i = \sum_t \sum_s \vartheta_{st} C_{is} + X_i' \theta_3 + \alpha_{3t} + \beta_{3g} + \sum_j \delta_{3j} d_{ij} + \epsilon_{igt} \quad (7)$$

where r_i indicates reclassification at enrollment for student i and C_{is} indicates charter enrollment in the year after the lottery. I estimate equations (6) and (7) separately by baseline special needs status. Two-stage least squares estimates using individual school immediate and waitlist offers and OLS estimates yield similar results. I focus on the OLS estimates for precision.³⁰

Figure 1 plots the cohort test score effects $\hat{\rho}_{st}$ against the reclassification effects $\hat{\vartheta}_{st}$. Charter school cohorts that experienced higher reclassification rates also had higher special needs student test outcomes: test score effects have a weak positive correlation with reclassification effects for special education increased inclusion and ELL classification removal. Test score and special education classification removal effects have a positive relationship for English and an imprecise relationship for math.³¹ Similar to the multiple endogenous variable results, the weak positive correlations suggest that reclassification contributes positively to student growth, but cannot fully explain the charter test score gains. Therefore, school practices other than special needs classification and services play an important role.

School Quality

Charter schools that serve special needs students well also serve general education students well. Figure 2 displays the strong positive relationship between schools' special needs and non-special needs test score effects.

To contrast the relative importance of classification practices with overall school quality, I estimate a multiple endogenous two-stage least squares using charter enrollment, an index of school quality, and classification removal effects. I add the math and English two-stage least squares effects for non-special needs students from a school-level version of equation (6) to create the school quality index. The multiple endogenous variables estimations yield noisy estimates for classification removal and precisely positive estimates for school quality. Enrolling in a school with a one standard deviation higher non-special needs student test score effect boosts special education and ELL students' math scores by 0.192 and 0.332 standard deviations (see Columns (5) and (12) of Table 8). In a two-stage least squares estimation with charter, classification removal, and the school quality index, school quality remains positive and significant while classification removal is a noisy positive (see Columns (6) and (13) of Table 8). The analogous OLS estimates show that classification removal has a similar effect to

³⁰Two-stage least squares estimates are available at the request of the author.

³¹If schools that reclassify more are effective due to other practices then this exercise overstates the importance of reclassification. The relationship between non-special needs test score effects and charter school reclassification effects is small and insignificant for special education and ELL classification removal, but small, positive, and marginally significant for special education increased inclusion. Therefore, there is little evidence of other school practices correlated with reclassification driving the correlation between reclassification and special needs academic effects.

one standard deviation increase in school quality for special education math and a much smaller effect for ELL math and English. School quality has a smaller effect relative to classification removal on special education students' English outcomes. This analysis shows the importance of general education practices in explaining special needs' charter gains.

5.2 School Practices

Special needs students who apply and do not receive charter lottery offers attend schools with markedly different characteristics. Their BPS schools have more experienced, more licensed, and higher paid teachers and spend about \$1,700 more per pupil relative to the Boston charter schools (see Table 9). Over half of Boston charters have a longer school year and over 95 percent of Boston charters have a longer school day compared to BPS.³² Tutoring programs exist in all Boston charters and about a third of charters require tutoring for all students. Boston charters commonly use no excuses practices, including high academic and behavior expectations, selective teacher hiring, frequent testing and teacher feedback, and data-driven instruction.

The set of school practices that positively correlate with charter school effectiveness for general education students also correlate with test score gains for special needs students. Column (3) of Table 9 displays the correlation between charter school special education math effects and school practices. Columns (4) and (5) display the analogous correlations for ELL and other students. An index of "No Excuses" school practices,³³ strict behavior code, longer school day, and emphasis for high expectations in academics, characteristics that Angrist, Pathak, and Walters (2013); Dobbie and Fryer (2011) find linked to overall charter gains, are also positively correlated with special education and ELL student gains.

School characteristics that do not correlate with general education student gains, expenditure per pupil, student teacher ratio, teacher licensure, teacher experience, and teacher salary, also have a null or a negative effect on special needs student outcomes. Special needs school characteristics are weakly correlated with special needs charter effects (see Panel B of Table 9).

³²BPS has 180 school days and 6.5 hours in the day.

³³The "no excuses" index includes equal weight for discussion of the following items in the annual school report: high expectations for academics, high expectations for behavior, strict behavior code, college preparatory curriculum, core values in school culture, selective teacher hiring or incentive pay, emphasis on math and reading, uniforms, hires Teach for America teachers, Teaching Fellows, or AmeriCorps members, affiliated with Teach for America alumni, data driven instruction, and regular teacher feedback.

5.3 Peer Composition

Charter lotteries in the bottom quartile for special needs student representation have similar academic effects as those in the top quartile (see Table A14). The similar point estimates counter the idea that charter special needs gains stem from fewer special needs students in the classroom. Lotteries with an average of 41 percent of applicants with ELL status have over 0.2 standard deviation effects. Additionally, charter cohorts with the lowest special needs representation have gains of around 0.2 standard deviations, suggesting that economies of scale cannot fully explain the charter gains. The limited evidence that special needs economies of scale correlating with academic effects further supports the importance of general school practices in explaining special needs charter gains.

6 Conclusion

Using randomized admission lotteries, this paper finds strong positive effects of Boston’s elementary, middle, and high school charters for special education and English Language Learner students. Charters generate substantial gains for special needs students in math and English standardized exams, English proficiency, and college preparation outcomes. Even the most disadvantaged special needs students perform better in charter schools compared to traditional public schools.

This paper documents the proportional representation of special needs students in charter lotteries in recent years. Even those with the highest need have close to proportional representation in charter lotteries. Furthermore, charters remove special needs classifications at a higher rate than traditional public schools and move special education students to more inclusive classrooms. These differences in classification practices make the proportion of special needs students in charters appear smaller.

Also, charter attendance substantially decreases the special needs achievement gap. Among students attending BPS schools, special education students and ELL students score about 0.87 and 0.39 standard deviations respectively below non-special needs students in math. Since charters generate math gains of 0.268 standard deviations for special education students, one year in a charter reduces the special education achievement gaps by 30.8 percent. ELL students score 0.345 standard deviations higher in charters, narrowing the ELL achievement gap by 88.4 percent.

The findings show that schools can boost special needs students’ academic outcomes without the traditional set of special needs services. Frequent use of tutoring and data-driven instruction enables charters to identify and provide support to struggling students, regardless of special needs status. “No

Excuses” school practices, strict behavior code, longer school day, and emphasis on high academic expectations positively correlate with charter school effectiveness for special needs and general education students.

I find no evidence that reclassification lowers outcomes for the reclassified students in the study. Reclassification can explain between 1 and 25 percent of the special needs achievement effects. Charter schools that generate large non-special needs student gains also generate gains for special needs students. Together, these findings imply that elements of the charter school experience that affect all students, not just those classified as having special needs, drive the positive gains for special needs students.

It is worth noting that the results apply to charter lottery applicants. While special needs students are currently well represented in the charter lotteries, Boston charters could have different effects for the students who do not apply. By extension, my estimates may not reflect the effects of expanding the number of seats in Boston’s charter sector or requiring charters to recruit more special needs students.

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A Data Appendix

This paper utilizes data from several sources. The charter applicant information was collected from the individual charter schools. This data includes immediate and waitlist offers as well as factors that impact an applicant’s ranking in the lottery, including sibling status, disqualifications, late applications, and applying from outside of Boston. Student demographic and school enrollment data comes from the Student Information Management System (SIMS), which includes all of the public school students in Massachusetts. Student standardized test scores come from the state database for the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). The paper also uses English proficiency exam data, SAT and AP records, and the Massachusetts Education Personnel Information Management Systems (EPIMS) data. This Appendix describes each data source and explains the process used to clean and match them.

Lottery Data

Massachusetts legally requires charters to admit students via lottery when there are more applicants than seats for a given grade. This paper uses charter lottery records from Spring 2004 to Spring 2014. The sample includes 10 elementary schools, 10 middle schools, five schools serving middle and high schools, and five high schools. For the full list of schools and years, see Appendix Table A1. Because of limited public pre-k enrollment, I exclude Spring 2014 pre-k lotteries from analysis due to relatively low match rates to the administrative data.

The lottery data typically includes applicants’ names, dates of birth, and lottery and waitlist offer information. Offers to attend the charter school can occur on the day of the lottery (referred to here as *immediate offer*) or after the day of the lottery when students from the randomly sequenced waitlist are contacted as seats become available (referred to as *waitlist offer*).

In some years, certain schools gave all applicants offers, so only the immediate offer instrument, not the waitlist offer instrument, can be used for that cohort. For a few lotteries, records did not

distinguish the timing of offers, so only one instrument can be used for these cohorts. In other cases, no waitlist offers were given to non-siblings. The lotteries affected by these circumstances are noted in Appendix Table A1.

SIMS Data

This research uses SIMS data from the 2003-2004 school year through the 2014-2015 school year. Each year has a file from October and the end of the school year. The observations are at the individual student level. Each student has only one observation in each data file, except when students switch grades or schools within year. The data includes a unique student identifier known as the SASID. This identifier is used to match the SIMS data to the MCAS, English Proficiency Exam, and SAT and AP data described below.

The SIMS dataset contains grade level, year, name, date of birth, gender, race, special education and limited English proficiency status, level of classroom inclusion and type of disability for special education students, free or reduced price lunch status, school attended, suspensions, attendance rates, native language, and immigrant status. Students appear in the state administrative data if they attend a Massachusetts public school. Those who enroll in private or parochial schools or move out of state have missing outcomes data in years they are not in Massachusetts public schools. A student is coded as attending a charter in a school year if there is any record in the SIMS of attending a charter that year. Students who attend more than one charter school within a year are assigned to the charter they attended the longest. If a student attended more than one traditional public school in a year, the analysis uses the school where the student attended for the majority of the year. In the case of attendance ties, the school for the analysis sample was randomly chosen. For baseline characteristics, I designate a student as special education, ELL, or free/reduced lunch if they have this status for either the October or end-of-year file for the application year.

State Standardized Exam (MCAS) Data

Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) data is used for the 2003-04 through 2013-2014 school years. An observation in the MCAS data refers to an individual student's test score results for a given grade level and year. The MCAS math and English Language Arts (ELA) is administered in grades 3 through 8 and grade 10. Baseline math and ELA scores in the year of charter application are used to check the balance for middle and high school lotteries. The raw test scores are standardized

to have a mean of zero within a subject-grade-year in Massachusetts.

English Proficiency Exam (MEPA/ACCESS)

English Language Learners in kindergarten through 12th grade in Massachusetts take an annual English proficiency exam. From 2005-2012, the state used the Massachusetts English Proficiency Assessment (MEPA), and starting in 2013, the state switched to the Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to-State for English Language Learners (ACCESS). I standardize the exam scores to center around the state mean for each year. I use state recommendations for interpreting the scores of the exam to categorize students as beginning, intermediate, or advanced English proficiency.

SAT and AP Data

I use SAT and AP data files provided to the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education by the College Board. The data include scores on all AP and SAT tests for students projected to graduate in 2008 through 2015. For students who took the SAT more than once, their data includes only the most recent exam score.

Staff Data

I develop school level totals of full-time equivalent teachers and staff by various categories using the Massachusetts Education Personnel Information Management Systems (EPIMS) data. I use the state designations for staff type (i.e.. special education therapist, ELL co-teacher/support content) and generate a total number of full-time equivalent teachers in each staff position for that school. This means that if one school has two half-time ELL teachers, they are counted as having one full-time equivalent ELL teacher. The EPIMS data ranges from the 2007-08 through the 2013-14 school years. I use a snapshot of the school staffing from October of these years.

Matching Data Sets

Lottery records were matched to the state administrative student-level data using applicants' names, date of birth, grade, and year. The applicants who uniquely and exactly match the grade, year, name, and date of birth (if available) in the state records are assigned the matched SASID. Then the names in the lottery and SIMS data are stripped of spaces, surnames (i.e.. Jr. IV), hyphens, and apostrophes. Students who exactly match after that cleaning process are also assigned the matched SASID. Then

relink, a fuzzy matching STATA program, is used to suggest potential matches for the unmatched students. This matches students with slight spelling differences and those who appear in one grade older or younger than the lottery application grade. These suggested matches are hand checked for accuracy. The remaining unmatched students are searched for by hand in the data. Students in this category were not matched in the earlier methods because their names were misspelled or their first and last names were recorded in the wrong field.

This matching process successfully assigns most applicants a unique student identifier. Appendix Table A15 shows the match rates to the administrative data for each year. Overall, 91.2 percent of applicants to elementary lotteries, 94.9 percent of applicants for middle school, and 96 percent of applicants for high school matched. Any student who enrolls in private, parochial, or out-of-state school does not appear in the state records.

Students with offers are significantly more likely to match to the data by 4.3 percent for elementary school and 3.8 percent for middle school. There is no significant difference for high school. This means that elementary and middle school applicants without offers are slightly more likely to go to private, parochial, or out-of-state schools. As a result, my findings show causal estimates for the set of students who ultimately enroll in Massachusetts Public Schools.

Sample Restrictions

Appendix Table A16 shows the sample restrictions imposed upon the raw lottery records. The sample excludes duplicate applicants within an individual school's lottery and applicants who receive higher or lower preference in the lottery. Those with higher or lower preference include late applicants, those who apply to the wrong grade, out-of-area applicants, and siblings. These groups generally have no variation in offer status. If a student applied to multiple charters in different years, I keep only the first application year for that student. Except for estimating the effect of charter attendance on initial special needs designation for new Massachusetts public school students, the sample is further restricted to those with baseline demographics data. With the restrictions imposed, the original raw elementary school sample of 13,281 is narrowed to 6,569. For middle and high school, the raw samples of 24,170 and 18,688 are restricted to 9,501 and 6,555 respectively.

Predicted Reclassification Index Estimation

I estimate the predicted reclassification risk index in the sample of Boston students who do not apply for charter schools using the following:

$$I_i = \lambda T_i + \alpha_{4t} + \beta_{4g} + \epsilon_{igts} \quad (8)$$

where T_i represents a vector of baseline student characteristics including gender, race, free or reduced price lunch, suspensions, days truant, and test scores. The special education index includes baseline level of classroom inclusion and the ELL index includes an indicator for native Spanish speakers and the baseline English proficiency exam. Predicted reclassification risk index I_i is estimated separately for the different types of reclassification (special education classification removal, special education increased inclusion, and ELL classification removal). I use the coefficients from equation (4) to estimate the predicted reclassification risk index on the charter analysis sample. I center the index around the BPS mean within a grade-year.

Figure A6 visualizes the positive relationship between the proportion of students reclassified at different predicted reclassification index values. Charter schools reclassify a higher proportion of students at each predicted reclassification index score compared to traditional public schools.

B Threats to Validity

Selective Attrition

At the time of the lottery, students with and without random charter offers should be similar. Differential attrition by offer status may lead to selection bias. For example, if not receiving a charter offer makes students less likely to attend Massachusetts public schools, not receiving an offer may alter the likelihood that a student appears in the data.³⁴ Differential attrition generates selection bias. To test for selection bias, I test the impact of charter offers on the probability that lottery applicants contribute to state math and English exam scores and whether they have a non-missing special needs status post-lottery.³⁵ Small differences in the follow-up rates by offer status imply that limited selection bias from differential attrition.

Differential attrition for middle and high school lottery applicants with baseline special needs is not

³⁴Students who leave the state or enroll in private or parochial schools do not appear in the data.

³⁵Post-lottery is defined as the October 1 after the lottery occurs.

statistically significant, as documented in Table A17. Elementary school lotteries have some differential attrition. Special needs students with charter offers are marginally more likely to take a state math or English exam. These differences are fairly small. Elementary ELL students with charter offers are 2.8 percentage points more likely to contribute to exam data than students without charter offers, 83 percent of whom take the exams. These relatively small differences seem unlikely to explain the elementary school exam results. For classification, 21.2 and 8.1 percent respectively of the non-offered special education and ELL elementary applicants attrit from the data, compared to essentially none of those with offers. These differences are significant and substantial, but they are not large enough to explain the ELL classification effect or to fully explain the special education classification effects.

School Switching

Charter critics often argue that large achievement gaps between charter and district schools stem in part from charters encouraging lower performing students to leave. This paper's results are not directly affected by whether students enroll or remain in charter schools because the lottery offer status comparisons (the two-stage least squares reduced forms) drive the estimates. The group with lottery offers includes those who enroll and remain in charters as well as those who switch to other schools. Similarly, the group without lottery offers includes some students who manage to eventually enroll in a charter school.

However, excess school switching in charters could potentially inflate my estimates if students who leave would generate negative peer effects (i.e. through disruption). Therefore, Table A18 investigates whether students in charters and traditional publics move schools one year following the lottery at different rates. The lottery applicant population appears very mobile: roughly 50 percent of special needs elementary and middle and 30 percent of high school traditional public school students switch schools.

For elementary and middle school, a large portion of these school moves are mechanical. When I exclude applicants who need to switch schools because they reach the highest grade offered in their school, 30.8 percent of special education and 21.2 percent of ELL elementary applicants in traditional publics switch schools. Similarly, switch rates drop to around 15 percent for middle school special needs applicants in traditional public schools.


The switching rate for elementary and middle school special education students is not statistically significantly different in charter compared to traditional public schools. Elementary ELL students are

13.8 percentage points less likely to switch schools in charter schools. In middle school, ELL switching rates in charter schools are marginally significantly lower by 6.3 percentage points.

Special education high school applicants are 29.9 percentage points more likely to switch in charters, more than double the school movement rate in traditional public schools. The differential switching comes from two early years. Without these years in the sample, the switching rates of special education students in charters and traditional public schools are not statistically significantly different, and the test score findings are essentially unchanged.


The estimates for ELL high school students are noisy, but not significantly different across school type. Since special needs students are overall similarly or less mobile in charters, it is unlikely that high mobility out of charters drives the main results.

Figure 1: Correlations of Reclassification and Academic Effect Sizes by School x Cohort



Notes: This figure plots the school-specific math and English Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) effects for special needs students against the school-specific post-application special needs reclassification OLS effects. The figure plots elementary, middle, and high school estimates. Each dot represents a charter school application cohort. Experimental strata with samples too small to estimate are not displayed. The fitted line is the regression of the test score effect on the reclassification effect, weighted by the inverse of the average variance of the effects.

Figure 2: Correlations of Effect Sizes by School x Cohort



Notes: This figure plots the school-specific math and English Ordinary Least Squares effects for special needs students and non-special needs students. The figure plots elementary, middle, and high school estimates. Each dot represents a charter school application cohort. Experimental strata with samples too small to estimate are not displayed. The fitted line is the regression of the special needs test score effect on the non-special needs test score effect, weighted by the inverse of the average variance of the effects.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance

	Boston Public	All Lottery Applicants			Special Education at Baseline			English Language Learner at Baseline		
	School Students	Non-Offered	Immediate	Any Offer	Non-Offered	Immediate	Any Offer	Non-Offered	Immediate	Any Offer
	Mean	Mean	Offer		Mean	Offer		Mean	Offer	
Baseline Characteristics	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Female	0.480	0.503	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)	0.342	0.012 (0.030)	0.013 (0.030)	0.482	0.006 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.028)
Black	0.392	0.461	-0.023* (0.013)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.477	0.005 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.031)	0.269	0.009 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.024)
Latino/a	0.363	0.369	0.013 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.360	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.029)	0.624	-0.035 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.027)
Subsidized Lunch	0.753	0.749	0.002 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.757	0.031 (0.024)	0.012 (0.025)	0.844	-0.003 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)
Baseline Math Test Score	-0.449	-0.407	0.016 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.027)	-1.002	-0.012 (0.066)	0.018 (0.066)	-0.736	0.017 (0.057)	-0.047 (0.055)
Baseline English Test Score	-0.548	-0.455	-0.028 (0.028)	0.004 (0.028)	-1.214	-0.036 (0.069)	0.062 (0.068)	-0.980	-0.028 (0.062)	-0.003 (0.060)
Special Education	0.226	0.192	0.007 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	-	-	-	0.190	-0.008 (0.022)	0.001 (0.022)
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.080	0.050	0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.260	0.016 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.026)	0.067	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.008 (0.012)
Partial Inclusion	0.056	0.057	0.008 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.296	0.021 (0.030)	0.014 (0.030)	0.059	0.015 (0.016)	0.011 (0.015)
Full Inclusion	0.093	0.082	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.425	-0.035 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	0.061	0.000 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.013)
English Language Learner	0.231	0.258	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.254	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.026)	-	-	-
Beginning Proficiency	0.017	0.025	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	0.024	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.098	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.028** (0.013)
Intermediate Proficiency	0.071	0.121	0.002 (0.009)	0.005 (0.008)	0.144	0.008 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.022)	0.465	0.033 (0.028)	0.035 (0.027)
Advanced Proficiency	0.049	0.058	0.001 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	0.029	-0.009 (0.015)	0.001 (0.013)	0.216	0.010 (0.027)	0.018 (0.027)
Observations with School/Offer Type	194712	7591	5085	10408	1458	1007	2076	1956	1119	2188
P-value			0.661	0.661		0.592	0.924		0.499	0.995

Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for Boston Public School (BPS) students and charter lottery applicants. Column (1) shows means for BPS attendees in charter application grades (Pre-K, K, 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8) for 2003-04 through 2013-14. Column (2) shows means for charter lottery applicants who did not receive offers. Columns (3) and (4) report coefficients from regressions of observed characteristics on immediate offers and any offers, controlling for experimental strata dummies. P-values come from tests of whether all non-test score coefficients equal zero. Baseline test scores are only available applicants to the 4th grade or higher. Columns (5) through (10) report analogous results for the subsample with special education classification and ELL classification in the lottery application year.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Table 2: Post-Application Special Education Classification

Baseline Status	Any Special Education		Substantially Separate Classroom				Full Inclusion		Move to More Inclusive Classroom	
	Trad. Public	Charter	Trad. Public	Charter	Trad. Public	Charter	Trad. Public	Charter	Trad. Public	Charter
	mean	effect	mean	effect	mean	effect	mean	effect	mean	effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>										
All Special Education	0.907	-0.190*** (0.069)							0.161	0.294** (0.125)
N		254								254
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.903	-0.016 (0.107)	0.629	-0.401** (0.169)	0.016	0.066 (0.093)	0.177	0.556*** (0.124)	0.226	0.539*** (0.175)
N		72								72
Partial Inclusion	0.895	-0.445** (0.226)			0.500	-0.551** (0.222)	0.289	0.226 (0.254)	0.342	0.464 (0.287)
N		49								49
Full Inclusion	0.910	-0.144 (0.136)					0.690	0.034 (0.171)	0.060	0.141 (0.131)
N		126								126
New Students (No Prior Special Ed. Evaluation)	0.014	-0.011* (0.006)	0.001	-0.002 (0.002)	0.003	0.003 (0.004)	0.008	-0.008* (0.005)		
N		2665								
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>										
All Special Education	0.927	-0.161*** (0.044)							0.125	0.301*** (0.049)
N		1726								1726
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.976	-0.140** (0.064)	0.897	-0.683*** (0.098)	0.036	0.016 (0.066)	0.028	0.259*** (0.076)	0.071	0.286*** (0.092)
N		403								403
Partial Inclusion	0.935	-0.143** (0.066)			0.665	-0.645*** (0.087)	0.156	0.413*** (0.079)	0.193	0.462*** (0.084)
N		611								611
Full Inclusion	0.886	-0.226*** (0.077)					0.692	-0.100 (0.090)	0.097	0.117** (0.059)
N		683								683
<i>Panel C: High School</i>										
All Special Education	0.841	0.030 (0.103)							0.180	0.112 (0.092)
N		1173								1173
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.975	-0.442*** (0.077)	0.819	-0.468*** (0.123)	0.071	-0.171* (0.095)	0.042	0.065 (0.077)	0.130	0.101 (0.126)
N		333								333
Partial Inclusion	0.884	0.270 (0.185)			0.589	-0.472** (0.191)	0.179	0.633*** (0.172)	0.254	0.470*** (0.177)
N		344								344
Full Inclusion	0.726	0.335* (0.187)					0.511	0.341* (0.198)	0.156	-0.147 (0.132)
N		469								469

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter enrollment on special education classification and level of classroom inclusion in the fall following the charter lottery. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for enrollment in charter schools. Estimation is run separately by baseline classroom inclusion type. Effects persist for up to two years following the charter application. All models control for gender, ethnicity, female x minority interaction, baseline special education, baseline ELL, baseline subsidized lunch, experimental strata, year-applied dummies, and grade-applied dummies. Estimates for elementary and middle school sample pool post-lottery outcomes for grades 3-5 and 5-8 respectively and cluster by student identifier and school-grade-year.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Table 3: Post-Application English Language Learner Classification

Baseline Status	Remain English Language Learner	
	Trad. Public mean (1)	Charter effect (2)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.900	-0.198*** (0.075)
	N	818
Beginning Proficiency	0.989	-0.033 (0.029)
	N	110
Intermediate Proficiency	0.986	-0.126* (0.074)
	N	349
Advanced Proficiency	0.739	-0.604** (0.297)
	N	25
New Non-native English Speaking Students (No Prior English Lang. Learner Evaluation)	0.637	-0.261*** (0.061)
	N	856
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.794	-0.328*** (0.059)
	N	2231
Beginning Proficiency	1.000	0.000 (0.000)
	N	130
Intermediate Proficiency	0.953	-0.420*** (0.075)
	N	1105
Advanced Proficiency	0.570	-0.199** (0.085)
	N	774
<i>Panel C: High School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.802	-0.375*** (0.140)
	N	714
Beginning Proficiency	1.000	-0.042 (0.047)
	N	47
Intermediate Proficiency	0.921	-0.384*** (0.143)
	N	356
Advanced Proficiency	0.618	-0.152 (0.375)
	N	209

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter enrollment on English Language Learner classification in the fall following the charter lottery. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for enrollment in charter schools. Estimation is run separately by baseline English proficiency level. Effects persist for up to two years following the charter application. See Table 2 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Table 4: Test Score Effects by Baseline Special Needs Status

	Special Education		English Language Learner		Non-Special Needs	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>						
Math	-0.737	0.309** (0.123)	-0.326	0.386*** (0.101)	-0.087	0.184*** (0.046)
N		171		541		591
English	-1.186	0.478*** (0.148)	-0.519	0.360*** (0.100)	-0.128	0.199*** (0.046)
N		169		539		590
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>						
Math	-1.025	0.245*** (0.059)	-0.550	0.306*** (0.052)	-0.129	0.257*** (0.026)
N		3608		4369		12053
English	-1.176	0.177*** (0.062)	-0.763	0.200*** (0.050)	-0.102	0.142*** (0.024)
N		3595		4373		11986
<i>Panel C: High School</i>						
Math	-0.920	0.240*** (0.092)	-0.419	0.412*** (0.139)	-0.086	0.333*** (0.053)
N		1030		493		3926
English	-1.069	0.160 (0.099)	-0.758	0.412** (0.170)	-0.135	0.214*** (0.042)
N		1050		503		3974

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of years spent in charter schools on test scores. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for years spent in charter schools.

Columns (1) and (2) show estimates for applicants with baseline special education status, columns (3) and (4) for applicants with baseline English Language Learner classification, and Columns (5) and (6) for other students. All models control for gender, ethnicity, female x minority interaction, baseline special education, baseline ELL, baseline subsidized lunch, experimental strata, year-applied dummies, and grade-applied dummies. Estimates for elementary and middle school sample pool post-lottery outcomes for grades 3-5 and 5-8 respectively and cluster by student identifier and school-grade-year. Estimates for the high school sample include only scores for tenth grade and cluster by school-grade-year.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Table 5: Effects on Longer-Term Outcomes by Special Needs Status

	Special Education		English Language Learner		Non-Special Needs	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean (1)	Charter effect (2)	mean (3)	Charter effect (4)	mean (5)	Charter effect (6)
<i>Panel A: High School Performance</i>						
Meets High School Proficiency Graduation Requirement	0.376	0.244** (0.110)	0.561	0.367** (0.162)	0.766	0.154*** (0.054)
Eligible for State Merit Scholarship	0.042	0.113** (0.051)	0.128	0.287** (0.129)	0.257	0.340*** (0.058)
N		1007		484		3892
<i>Panel B: AP and SAT Exams</i>						
Took AP	0.102	0.363*** (0.089)	0.299	0.403** (0.182)	0.336	0.295*** (0.062)
Number of AP Exams	0.207	0.711*** (0.205)	0.773	0.179 (0.683)	0.003	1.051*** (0.240)
Took SAT	0.460	0.090 (0.109)	0.617	-0.182 (0.212)	0.640	0.137** (0.055)
AP Score 3 or Higher	0.050	0.088 (0.054)	0.182	0.102 (0.203)	0.159	0.108* (0.055)
N		961		363		3579
SAT Score (for takers)	1071.2	115.4** (54.0)	1164.3	76.3 (119.1)	1319.3	77.6** (33.0)
N		503		246		2537
<i>Panel C: High School Graduation</i>						
Four-year Graduation	0.577	-0.365*** (0.107)	0.674	-0.364** (0.164)	0.687	-0.012 (0.053)
N		961		363		3579
Five-year Graduation	0.664	-0.154 (0.116)	0.716	-0.457 (0.315)	0.772	0.014 (0.054)
Dropout	0.184	-0.100 (0.092)	0.135	0.329 (0.221)	0.134	-0.031 (0.042)
		767		196		2984

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of charter enrollment on longer-term outcomes. Immediate and waitlist lottery offer dummies instrument for any charter enrollment by the end of 10th grade. The 10th-grade state standardized exam score determines whether students meet the high school proficiency graduation requirement (called Massachusetts Competency Determination) and the State Merit College Scholarship (John and Abigail Adams Scholarship). The latter has higher standards for eligibility. Panel A's sample includes students projected to graduate in Spring 2008 – 2016. Panel B and four-year graduation includes students projected to graduate in Spring 2008 - 2015. Five-year graduation and dropout are restricted to students projected to graduate in 2008 – 2014. All models control for gender, ethnicity, female x minority interaction, baseline special education, baseline ELL, baseline subsidized lunch, experimental strata, year-applied dummies, and grade-applied dummies. Estimates cluster by 10th grade school and year.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Table 6: Test Score Effects for Special Needs Subgroups

<i>Panel A: Baseline Special Education Level of Classroom Inclusion</i>						
	Substantially Separate Classroom		Partial Inclusion		Full Inclusion	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Math	-1.392	0.256**	-1.148	0.328***	-0.606	0.269***
		(0.114)		(0.093)		(0.072)
N		1004		1656		2090
English	-1.614	0.204	-1.243	0.171	-0.791	0.216***
		(0.135)		(0.104)		(0.065)
N		1004		1658		2092

<i>Panel B: Baseline English Language Learner English Proficiency Level</i>						
	Beginning Proficiency		Intermediate Proficiency		Advanced Proficiency	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Math	-1.392	0.404***	-0.652	0.370***	0.003	0.296***
		(0.138)		(0.062)		(0.072)
N		289		2710		1799
English	-1.961	0.498***	-0.904	0.315***	-0.251	0.162**
		(0.145)		(0.057)		(0.063)
N		292		2719		1801

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of years spent in charter schools for baseline special needs subgroups: by special education level of classroom inclusion and by English proficiency level. The sample includes elementary, middle, and high school lottery applicants. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Table 7: Test Score Effects by Pre-lottery Test Performance and Special Needs Status

Pre-lottery Test Performance within Special Needs Status	Special Education		English Language Learner		Non-Special Needs	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect	mean	Charter effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Math</i>						
Bottom third	-1.699	0.255*** (0.088)	-1.337	0.248*** (0.090)	-0.905	0.357*** (0.040)
	N	1360		1491		5077
Middle third	-1.067	0.219*** (0.078)	-0.539	0.334*** (0.065)	-0.100	0.284*** (0.032)
	N	1540		1613		5285
Top third	-0.302	0.314*** (0.069)	0.254	0.328*** (0.061)	0.592	0.185*** (0.026)
	N	1597		1706		5123
<i>Panel B: English</i>						
Bottom third	-1.812	0.189* (0.110)	-1.474	0.400*** (0.073)	-0.789	0.175*** (0.040)
	N	1418		1486		5021
Middle third	-1.187	0.114 (0.077)	-0.722	0.305*** (0.076)	-0.080	0.173*** (0.028)
	N	1487		1580		5224
Top third	-0.443	0.131** (0.064)	0.009	0.140** (0.056)	0.451	0.106*** (0.026)
	N	1592		1617		5213

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of years spent in charter schools on test scores by baseline test performance and special needs status. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates for the baseline special education students by terciles of their baseline math and English test scores. Columns (3) and (4) report these estimates for baseline English Language Learners and Columns (5) and (6) for baseline non-special needs students. The sample includes elementary, middle, and high school lottery applicants. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Table 8: Multiple Endogenous Variable Estimates for Test Scores

Endogenous Variables	Special Education							English Language Learner						
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
<i>Panel A: Math</i>														
Charter	0.210*** (0.034)	0.205*** (0.036)	0.204*** (0.040)	0.229*** (0.018)	0.172*** (0.037)	0.164*** (0.039)	0.187*** (0.016)	0.321*** (0.027)	0.282*** (0.038)	0.344*** (0.049)	0.292*** (0.027)	0.239*** (0.033)	0.212*** (0.040)	0.206*** (0.017)
First-stage F	13.470	12.358	9.213		9.929	8.786		11.071	6.205	4.330		8.523	5.477	
Remove Classification		0.289 (0.356)	0.275 (0.339)	0.231*** (0.071)		0.334 (0.360)	0.214*** (0.056)		0.174 (0.118)	0.537** (0.233)	0.124*** (0.043)		0.130 (0.115)	0.028 (0.032)
First-stage F		10.061	8.567			10.178			27.305	1.040			26.639	
Charter X Remove Classification			0.014 (0.100)	-0.031 (0.049)						-0.222* (0.119)	-0.071** (0.033)			
First-stage F			13.623							3.026				
School Quality Index					0.192*** (0.072)	0.201*** (0.070)	0.203*** (0.029)					0.332*** (0.078)	0.325*** (0.079)	0.337*** (0.044)
First-stage F					9.849	9.662						17.189	13.826	
Overid. p-value		0.221	0.210		0.472	0.346			0.030	0.046		0.174	0.157	
N				3693							3830			
<i>Panel B: English</i>														
Charter	0.172*** (0.037)	0.167*** (0.038)	0.167*** (0.043)	0.193*** (0.018)	0.161*** (0.040)	0.154*** (0.042)	0.176*** (0.018)	0.300*** (0.030)	0.243*** (0.042)	0.279*** (0.051)	0.224*** (0.022)	0.242*** (0.036)	0.195*** (0.046)	0.176*** (0.017)
First-stage F	13.221	12.380	9.472		9.868	8.920		11.095	6.026	4.296		8.471	5.371	
Remove Classification		0.310 (0.357)	0.315 (0.341)	0.319*** (0.065)		0.324 (0.356)	0.270*** (0.057)		0.258** (0.126)	0.467* (0.255)	0.159*** (0.043)		0.228* (0.122)	0.085** (0.034)
First-stage F		10.037	8.434			10.152			27.948	1.104			27.272	
Charter X Remove Classification			-0.004 (0.115)	-0.057 (0.048)						-0.128 (0.129)	-0.051* (0.030)			
First-stage F			13.358							3.037				
School Quality Index					0.054 (0.078)	0.062 (0.075)	0.071** (0.031)					0.233*** (0.079)	0.222*** (0.080)	0.187*** (0.037)
First-stage F					9.786	9.689						17.586	14.057	
Overid. p-value		0.430	0.398		0.406	0.409			0.025	0.025		0.043	0.036	
N				3705							3844			

Notes: This table displays multiple endogenous variable two-stage least squares (2SLS) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the effects of time in charter, classification removal, classification removal in charters, and school quality on test scores for students with special needs status at the time of the lottery. School quality is the sum of the non-special needs math and English school 2SLS effects in a model where Boston Public Schools (BPS) is the omitted district. Instruments include individual charter offers and individual charter offers interacted with a predicted reclassification index. See data appendix for details of the predicted reclassification index. The sample includes middle, and high school lottery applicants with baseline test scores. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%


Table 9: School Characteristics and Correlation with Charter Effects

School Practices	Correlates of School Practices and Charter Effectiveness by Special Needs Group				
	Boston Public		Special Education	English Language Learner	Non-Special Needs
	Schools Mean	Charter Sample Mean			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
<i>Panel A: General School Characteristics</i>					
"No excuses" index		0.826 (0.120)	0.285 (0.446)	0.505*** (0.104)	0.884*** (0.304)
Strict behavior code		0.818 (0.395)	0.187** (0.094)	0.194*** (0.042)	0.247*** (0.072)
Longer school year		0.591 (0.503)	-0.010 (0.065)	0.130* (0.078)	-0.036 (0.061)
Longer school day		0.955 (0.213)	0.335*** (0.032)	0.409*** (0.051)	0.433*** (0.025)
Emphasize high academic expectations		0.955 (0.213)	0.335*** (0.032)	0.409*** (0.051)	0.433*** (0.025)
Total per pupil expenditure	\$18,766	\$17,079 (\$2,438)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Student to teacher ratio	12.678 (1.790)	12.126 (3.092)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.008 (0.012)
% of Teachers licensed in teaching assignment	94.974 (4.554)	52.265 (17.173)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)
Years of teaching experience in Massachusetts	12.353 (3.355)	2.625 (1.489)	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.085*** (0.029)	-0.061*** (0.016)
Average teacher salary	\$78,237	\$65,380 (10774.157)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<i>Panel B: Special Needs School Characteristics</i>					
Special education compliance index	0.685	0.723 (0.041)	-0.323 (0.517)		
English Language Learner compliance index	0.511	0.696 (0.066)		0.335 (0.629)	
Special education remove classification effect		0.068 (0.111)	-0.069 (0.419)		
Special education increased inclusion effect		0.225 (0.229)	0.379* (0.194)		
English Language Learner remove classification effect		0.300 (0.193)		0.347 (0.260)	
Special education instructional spending per pupil	\$2,299 (2,008)	\$988 (519)	0.000 (0.000)		
Special needs staff to student ratio	0.030 (0.012)	0.015 (0.011)	-1.445 (4.034)	6.048 (4.894)	
N	114	22		22	

Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of school-specific treatment effects for each special needs subgroup on 2012-13 school practices in Columns (3) - (5) (one regression for each school practice and student type combination). School-level BPS data is weighted by the proportion of lottery applicants who enrolled in the school. Only district-level data was available for total per pupil expenditure and the compliance indices. All costs are in 2015 CPI-U adjusted dollars. Column (2) displays the mean characteristics for sample charter schools with lottery cohorts with test results (those that reach grade 3 or higher by 2013-2014). Data come from charter school annual reports, Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education School District Profiles, Education Personnel Information Management System, School District Expenditures, and Charter School End of Year Financial Reports. Data also come from MA DESE charter inspections including Renew Inspection Reports, site visits, Summary of Reviews, and Coordinated Program Reviews. See the Data Appendix for information on the "no excuses" index.


*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

Figure A1: Special Education Prevalence in Charters and Boston Public Schools (BPS)




Notes: The graphs on the left plot the percent of students with a special education status at the time of the lottery for charter applicants and Boston Public School (BPS) students in charter application grades (4, 5, and 8). The graphs on the right plot the percent of students with special education status at the time of the lottery for charter enrollees and BPS students in charter entry grades (5, 6, and 9). Using the special education status at the time of the lottery ignores any post-lottery changes to classification.

Figure A2: English Language Learner Prevalence in Charters and Boston Public Schools (BPS)




Notes: The graphs on the left plot the percent of students with English Language Learner (ELL) status at the time of the lottery for charter applicants and Boston Public School (BPS) students in charter application grades (4, 5, and 8). The graphs on the right plot the percent of students with ELL status at the time of the lottery for charter enrollees and BPS students in charter entry grades (5, 6, and 9). Using the ELL status at the time of the lottery ignores any post-lottery changes to classification.

Figure A3: Baseline Level of Inclusion of Charter Applicants and Boston Public School (BPS) Students




Notes: This figure plots the percent of students with special education substantially separate, partial, and full classroom inclusion at the time of the lottery for charter applicants and Boston Public School students in charter application grades (4, 5, and 8).

Figure A4: Baseline English Proficiency of Charter Applicants and Boston Public School (BPS) Students



Notes: This figure plots the percent of students with beginning, intermediate, and advanced English proficiency at the time of the lottery for charter applicants and Boston Public School students in charter application grades (4, 5, and 8). English proficiency is measured by the required annual state exam for English Language Learners.


Figure A5: Density of Treated and Non-treated Compliers' Math Test Scores



Treated Compliers
 Un-treated Compliers

Notes: This figure shows the distribution of test scores by pre-lottery special needs status over time for middle school treated and untreated charter compliers. Dashed lines represent the group average. The two-stage least squared estimates for charter effects are displayed with standard errors in parentheses. Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and p -values are from bootstrap tests of distributional equality for treated and untreated compliers.

Figure A6: Relationship between Proportion Reclassified and Predicted Reclassification Index



Notes: This figure displays the proportion of students reclassified by predicted reclassification index value (grouped into five bins).

A1: Lottery Participation by Schools and Cohorts

Panel A: Elementary School

Application Year/School	Bridge Boston	Brooke East Boston	Brooke Mattapan	Brooke Roslindale	Codman	Conservatory Lab	Dorchester Collegiate Academy	KIPP	Match Community Day	Neighborhood House
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Entry Grade	Pre-K	K	K	K	Pre-K	Pre-K	4	K	Pre-K & 2	Pre-K
2003										Not open
2004										Y
2005				No records						Y*
2006	Not open	Not open	Not open			No records	Not open		Not open	Y*
2007				Y	Not open					Y
2008				Y				Not open		Y
2009				Y**		Y+	No records			Y
2010				Y		Y*	No records			Y
2011	Y+		Y+	Y		Y	No records		Y	Y
2012	Y	Y+	Y	Y*		Y	Y		Y	Y
2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y+**	Y			Y	Y
2014	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y+	Y+	Declined	Y	Y	Y
N	561	2300	1296	785	114	739	52	159	1082	1932

Panel B: Middle School

Application Year/School	Dorchester Prep (UCS)	Brooke Roslindale	Brooke Mattapan	Brooke East Boston	Excel East Boston	Excel Orient Heights	Lucy Stone (UCS)	Mission Hill (UCS)	KIPP Boston	UP Academy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Entry Grade	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5/6	5	6
2003								Y*		
2004		No records						Y*		
2005					No records			Y*		
2006		Y**	Not open	Not open			Not open	Y		
2007	Not open	Y				Not open		Y	Not open	
2008		Y			Y			Y		
2009		Y			Y			Y		
2010					Y			Y		Not open
2011			Y		Y		Y	Y		Y
2012	Y	Not entry grade	Y	Y**	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y*	Y
2013	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y*	Y
2014	Y**		Y**	Y	Incomplete records		Y**	Y**	Y	Y**
N	1035	254	738	367	519	333	1430	2291	429	1021

Panel C: Combined Middle and High Schools (5th-6th - 12th Grades)

Application Year/School	Academy of the Pacific Rim	Boston Collegiate	Boston Prep	Codman Academy	Match MS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Entry Grade	5/6	5	6	5/6	6
2003		Y	Not open		
2004	No records		Incomplete records		
2005	Y	Y	Y**		Not open
2006	Y	Y	Y		
2007	Y	Y	Y	Not entry grade	
2008	Y	Y	Y		Y
2009	Y	Y	Y		Y
2010	Y	Y	Y		Y
2011	Y	Y	Y		Y
2012	Y	Y	Y		Y
2013	Y	Y	Y		Y
2014	No records	Y	Y+	Y	Y
N	1852	3025	1636	69	2137

Panel D: High School

Boston Green Academy	City on a Hill	City on a Hill II	Codman Academy	Match HS	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
9	9	9	9	9	
2003	No records		Incomplete records		Y
2004		Y*		Y**	Y
2005		Y		Incomplete records	Y
2006	Not open	Y			Y
2007		Y	Not open	No record	Y
2008		Y*		Y	Y
2009		Y		Y	Y
2010		Y		Y	Y
2011	Y	Y		Y	
2012	Y**	Y		Y	
2013	Y	Y	Y**	Y	Not entry grade
2014	Y**	Y	Y	Y	
N	901	4624	1102	1737	2766

Notes: This table shows study charters and their application cohorts. The counts contain the number of students applying to each school in the study sample, not including siblings, out of area applicants, duplicates, disqualified applicants, and students not matched to the state data. In 2012, Uncommon Schools (Roxbury Prep, Dorchester Prep, and Grove Hall) held a joint lottery. APR had 6th grade lotteries from 2005-2007 and 5th grade lotteries from 2007-2014. Roxbury Prep began using 5th grade lotteries in Spring 2012. This table excludes closed schools and schools that did not provide usable lottery records.

* Only ever offer information is available.

** There is no variation in waitlist offers.

+ Lotteries for additional entry grades are included in the analysis sample.

A2: Effect of Lottery Offer on Charter Enrollment and Years in Charter

	Special Education		English Language Learner		Non-Special Needs	
	Immediate		Immediate		Immediate	
	Offer (1)	Waitlist Offer (2)	Offer (3)	Waitlist Offer (4)	Offer (5)	Waitlist Offer (6)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>						
Years in Charter	1.626*** (0.153)	1.125*** (0.265)	1.463*** (0.096)	0.831*** (0.156)	2.234*** (0.162)	0.924*** (0.277)
N		171		542		591
Enroll in Charter	0.589*** (0.060)	0.364*** (0.086)	0.620*** (0.030)	0.347*** (0.042)	0.709*** (0.031)	0.384*** (0.049)
N		236		715		682
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>						
Years in Charter	1.035*** (0.041)	0.676*** (0.041)	1.100*** (0.033)	0.661*** (0.033)	1.221*** (0.022)	0.809*** (0.023)
N		3632		4380		12046
Enroll in Charter	0.581*** (0.030)	0.387*** (0.030)	0.640*** (0.025)	0.422*** (0.026)	0.629*** (0.017)	0.410*** (0.017)
N		1607		2052		4696
<i>Panel C: High School</i>						
Years in Charter	0.717*** (0.084)	0.490*** (0.079)	0.662*** (0.116)	0.726*** (0.105)	0.714*** (0.038)	0.424*** (0.037)
N		1055		504		3955
Enroll in Charter	0.720*** (0.082)	0.470*** (0.079)	0.680*** (0.109)	0.722*** (0.105)	0.717*** (0.039)	0.452*** (0.038)
N		1160		621		3752

Notes: This table reports the first stage estimates for the two main two-stage least squares specifications. It displays the effect of lottery offers on years spent in charter schools and an indicator for charter enrollment.

A3: Special Education Classification Two Years After Application

Baseline Status	Any Special Education		Substantially Separate Classroom		Partial Inclusion		Full Inclusion		Move to More Inclusive Classroom	
	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>										
All Special Education	0.897	-0.049 (0.093)							0.299	0.359*** (0.139)
N		137								
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.941	0.058 (0.071)	0.529	-0.620*** (0.167)	0.059	0.144 (0.120)	0.324	0.678*** (0.127)	0.441	0.764*** (0.168)
N		38								
Partial Inclusion	0.909	0.111 (0.093)			0.182	-0.160 (0.120)	0.364	0.173 (0.208)	0.455	0.062 (0.182)
N		29								
Full Inclusion	0.848	-0.110 (0.157)					0.565	0.162 (0.235)	0.152	0.110 (0.157)
N		63								
New Students (No Prior Special Ed. Evaluation)	0.090	-0.027 (0.023)	0.011	-0.014** (0.005)	0.011	-0.018** (0.007)	0.067	0.002 (0.021)		
N		1138								
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>										
All Special Education	0.889	-0.124** (0.055)							0.326	0.234*** (0.078)
N		1191								
Substantially Separate Classroom	1.000	0.034 (0.057)	0.789	-0.266* (0.161)	0.037	0.051 (0.076)	0.137	0.393** (0.162)	0.174	0.410** (0.165)
N		271								
Partial Inclusion	0.948	-0.132* (0.078)			0.354	-0.091 (0.113)	0.441	0.051 (0.129)	0.493	0.183 (0.119)
N		431								
Full Inclusion	0.743	-0.105 (0.102)					0.466	0.111 (0.110)	0.257	0.105 (0.102)
N		472								
<i>Panel C: High School</i>										
All Special Education	0.837	0.008 (0.095)							0.306	0.009 (0.133)
N		848								
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.967	-0.109 (0.088)	0.663	-0.044 (0.189)	0.120	-0.240 (0.148)	0.120	0.076 (0.141)	0.272	-0.056 (0.203)
N		240								
Partial Inclusion	0.857	-0.295* (0.173)			0.516	-0.374* (0.217)	0.273	0.199 (0.215)	0.416	0.494** (0.229)
N		241								
Full Inclusion	0.750	0.264 (0.174)					0.465	0.468** (0.208)	0.250	-0.264 (0.174)
N		349								

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter enrollment on special education classification and level of classroom inclusion two years following the charter lottery. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for enrollment in charter schools. Estimation is run separately by baseline classroom inclusion type. Effects persist for up to two years following the charter application. See Table 2 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A4: English Language Learner Classification Two Years After Application

Baseline Status	Remain English Language Learner	
	Trad. Public mean (1)	Charter effect (2)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.781	-0.210 (0.198)
N		496
Beginning Proficiency	1.000	-0.145 (0.118)
N		65
Intermediate Proficiency	0.763	-0.152 (0.220)
N		274
Advanced Proficiency	0.286	- -
N		15
New Non-native English Speaking Students (No Prior English Lang. Learner Evaluation)	0.565	-0.336*** (0.093)
N		308
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.553	-0.352*** (0.065)
N		1423
Beginning Proficiency	0.980	-0.309 (0.231)
N		65
Intermediate Proficiency	0.734	-0.576*** (0.118)
N		688
Advanced Proficiency	0.283	-0.262*** (0.069)
N		476
<i>Panel C: High School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.552	-0.280 (0.190)
N		392
Beginning Proficiency	0.900	- -
N		16
Intermediate Proficiency	0.822	-0.181 (0.253)
N		166
Advanced Proficiency	0.244	0.188 (0.461)
N		151

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter enrollment on English Language Learner classification two years following the charter lottery. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for enrollment in charter schools. Estimation is run separately by baseline English proficiency level. Effects persist for up to two years following the charter application. See Table 2 notes for detailed regression specifications.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A5: Staff-to-Student Ratios

	All Staff		Special Education Staff		English Language Learner Staff	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean	Charter Effect	mean	Charter Effect	mean	Charter Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Total Staff	0.120	0.045*** (0.011)	0.019	-0.011*** (0.001)	0.015	-0.013*** (0.001)
Teachers	0.079	0.013*** (0.004)	0.010	-0.010*** (0.001)	0.003	-0.002*** (0.001)
Specialists	-	-	0.003	-0.001** (0.000)	0.000	0.000** (0.000)
Content Support	-	-	0.004	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001	0.001** (0.001)
N (students)	14346					

Notes: This table shows two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of charter enrollment on the staff-to-student ratios. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for any charter enrollment in the year following the lottery. The sample includes all lottery applicants applying in the 2007-08 through 2013-14 school years. Staffing and student counts data are collected in October of each year. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A6: School Finances

	Total		Special Education	
	Boston Public Schools	Boston Charter Schools	Boston Public Schools*	Boston Charter Schools
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Per Pupil Expenditures</i>				
Total	\$19,214	\$16,759		\$1,361
		(2,502)		(713)
Total Instructional Spending	\$8,913	\$9,769	\$2,365	\$1,325
	(2,395)	(1,470)	\$2,365	
Retirement & Insurance	\$3,282	\$1,345		-
		(410)		
Other Teaching Services	\$1,307	\$872	\$504	\$168
	(842)	(652)	(725)	(209)
Professionals	\$309	\$360	\$5	\$72
	(183)	(489)	(62)	(146)
Paraprofessionals	\$974	\$249	\$498	\$17
	(772)	(398)	(697)	(49)
Contractors	\$120	\$204	\$6	\$76
	(373)	(331)	(015)	(144)
Classroom & Specialist Teachers	\$6,051	\$5,521	\$1,567	\$808
	(1069)	(844)	(1,231)	(605)
Professional Development	\$310	\$190	\$86	\$16
	(134)	(205)	(75)	(52)
Pupil Services	\$2,601	\$1,994		\$36
		(726)		(110)
Operations & Maintenance	\$1,249	\$1,020		-
		(517)		
Administration	\$557	\$2,632		-
		(1,471)		
Guidance, Counseling, & Testing	\$117	\$715	\$23	\$210
	(346)	(419)	(291)	(196)
Instructional Leadership	\$821	\$1,627	\$159	\$100
	(400)	(0,641)	(231)	(117)
Materials, Equipment, & Tech	\$308	\$843	\$27	\$22
	(406)	(588)	(035)	(45)
<i>Panel B: Federal and State Grants Per Pupil</i>				
Federal Grants	\$1,396	\$1,257	\$389	\$246
		(683)		(115)
State Grants	\$89	\$6		
		(15)		
Medicaid Reimbursement			\$119	\$24
			-	(35)

Notes: This table shows the per pupil expenditures and grants per pupil for total spending and special education spending for the 2013-14 school year in 2015 CPI-U adjusted dollars. Districts do not report English Language Learner specific school expenditures. Total enrollment is used to calculate special education spending per pupil (instead of special education enrollment). Items without school-level BPS data do not have standard deviations. If school-level Boston Public Schools (BPS) data is available, BPS statistics are weighted by the proportion of lottery applicants that enroll in individual BPS schools.

A7: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates by Baseline Special Needs Status

	Special Education		English Language Learner		Non-Special Needs	
	Trad. Public	Charter	Trad. Public	Charter	Trad. Public	Charter
	mean	effect	mean	effect	mean	effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>						
Math	-0.737	0.250*** (0.071)	-0.326	0.200*** (0.059)	-0.087	0.089** (0.040)
	N	171		541		591
English	-1.186	0.337*** (0.074)	-0.519	0.194*** (0.066)	-0.128	0.108*** (0.038)
	N	169		539		590
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>						
Math	-1.025	0.231*** (0.019)	-0.550	0.276*** (0.021)	-0.129	0.198*** (0.012)
	N	3608		4369		12053
English	-1.176	0.187*** (0.019)	-0.763	0.220*** (0.018)	-0.102	0.138*** (0.010)
	N	3595		4373		11986
<i>Panel C: High School</i>						
Math	-0.920	0.233*** (0.033)	-0.419	0.102 (0.067)	-0.086	0.171*** (0.029)
	N	1030		493		3926
English	-1.069	0.197*** (0.028)	-0.758	0.135* (0.070)	-0.135	0.129*** (0.021)
	N	1050		503		3974

Notes: This table reports the Ordinary Least Squares estimates of years spent in charter school on state standardized test scores. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A8: Reduced Form (Intent To Treat) Estimates by Baseline Special Needs Status

	Special Education		English Language Learner		Non-Special Needs	
	No charter offer mean	Charter offer effect	No charter offer mean	Charter offer effect	No charter offer mean	Charter offer effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>						
Math	-0.618	0.444** (0.187)	-0.351	0.587*** (0.114)	-0.100	0.461*** (0.104)
	N	171		541		591
English	-1.047	0.694*** (0.199)	-0.544	0.528*** (0.133)	-0.154	0.498*** (0.110)
	N	169		539		590
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>						
Math	-0.910	0.204*** (0.055)	-0.449	0.231*** (0.055)	-0.033	0.251*** (0.032)
	N	3608		4369		12053
English	-1.090	0.162*** (0.058)	-0.687	0.147*** (0.049)	-0.035	0.131*** (0.028)
	N	3595		4373		11986
<i>Panel C: High School</i>						
Math	-0.771	0.168*** (0.065)	-0.410	0.255** (0.108)	-0.073	0.196*** (0.037)
	N	1030		493		3926
English	-0.963	0.117* (0.064)	-0.753	0.260** (0.123)	-0.122	0.128*** (0.030)
	N	1050		503		3974

Notes: This table reports the Reduced Form estimates of the effect of getting any charter offer on state standardized test scores. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A9: Charter Effects on English Proficiency Exam for Baseline English Language Learners

School Level	Take English Proficiency Exam		English Proficiency Exam Score	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean (1)	Charter effect (2)	mean (3)	Charter effect (4)
Elementary School	0.696	-0.103 (0.082)	-0.013	-0.066 (0.110)
	N	536		464
Middle School	0.628	-0.300*** (0.065)	0.593	-0.074 (0.105)
	N	2172		1054
High School	0.490	-0.485*** (0.163)	0.484	0.841* (0.468)
	N	673		339

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of charter enrollment on whether English Language Learners take the annual Spring English Proficiency exam and their scores. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for charter enrollment in the year following the lottery. Students who remain classified as English Language Learners take the English Proficiency exam. Models control for gender, ethnicity, female x minority interaction, baseline special education, baseline subsidized lunch, experimental strata, year-applied dummies, grade-applied dummies, and baseline English proficiency exam score. Estimates are clustered by school-grade-year.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A10: Test Score Effects by Baseline Special Education of Disability

	Intellectual		Communication		Emotional		Learning	
	Trad. Public mean (1)	Charter effect (2)	Trad. Public mean (3)	Charter effect (4)	Trad. Public mean (5)	Charter effect (6)	Trad. Public mean (7)	Charter effect (8)
Math	-1.834	0.635 (0.578)	-0.721	0.183 (0.121)	-1.028	-0.329 (0.252)	-1.055	0.337*** (0.068)
	N	263		1179		361		2783
English	-2.051	0.363 (0.458)	-0.913	0.130 (0.119)	-1.240	-0.584 (0.370)	-1.199	0.236*** (0.070)
	N	264		1177		365		2785

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of years spent in charter schools on test scores for students by their baseline disability type for elementary, middle, and high school applicants. Disabilities with fewer than 200 observations are not shown. These include autism, physical disabilities, multiple disabilities, developmental disabilities, and health disabilities. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A11: Test Score Effects by First Language of Baseline English Language Learners

	Spanish		Haitian Creole		Other	
	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect
Exam	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Math	-0.567	0.273*** (0.058)	-0.731	0.587*** (0.127)	-0.236	0.256*** (0.095)
	N	3120		931		1331
English	-0.786	0.210*** (0.056)	-0.816	0.451*** (0.124)	-0.564	0.083 (0.107)
	N	3134		931		1329

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of years spent in charter schools on test scores for students by their first language for elementary, middle, and high school applicants. Languages in the "Other" category had too few students to individually estimate. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A12: Ordinary Least Squares Post-Application Special Education Classification Estimates

Baseline Status	Any Special Education		Substantially Separate Classroom		Partial Inclusion		Full Inclusion		Move to More Inclusive Classroom		
	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	Trad. Public mean	Charter effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>											
All Special Education	0.907	-0.178*** (0.051)								0.161	0.313*** (0.080)
N		254									254
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.903	0.088 (0.072)	0.629	-0.469*** (0.124)	0.016	0.237*** (0.080)	0.177	0.532*** (0.099)		0.226	0.691*** (0.112)
N		72									72
Partial Inclusion	0.895	-0.369* (0.198)			0.500	-0.390*** (0.144)	0.289	0.014 (0.184)		0.342	0.144 (0.209)
N		49									49
Full Inclusion	0.910	-0.129 (0.091)					0.690	-0.026 (0.122)		0.060	0.180** (0.091)
N		126									126
New Students (No Prior Special Ed. Evaluation)	0.014	-0.005 (0.005)	0.001	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003	0.001 (0.003)	0.008	-0.002 (0.004)			
N		2665									
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>											
All Special Education	0.927	-0.109*** (0.024)								0.125	0.226*** (0.025)
N		1726									1726
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.976	-0.054* (0.029)	0.897	-0.628*** (0.054)	0.036	0.073** (0.033)	0.028	0.284*** (0.046)		0.071	0.370*** (0.053)
N		403									403
Partial Inclusion	0.935	-0.136*** (0.036)			0.665	-0.472*** (0.045)	0.156	0.310*** (0.041)		0.193	0.349*** (0.041)
N		611									611
Full Inclusion	0.886	-0.128*** (0.036)					0.692	-0.002 (0.044)		0.097	0.081*** (0.030)
N		683									683
<i>Panel C: High School</i>											
All Special Education	0.841	-0.134*** (0.038)								0.180	0.163*** (0.034)
N		1173									1173
Substantially Separate Classroom	0.975	-0.272*** (0.052)	0.819	-0.416*** (0.078)	0.071	0.008 (0.034)	0.042	0.089** (0.042)		0.130	0.186*** (0.064)
N		333									333
Partial Inclusion	0.884	-0.119** (0.052)			0.589	-0.335*** (0.068)	0.179	0.214*** (0.067)		0.254	0.285*** (0.068)
N		344									344
Full Inclusion	0.726	-0.029 (0.053)					0.511	0.053 (0.054)		0.156	0.075* (0.041)
N		469									469

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter enrollment on special education classification and level of classroom inclusion in the fall following the charter lottery. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for enrollment in charter schools. Estimation is run separately by baseline classroom inclusion type. Effects persist for up to two years following the charter application. All models control for gender, ethnicity, female x minority interaction, baseline special education, baseline ELL, baseline subsidized lunch, experimental strata, year-applied dummies, and grade-applied dummies. Estimates for elementary and middle school sample pool post-lottery outcomes for grades 3-5 and 5-8 respectively and cluster by student identifier and school-grade-year.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A13: Ordinary Least Squares Post-Application English Language Learner
Classification Estimates

Baseline Status	Remain English Language Learner	
	Trad. Public mean (1)	Charter effect (2)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.900	-0.214*** (0.064)
	N	818
Beginning Proficiency	0.989	-0.031 (0.022)
	N	110
Intermediate Proficiency	0.986	-0.134* (0.069)
	N	349
Advanced Proficiency	0.739	-0.604** (0.297)
	N	25
New Non-native English Speaking Students (No Prior English Lang. Learner Evaluation)	0.637	-0.225*** (0.047)
	N	856
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.794	-0.324*** (0.038)
	N	2231
Beginning Proficiency	1.000	0.000 (0.000)
	N	130
Intermediate Proficiency	0.953	-0.400*** (0.045)
	N	1105
Advanced Proficiency	0.570	-0.219*** (0.052)
	N	774
<i>Panel C: High School</i>		
All English Language Learners	0.802	-0.262*** (0.048)
	N	714
Beginning Proficiency	1.000	-0.070 (0.102)
	N	47
Intermediate Proficiency	0.921	-0.253*** (0.073)
	N	356
Advanced Proficiency	0.618	-0.170** (0.085)
	N	209

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter enrollment on English Language Learner classification in the fall following the charter lottery. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for enrollment in charter schools. Estimation is run separately by baseline English proficiency level. Effects persist for up to two years following the charter application. See Table 2 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A14: Test Score Effects for Lotteries with High and Low Proportions of Special

	Special Education		English Language Learner	
	Bottom Quartile	Top Quartile	Bottom Quartile	Top Quartile
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Math	0.264*** (0.036)	0.321*** (0.036)	0.241*** (0.049)	0.315*** (0.029)
N	5711	7148	3656	9703
English	0.196*** (0.035)	0.207*** (0.035)	0.152*** (0.043)	0.199*** (0.028)
N	5640	7156	3608	9706
Mean % of Lottery Applicants with Special Needs Status	13.55% (3.99)	23.32% (5.36)	14.08% (10.49)	41.22% (25.11)

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of years spent in charter schools on test scores for lotteries with the highest and lowest quartile of special needs representation. Immediate and waitlist offer dummies instrument for years spent in charter schools for elementary, middle, and high school lottery applicants. See Table 2 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A15: Match from Lottery Data to Administrative Data

Lottery Year	Elementary School				Middle School				High School			
	Number of Applications	Proportion Matched	Reg of Match on Offer		Number of Applications	Proportion Matched	Reg of Match on Offer		Number of Applications	Proportion Matched	Reg of Match on Offer	
			Immediate Offer	Any Offer			Immediate Offer	Any Offer			Immediate Offer	Any Offer
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
2004	150	0.867	0.139*** (0.029)	0.074 (0.071)	268	0.989	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.013)	638	0.991	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)
2005	141	0.865	-	0.090 (0.056)	616	0.987	0.005 (0.011)	0.002 (0.013)	601	0.990	0.000 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)
2006	166	0.910	-	0.098*** (0.024)	742	0.991	0.001 (0.008)	0.004 (0.016)	669	0.991	0.002 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.013)
2007	303	0.901	0.077*** (0.026)	0.043 (0.031)	924	0.984	0.019** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.013)	997	0.978	0.008 (0.009)	0.013 (0.009)
2008	322	0.913	0.089*** (0.018)	0.082*** (0.025)	1018	0.957	0.042*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.019)	837	0.957	0.038*** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.030)
2009	472	0.960	0.031** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.015)	1106	0.977	0.004 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	898	0.971	-0.017 (0.020)	0.023 (0.015)
2010	558	0.937	0.013 (0.028)	0.020 (0.024)	1041	0.924	0.065*** (0.016)	0.071*** (0.017)	917	0.954	0.013 (0.012)	0.027** (0.013)
2011	1610	0.940	0.032*** (0.012)	0.033*** (0.011)	2614	0.954	0.018*** (0.007)	0.025*** (0.007)	1234	0.930	0.012 (0.010)	0.020 (0.013)
2012	1864	0.911	0.048*** (0.014)	0.048*** (0.013)	2503	0.939	0.001 (0.011)	0.033*** (0.011)	1499	0.951	0.000 (0.008)	-0.030 (0.021)
2013	1422	0.884	0.032* (0.018)	0.052*** (0.018)	2712	0.902	0.045*** (0.012)	0.078*** (0.015)	1537	0.951	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.120 (0.078)
2014	1085	0.890	0.009 (0.022)	0.020 (0.021)	1938	0.961	0.027*** (0.007)	0.036** (0.014)	1403	0.952	0.023** (0.010)	0.111 (0.106)
All Cohorts	8093	0.912	0.036*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.006)	15482	0.949	0.023*** (0.003)	0.038*** (0.004)	11230	0.960	0.007** (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)

Notes: This table summarizes the match from the state administrative data to the lottery records. The sample excludes late applicants, siblings, disqualified applicants, duplicate names, and out-of-area applicants. Columns (3) and (4) report coefficients from regressions on a dummy for a successful state data match on immediate and any charter offer dummies for the elementary school sample. Year-specific regressions control for charter school dummies. All cohort regressions control for school-by-year dummies.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A16: Sample Selection

Year of application	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	All
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>												
Total number of records	160	166	194	364	396	602	702	2899	2963	2537	2298	13281
Excluding disqualified applications	160	166	194	360	396	602	702	2889	2956	2479	2280	13184
Excluding late applications	160	166	194	360	396	602	700	2882	2956	2470	2279	13165
Excluding out of area applications	160	160	194	357	395	590	687	2832	2874	2408	2233	12890
Excluding siblings	151	140	166	325	338	525	621	2330	2508	2101	2038	11243
Excluding records not matched to SIMS	131	123	151	296	310	507	585	2225	2336	1942	1858	10464
Keep only first year of charter application	131	123	151	273	294	491	555	1965	2069	1633	1398	9083
Excluding repeat applications	131	121	151	273	294	491	551	1954	2041	1618	1396	9021
Reshaping to one record per student	130	119	138	261	284	409	393	1336	1427	1041	918	6937
Has any demographics	130	119	150	262	285	426	484	1391	1430	1060	832	6569
Has demographics for baseline and/or year 1	29	37	54	205	228	345	392	1156	1131	874	805	5256
Has baseline demographics	1	5	3	26	56	68	62	613	472	249	388	1943
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>												
Total number of records	341	739	913	1143	1422	1595	1467	4283	4312	4766	3189	24170
Excluding disqualified applications	341	738	911	1135	1404	1594	1444	4273	4305	4760	3189	24094
Excluding late applications	340	738	909	1135	1363	1566	1397	4163	4196	4583	3187	23577
Excluding out of area applications	340	733	900	1123	1353	1548	1379	4094	4071	4513	3136	23190
Excluding siblings	300	677	836	1021	1223	1408	1249	3758	3760	4320	2865	21417
Excluding records not matched to SIMS	266	634	801	1000	1181	1378	1179	3627	3573	4016	2792	20447
Keep only first year of charter application	266	617	770	962	1093	1282	1038	3308	2962	3469	1975	17742
Excluding repeat applications	266	617	770	962	1093	1282	1038	3308	2962	3458	1960	17716
Reshaping to one record per student	265	523	586	760	868	963	812	2055	1715	1900	1176	11623
Has baseline demographics and in Boston at baseline	176	382	437	571	679	722	623	1790	1499	1594	1028	9501
<i>Panel C: High School</i>												
Total number of records	940	884	942	1330	1211	1300	1500	1835	2049	3280	3417	18688
Excluding disqualified applications	940	883	942	1327	1210	1289	1500	1818	2040	3278	3417	18644
Excluding late applications	930	880	942	1327	1191	1289	1500	1818	1986	3235	3417	18515
Excluding out of area applications	930	880	939	1327	1191	1276	1465	1787	1979	3136	2762	17672
Excluding siblings	905	864	939	1298	1153	1214	1376	1727	1952	3082	2658	17168
Excluding records not matched to SIMS	858	817	919	1271	1108	1184	1335	1642	1882	2980	2571	16567
Keep only first year of charter application	858	810	910	1161	919	925	984	1208	1369	2192	1416	12752
Excluding repeat applications	858	810	910	1161	919	925	984	1208	1366	2187	1414	12742
Reshaping to one record per student	632	590	656	827	604	629	591	736	786	928	652	7631
Has baseline demographics and in Boston at baseline	508	478	536	751	487	529	503	628	735	848	552	6555

Notes: This table shows the sample restrictions imposed for lottery analysis.

A17: Attrition

Outcome	Special Education at Baseline		English Language Learner at Baseline		Non-Special Needs at Baseline	
	Trad. Public Attrition Rate (1)	Attrition Differential by Offer Status (2)	Trad. Public Attrition Rate (3)	Attrition Differential by Offer Status (4)	Trad. Public Attrition Rate (5)	Attrition Differential by Offer Status (6)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>						
Math Exam	0.266	-0.059* (0.035) 217	0.168	-0.027* (0.015) 625	0.196	-0.026* (0.014) 695
English Exam	0.260	-0.071** (0.035) 217	0.168	-0.028* (0.015) 625	0.198	-0.027* (0.015) 695
Classification Status	0.212	-0.219** (0.101) 240	0.081	-0.114*** (0.040) 726	0.105	-0.059 (0.038) 716
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>						
Math Exam	0.201	0.002 (0.022) 4304	0.164	-0.005 (0.019) 4966	0.200	-0.030*** (0.011) 13878
English Exam	0.204	0.003 (0.021) 4304	0.164	-0.008 (0.018) 4966	0.203	-0.032*** (0.011) 13878
Classification Status	0.114	-0.025 (0.031) 1658	0.120	-0.023 (0.027) 2164	0.148	-0.076*** (0.018) 5036
<i>Panel C: High School</i>						
Math Exam	0.287	0.052 (0.041) 1340	0.308	0.125 (0.104) 643	0.274	-0.022 (0.021) 4869
English Exam	0.268	0.023 (0.042) 1340	0.291	0.051 (0.099) 643	0.263	-0.014 (0.023) 4869
Classification Status	0.080	-0.060 (0.089) 1347	0.027	0.106 (0.096) 819	0.056	-0.176*** (0.062) 4596

Notes: This table reports the two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of years spent in charter schools on attriting from the sample for test score and reclassification outcomes. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

A18: Effects on School Switching by Baseline Special Needs Status

	Special Education		English Language		Non-Special Needs	
	Trad. Public		Trad. Public		Trad. Public	
	mean	Effect	mean	Effect	mean	Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Elementary School</i>						
Any Switch	0.498	0.253*	0.373	-0.002	0.440	-0.120***
		(0.151)		(0.057)		(0.045)
	N	296		864		858
Switch excluding transitional grades	0.308	0.095	0.212	-0.138***	0.230	-0.173***
		(0.139)		(0.046)		(0.041)
	N	296		864		858
<i>Panel B: Middle School</i>						
Any Switch	0.549	-0.160***	0.556	-0.176***	0.598	-0.393***
		(0.051)		(0.043)		(0.031)
	N	1820		2314		5263
Switch excluding transitional grades	0.160	0.018	0.144	-0.063*	0.205	-0.119***
		(0.039)		(0.032)		(0.023)
	N	1820		2314		5263
<i>Panel C: High School</i>						
Any Switch	0.296	0.257**	0.337	0.068	0.262	0.068
		(0.102)		(0.117)		(0.057)
	N	1259		741		4040
Switch excluding transitional grades	0.206	0.299***	0.178	0.178	0.168	0.073
		(0.099)		(0.114)		(0.055)
	N	1259		741		4040

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter enrollment on switching schools one year following the lottery. Students who do not appear in Massachusetts public schools in October following the charter application are not counted as school switchers. The switch excluding transitional grades equals one for students who switch schools in grades other than the exit grade of their first school. It does not equal to one if the school closed the year the student switched. See Table 4 notes for detailed regression specifications.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%