How Flexible is that Functional Form?
Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories*

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June 18, 2020

Abstract

We propose an algorithm for quantifying the restrictiveness of economic models. Our restrictiveness measure is evaluated on simulated, hypothetical data sets that are drawn at random from a distribution that satisfies some application-dependent content restrictions, such as that people should prefer more money to less. We measure how well the model fits each of these data sets. Models that can fit almost all data well are not restrictive. We illustrate our approach by evaluating the restrictiveness of two widely-used behavioral models: Cumulative Prospect Theory and the Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy Model.

*We thank Nikhil Agarwal, Victor Aguiar, Abhijit Banerjee, Vince Crawford, Glenn Ellison, and John Quah for helpful comments, and NSF grant SES 1643517 for financial support.
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1 Introduction

When a parametric model does a good job of fitting the available data, is it because the model is so flexible that it would fit most possible data, or does it achieve this by singling out some structure that is specific to the actual data?

Our goal in this paper is to provide a quantitative measure of model restrictiveness that can be practically computed across a variety of applications. Specifically, we propose an algorithm that determines the ability of a theory to accommodate a wide range of data. Our approach is to first stipulate some basic application-dependent content restrictions, such as that people should prefer more money to less. Then we generate random data sets that obey these properties, and determine the restrictiveness of a model based on its performance on this hypothetical data. A restrictive model is one that performs poorly on most of the hypothetical data, so if it performs well on the real data, then it encodes important structure. In contrast, if the model can approximate almost all conceivable data, its ability to fit the real data doesn’t speak to its relevance.

While restrictive models are desirable, a restrictive model is not useful if it fails to predict real data. We thus complement restrictiveness with evaluation of the model’s performance on actual data, using the “completeness measure” proposed in Fudenberg et al. (2019). The ideal model not only captures the regularities in the actual data, but also rule out regularities that are not present—that is, it is simultaneously restrictive and complete.

An important property of our proposed measures is that they can be computed from data without the guidance of analytical results regarding the model’s implications or empirical content. This substantially broadens the applicability of our approach, since it allows us to evaluate parametric models that do not currently have axiomatic characterizations. We provide estimators for our measures of restrictiveness and completeness, and characterize their asymptotic distributions, providing standard errors that can be used in practice. We illustrate our method and estimators by evaluating parametric models from two classic settings in experimental economics—predicting certainty equivalents for binary lotteries and predicting initial
play in matrix games.

In our first application, we evaluate the restrictiveness of a popular four-parameter specification of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), using a set of binary lotteries from Bruhin et al. (2010). In addition to the reported certainty equivalents, we generate many hypothetical data sets of certainty equivalents (restricted to satisfy first-order stochastic dominance). We find that while the CPT is nearly complete for prediction of the real data, it is not very restrictive, as it is also able to fit the hypothetical certainty equivalent data quite well. CPT’s relatively low restrictiveness is important to keep in mind when interpreting its striking predictive performance on real data.

The flexibility of CPT is not immediately revealed by a count of its parameters, but reducing the number of parameters will always at least weakly increase restrictiveness. We next compare our initial four-parameter specification of CPT with alternative specifications from the literature that have fewer parameters. We find that using only the two nonlinear probability weighting parameters approximates the performance of the four-parameter specification on actual data, while being substantially more restrictive. These results point to the importance of the nonlinear probability weighting parameters in CPT.

Our second application is to the prediction of initial play in $3 \times 3$ matrix games from Fudenberg and Liang (2019). We evaluate the restrictiveness of the Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy Model (PCHM) (Camerer et al., 2004) by generating hypothetical distributions of play and evaluating how well PCHM fits the hypothetical data. We find that in contrast to CPT, the PCHM is very restrictive: Most hypothetical distributions are poorly fit by the PCHM for any parameter values. In contrast, PCHM’s performance on the actual data is substantially better than its performance on the hypothetical data. These findings suggest that PCHM precisely isolates a systematic regularity in real behavior.

We next compare the PCHM with two alternative models: logit level-1, which models the distribution of play as a logistic best reply to the uniform distribution, and logit PCHM, which allows for logistic best replies in the PCHM (Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2014). We find that logit level-1 not only fits the actual data better
than the PCHM, but is also more restrictive. Moreover, logit level-1 performs almost as well as the more complex logit PCHM on the actual data, and is substantially more restrictive.

Our measure of restrictiveness provides a new perspective on the problem of how richly to parameterize a model. Minimizing cross-validated prediction error can help with this, as overparameterized models can overfit to training data and perform poorly on test data. But cross-validation—like other techniques for guarding against overfitting—tends to favor increasingly flexible models given increasingly large data sets. In contrast, our approach supposes an intrinsic preference for more parsimonious models. As we show, models with a small number of parameters, such as the four-parameter specification of CPT that we examine, can allow for a large range of behaviors, and models with the same number of parameters (PCHM versus logit level-1) can differ substantially in their restrictiveness. Understanding the range of behaviors permitted by these models tells us how much of a model’s success on real data is due to its flexibility, and how much is due to the fact that it specifically tracks regularities that are present in the data.

2 Related Work

Koopmans and Reiersol (1950) defined a model to be observationally restrictive if the distributions of observables it allows is a proper subset of the distributions that would otherwise be possible. Their definition is with respect to an ambient family of outcome distributions; when this ambient family consists of every distribution, a non-restrictive theory cannot be refuted from data.\footnote{As Koopmans and Reiersol (1950) point out, a special case of an observationally restrictive specification is an overidentifying restriction. See e.g. Sargan (1958), Hausman (1978), Hansen (1982), and Chen and Santos (2018) for econometric tests of overidentification.}

Selten (1991) subsequently proposed measuring the restrictiveness of a model by the fraction of possible data sets that it can exactly explain. To compute this measure, the analyst needs to know which data sets are consistent with the model, which can be a demanding criterion. It is satisfied in settings such as evaluating whether individual choices from budget sets are consistent with maximization of a utility function (Beatty...
and Crawford, 2011), and whether individual choices between certain pairs of lotteries are consistent with expected utility or one of its generalizations (Hey, 1998; Harless and Camerer, 1994). But for example, we do not know which distributions of initial play are consistent with PCHM, and so it is difficult to compute a measure such as Selten (1991)’s for this parametric model.

In contrast, our proposed measure of restrictiveness is based on approximate rather than exact fit to a model, and the fit of the model is computed numerically. In this respect, our approach is closer to revealed preference papers that measure the distribution of the Afriat index (e.g. Choi et al. (2007a), Polisson et al. (2020a)), which we discuss in more detail in Section 3.4. Our work is also distinguished in that we provide statistical estimators for our proposed measures, and standard errors for these estimates. These results tell us, for example, how many hypothetical data sets need to be generated to achieve a certain level of approximation to our measure of restrictiveness.

Our work complements the representation theorems of decision theory, which describe the empirical content of different models. Currently, there are no representation theorems for many parametric economic models (including the commonly-used parameterizations of Cumulative Prospect Theory and the Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy Model). For example, although there are theorems that characterize which data are consistent with general Cumulative Prospect Theory specification (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987), we know of no representation theorems for the popular functional form we use here. Moreover, it can be computationally challenging to apply a representation theorem to determine whether a given data set is consistent with the theory.²

Our paper is also related to the vast literature in statistics and econometrics on model selection, which dates back to Cox (1961, 1962). Unlike classic measures like AIC and BIC, restrictiveness is not based on observed data, and it is not designed to guard against overfitting. Instead, it proposes a practical procedure for evaluating the restrictiveness of a parametric modeling class within a class of permissible models.³

²For example, the Harless and Camerer (1994) exercise would be much harder on larger menus of binary lotteries, on 3-outcome lotteries, or if subjects had been asked to report real-valued certainty equivalents.

³This paper also has a different goal than the extensive econometric literature that studies how the “restrictiveness” of an econometric model may affect the identification of parameters and the
Similarly, although VC dimension—which provides another measure for the “span” of a model—is related to our restrictiveness measure at a high level, it is generally nontrivial to determine the VC dimension of any given model.\footnote{The VC dimension is known for very few economic models. A recent exception is the work of Basu and Echenique (2020) for various models of decision-making under uncertainty.} In contrast, our metric is (by design) easy to compute. Finally, the paper utilizes a recent development in the statistics literature, specifically Austern and Zhou (2020) on the asymptotic theory of cross-validation risk estimator.

3 Approach

3.1 Preliminaries

Let $X$ be an observable (random) feature vector taking values in a finite set $\mathcal{X}$, and $Y$ be an observable random outcome variable taking values in a finite-dimensional set $\mathcal{Y}$. We use $P^*$ to denote the joint distribution of $(X,Y)$, $P^*_X$ to denote the marginal distribution of $X$ and $P^*_{Y|X}$ to denote the conditional distribution of $Y$ given $X$. We assume that the marginal $P^*_X$ is known to the analyst, while the conditional distribution is not.\footnote{For example, in a decision theory experiment the experimenter knows the distribution over menus that the subjects will face.}

The analyst wants to learn a function of the conditional distribution, $s(P^*_{Y|X=x}) \in S$, where $S$ is finite-dimensional. We call any function $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow S$ a predictive mapping, or simply mapping, and denote the true mapping $f^*$ by $f^*(x) := s(P^*_{Y|X=x})$. The set of all possible mappings is denoted $\mathcal{F}$.

We focus on the following two leading cases of this problem whose structure makes our methods easier to explain; Section 7 explains how to extend our approach to more general problems.

Prediction of a Conditional Expectation. The statistic of interest is $\mathbb{E}_{P^*}[Y \mid X]$, so the analyst’s objective is to learn the average outcome for each realization of $X$. To evaluate the error of predicting $f(x)$ when the realized outcome is $y$,
we use squared loss \( l(f, (x, y)) := (y - f(x))^2 \). The expected error of a mapping \( f \) is then \( e_{P^*}(f) = \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [(Y - f(X))^2] \), which is minimized by the true mapping \( f^*(x) = \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [Y|X = x] \). We show in Appendix A that the difference between the error \( e_{P^*}(f) \) of an arbitrary mapping \( f \in \mathcal{F} \) and the best possible error \( e_{P^*}(f^*) \) is

\[
d_{MSE}(f, f^*) := e_{P^*}(f) - e_{P^*}(f^*) := \mathbb{E}_{P_X^*} \left[ (f^*(X) - f(X))^2 \right]
\]

i.e. the expected mean-squared difference between the predicted outcomes.

Our first application, the prediction of the average reported certainty equivalent for binary lotteries, is an example of this case. Each lottery is described as a tuple \( x = (z, z, p) \), and the feature space \( \mathcal{X} \) consists of the 50 tuples associated with lotteries in a data set from Bruhin et al. (2010). The outcome space of certainty equivalents is \( \mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{R} \), and we seek to predict the population average of certainty equivalents for each lottery \( x \in \mathcal{X} \). A predictive mapping for this problem specifies an average certainty equivalent for each of the 50 binary lotteries.

**Prediction of a Conditional Distribution.** Here the statistic of interest is \( P_{Y|X}^* \), so the analyst’s objective is to learn the conditional distribution itself. To evaluate the error of predicting the distribution \( f(x) \) when the realized outcome is \( y \), we use the negative (conditional) log-likelihood \( l(f, (x, y)) := -\log f(y|x) \). The expected error of mapping \( f \) is \( e_{P^*}(f) = \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [-\log f(Y|X)] \), which is minimized by the true conditional distribution \( f^*(x) = P_{Y|X}^*(x) \). As we show in Appendix A, the difference between the error of an arbitrary mapping \( f \in \mathcal{F} \), \( e_{P^*}(f) \) and the best possible error, \( e_{P^*}(f^*) \), is

\[
d_{KL}(f, f^*) := e_{P^*}(f) - e_{P^*}(f^*) := \mathbb{E}_{P_X^*} \left[ \sum_y f(y|x) \left[ \log f(y|x) - \log f^*(y|x) \right] \right]
\]

i.e. the expected Kullback-Liebler divergence between \( f \) and the true distribution.

Our second application, the prediction of initial play in in matrix games, is an example of this case. Here the feature space \( \mathcal{X} \) consists of the 466 unique \( 3 \times 3 \) matrix games from Fudenberg and Liang (2019), each described as a vector in \( \mathbb{R}^{18} \).
The outcome space is \( \mathcal{Y} = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\} \) (the set of row player actions) and the analyst seeks to predict the conditional distribution over \( \mathcal{Y} \) for each game, interpreted as choices made by a population of subjects for the same game. Thus, \( S = \Delta(\mathcal{Y}) \), the set of all distributions over row player actions. A predictive mapping is any function \( f : \mathcal{X} \to S \) taking the 466 games into predicted distributions of play.

### 3.2 Restrictiveness

Our goal is to evaluate the restrictiveness of parametric models \( \mathcal{F}_\Theta = \{f_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta} \subseteq \mathcal{F} \), where the permitted mappings \( f_\theta \) are indexed by a finite dimensional parameter \( \theta \) and \( \Theta \) is a compact set. If the model \( \mathcal{F}_\Theta \) contains a mapping that can approximate the predictions of the true mapping \( f^* \), then \( \inf_{f \in \mathcal{F}_\Theta} e_{P^*}(f) \) also approximates the true mapping’s error, \( e_{P^*}(f) \). Given enough data, such a model will predict about as well as possible. But a good fit to the data could be because the model includes the “right” regularities, or because it is simply flexible enough to accommodate any pattern of behavior (i.e. \( \mathcal{F}_\Theta \) includes most mappings).

Our strategy to determine the restrictiveness of a model is to generate random mappings \( f \) from a primitive distribution \( \mu \). In our applications below, we choose \( \mu \) to be uniform over a set \( \mathcal{F}_M \subseteq \mathcal{F} \) of “permissible mappings,” which encodes prior knowledge or intuition about the setting. For example, when predicting certainty equivalents for lotteries, we may assume that people prefer more money to less.\(^6\)

We then evaluate how well the generated mappings can be approximated using the model \( \mathcal{F}_\Theta \). When predicting conditional expectations, we define \( d : \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{F} \to \mathbb{R} \) to extend \( d_{MSE} \) (as given in (1)) to

\[
d_{MSE}(f, f') := \mathbb{E}_{p_X} \left[ (f'(X) - f(X))^2 \right]
\]

In the setting of predicting a conditional distribution, we define \( d \) to extend \( d_{KL} \) (as
\(^6\)It can also be instructive to compute restrictiveness with respect to different choices of \( \mu \)—including those that have support on different permissible sets \( \mathcal{F}_M \)—as we do in Appendix B.1.)
given in (2)) to

\[ d_{KL}(f, f') : \mathbb{E}_{P_X} \left[ \sum_y f(y|x) \left[ \log f(y|x) - \log f'(y|x) \right] \right] \]

Since our subsequent statements hold for both of these functions, we simply use the notation in \(d\), understanding that it means \(d_{MSE}\) for predicting the conditional expectation, and \(d_{KL}\) for predicting the conditional distribution.

The model’s approximation error to a generated mapping \(f\) is then \(d(F_\Theta, f) := \inf_{\theta \in \Theta} d(f_\theta, f)\). We normalize this raw error relative to a benchmark naive mapping \(f_{naive} \in F_\Theta\) chosen to suit the problem. The naive mapping is interpreted as a lower bound that any sensible model should outperform. For example, in our application to predicting initial play in games, we define the naive mapping to predict a uniform distribution of play in every game. Normalizing relative to a naive benchmark returns a unit-free measure of approximation, which can be more easily interpreted. (See further discussion in 3.4.)

**Definition 1.** The \(f\)-discrepancy of model \(F_\Theta\) is

\[ \delta_f := \frac{d(F_\Theta, f)}{d(f_{naive}, f)} \]

Since \(f_{naive}\) is assumed to be an element of \(F_\Theta\), the \(f\)-discrepancy of \(F_\Theta\) is bounded above by 1, and since \(d\) is nonnegative, the \(f\)-discrepancy is also lower bounded by zero. Thus, the \(f\)-discrepancy in any problem must fall between 0 and 1. Large values of \(\delta_f\) imply that the model does not approximate \(f\) much better than the naive mapping does. Since the naive mapping itself has no free parameters, and so cannot flexibly accommodate most mappings, concentration of the distribution of \(\delta_f\) around large values implies that the model rules out many kinds of regularities.

The restrictiveness of model \(F_\Theta\) is its average \(f\)-discrepancy:

**Definition 2.** The restrictiveness of model \(F_\Theta\) is \(r := \mathbb{E}_\mu [\delta_f]\).

If \(F_\Theta = F_M\) (so that the model is completely unrestricted), then \(r = 0\) for every choice of \(\mu\) with support on \(F_M\).
3.3 Completeness

While restrictive models are desirable, a restrictive model is not particularly useful if it fails to predict real data. We would like models to embody regularities that are present in actual behavior, and rule out conceivable regularities that are not. We thus evaluate models from the dual perspectives of how restrictive they are, and how well they predict actual data. The latter can be measured using the $f^*$-discrepancy of the model, where $f^*$ is the true mapping. This measure is tightly linked to the notion of completeness introduced in Fudenberg et al. (2019):

**Definition 3** (Fudenberg et al. (2019)). The completeness of the model $\mathcal{F}_\Theta$ is

$$\kappa^* := \frac{e_{P^*}(f_{\text{naive}}) - e_{P^*}(\mathcal{F}_\Theta)}{e_{P^*}(f_{\text{naive}}) - e_{P^*}(f^*)},$$

where $e_{P^*}(\mathcal{F}_\Theta) := \inf_{\theta \in \Theta} e_{P^*}(f_\theta)$.

Completeness is the complement of the $f^*$-discrepancy, since

$$\kappa^* = 1 - \frac{e_{P^*}(\mathcal{F}_\Theta) - e_{P^*}(f^*)}{e_{P^*}(f_{\text{naive}}) - e_{P^*}(f^*)} = 1 - \frac{d(\mathcal{F}_\Theta, f^*)}{d(f_{\text{naive}}, f^*)} = 1 - \delta_f, \quad (3)$$

A model’s completeness can be interpreted as the ratio of the reduction in error achieved by the model (relative to the naive baseline), compared to largest achievable reduction. By construction, the measure $\kappa^*$ is scale-free and lies within the unit interval. A large $\kappa^*$ suggests that the model is able to approximate the real data well: at the extremes, a model with $\kappa^* = 1$ matches the true mapping $f^*$ exactly, while a model with $\kappa^* = 0$ is no better at matching $f^*$ than the naive model. Subsequently, we will report restrictiveness $r$ and completeness $\kappa^*$ jointly for each of the models that we consider.

3.4 Discussion of Measures

**An alternative “area” measure.** Selten’s area measure of model flexibility is $a := \mu(\mathcal{F}_\Theta)$, where $\mu$ is the Lebesgue measure, i.e. the fraction of possible mappings that are exactly consistent with the model. Our measure of restrictiveness differs both by normalization with respect to the performance of a naive model, and in measuring
how well the model $\mathcal{F}_\Theta$ approximates a randomly drawn mapping $f$ in $\mathcal{F}_M$, which allows for the quantification of the degree of error. A model that doesn’t include most mappings from $\mathcal{F}_M$ can nevertheless have low restrictiveness by our measure if it approximates most mappings very well.

Efficiency-index measures. Choi et al. (2007b) and Polisson et al. (2020b) relax the implications of expected utility maximization using Afriat’s “efficiency index” as an analog of our loss function. They then compare the distribution of the efficiency indices of the actual subjects with the distribution of efficiency indices in randomly generated data. Our work can thus be seen as a way of extending their approach to other problem domains and “loss functions.”

Role of the normalization. We define restrictiveness to be the average value of $d(\mathcal{F}_\Theta, f)/d(f_{naive}, f)$, rather than its un-normalized counterpart $d(\mathcal{F}_\Theta, f)$. Normalizing relative to a naive mapping has several advantages compared to the unit-dependent raw error $d(\mathcal{F}_\Theta, f)$. For example, if we were to scale up the payoffs in the binary lotteries in our first application, then $d(\mathcal{F}_\Theta, f)$ would mechanically scale up as well, even though the flexibility of the model has not changed, which makes it hard to say what constitutes a “large” value of $d(\mathcal{F}_\Theta, f)$. Normalizing relative to the naive error returns a unitless quantity that is easier to interpret and can also be compared across problem domains.\footnote{Note though that the restrictiveness of the naive model can vary across problems, so our method measures the restrictiveness of the model relative to the restrictiveness of the chosen naive mapping.}

Sensitivity to $\mu$. We might prefer that the restrictiveness measure doesn’t respond too sensitively to small changes in $\mu$. We demonstrate now that it does not. For any two measures $\mu, \mu' \in \Delta(\mathcal{F})$,

$$
\mathbb{E}_\mu [\delta_f] - \mathbb{E}_{\mu'} [\delta_f] \leq \int \delta_f \cdot |d\mu - d\mu'| \leq 2 \cdot d_{TV}(\mu, \mu')
$$

where $d_{TV}$ is the total variation distance. Thus for any two measures that are close in total variation distance, the corresponding restrictiveness measures must also be
Combining $\kappa^*$ and $r$. Ideal models have high $\kappa^*$, and so approximate the real data well, but high restrictiveness $r$, so they rule out regularities that conceivably could have been present but are not. These two criteria generate a partial order on models; there are many ways to complete it. One possibility is to use a lexicographic ordering, where models are ordered first by $\kappa^*$ and then by $r$. Another is to impose a functional form that combine $\kappa^*$ and restrictiveness $r$, such as $r - (1 - \kappa^*) = E_{\mu}[\delta_f] - \delta_{f^*}$. Yet another possibility is to use the probability that the model fits the actual data better than it fits a randomly generated data set, namely the quantile of $\delta_{f^*}$ under the distribution of $f$-discrepancies. In the present paper, we report $\kappa^*$ and $r$ separately, and leave it to the analyst’s discretion whether or how to combine these two metrics.

**Point-Identified and Set-Identified Models.** Note that $f$-discrepancy, restrictiveness, and completeness are well-defined regardless of whether the parametric model $F_\Theta$ is point-identified or set-identified. This is because the definitions of $d(F_\Theta, f)$ and restrictiveness, and $e_{P^*}(F_\Theta)$ do not rely on the uniqueness of the minimizers. In other words, we evaluate the parametric model $F_\Theta$ with $d$ and $e_{P^*}$, so our measures do not differentiate point-identified models from set-identified models that yield the same $d(F_\Theta, f)$ and $e_{P^*}(F_\Theta)$.

### 4 Estimates and Test Statistics

We now discuss how to implement our approach in practice.

#### 4.1 Computing Restrictiveness $r$

We provide an algorithm for computing $r$: Sample $M$ times from the distribution $\mu$ on $F_M$, and for each sampled $f_m \in F_M$, compute $\delta_m := \frac{d(F_\Theta, f_m)}{d(f_{\text{naive}}, f_m)}$. The sample mean $\bar{\delta}_M := \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \delta_m$ is an estimator for restrictiveness. In principle, the number

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8Selten (1991) provided an axiomatic characterization of the similar aggregator $m = r - a$, where $r$ is the pass rate of the model on the actual data and $a$ is the area measure we discussed above.
of simulations we run, $M$, can be taken as large as we want, so $\delta$ can be made arbitrarily close to $r$ by the Law of Large Numbers. Moreover, the approximation error under a given finite $M$ can be quantified using standard statistical inference methods. We focus on the case where the distribution of $\delta_m$ is nondegenerate:

**Assumption 1.** The distribution of $\delta_m$ is non-degenerate.

Assumption 1 is a very mild condition that can be easily verified, as it is sufficient for any two $\delta_m$ and $\delta'_m$ to be distinct.

The sample variance is

$$\hat{\sigma}_\delta^2 := \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^{M} (\delta_m - \overline{\delta}_M)^2,$$

and by the standard Central Limit Theorem:

**Proposition 1.** Under Assumption 1,

$$\frac{\sqrt{M} (\overline{\delta}_M - r)}{\hat{\sigma}_\delta} \overset{d}{\to} \mathcal{N}(0, 1).$$

The $(1 - \alpha)$-th confidence interval for $r$ is given by

$$\left[ \overline{\delta}_M - q_{1-\alpha/2} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{M}\hat{\sigma}_\delta}, \overline{\delta}_M - q_{\alpha/2} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{M}\hat{\sigma}_\delta} \right]$$

where $\hat{\sigma}_\delta$ is given in (4).

One-sided hypothesis tests on $r$, e.g. for the null that $r = 0$ so the model is completely unrestrictive, can be also carried out in standard ways. We again note that the confidence intervals here simply serve to measure the approximation error of $r$ based on a finite number of simulations, and do not reflect randomness in experimental data.

### 4.2 Estimating Completeness

In this section, we show how to estimate completeness, $\kappa^*$. 


Suppose that the analyst has access to a finite sample of data \( \{ Z_i := (X_i, Y_i) \}_{i=1}^N \) drawn from the unknown true distribution \( P^* \). To estimate completeness, we use \( K \)-fold cross-validation to estimate the out-of-sample prediction error of the model. (In our applications, we take the standard choice of \( K = 10 \).) Specifically, we randomly divide \( Z_N \) into \( K \) (approximately) equal-sized groups. For notational simplicity assume that \( J_N = N/K \) is an integer. Let \( k(i) \) denote the group number of observation \( Z_i \), and for each group \( k = 1, ..., K \), define

\[
\hat{f}^{-k} := \arg\min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \frac{1}{N - J_N} \sum_{k(i) \neq k} l(f, Z_i)
\]

to be the mapping from \( \tilde{F} \) that minimizes error for prediction of observations outside of group \( k \). This estimated mapping is used for prediction of the \( k \)-th test set, and

\[
\hat{\epsilon}_k := \frac{1}{J_N} \sum_{k(i) = k} l(\hat{f}^{-k}, Z_i)
\]

is its out-of-sample error on the \( k \)-th test set. Then,

\[
CV (\mathcal{F}) := \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{\epsilon}_k
\]

is the average test error across the \( K \) folds. This is an estimator for the unobservable expected error of the best mapping from class \( \mathcal{F} \).

Setting \( \tilde{F} \) to be respectively \( \mathcal{F}_\Theta \), \( \mathcal{F} \), or \( \mathcal{F}_{naive} = \{ f_{naive} \} \), we can compute \( CV (\mathcal{F}_\Theta) \), \( CV (\mathcal{F}) \) and \( CV (\mathcal{F}_{naive}) \) from the data, leading to the following estimator for \( \kappa^* \):

\[
\hat{\kappa}^* = \frac{CV (\mathcal{F}_\Theta) - CV (\mathcal{F})}{CV (\mathcal{F}_{naive}) - CV (\mathcal{F})}.
\]

It is crucial that the denominator in \( \hat{\kappa}^* \) does not vanish asymptotically, so we impose the following assumption:

**Assumption 2** (Naive Rule is Imperfect). \( e(f_{naive}) - e(f^*) > 0 \).

This assumption is quite weak, as it simply says that the naive mapping performs strictly worse in expectation than the best mapping. Under additional technical
conditions, we show, by applying and adapting Proposition 5 in Austern and Zhou (2020), that $\hat{\delta}^*$ is asymptotically normal. See Appendix C for details.

To obtain the standard error, we use a variance estimator adapted from Proposition 1 in Austern and Zhou (2020). Specifically, for the $k$-th test set, let $f_{\hat{\theta}^{-k}}$ and $\hat{f}^{-k}$ be the estimated mappings from model $F_{\Theta}$ and $F$, respectively. The difference in their test errors on observation $Z_i$ is $\Delta(Z_i) = l(f_{\hat{\theta}^{-k}}, Z_i) - l(\hat{f}^{-k}, Z_i)$ and the average difference across all observations in test fold $k$ is

$$\bar{\Delta}_k = \frac{1}{JN} \sum_{k(i)=k} \Delta(Z_i).$$

The sample variance of the difference in test errors is correspondingly

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta,k}^2 = \frac{1}{JN - 1} \sum_{k(i)=k} (\Delta(Z_i) - \bar{\Delta}_k)^2.$$

Based on this, we define the following variance estimator for $\hat{\kappa}^*$:

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{\kappa}^*}^2 := \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \hat{\sigma}_{\Delta,k}^2 \left[ CV(f_{\text{naive}}) - CV(F) \right]^2$$

We establish the asymptotic distribution of our proposed estimators via the following theorem.

**Theorem 1.** Under Assumption 2 and some regularity conditions\(^9\):

$$\frac{\sqrt{N} (\hat{\kappa}^* - \kappa^*)}{\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{\kappa}^*}} \xrightarrow{d} N(0, 1).$$

Consequently, the $(1 - \alpha)$ two-sided confidence interval for $\kappa^*$ is given by

$$\left[ \hat{\kappa}^* - q_{1-\alpha/2} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \hat{\sigma}_{\hat{\kappa}^*}, \hat{\kappa}^* - q_{\alpha/2} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \hat{\sigma}_{\hat{\kappa}^*} \right]$$

where $\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{\kappa}^*}$ is given in (5).

\(^9\)See Appendix C for details of these assumptions.
5 Application 1: Certainty Equivalents

5.1 Setting

Our first application is to predicting certainty equivalents for a set of binary lotteries from Bruhin et al. (2010). Each lottery is described as a tuple \( x = (\overline{z}, \hat{z}, p) \), where \( \overline{z} \) and \( \hat{z} \) are the two possible prizes, with \( \overline{z} \geq \hat{z} \), and \( p \) is the probability of the larger prize \( \overline{z} \). The feature space \( \mathcal{X} \) consists of the 50 tuples associated with lotteries in the Bruhin et al. (2010) data. The outcome space is \( \mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{R} \). Each observation in the Bruhin et al. (2010) data is a pair consisting of a lottery and a reported certainty equivalent by a given subject. Note that the variation in \( \mathcal{Y} \) for fixed \( \mathcal{X} \) reflects the fact that different subjects report different certainty equivalents for the same lottery. (In Appendix B.4, we discuss how the approach extends for subject-level heterogeneity.)

We seek to predict the average of the certainty equivalents (over subjects) reported for each lottery. A mapping for this problem is any function \( f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) from the 50 lotteries to predicted average certainty equivalents. We define \( d(f, f') \) to be the expected mean-squared distance between the two mappings’ predictions, as in (1).

The economic model that we evaluate is a four-parameter version of Cumulative Prospect Theory indexed by \( \theta = (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \eta) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}_+ \), which predicts

\[
 f_\theta(\overline{z}, \hat{z}, p) = w(p)v(\overline{z}) + (1 - w(p))v(\hat{z})
\]

where

\[
v(z) = \begin{cases} 
z^\alpha & \forall z \geq 0 \\
-(z)^\beta & \forall z < 0 \end{cases}
\]

is a value function for money, and

\[
w(p) = \frac{\eta p^\gamma}{\eta p^\gamma + (1-p)^\gamma}
\]

is a probability weighting function.\(^{10}\) We specify \( \mathcal{F}_\Theta \) as the set of all such functions \( f_\theta \), and refer to this model simply as CPT. As a naive benchmark, we consider the

\(^{10}\text{This parametric form for } w(p) \text{ was first suggested by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Lattimore et al. (1992).}\)
function \( f_{\text{naive}} \) which maps each lottery into its expected value, which corresponds to \( \alpha = \beta = \gamma = \eta = 1 \) in CPT.

Using the estimation procedure described in Section 4.2, we find that CPT is 93% complete for predicting this data—that is, the model achieves almost all of the possible improvement in prediction accuracy over the naive baseline.\(^{11}\) (Equivalently, the estimated \( f^* \)-discrepancy of this model is 0.07.) One explanation is that CPT is a very good model of risk preferences; another possibility is that the model is flexible enough to mimic most functions from binary lotteries to certainty equivalents. These explanations have very different implications for how to interpret CPT’s empirical success.

## 5.2 Restrictiveness

To distinguish between these explanations, we now compute CPT’s restrictiveness. Our primitive distribution \( \mu \) is a uniform distribution over the set of all mappings satisfying the following criteria:\(^{12}\)

1. \( z \leq f(z, z', p) \leq z \)
2. if \( z \geq z', z \geq z', \text{ and } p \geq p' \text{ then } f(z, z', p) \geq f(z', z', p') \)
3. if \( z \geq z, p \geq p' \text{, then } f(z, z, p) \geq f(z, z, p') \)

Constraint (1) requires that the certainty equivalent is within the range of the possible payoffs, while constraints (2) and (3) require \( f \) to respect first-order stochastic dominance. Note that in the Bruhin et al. (2010) lottery data, there are many pairs of lotteries that can be compared via (2) and (3), so these conditions are not vacuous.

Below we plot the distribution of \( f \)-discrepancies for 100 random mappings \( f \).

\(^{11}\)\( CV(\mathcal{F}_{\text{naive}}) - CV(\mathcal{F}) = 0.93 \)

\(^{12}\)This uniform distribution is well-defined since \( \mathcal{F}_M \) is a bounded subset of \( \mathbb{R}^{50} \).
Figure 1: Distribution of $f$-discrepancies for 100 randomly generated mappings $f$

The restrictiveness of the model (i.e. the average $f$-discrepancy) is 0.31, so on average, CPT’s approximation error is about a third of the error of the naive (expected-value) mapping. This suggests that CPT is quite flexible, as it rules out very few regularities that are not already restricted by first-order stochastic dominance. Equivalently, CPT is on average 69% complete on hypothetical data, and this should be born in mind when evaluating the fact that CPT is 93% complete on the actual data. CPT’s restrictiveness thus suggests an explanation of its completeness intermediate to the two explanations proposed above: CPT’s empirical success on the real data is due in part to flexibility, as it substantially outperforms the naive mapping even on hypothetical data, but the relative magnitude of its success on real data suggests that it does encode additional structure.

In the Appendix, we test the robustness of these observations to alternative specifications. First, in Appendix B.1, we compute the restrictiveness of the model with respect to a different background constraint, dropping the FOSD restrictions in (2) and (3) while keeping the range restriction in (1). We would expect the restrictiveness of CPT to increase in this case, since (for all parameter values) CPT obeys first-order stochastic dominance. We find however that the restrictiveness of CPT relative to this larger permissible set, 0.37, is only slightly higher than the restrictiveness of 0.31 that we find for the main specification of $\mathcal{F}_M$. This reinforces our finding that CPT is not very restrictive.

Our analysis so far leaves open the possibility that the flexibility of the 4-parameter CPT model is specific to the domain of binary lotteries. In Appendix B.3, we evaluate
the restrictiveness of CPT on a set of 3-outcome lotteries from Bernheim and Sprenger (2020). We find that CPT is indeed more restrictive on this domain, but still quite flexible: Its restrictiveness on these lotteries is 0.57. In particular, CPT is much less restrictive than the models of initial play that we study in Section 6.

5.3 Comparison of Models

One way to evaluate the value of additional parameters is to compare the increase in completeness that they permit, relative to the decrease in restrictiveness. As an illustration, we compare the 4-parameter specification of CPT with more restrictive special cases that have been studied in the literature: $\eta = 1$, as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), $\alpha = \beta = 1$, which corresponds to a risk-neutral CPT agent whose utility function over money is $u(z) = z$ but exhibits nonlinear probability weighting, and $\eta = \gamma = 1$, which corresponds to an Expected Utility decision-maker whose utility function is as given in (6). We refer to these models respectively as CPT($\alpha, \beta, \gamma$), CPT($\gamma, \eta$), and CPT($\alpha, \beta$), where models are associated with their free parameters, and refer to the original 4-parameter specification of CPT as CPT($\alpha, \beta, \eta, \gamma$). The distribution of $f$-discrepancies under these more restrictive models are shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Distribution of $f$-discrepancies. *Top-Left:* Original 4-parameter CPT; *Top-Right:* CPT($\alpha, \beta, \gamma$); *Bottom-Left:* CPT($\eta, \gamma$) (nonlinear probability weighting parameters only); *Bottom-Right:* CPT($\alpha, \beta$) (risk aversion parameters only).

Less general specifications are always at least weakly more restrictive, but the restrictiveness of a model must be considered jointly with its ability to explain the actual data. Table 5.3 reports restrictiveness and completeness for all four specifications of CPT, and Figure 5.3 plots these measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free Parameters</th>
<th>Completeness $\kappa^*$</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>Restrictiveness $r$</th>
<th>$M$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \eta$</td>
<td>0.93 (0.01)</td>
<td>8906</td>
<td>0.31 (0.02)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \beta, \gamma$</td>
<td>0.76 (0.04)</td>
<td>8906</td>
<td>0.43 (0.01)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma, \eta$</td>
<td>0.89 (0.02)</td>
<td>8906</td>
<td>0.55 (0.01)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \beta$</td>
<td>0.13 (0.06)</td>
<td>8906</td>
<td>0.71 (0.02)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Completeness and restrictiveness are reported for each model in the certainty equivalent setting. $N$ is the number of observations in the data used to estimate $\kappa^*$. $M$ is the number of generated mappings from $\mathcal{F}_M$ for computation of $r$. 

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We find that CPT(\(\eta, \gamma\)), which uses only the nonlinear probability weighting parameters \(\eta\) and \(\gamma\), achieves a higher completeness than CPT(\(\alpha, \beta, \gamma\)), and does so despite being more restrictive. This suggests to us that it is a better model of risk preferences. Adding the risk-aversion parameters \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) to the nonlinear probability weighting parameters \(\eta\) and \(\gamma\) leads to only a slight improvement in completeness (\(\kappa^*\) increases from 0.89 to 0.93), but comes at a substantial drop in restrictiveness (\(r\) falls from 0.55 to 0.31). This suggests that the probability weighting parameters \(\eta\) and \(\gamma\) are more useful than the utility curvature parameters \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\). Our finding is consistent with previous studies which find that probability distortions play an important role in explaining field data (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010; Barseghyan et al., 2013), and adds a perspective on how much flexibility these parameters introduce. While the model CPT-(\(\alpha, \beta\)) is less complete than CPT-(\(\eta, \gamma\)), it is more restrictive, so these two models cannot be directly ranked.
6 Application 2: The Distribution of Initial Play

6.1 Setting

Our second application is to predicting the distribution of initial play in games. Here the feature space $\mathcal{X}$ consists of the 466 unique $3 \times 3$ matrix games from Fudenberg and Liang (2019),\textsuperscript{13} each described as a vector in $\mathbb{R}^{18}$. The outcome space is $\mathcal{Y} = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\}$ (the set of row player actions) and the analyst seeks to predict the conditional distribution over $\mathcal{Y}$ for each game, interpreted as choices made by a population of subjects for the same game. Thus, $S = \Delta(\mathcal{Y})$, the set of all distributions over row player actions. A mapping for this problem is any function $f : \mathcal{X} \to S$ taking the 466 games into predicted distributions of play. We define $d(f, f')$ to be the expected Kullback-Liebler divergence between the predicted distributions under $f$ and $f'$, as in (2).

We define the naive mapping to predict the uniform distribution for every game: $f_{naive}(x) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$ for every $x$. Additionally, we consider three economic models for this prediction task. The Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy Model (PCHM) of Camerer et al. (2004) supposes that there is a distribution over players of differing levels of sophistication: The level-0 player randomizes uniformly over his available actions, the level-1 player best responds to level-0 play (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995); and for $k \geq 2$, level-$k$ players best respond to a perceived distribution

$$p_k(h, \tau) = \frac{\pi_{\tau}(h)}{\sum_{l=0}^{k-1} \pi_{\tau}(l)} \quad \forall \ h \in \mathbb{N}_{<k}$$

over (lower) opponent levels, where $\pi_{\tau}$ is the Poisson distribution with rate parameter $\tau$. The parameter $\tau$ is the only free parameter of the model, and the naive mapping is nested as $\tau = 0$.

We also evaluate a model that we call logit level-1, which has a single free parameter $\lambda \geq 0$. For each action $a_i$, the predicted frequency with which $a_i$ is played

\textsuperscript{13}This data includes a meta data-set of experimental data aggregated in Wright and Leyton-Brown (2014) from six experimental game theory papers, in addition to Mechanical Turk data from new experiments in Fudenberg and Liang (2019).
is
\[
\frac{\exp(\lambda \cdot u(a_i))}{\sum_{i=1}^{3} \exp(\lambda \cdot u(a_i))}.
\]
The model nests prediction of uniform play (our naive rule) as \(\lambda = 0\), and predicts a
degenerate distribution on the level-1 action when \(\lambda\) is sufficiently large.

Finally, we consider a model that we call logit \(\text{PCHM}\) (see e.g. Wright and Leyton-Brown (2014)), which replaces the assumption of exact maximization in the PCHM
with a logit best response. This model has two free parameters: \(\lambda, \tau \in \mathbb{R}_+\). The
level-0 player chooses \(g_0 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)\), as in the PCHM. Recursively define for
each \(k \geq 1\)
\[
v_k(a_i) = \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} p_k(h, \tau) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{3} g_h(j) u(a_i, a_j) \right)
\]
to be the expected payoff of action \(a_i\) against a player whose type is distribution
according to \(p_k(\cdot, \tau)\), where \(p_k(h, \tau)\) is as defined in (8), and define
\[
g_k(a_i) = \frac{\exp(\lambda \cdot v_k(a_i))}{\sum_{j=1}^{3} \exp(\lambda \cdot v_k(a_j))}
\]
to be the distribution of level-\(k\) play. We aggregate across levels using a Poisson
distribution with rate parameter \(\tau\).

The models PCHM, logit level-1, and logit PCHM turn out to be 43.6%, 72.7%,
and 72.9% complete on the actual data. (Equivalently, their \(f^*\)-discrepancies are
0.564, 0.273, and 0.271.) Thus, as observed in a related study by Wright and Leyton-
Brown (2014), logit PCHM provides much better predictions of the distribution of
play than does the baseline PCHM. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that almost all of this
improvement is obtained by simply adding the logit parameter to the level-1 model;
that is, the further improvement from allowing for multiple levels of sophistication is
negligible.

The strong performance of logit level-1 for predicting initial play is consistent with
the earlier result of Fudenberg and Liang (2019) that the level-1 model provides a
good prediction of the modal action. It is harder to predict the full distribution of
play, so it is not obvious from the previous result that level-1 play with a logit noise
parameter would perform so well for prediction of the distribution of play. These
results collectively suggest that initial play in many games is rather unstrategic.\textsuperscript{14}

6.2 Restrictiveness

We turn now to evaluating the restrictiveness for these models. Compared to the case of preferences over binary lotteries, economic theory provides very little in the way of a prior restrictions on initial play.\textsuperscript{15} We thus define the permissible set $F_M$ to include all mappings satisfying the following very weak conditions:

1. If an action is strictly dominated, then the frequency with which it is chosen does not exceed $1/3$.\textsuperscript{16}

2. If an action is strictly dominant, then the frequency with which it is chosen is at least $1/3$.\textsuperscript{17}

For each of the PCHM, level-1($\alpha$), and logit PCHM, we generate 100 mappings $f$ from a uniform distribution $\mu$ over the set of permissible mappings $F_M$, and evaluate the $f$-discrepancies with respect to these mappings.\textsuperscript{18} The distributions of $f$-discrepancies are shown in the figure below.

\\textsuperscript{14}In Fudenberg and Liang (2019), we found that modal play in some sorts of games is better described by equilibrium notions than level-1. Since such regularities cannot be accommodated by the logit level-1 model, these may explain the gap between the completeness of logit level-1 and full completeness.

\textsuperscript{15}Classic game theory alone would suggest that dominant strategies have probability 1 and dominated strategies have probability 0, but this is inconsistent with our data (and most experimental data of play in games).

\textsuperscript{16}In the actual data, the median strictly dominated action receives a frequency of 0.03 and the max frequency is 0.35.

\textsuperscript{17}In the actual data, the median strictly dominant action receives a frequency of 0.86 and the min frequency is 0.69.

\textsuperscript{18}The set $F_M$ can be embedded in $[0,1]^{466\times3}$, and so the uniform distribution over $F_M$ is well-defined.
We find that logit level-1’s restrictiveness is 0.930, PCHM’s restrictiveness is 0.915, and logit-PCHM’s restrictiveness is 0.822. Indeed, across all of these mappings and models, the $f$-discrepancy is always at least 0.72. Equivalently, the completenesses of these models across the simulated mappings is bounded above by 0.28. Since the completeness of these models on the actual data ranged from 0.436 to 0.729, each of these models is a much better predictor of the real data than of our hypothetical ones.

Simply comparing the completeness of the PCHM, 0.436, against the completeness of CPT, 0.93, suggests that the PCHM is a “worse” model of initial play than CPT is of certainty equivalents for lotteries. The contrast in their restrictivenesses (0.915 vs. 0.31) tells us that while PCHM does not capture all of the observed behaviors, it more successfully rules out behaviors that we do not observe.

Table 6.2 summarizes completeness and restrictiveness measures for all three models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Completeness $\kappa^*$</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>Restrictiveness $r$</th>
<th>$M$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCHM</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>21,393</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logit level-1</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>21,393</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logit PCHM</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>21,393</td>
<td>0.822</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: $N$ is the number of observations in the data used to estimate $\kappa^*$. $M$ is the number of generated mappings from $\mathcal{F}_M$ for computation of $r$. 

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From Table 6.2 we see that logit level-1 is more complete and also more restrictive than the PCHM. Logit level-1 is also substantially more restrictive than logit PCHM, at the cost of only a slight and not statistically significant decrease in completeness. These observations suggest that logit level-1 may be a preferable model to the PCHM and logit PCHM for prediction of initial play.\textsuperscript{19}

\section{Extension of the Approach}

In the two cases we have analyzed in the text, the function \(d\) is derived from a primitive loss function \(l\). We call the general property that permits this \textit{decomposability}.

\textbf{Definition 4 (Decomposability).} Consider an arbitrary loss function \(l : \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}\) and define \(e_P(f) = \mathbb{E}_{P_X}[l(f, (X, Y))]\) to be the expected loss of mapping \(f\). For any distribution \(P\), let \(f_P = \min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} e_P(f)\) denote the error-minimizing mapping under that distribution. Say that the problem is \textit{decomposable} if there exists a function \(d : \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) such that

\[
d(f, f_P) = e_P(f) - e_P(f_P)
\]

for every distribution \(P\) (with fixed marginal distribution \(P_X\)). That is, \(d(f, f_P)\) is the difference between the error of mapping \(f\) and the error of the best mapping \(f_P\).

In general, prediction problems need not be decomposable. For example, suppose the objective is to predict the conditional median, and the loss function is \(l(f, (x, y)) = |y - f(x)|\) instead of squared loss. The expected error is then \(e_{P^*}(f) = \mathbb{E}_{P_X}|Y - f(X)|\), and the error-minimizing function \(f^*\) is the one that takes each \(x\) into the median value of \(Y\) at \(x\). We might want to use

\[
d(f, f') = \mathbb{E}_{P_X}(|f(X) - f'(X)|)
\]

as a measure of how different the predictions are under \(f\) and \(f'\), but this function

\textsuperscript{19}We suspect that PCHM and logit PCHM would outperform logit level-1 for predicting the actions of subjects who played these games several times and learned from feedback. Note however that the restrictiveness of the models would not change.
does not satisfy (9). For the absolute value loss function, there is in fact no function \( d : \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{F} \to \mathbb{R} \) that satisfies (9), because the difference in errors cannot be determined from \( f \) and \( f^* \) alone, but depends on further properties of the conditional distribution \( P^* \). (See Appendix D.2 for more details.)

When the problem is decomposable, as in the cases we have analyzed here, then our approach goes through with \( d \) defined to be the function satisfying (9). If the problem is not decomposable, we take \( d \) as a primitive, rather than deriving it from the loss function \( l \). The key concepts of \( f \)-discrepancies and restrictiveness can be defined as they are in the main text, using this primitive \( d \).

What we lose is the equivalence between the \( 1 - \delta_{f^*} \) and completeness \( \kappa^* \), as described in (3). One approach is to report restrictiveness \( r \) (based on the primitive \( d \)) and completeness \( \kappa^* \) (based on the primitive \( l \)), understanding that there is no inherent relationship between these concepts. Larger values of \( r \) and \( \kappa^* \) can still be interpreted as more restrictive and more complete models. A second alternative is to report \( 1 - \delta_{f^*} \) instead of completeness. Since \( \delta_{f^*} \) is derived from \( d \), this second approach does not require specification of a loss function at all. A new estimation procedure for \( \delta_{f^*} \) is needed, however, as our approach in Section 4.2 makes use of the relationship \( \delta_{f^*} = 1 - \kappa^* \). We provide an alternative estimator for \( \delta_{f^*} \) in Appendix D.1 to this purpose.

8 Conclusion

When a theory fits the data well, it matters whether this is because the theory captures important regularities in the data, or whether the theory is so flexible that it can explain any behavior at all. We provide a practical, algorithmic approach for evaluating how the restrictiveness of a theory, and demonstrate that it reveals new insights into models from two economic domains. The method is easily applied to other models from different domains.

We conclude with a few final comments:
Why prefer restrictive theories? Completely unrestrictive theories, such as the theory of utility maximization with unrestricted dependence of preferences on the menu, can explain any data and so are vacuous. A theory is falsifiable if there is at least one potential observation that it couldn’t explain. We can view restrictiveness as a quantitative extension of the idea of falsifiability. Just as we prefer falsifiable theories to vacuous one, we prefer theories that are more restrictive, though this is not quite the same as “more falsifiable,” as it replaces the binary evaluation of whether or not a data set refutes the theory with a quantitative evaluation of how theory approximates the data.

Comparison of the predictions of two models. A common practice for distinguishing the empirical content of two models is to find instances where the models make different predictions. We do not compare models here, although our approach can be extended to compare the predictions of two models on the hypothetical data sets. Specifically, instead of evaluating the discrepancy between the estimated model and the best mapping, one could evaluate the discrepancy between the estimated models from two parametric families. The average discrepancy in this case would then represent an average disagreement between the two models on hypothetical data. We leave development of concepts like this to future work.
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A Supplementary Material to Section 3.1

We now demonstrate the relationships in (1) and (2).

Mean-Squared Error. Suppose $S = \mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{R}$ and the loss function is $l(f, (x, y)) = (y - f(x))^2$. The following decomposition is standard:

$$e_{P^*}(f) := \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [(Y - f(X))^2] = \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [(Y - f^*(X))^2] + \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [(f(X) - f^*(X))^2] = e_{P^*}(f^*) + d(f, f^*)$$

Negative Log-Likelihood. Suppose $S = \Delta(\mathcal{Y})$ where $\mathcal{Y}$ is a finite set, and the loss function is $l(f, (x, y)) = -\log f(y | x)$ for any mapping $f : \mathcal{X} \to S$. Then,

$$d(f, f^*) = \sum_x f^*(x) \sum f^*(y | x) \log \left( \frac{f^*(y | x)}{f(y | x)} \right)$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [\log f^*(y | x)] - \mathbb{E}_{P^*} [\log f(y | x)] = -e_{P^*}(f^*) + e_{P^*}(f).$$

So $e_{P^*}(f) = e_{P^*}(f^*) + d(f, f^*)$ as desired.

B Supplementary Material for Application 1

B.1 Different Specification for the Permissible Set

Define an alternative permissible set of mappings to include all functions $f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}$ satisfying $f(z, \bar{z}, p) \in [\bar{z}, z]$. We sample 100 mappings from a uniform distribution over this set and report the distribution of $f$-discrepancies in the figure below:

![Histogram of $f$-discrepancies](image)

The estimated restrictiveness is 0.37 (with a standard error of 0.01). This is barely
higher than the restrictiveness of 0.31 under our original specification of $\mathcal{F}_M$ from the main text, where we also require the permissible mappings to respect FOSD.\footnote{The mean naive error is 329.24 (compared to 178.73 under the original $\mathcal{F}_M$), while the mean CPT error is 124.80 (compared to 58.21 under the original $\mathcal{F}_M$).}

## B.2 Parameter Estimates

We report below the estimated parameters for each of the models that we consider. In the first column, we report the estimated parameters on the actual data. In the second, we report the average parameter estimates for across our generated mappings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free Parameters</th>
<th>Real Data</th>
<th>Generated Mappings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \beta, \eta, \gamma$</td>
<td>(1.03, 0.98, 0.53, 0.5)</td>
<td>(1.05, 0.98, 1.24, 0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \beta, \gamma$</td>
<td>(0.98, 1.01, 0.50)</td>
<td>(1.06, 0.95, 0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta, \gamma$</td>
<td>(0.70, 0.50)</td>
<td>(1.12, 0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \beta$</td>
<td>(0.98, 0.99)</td>
<td>(1.02, 0.95)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B.3 Three-Outcome Lotteries

We use a set of 18 three-outcome lotteries from Bernheim and Sprenger (2020) (listed below) and evaluate the restrictiveness of Cumulative Prospect Theory for predicting certainty equivalents for these lotteries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Real Data</th>
<th>Generated Mappings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCHM</td>
<td>$\tau = 0.5$</td>
<td>$\tau = 0.1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logit level-1</td>
<td>$\lambda = 0.02$</td>
<td>$\lambda = 0.0018$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logit PCHM</td>
<td>$(\tau, \lambda) = (1.4, 0.11)$</td>
<td>$(\tau, \lambda) = (1.05, 0.02)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By convention, $z_1 \geq z_2 \geq z_3$. Our four-parameter specification of CPT predicts

$$w(p_1)v(z_1) + w(p_2)v(z_2) + (1 - w(p_1) - w(p_2))v(z_3)$$

for each lottery, where $v$ and $w$ are as defined in the main text. (Note that because these lotteries are only over gains, the parameter $\beta$ is not used.)

A predictive mapping $f$ is a map from these 18 lotteries into average certainty equivalents. The set of permissible mappings $\mathcal{F}_M$ is defined using an adaptation of the restrictions used for two-outcome lotteries: (1) each certainty equivalent has to be in the range of the lottery outcomes, and (2) if a lottery first-order stochastically dominates another, then its certainty equivalent must be higher. We generate 100 random mappings from a uniform distribution over mappings satisfying these properties.

Below, we compare the distribution of $f$-discrepancies from Figure 5 with the distribution of $f$-discrepancies that we find for these three-outcome lotteries.
The restrictiveness of CPT on this set of three-outcome lotteries is 0.566, with a standard error of 0.017. Thus CPT is about 1.5 times as restrictive as a model of certainty equivalents for three-outcome lotteries than as a model of certainty equivalents for binary lotteries. Even this higher restrictiveness is substantially less than what we find for models of initial play.

B.4 Heterogeneous Risk Preferences

Our analysis in the main text considered representative agent models. In some cases, the analyst may have auxiliary data on the subjects that can be used to improve predictions. We show now how completeness and restrictiveness can be evaluated in this case.

Specifically, we return to our first application and group subjects into three clusters identified by Bruhin et al. (2010). We fit CPT-(\(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta\)) (henceforth CPT) for each cluster, allowing parameter values to vary across groups. Table B.4 reports completeness measures cluster by cluster.

Both the performance of the naive expected value rule, as well as the best achievable performance, vary substantially across clusters. For example, the behavior of subjects in cluster 1 is roughly consistent with expected value (the error of the naive rule is 39.90), while the behavior of subjects in cluster 2 departs substantially from this benchmark (the error of the naive rule is 150.10). The best achievable prediction for these groups of subjects is also very different (ranging from 29.39 to 64.81). The completeness of CPT, however, is roughly stable across the clusters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naive</td>
<td>39.90</td>
<td>150.10</td>
<td>99.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.98)</td>
<td>(7.24)</td>
<td>(7.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>30.08</td>
<td>62.67</td>
<td>66.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(5.07)</td>
<td>(3.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Achievable Error</td>
<td>29.39</td>
<td>52.08</td>
<td>64.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.22)</td>
<td>(4.35)</td>
<td>(3.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completeness</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1341</td>
<td>2292</td>
<td>5273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Completeness measures for each of three subject clusters.

The average completeness, weighted by proportion of observations in each cluster, is 0.935, which is very close to what we found for the representative agent model. This may seem surprising at first, since allowing for parameters to vary across subjects improves the accuracy of predictions. But the best mapping from the extended feature space $\mathcal{X}' = \mathcal{X} \times \{1, 2, 3\}$ to $\mathcal{Y}$ is more predictive than the best mapping considered previously. Thus what we find is that the completeness of CPT with three clusters, relative to the best three-cluster mapping, is comparable to the completeness of the representative-agent version of CPT, relative to the best representative-agent mapping.

Similarly, when measuring restrictiveness, we extend the set of permissible mappings to the domain $\mathcal{X}'$. Each generated pattern of behavior is thus a triple $(f_1, f_2, f_3)$ of mappings from the original $\mathcal{F}_\mathcal{M}$. We ask how well these tuples can be approximated using mappings $(g_1, g_2, g_3)$ from CPT. It is straightforward to see that the restrictiveness of the three-cluster CPT is identical to the restrictiveness of the representative-agent model.\(^{21}\)

## C Estimation of Completeness $\kappa^*$

### C.1 Preliminary Definitions

We now introduce some definitions and notation that will be useful in the derivation of the asymptotic distribution of the CV-based completeness estimator.

\(^{21}\)Note that this is true for any number of exogenously specified clusters.
C.1.1 Finite-Sample Out-of-Sample Error

Let \( Z_N := (Z_i)_{i=1}^N \) be a random sample of observations in a given data set, and let \( Z_{N+1} \sim P^* \) denote a random variable with the same distribution \( P^* \) that is independent of \( Z_N \). For a given data set \( Z_N \) and a given model \( F \), we define the conditional out-of-sample error (given data set \( Z_N \)) as

\[
e_F(Z_N) := \mathbb{E} \left[ l\left(\hat{f}_{Z_N}, Z_{N+1}\right) \mid Z_N \right],
\]

where \( \hat{f}_{Z_N} \in F \) is an estimator, or an algorithm, that selects a mapping \( \hat{f}_{Z_N} \) within the model \( F \) based on data \( Z_N \). We also define the out-of-sample error, with expectation taken over different possible data sets \( Z_N \), as

\[
e_{F,N} := \mathbb{E} [e_F(Z_N)].
\]

From the definition of the K-fold cross-validation estimator, it can be easily shown that \( \mathbb{E} [CV(F)] = e_{F, \frac{K-1}{K} N} \). As a result, the asymptotic distribution of \( CV(F) - e_{F, \frac{K-1}{K} N} \) has been studied in the statistics and machine learning literature. Our analysis below will be based on the results in Austern and Zhou (2020) on the asymptotic distribution of \( CV(F) - e_{F, \frac{K-1}{K} N} \).

C.1.2 Joint Parametrization of \( F_\Theta \) and \( F_M \)

Recall that the model \( F_\Theta \) is parametrized by \( \theta \in \Theta \), and \( f_\theta \) denotes a generic function in \( F_\Theta \). Motivated by the applications in this paper, we assume that \( F_M \) can be smoothly parameterized by a finite-dimensional parameter \( \beta \in B_M \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{d_M} \) and use the notation \( f_{[\beta]} \in F_M \) to denote a generic function in \( F_M \). Since by assumption \( f^* \in F_M \), we can define a parameter \( \beta^* \) to represent it, i.e. \( f_{[\beta^*]} = f^* \).

For arbitrary parameters \( \theta \) and \( \beta \), write

\[
l_\Theta (\theta, Z_i) := l (f_\theta, Z_i), \quad l_B (\beta, Z_i) := l (f_{[\beta]}, Z_i).
\]

We define the estimation mappings in \( F_\Theta \) and \( F_M \) by

\[
\hat{\theta} (Z_N) := \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} \frac{1}{N} \sum l_\Theta (\theta, Z_i),
\]
\[
\hat{\beta}(Z_N) := \arg \min_{\beta \in B_M} \frac{1}{N} \sum l_B(\beta, Z_i).
\]

Let \( \alpha := (\theta', \beta')' \) denote the concatenation of the parameters \( \theta \in F_\Theta \) and \( \beta \in B_M \), \( \alpha^* := (\theta^*, \beta^*)' \) to be the parameters associated with the best mappings in \( F_\Theta \) and \( F_M \), and also define
\[
\hat{\alpha}(Z_N) := \left( \hat{\theta}'(Z_N), \hat{\beta}'(Z_N) \right)',
\]
\[
= \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta, \beta \in B_M} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \left[ l_\Theta(\theta, Z_i) + l_B(\beta, Z_i) \right],
\]
to be an estimator for \( \alpha^* \). Finally, define
\[
\Delta l(\theta, \beta; Z_i) := l(f_\theta, Z_i) - l(f_\beta, Z_i) = l_\Theta(\theta, Z_i) - l_B(\beta, Z_i).
\]

### C.2 Assumptions and Lemmas Based on Austern and Zhou (2020)

**Assumption 3** (Conditions for Asymptotics of CV Estimator).

1. \( l_\Theta(\theta, z) \) and \( l_B(\beta, z) \) are twice differentiable and strictly convex in \( \theta \) and \( \beta \).
2. \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \sup_{\theta \in \Theta} l_\Theta^4(\theta, Z_i) \right] < \infty \) and \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \sup_{\beta \in B} l_B^4(\beta, Z_i) \right] < \infty \).
3. There exist open neighborhoods \( O_{\theta^*} \) and \( O_{\beta^*} \) of \( \theta^* \) and \( \beta^* \) in \( \Theta \) and \( B \) such that
   - (a) \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \sup_{\theta \in O_{\theta^*}} \| \nabla^2 l_\Theta(\theta, Z_i) \|^{16} \right] < \infty \), \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \sup_{\beta \in O_{\beta^*}} \| \nabla^2 l_B(\beta, Z_i) \|^{16} \right] < \infty \).
   - (b) \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \sup_{\theta \in O_{\theta^*}} \| \nabla^2 l_\Theta(\theta, Z_i) \|^{16} \right] < \infty \), \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \sup_{\beta \in O_{\beta^*}} \| \nabla^2 l_B(\beta, Z_i) \|^{16} \right] < \infty \).
   - (c) there exists \( c > 0 \) such that \( \lambda_{\min}(\nabla^2 l_\Theta(\theta, Z_i)) \geq c \), \( \lambda_{\min}(\nabla^2 l_B(\beta, Z_i)) \geq c \) a.s. uniformly on \( O_{\theta^*} \) and \( O_{\beta^*} \).

**Lemma C.1** (Application of Proposition 5 of Austern and Zhou, 2020). **Under Assumption 3:**

\[
\sqrt{N} \left[ CV(F_\Theta) - CV(F_M) - \left( e_{F_\Theta, \kappa N} - e_{F_M, \kappa N} \right) \right] \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}\left(0, \text{Var}(\Delta l(f_\theta^*, f^*; Z_i))\right).
\]

**Proof.** Proposition 5 of Austern and Zhou (2020) establishes the asymptotic normality of cross-validation risk estimator and its asymptotic variance under parametric settings where the loss function used for training is the same as the loss function used for evaluation. Applying Proposition 5 of Austern and Zhou (2020) under Assumption
3 to $\theta, \beta$ and $\alpha = (\theta, \beta)$, we obtain:

$$
\sqrt{N} \left( CV(F_\Theta) - e_{F_\theta, \frac{K-1}{K} N} \right) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, \text{Var} (l (f^*, Z_i)))
$$
$$
\sqrt{N} \left( CV(F_M) - e_{F_M, \frac{K-1}{K} N} \right) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, \text{Var} (l (f^*, Z_i)))
$$
$$
\sqrt{N} \left( CV(F_\Theta) + CV(F_M) - e_{F_\theta, \frac{K-1}{K} N} - e_{F_M, \frac{K-1}{K} N} \right) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, \text{Var} (l (f^*, Z_i) + l (f^*, Z_i))).
$$

Using the equality $\text{Var} (X + Y) + \text{Var} (X - Y) = 2 \text{Var} (X) + 2 \text{Var} (Y)$, we then deduce that

$$
\sqrt{N} \left[ CV(F_\Theta) - CV(F_M) - e_{F_\theta, \frac{K-1}{K} N} - e_{F_M, \frac{K-1}{K} N} \right] \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, \text{Var} (\Delta l (f^*, f^*, Z_i))).
$$

**Lemma C.2** (Application of Proposition 1 of Austern and Zhou, 2020). **Under Assumption 3,**

$$
\hat{\sigma}^2_{\Delta} \xrightarrow{p} \text{Var} (\Delta l (f^*, f^*, Z_i)).
$$

**Proof.** Applying Proposition 1 of Austern and Zhou (2020) under Assumption 3 to $\theta, \beta$ and $\alpha = (\theta, \beta)$:

$$
\hat{\sigma}^2_{CV(F_\Theta)} := \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{1}{J_N - 1} \sum_{k(i)=k} \left( l (f_{\hat{\theta} - k}, Z_i) - \frac{1}{J_N} \sum_{k(j)=k} l (f_{\hat{\theta} - k}, Z_j) \right)^2
$$
$$
\xrightarrow{p} \text{Var} (l (f^*, Z_i)).
$$

and

$$
\hat{\sigma}^2_{CV(F_M)} := \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{1}{J_N - 1} \sum_{k(i)=k} \left( l (f_{\hat{\beta} - k}, Z_i) - \frac{1}{J_N} \sum_{k(j)=k} l (f_{\hat{\beta} - k}, Z_j) \right)^2
$$
$$
\xrightarrow{p} \text{Var} (l (f^*, Z_i)).
$$

and

$$
\hat{\sigma}^2_{CV(F_\Theta) + CV(F_M)} := \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{1}{J_N - 1} \sum_{k(i)=k} \left( l (f_{\hat{\theta} - k}, Z_i) + l (f_{\hat{\beta} - k}, Z_i) - \frac{1}{J_N} \sum_{k(j)=k} \left[ l (f_{\hat{\beta} - k}, Z_j) + l (f_{\hat{\theta} - k}, Z_i) \right] \right)^2
$$
$$
\xrightarrow{p} \text{Var} (l (f^*, Z_i) + l (f^*, Z_i)).
$$
Hence:

\[
\hat{\sigma}^2_{\Delta} = 2\hat{\sigma}^2_{CV(F_\Theta)} + 2\hat{\sigma}^2_{CV(F_M)} - \hat{\sigma}^2_{CV(F_\Theta)+CV(F_M)} \\
\xrightarrow{p} 2\text{Var}(l(f_\theta^*, Z_i)) + 2\text{Var}(l(f^*, Z_i)) - 2\text{Var}(l(f_\theta^*, Z_i) + l(f^*, Z_i)) \\
= \text{Var}(\Delta l(f_\theta^*, f^*; Z_i))
\]

\[\square\]

### C.3 Proof of Asymptotic Normality of \(\hat{\kappa}^*\)

Lemma C.1 characterizes the limit distribution of

\[
\sqrt{N} \left[ CV(F_\Theta) - CV(F_M) - \left( e_{\theta^*, \kappa, K-1} - e_{F_M, \kappa, K-1} \right) \right]
\]

which we now show is also the limit distribution of

\[
\sqrt{N} \left[ CV(F_\Theta) - CV(F_M) - (e_{F_\Theta} - e_{F_M}) \right].
\]

To see this, notice that

\[
e_{\theta^*, \kappa, K-1} - e_{F_\Theta} = \mathbb{E} \left[ l_{\Theta} (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)}, Z_i) - l_{\Theta} (\theta^*, Z_i) \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ \nabla l_{\Theta} (\theta^*, Z_i) \cdot (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)} - \theta^*) + (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)} - \theta^*) \right] \nabla^2 l_{\Theta} (\theta^*, Z_i) \cdot (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)} - \theta^*)
\]

\[
= 0 + \mathbb{E} \left[ (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)} - \theta^*) \nabla^2 l_{\Theta} (\theta^*, Z_i) \cdot (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)} - \theta^*) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{N - J_N} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sqrt{N - J_N} (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)} - \theta^*) \nabla^2 l_{\Theta} (\theta^*, Z_i) \cdot \sqrt{N - J_N} (\hat{\theta}^{k(i)} - \theta^*) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{c}{K - 1} \cdot \frac{1}{N} + o \left( \frac{1}{N} \right)
\]

and hence

\[
\sqrt{N} \left( e_{\theta^*, \kappa, K-1} - e_{\Theta} \right) = o_p (1).
\]

Similarly, \(\sqrt{N} \left( e_{F_M, \kappa, K-1} - e_{F_M} \right) = o_p (1)\).

Hence:

\[
\sqrt{N} \left[ CV(F_\Theta) - CV(F_M) - (e_{F_\Theta} - e_{F_M}) \right] \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N} (0, \text{Var}(\Delta l(f_\theta^*, f^*; Z_i))).
\]
Then, by Lemma C.2, Assumption 2 and the continuous mapping theorem, we have
\[
\frac{\sqrt{N} (\hat{\kappa} - \kappa^*)}{\hat{\sigma}_{\kappa^*}} \overset{d}{\rightarrow} N(0,1).
\]

D Supplementary Material to Section 7

D.1 Alternative Estimator of \( f^* \)-Discrepancy

We now discuss an alternative estimator for \( f^* \)-discrepancy
\[
\delta^* = \frac{d(f_{\theta^*}, f^*)}{d(f_{\text{naive}}, f^*)}
\]
when the decomposability condition (9) does not hold.

We again work with the parameterization of \( F_M \) via \( \beta \in \mathcal{B} \). Suppose that we have access to an estimator \( \hat{\beta} \) of \( \beta^* \) that is consistent and asymptotically normal:
\[
\sqrt{N} (\hat{\beta} - \beta^*) \overset{d}{\rightarrow} N(0, \Sigma).
\]

Given that \( \theta^* = \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} d(f_\theta, f_{[\beta^*]}) \), we can construct an estimator of \( \theta^* \) as
\[
\hat{\theta} := \hat{\theta}(\hat{\beta}) := \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} d(f_\theta, f_{[\hat{\beta}]}),
\]
with which we can obtain the following estimator of \( \delta_f^* \).
\[
\hat{\delta}^* := \frac{d\left(f_{\hat{\theta}(\hat{\beta})}, f_{[\hat{\beta}]}ight)}{d\left(f_{\text{naive}}, f_{[\hat{\beta}]}ight)} = \frac{\min_{\theta \in \Theta} d\left(f_\theta, f_{[\hat{\beta}]}ight)}{d\left(f_{\text{naive}}, f_{[\beta^*]}ight)}.
\]

We impose the following joint assumption on the dissimilarity function \( d \) and the parameterization of \( F_\Theta \) and \( F_M \).

Assumption 4. Define \( \tilde{d}(\theta, \beta) := d(f_\theta, f_{[\beta]}) \). Suppose that:

(a) \( \tilde{d} \) is joint differentiable with respect to \((\theta, \beta)\) in a neighborhood of \((\theta^*, \beta^*)\).

(b) \( \psi^* := \nabla_\beta \tilde{d}(\hat{\theta}(\hat{\beta}), \beta) \bigg|_{\beta = \beta^*} \neq 0 \).

The requirements in Assumption 4 are very weak. (a) is a standard differentiability condition, which should be satisfied in most applications. For (b), notice that by the
Envelope Theorem,
\[ \psi^* := \nabla_{\beta} d\left(\hat{\theta}^*(\beta^*), \beta^*\right) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} d\left(\hat{\theta}(\beta^*), \beta^*\right) \]

Hence, \( \psi^* \neq 0 \) essentially requires that the dissimilarity \( d(f_{\theta^*}, f) \) between \( f_{\theta^*} \) and \( f \) as \( f \) varies locally in a neighborhood of \( f^* \).

By the Delta Method,
\[
\sqrt{N} \left( \min_{\theta \in \Theta} d\left(f_{\theta}, f_{\beta^*}\right) - \min_{\theta \in \Theta} d\left(f_{\theta}, f_{[\beta^*]}\right) \right) = \sqrt{N} \left( \hat{d}\left(\hat{\theta}(\beta^*), \beta^*\right) - \hat{d}\left(\hat{\theta}(\beta^*), \beta^*\right) \right) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}\left(0, \psi^* \Sigma \psi^* \right).
\]

implying that
\[
\sqrt{N} \left( \hat{\delta}^* - \delta^* \right) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{\psi^* \Sigma \psi^*}{d^2(f_{\text{naive}}, f^*)} \right).
\]

The standard error can be estimated via bootstrapping.

D.2 Example: Lack of Decomposability

Consider a setting where \( X \) is degenerate, i.e., \( X \) is a singleton, so that the joint distribution \( P \) is completely characterized by the distribution of \( Y \). Furthermore, let \( Y := [0, 1] \).

Suppose we are interested in the median of \( Y \)
\[ f^* := \text{med} (Y) \in \mathcal{S} := Y = [0, 1]. \]

In this case a mapping \( f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{S} \) is just a number in \([0, 1]\). Given the loss function defined by absolute deviation \( l(f, y) := |y - f| \), and the error function defined by mean absolute deviation \( e_{P^*} (f) := E_{P^*} [ |Y - f| ] \), it is then well known that \( f^* \in \arg \min_{f \in [0,1]} e_{P^*} (f) \).

First, it is no longer true that \(|f - f^*| = e_{P^*} (f) - e_{P^*} (f^*)\) for any \( f \in [0,1] \). To see this, suppose that \( Y \sim U [0,1] \) under \( P^* \). Then \( f^* = 0.5 \) and \( e_{P^*} (f^*) = 0.25 \). However, for \( f = 0.4 \), we have \( e_{P^*} (f) = 0.26 \) but \(|f - f^*| = 0.1 \neq 0.01 = e_{P^*} (f) - e_{P^*} (f^*)\).

Moreover, it is no longer true that there exists a function \( d : [0,1]^2 \to [0,1] \) such
that decomposability (9) holds, i.e., for any distribution $P$ of $Y$ supported on $[0, 1]$,

$$d (f, f_P) = e_P (f) - e_P (f_P).$$

To see this, suppose that $Y \sim U [0, 1]$ under $P_1$, we have

$$e_{P_1} (f) - e_{P_1} (f_{P_1}) = (f - 0.5)^2 = (f - f_{P_1})^2, \quad \forall f \in [0, 1].$$

However, supposing that, under $P_2$, the probability density function of $Y$ is given by $2y$ for $y \in [0, 1]$, we have $f_{P_2} = \sqrt{2}/2$ and $e_{P_2} (f_{P_2}) = (2 - \sqrt{2})/3$ but

$$e_{P_2} (f) - e_{P_2} (f_{P_2}) = \frac{1}{3} \left( 2f^3 - 3f^2 + \sqrt{2} \right) \neq (f - f_{P_2})^2.$$