Noncompete Clauses, Job Mobility, and Job Quality: Evidence from a Low-Earning Noncompete Ban in Austria

Samuel Young

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Abstract

I study the effect of noncompete agreements on low-earning workers using a noncompete ban in Austria. The ban increased treated workers’ annual job-to-job transition rate by 0.3 percentage points (a two percent increase). This effect was driven by within-industry job transitions. The reform also disproportionately increased transitions to higher-quality firms and transitions accompanied by earnings gains. However, I do not find that the ban increased treated workers’ overall earnings growth rates. This evidence shows that noncompetes in Austria restricted low-earning workers’ job mobility but that their impact was not large enough to affect aggregate mobility or earnings trends.

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†Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Email: sgyoung@mit.edu Website: economics.mit.edu/grad/sgyoung
1 Introduction

Noncompete clauses in employment contracts are used around the globe to restrict workers from moving to competitor firms. Although their use is commonly associated with high-earning workers, noncompetes are also prevalent for lower-earning workers. Examples of low-earning workers with noncompetes include taxi drivers in Austria, dog groomers in Hong Kong, and sandwich makers in the U.S.\(^1\) Moreover, in the U.S. in 2014, Starr et al. (2020) estimate that 14% of hourly employees currently had a noncompete in their employment contract and 34% ever had a contract with a noncompete. This high prevalence has motivated discussions that the rise in noncompete clauses could explain macro trends in labor market dynamism and wage growth (Council of Economic Advisers, 2016; Krueger, 2018). In response, multiple U.S. states and European countries recently banned noncompetes for low-earning workers and President Biden has proposed a near-complete ban.\(^2\)

The underlying economic question concerning noncompetes is how much their job mobility restrictions benefit firms versus hurt workers. Noncompetes could increase firms’ productivity by protecting their trade secrets or increasing their investment in worker training or physical capital. For workers, noncompetes could reduce their earnings by restricting their ability to move to higher-paying firms or to bargain for pay raises. While prior empirical research has explored these effects, it has primarily focused on high-earning workers. Yet, the effects of noncompetes on firms and workers may be more muted for low-earning workers. For example, noncompetes only restrict moves to competitor firms. Consequently, if low-earning workers can easily switch jobs across industries, noncompetes may not affect them. This example shows how the costs of noncompetes for workers depend on their wage-setting and job-mobility processes. Thus, studying the effect of noncompetes on these workers also helps us to learn how their labor markets function.

In this paper, I analyze a 2006 ban on noncompetes for low-earning workers in Austria. Using administrative, employer-employee data, I provide quasi-experimental evidence on how the reform affected workers’ job mobility, firm quality, and earnings. I find that the ban increased the types of job transitions restricted by noncompetes (e.g., within-industry transitions). These increased transitions were disproportionately to higher-quality and higher-paying jobs. I do not, however, detect effects of the ban on treated workers’ earning growth rates. Overall, I provide evidence that noncompetes can both restrict low-earning workers’ job mobility and prevent them from moving to better jobs. The magnitude of the ban’s effect on job mobility, however, was relatively small so the ban did not have a substantial effect on macro trends in job mobility or earnings. Nevertheless, the results help us understand in which other labor market settings we would expect larger effects.

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\(^1\)See Meickl (2005) for Austria, Campbell (2014) for Hong Kong, Quinton (2017) for the U.S.

\(^2\)Belgium and Luxembourg restrict noncompetes below certain earnings thresholds, the U.K. banned them in zero-hour contracts in 2015, and several U.S. states recently proposed or implemented bans for low-earning workers (OECD, 2019). See Cohen et al. (2020) for Biden’s proposal.
Before 2006, noncompete agreements in Austria were enforceable for all adult employees and prevalent for high- and low-earning workers. According to a 2005 survey, over 30% of low-earning workers had a noncompete in their employment contract (Klein and Leutner, 2006). In 2006, the Austrian Parliament changed the legislation such that noncompetes were not enforceable for employees who signed their contract after March 2006 and whose earnings were below around €2,100 per month (52nd percentile of the earnings distribution).

To exploit this reform’s sharp change in noncompete enforceability, I use a difference-in-differences empirical strategy based on when employees signed their contract and their monthly earnings. Intuitively, the strategy tests whether the differences in outcomes between high- versus lower-earning employees changed for employment spells started after the ban. I implement this strategy using the near-universe of employment records from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD). These data allow me to define detailed outcomes motivated by different theories of the effects of noncompetes. For example, I can isolate within- versus across-industry job transitions, define multiple wage and non-wage measures of firm quality, and separate earnings changes from switching jobs versus earnings changes for job stayers.

I find that the noncompete ban increased job mobility and this increase was driven by the types of transitions that were restricted by noncompetes. The ban increased treated workers’ annual job-to-job mobility rate by 0.27 percentage points (a 1.7% increase relative to the base rate of 16.0%). This increase in job mobility was driven by a 6.4% increase in transitions between firms in the same narrowly defined industries. This is consistent with noncompetes only legally restricting transitions between firms in the same “line of business”. Additionally, most of the increase in within-industry transitions came from direct employment-to-employment transitions without intervening unemployment spells. Since noncompetes were often enforced via waiting periods, transitions with extended periods of unemployment between jobs should not have increased.

To understand what types of job transitions noncompetes restricted, I separately analyze the ban’s effect on transitions to higher-quality firms and transitions accompanied by earnings increases. I find that the ban disproportionately increased transitions to higher-quality firms measured by wage and non-wage characteristics (e.g., workers’ average tenure or average earnings). Next, I analyze the effect of the ban on job transitions accompanied by earnings increases versus transitions with decreases (i.e., did the worker earn more in her new job than in her previous job). I find that the ban increased transitions with earning increases substantially more than transitions with decreases. These two results provide evidence that noncompetes can hurt low-earning workers by preventing them from moving up the “job ladder.”

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3 This reduced-form estimate does not take into account that not all treated workers had noncompetes before the ban. Scaling this estimate up by the pre-reform noncompete prevalence of .33 yields a treatment-on-treated estimate of .82 percentage points.
A potential concern with this empirical strategy is that since it compares workers just above and below an earnings threshold, it may be biased by spillovers or strategic earnings manipulation. To address this, I estimate a series of “donut-hole” specifications that leave out progressively larger groups of workers immediately around the threshold. The mobility and earnings results are qualitatively the same dropping workers right around the threshold which alleviates these concerns. Additionally, I find no evidence of bunching around the earnings threshold.

To expand the analysis beyond earnings changes just from moving jobs, I analyze the ban’s impact on workers’ overall earnings growth rates. Although collective bargaining is common in Austria, firms have considerable flexibility to pay workers above the negotiated wage floors which motivates this analysis. I estimate that the effect of the ban on individual-level earnings growth for treated workers was very close to zero and I can rule out increases in annual log earnings differences of more than 0.002 (i.e., a 0.2 percentage point increase in the annual earnings growth rate). Similarly, the effect of the ban on earnings growth for job stayers (i.e., workers who remain with their previous employer) was also statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Finally, I benchmark my estimated job transition effects relative to macro job mobility trends in Austria to assess whether the ban plausibly affected aggregate job mobility. My estimated treatment effect on job transitions is small relative to annual fluctuations in the job mobility rate for low-earning workers. Thus, the ban did not affect overall mobility trends during this time period. The relatively small effect on job transitions also reconciles how the reform increased transitions with earnings gains but had no detectable effect on overall earnings growth rates. I show that even if all job transitions caused by the ban had very large earnings changes (e.g., 25% increases), this would not have caused a detectable effect on overall earnings growth.

The institutional details of noncompete enforcement in Austria provide some clues about why the effects of the ban were relatively small despite that around 33% of workers had noncompetes before the ban. First, noncompetes in Austria could legally only restrict transitions between close competitors. Additionally, the existence of free and accessible employment law advice for all employees through the Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) made it difficult for employers to “abuse” noncompetes by restricting broader transitions. Second, less than a quarter of lower-earning workers’ job transitions were between firms in the same narrow industry (i.e., transitions that noncompetes could legally restrict). Consequently, even though I estimate that a noncompete decreases a worker’s within-industry job transition rate by 20% (a treatment-on-treated estimate), this does not translate into large effects of the ban on overall job mobility rates. In other words, the ban had a sizable impact on job transitions restricted by noncompetes for workers with a noncompete. Yet, scaling this estimate by the fact that low-earning workers frequently switch jobs across industries and that only one-third of workers had noncompetes yields a much smaller overall effect.
These empirical results help evaluate predictions of how noncompetes affect workers from different models of wage setting and job mobility. First, my job mobility results reject the model of perfectly competitive labor markets. In this benchmark, there are many firms that each worker could costlessly switch to. Consequently, restricting job transitions to a few competitor firms should not reduce overall job mobility which contradicts my results. Second, my finding that the increased job mobility was directed towards higher-quality firms and higher-paying jobs supports theories of mobility with firm differentiation and search frictions (Topel and Ward, 1992; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018). In these theories, some firms are more desirable than others but workers cannot immediately find these firms due to search frictions. Thus, when switching jobs becomes easier, workers move to better jobs and potentially find more productive matches. My results support this by providing some of the first evidence that workers systematically move to better jobs in response to exogenous reductions in mobility costs. Third, the lack of earnings growth effects for job stayers is inconsistent with theories where workers can use job offers from other firms to get pay raises from their current employer (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002). In related work, Caldwell and Harmon (2019) find evidence of this mechanism for high- but not lower-skilled workers. Finally, my analysis does not address whether the ban increased earnings at the firm rather than the individual level or whether the ban affected workers’ starting earnings rather than earnings growth.4

This paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of noncompete agreements on workers. This literature has focused on the U.S. and mostly studied higher-earning workers, despite the policy focus on lower-earners.5 Additionally, my analysis complements the literature about the effect of noncompetes on firm outcomes and the literature on the effects of non-poaching agreements.6 The closest paper to mine is Lipsitz and Starr (2020) that analyzes a ban in Oregon on noncompetes for hourly workers. My analysis differs on three dimensions. First, my research design allows me to compare similar workers in the same labor market (e.g., same industry, region, and occupation) who were affected and unaffected by the ban only based on the earnings cutoff. Second, the rich employer-employee data allow me to test some of the theoretically motivated channels through which noncompetes could affect wages. For example, I separately analyze whether there are wage gains from moving to better jobs versus wage effects for job stayers. Finally, although the bans were fairly similar, my results are qualitatively different than the effects of the Oregon ban. For example, the mobility effects of the Oregon ban are an order of magnitude larger than my estimates and I do not find wage effects from the Austrian ban. These differences motivate my discussion about different legal and labor market institutions in Austria that could explain my smaller estimates.

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4As discussed in Section 7, the reform is not well suited to analyze these channels.
5See Garmaise (2011); Thomas et al. (2015) for CEOs, Marx (2011); Balasubramanian et al. (2020) for technical workers, and Lavetti et al. (2017) for doctors. Johnson et al. (2020) study all state-level changes in noncompete enforceability since 1991.
6For other firm outcomes, see Jeffers (2017), Belenzon and Schankerman (2013), and Hausman and Lavetti (2020). Non-poaching agreements prevent an employer from hiring workers from similar firms (Krueger and Ashenfelter, 2018).
Although my analysis is specific to Austria, it provides some lessons for the broader debate about noncompetes. First, in other settings where noncompetes only restrict job transitions between close competitors (e.g., due to their legal interpretation) and where workers often transition across industries, we might also expect smaller effects on workers’ job mobility or earnings. Alternatively, in settings where noncompetes restrict a larger share of job transitions, my results suggest that noncompetes would have large effects on job mobility and the allocation of workers to different types of firms. Second, an understanding of the wage-setting process for workers affected by noncompetes helps guide if and where we would expect earnings effects. For example, in settings where employers often counteroffer outside job offers (e.g., engineers or academics) we would expect noncompetes to decrease earnings growth at the individual level for both job stayers and movers. Alternatively, in settings where most wage changes are due to moving to better firms or matches, noncompetes would only reduce earnings growth through fewer transitions to higher-paying jobs.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of how different models of wage setting and job mobility imply different effects of noncompetes on workers. Section 3 describes the institutional details of the 2006 noncompete ban and wage setting and job mobility in Austria. Section 4 discusses the data and outcomes of interest. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy. Sections 6 and 7 present the results for worker mobility, firm quality, and earnings. Section 8 discusses the magnitude and implications of my estimates. Finally, Section 9 concludes.

2 Noncompetes Theoretical Framework

In this section, I discuss the predictions from various models about the effect of noncompetes on workers’ job mobility and wages. Ultimately, the theoretical predictions are ambiguous so the effects are an empirical question. For example, if noncompetes increase workers’ productivity, they could raise wages. Alternatively, when labor markets are imperfectly competitive, noncompetes can reduce workers’ wages and job mobility. These predictions depend on the underlying labor market structure (e.g., noncompetes are more restrictive when workers are less sustainable across industries). Consequently, my results help inform us about the nature of low-earning labor markets in Austria.

2.1 Noncompetes in Perfectly Competitive Labor Markets

In a perfectly competitive labor market, noncompetes should not affect workers’ wages or job mobility. In the competitive benchmark, there are many firms that would all pay a worker the same wage and workers can costlessly move between these firms. In this benchmark, consider a noncompete that prevents a worker from moving to a subset of other firms (e.g., firms in the same industry). Since the worker could still costlessly move to a large number of other firms, this
noncompete would not affect her wage or overall job mobility.

2.2 Productivity Effects and Wage Increases

Noncompetes could increase workers’ wages by increasing their productivity. Three examples of how they could increase productivity are increased training investment, increased capital investment, and protecting company trade secrets. Whether these productivity changes increase wages depends on the degree of “rent-sharing” (i.e., the passthrough of productivity to wages).

First, noncompetes could increase firms’ investment in worker training. Firms may not invest in workers’ general training (i.e., skills that are beneficial across firms) because workers can take these skills to other firms. Firms, however, are incentivized to invest in firm-specific training because workers are not compensated for these skills at other firms. Noncompetes can turn industry-specific skills into firm-specific skills by restricting employees from moving to firms in the same industry. Consequently, noncompetes could incentivize firms to increase industry-specific training because workers no longer benefit from this training at other firms (Meccheri, 2009; Starr, 2019).

Second, noncompetes could increase firms’ capital investment by lowering employee turnover. If it is difficult for firms to replace workers or train them to use capital, increased turnover would lead to lower capital utilization. By reducing turnover, noncompetes could increase capital investment.

Third, noncompetes can prevent the spread of company trade secrets or intellectual property. This could increase workers’ revenue productivity by reducing product market competition.

2.3 Noncompetes in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets

When labor markets are not perfectly competitive, noncompetes can decrease wages and lower overall job mobility. The relevant difference from the competitive benchmarks is that workers care about which firm they are employed at (e.g., some firms offer better wages than others). By restricting workers’ job mobility, noncompetes can decrease their wages by making it harder for them to move to better firms. Different models of imperfectly competitive labor markets have different predictions for the channels through which wages could decrease. But these models all predict that the effects of noncompetes will be larger when they restrict more of workers’ potential job transitions. Since

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7In competitive labor markets workers, however, are incentivized to invest in their own general training but credit constraints or wage regulations may cause suboptimal investment (Becker, 1964).

8Alternatively, noncompetes could increase general training investment by giving firms monopsony power over workers. Firms would then receive some of the surplus from general training and be incentivized to invest in it (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998).

9If noncompetes decrease workers’ bargaining power, they could alleviate the capital “hold-up problem” which would also increase investment (Grout, 1984). However, a more natural interpretation of noncompetes in bargaining frameworks is that they decrease workers’ outside options rather than bargaining power. In this case, they would not alleviate the hold-up problem.

10In equilibrium, however, stopping the flow of company trade secrets might decrease overall productivity by preventing knowledge spillovers or deterring startup activity (Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2012). Gilson (1999) and Fallick et al. (2006) argue that this explains the rise of Silicon Valley where noncompetes are unenforceable.
noncompetes restrict within-industry job transitions, their effect on low-earning workers will be smaller if these workers can easily switch jobs across industries.

If noncompetes restrict workers’ from moving to better jobs, the workers may receive a “compensating differential” for signing noncompetes. For example, consider a worker deciding between job offers with and without a noncompete clause. To take the offer with the noncompete, the worker would need to be paid more to accept the job mobility restrictions (Coase, 1960). There are, however, many reasons why this Coasian argument may fail. For example, employees might be unaware of the noncompete in their contract or they might underestimate the costs of signing a noncompete due to myopia or misunderstanding (Prescott and Starr, 2020).

**Wage Effects from Increased Transitions to Better Jobs**  Noncompetes could reduce workers’ wages directly by preventing them from moving to higher-paying jobs. Most models of imperfectly competitive labor markets imply that some jobs are more desirable than others but search frictions prevent workers from immediately finding them. Thus, noncompetes restrict workers from being able to move up the “job ladder” to better jobs. It is theoretically ambiguous, however, what types of firms workers would move to if they were not restricted by noncompetes. For example, models with *vertically differentiated* firms predict that all workers would move to the same type of firm (e.g., higher-paying or more productive firms) (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018). Alternatively, models with *horizontally differentiated* firms assume that the best match for one worker might not be the best for other workers (Jovanovic, 1979). In this case, noncompetes would prevent workers from finding their highest productivity matches which could decrease overall productivity. Finally, firms may differ in *non-wage amenities* (Rosen, 1986). In this case, workers may not move to higher-paying jobs but instead, move to jobs with more job security or safer workplaces.

**Individual-Level Wage Bargaining**  Noncompetes could also reduce wages by preventing a worker from threatening to switch jobs while negotiating with their employer. Interpreted through *bargaining* models of wages setting, noncompetes reduce workers’ “outside option” of employment at other firms. Specifically, models with individual-level wage bargaining and on-the-job search imply that one source of wage growth is employees using job offers from other firms to bargain for higher wages at their current firm (Cahuc et al., 2006). Noncompetes dampen this channel by shrinking the set of credible outside offers employees receive. Consequently, these models predict that noncompetes decrease wage growth even for workers who remain at the same firm. This effect, however, would be diminished if the noncompetes restrict a small share of outside job offers.

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11This relates to Jarosch et al. (2019) who develop a model where market concentration depresses wages by lowering workers’ outside options while bargaining with their employer. See Shi (2020) for a model that incorporates noncompetes into an on-the-job search model with endogenous human capital investment.
Wage Effects at the Firm Level  If wages are set at the firm rather than individual level, noncompetes for some workers at a firm could reduce all workers’ wages. This is a prediction of monopsony or wage-posting models of wage setting. In these models, a firm sets a single wage for all workers by trading off increased profits from a lower wage versus increased difficulty retaining and hiring workers. Noncompetes allow the firm to pay a lower wage without losing as many workers because noncompetes make it more difficult for workers to leave the firm. More formally, consider a firm introducing noncompetes for its employees in a partial-equilibrium, dynamic monopsony model (Manning, 2003). The noncompetes would decrease the firm’s separation elasticity (i.e., if the firm lowered its wage, fewer workers would leave to other firms). The firm would then cut its wage as the cost of this cut, increased job separations, would be lower. The magnitude of the effect on the firm’s separation elasticity depends on the share of job transitions the noncompetes restrict and on the share of employees with noncompetes. The wage effect would also spill over to workers at the same firm without noncompetes. These predictions from this partial-equilibrium monopsony model also hold in more general settings.

Overall, these models predict that a noncompete ban should increase firm-wide wages at firms where some workers had noncompetes.

Theoretical Motivation of the Empirical Strategy  The differing theoretical predictions from these models motivate the different parts of my empirical analysis. First, the estimates of the effect of the ban on overall job mobility test the perfectly competitive benchmark where we would not expect increased mobility since workers could still costlessly switch to many other firms. Second, the analysis of whether the ban increased transitions to different types of “higher-quality” jobs tests which types of “job ladders” workers move up after an exogenous shock to mobility costs. For example, workers moving to firms with more job security rather than higher-pay would support theories where firms are differentiated based on non-wage amenities. Finally, the analysis of whether the ban increased individual-level wage growth for job stayers tests bargaining models of wage setting. For example, wage growth increases would provide evidence that low-earning workers do bargaining with their employees and that their own employment outside options affect their wages.

3  Noncompetes, Wage Setting, and Job Mobility in Austria

In this section, I first discuss the enforcement and prevalence of noncompetes before 2006 and the ban on noncompetes for low-earning workers in 2006. I then describe wage setting and job mobility during this time period in Austria and how it informs the expected effects of the noncompete ban.

12 If the new hires are aware of the noncompetes, the firm’s hiring elasticity might increase offsetting the effect of the separation elasticity. Yet, if workers are unaware of or myopic towards noncompetes, the hiring elasticity might be unaffected.

13 In Burdett and Mortensen (1998), a decrease in the job offer rate to employees (one interpretation of firms adopting noncompetes) would shift down the distribution of firm-level wages. Similarly, oligopsonistic models of labor market competition predict that firm-level markdowns will increase when workers are less substitutable within labor markets (Berger et al., 2019).
Noncompete Enforcement and Prevalence  Noncompete clauses have long been used in Austria to restrict employees from moving to competitors of their current employer. Before 2006, post-contractual noncompete clauses (Konkurrenzklausel) were enforceable for all adult employees.\textsuperscript{14} If included in an employment contract, a noncompete can be used to prevent an employee from moving to a firm in the same “line of business” as their current employer. The legislation also stipulates that noncompete clauses cannot impose an “unreasonable impediment on workers’ career advancement”. Consequently, Austrian courts are more likely to uphold noncompete agreements that restrict an employee from moving to a few pre-specified competitors than those that restrict mobility across an entire industry (Crisolli and Deur, 2017). Additionally, noncompetes are not enforceable if the employer terminates the relationship without good cause (e.g., layoffs) or if the employee terminates the relationship with good cause (e.g., unsafe work conditions). Noncompete clauses can be enforced in two ways. First, the clause could include a “contractual penalty” that the employee must pay the original employer to move to a competitor. Second, the clause could include a waiting period of up to one year during which the employee cannot work at the competitor firm.

In 2006, Austria banned noncompetes for low-earning workers (see Appendix Section E for an analysis of the political process and motivation behind the reform). Specifically, on March 16th, 2006, the Parliament changed the legislation so that noncompetes were not enforceable for employees whose previous month’s earnings were below a sharp earnings threshold and \textit{whose employment contract was signed after March 2006}.\textsuperscript{15} Consequently, noncompete clauses are still enforceable for employees who either have earnings above the threshold or who signed their employment contract before March 2006. The ban considers the date when you sign your employment contract but contemporaneous earnings. Thus, if you sign a contract with earnings below the limit but your earnings then increase above the limit, a noncompete clause could still be enforced.\textsuperscript{16} For contracts starting in 2006-2015, the monthly earnings threshold was indexed to \(\frac{17}{30}\)ths of the maximum monthly social security contribution limit. In 2006, this cutoff was at the 52nd percentile of the Austrian monthly earnings distribution at €2,125 per month.

The reform was motivated by an increasing prevalence of low-earning workers with noncompetes (Walch and Silhavy, 2005). Figure 1 presents results from a 2005-2006 survey of employees about clauses in their employment contracts.\textsuperscript{17} It presents the share of employees who had a noncompete in

\textsuperscript{14}Post-contractual means employment restrictions after leaving a firm and does not include restrictions on multiple job holding.

\textsuperscript{15}Specifically, the cutoff date is March 17th for white-collar workers and March 18th for blue-collar workers. It is, however, possible that some employers interpreted the ban as applying to all contracts signed in 2006. I conservatively include contracts signed in the first three months of 2006 in the control group (e.g., starting in 2005). But for some outcomes, I find evidence of an anticipation effect in 2005 which could reflect this alternative interpretation of the cutoff dates by employers.

\textsuperscript{16}Anecdotally, some employment contracts in Austria today include such “kick-in” clauses that specify a noncompete clause only if an employee’s earnings increase above the limit.

\textsuperscript{17}The survey was conducted by the Chamber of Labor, the Trade Union Federation (ÖGB), and FH Wiener Neustadt. Tabulations from this survey were received via private communication from Arbeiterkammer Wien and are available upon request. The survey results were also discussed in numerous Arbeiterkammer press releases (see e.g., Klein and Leutner (2006)).
their employment contract by their monthly gross earnings. Although the prevalence of noncompetes increased with earnings, at least 33% of employees in the lowest two earnings groups (between € 324-1,000 and € 1,001-3,630 per month) reported a noncompete clause in their contract. Consequently, the survey’s estimated prevalence of noncompete agreements for low-earning individuals in Austria in 2005 is higher than current estimates in the U.S. of 10-20% (Starr et al., 2020).

Given the evidence in Figure 1, full compliance with the ban should have reduced the prevalence of noncompetes for low-earning workers, the “first stage”, by about 33 percentage points. There are two reasons, however, that the true first stage might be lower. First, employers may have still tried to use unenforceable noncompetes after the ban. Although there is evidence of such “noncompete abuse” in the U.S. (Prescott et al., 2016), it may be less common in Austria because every employee has access to free and accessible employment law advice from the Chamber of Labor. Second, some noncompetes before the ban may have been from “boilerplate” employment contract templates and never actually enforced by employers. However, the prevalence estimates in Figure 1 are from an employee survey which suggests that even if employers did not enforce the clauses, employees’ awareness may have still changed their job search behavior. Unfortunately, no data are available on how the prevalence of noncompete clauses changed before and after the ban. Going forward, I will present reduced-form estimates of the reform but discuss the results in light of this evidence on the first stage in Section 8.

Wage Setting and Job Mobility  Wage setting in Austria is centralized at the sector level yet still allows for substantial wage flexibility. During this time period, over 95% of employees were covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) which are negotiated at roughly the industry by occupation level (Glassner and Hofmann, 2019). These agreements set wage floors and hour limits for specific job title by experience levels. Yet, firms are free to pay workers above these wage floors (“overpayments”) and provide other firm-wide bonuses or fringe benefits (e.g., subsidized lunches or hour reductions). As evidence that overpayments were common, Leoni and Pollan (2011) find that actual wages were 20-30% higher on average than CBA wage floors in manufacturing during this time period. Anecdotally, however, overpayments are less common for lower-earning workers who were affected by the noncompete ban (Dingeldey et al., 2017). Since the ban threshold was near the middle of the earnings distribution, the institutional details leave open the possibility that the ban affected wages at the individual or higher levels (e.g., firm- or CBA-wide wage changes).

Note, however, that the Austrian survey has a smaller sample size (N = 823) and is less rigorous than the U.S. evidence. A subsequent survey in 2012 with a larger sample size (N = 2,641) also found that 34% of individuals reported a noncompete in their employment contract (Vevera, 2013). This survey, however, does not separately report the prevalence for individuals who signed employment contracts before and after the 2006 noncompete ban so it cannot be used to assess the effect of the ban.

For example, sample employment contracts provided by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce (Wirtschaftskammer) for sales representatives and shop assistants both included noncompetes (WKO, 2005a,b).
While job dismissal in Austria is fairly regulated, there are few restrictions on employee-initiated job transitions. Job dismissal regulations include consultations with work councils and mandatory pre-layoff notice periods of up to five months (Nagl and Jandl-Gartner, 2016). However, since the noncompete ban affected *employee-initiated* terminations, these frictions on *employer-initiated* terminations should not diminish the reform’s potential effect. Most private-sector workers were entitled between 0-12 months of earnings in severance pay (Koman et al., 2005). The unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rate was 55% of net earnings and the maximum benefit duration ranged between 12-52 weeks (Jäger et al., 2020). Quitters in Austria are eligible for UI after a one-month waiting period which reduces some financial barriers to voluntary job mobility. Bachmann et al. (2020) find that the average job transition rate in Austria from 2011-2014 was slightly higher than the EU average but below rates in the U.K. and U.S.

4 Data, Treatment Definition, and Outcomes of Interest

Data Sources My main data source is the near-universe of linked employee-employer data from 1972-2018 from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD). The data cover all Austrian employees except tenured public-sector and self-employed employees (Zweimüller et al., 2009). The data include information on individuals’ daily labor force status and the annual earnings each employee received from each of their employers. It also includes individuals’ gender, age, nationality, and white versus blue-collar status and firms’ industry, location, and unique IDs. I supplement these covariates with measures of the GDP growth rate from Statistik Austria as a measure of business cycle conditions.

To convert the daily labor market status data to an annual panel, I first restrict the sample to private-sector employees, age 24-54, who are not multiple job holders. I construct employment spells as continuous months where an individual is employed by the same firm. I aggregate the data to the annual level by assigning each worker the firm at which they spend the most time each year. All individuals employed at least one month each year are classified as employed.

Defining Treated Employment Spells The earnings and labor force status concepts in the ASSD align closely with the concepts used to determine noncompete enforceability. As described in Section 3, noncompetes are not enforceable for employees who signed their employment contracts

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20 There was a reform to the severance pay system designed to increase job mobility for employment spells starting after 2002. My analysis separates the effects of this severance pay reform from the effect of the noncompete reform because the severance pay reform should affect all spells starting in 2003 and the severance pay reform did not differentially affect workers above and below the noncompete earnings threshold.

21 There is no clear guidance as to whether these are firms or establishments. Fink et al. (2010) compare the ASSD employer size distribution to external firm size data and find similar distributions which suggests that the IDs likely correspond to firms.

22 Multiple job holders are employees who are employed by multiple employers on the same day. They are dropped because it is conceptually difficult to define job transitions for them. They make up 3.5% of workers in the ASSD from 1990-2018.

23 I count parental leave, sickness spells, and nonemployment spells of up to six months where the employee returns to the same employer as continuous employment. The six-month allowance accounts for seasonal workers.
after March 2006 and whose earnings in the previous month were below the earnings threshold. I assume that the first date I see an individual receive earnings from a firm in the ASSD is the employment contract signing date.\textsuperscript{24} To approximate individuals’ monthly earnings relevant for the noncompete ban, I convert the annualized earnings in the ASSD to a monthly earnings measure.\textsuperscript{25} Since I only observe annual earnings, my treatment definition will be measured with some error.

I further restrict the sample based on employees’ earnings and job tenure to create comparable treatment and control groups. First, I restrict the sample to employees whose monthly earnings are within 25\% of the noncompete earnings threshold each year (e.g., monthly earnings between 75 and 125\% of the threshold).\textsuperscript{26} Second, I restrict the sample to employees with less than six years of job tenure. The motivation for this restriction is that my empirical strategy compares different cohorts of employment spells (i.e., groups of workers who started jobs in the same year). Due to the right-censoring of the data in 2018, different cohorts will mechanically have different job tenure distributions. Restricting the entire sample to have less than six years of job tenure balances the tenure distribution across cohorts.\textsuperscript{27} Finally, I restrict the sample to employment spell that started in 1995-2013 which ensures that I observe five years of job tenure for all cohorts.

**Mobility and Earnings Outcomes of Interest** The main effects of the noncompete ban that I analyze are its impact on job mobility, firm quality, and individual-level earnings changes.

I first define overall job-to-job transitions and then divide these into types of transitions more or less likely to have been affected by the ban. I define a job-to-job transition in year \( t \) as being employed by a firm in year \( t \) and primarily employed by a different firm in year \( t + 1 \). These transitions do not include recalls which were common in Austria (Nekoei and Weber, 2020). Since the ban should have affected voluntary transitions, I exclude transitions from firm deaths.\textsuperscript{28} This definition of job-to-job transitions and my sample selection result in higher transition rates than other job mobility statistics in Austria.\textsuperscript{29} Next, I separate job transitions into within narrow-industry, within broad-industry, and across-industry transitions.\textsuperscript{30} Finally, I separate within-industry job transitions into direct employer-to-employer (EE) transitions and employer-to-unemployment-to-employer (EUE) transitions with

\textsuperscript{24}See Appendix Section G.2 for a discussion about cases where this would over or underestimate the true signing date.

\textsuperscript{25}For the main analysis, I use only workers’ monthly salary adjusting for 13th and 14th monthly payments to define noncompete eligibility (i.e., bonuses and variable payments are excluded). See Appendix Section G.2 for details about the earnings concepts and Appendix Figures A7 and A8 for results that show robustness to defining treatment based on total earnings at each firm.

\textsuperscript{26}Since the earnings threshold is indexed to the time-varying, maximum social security contribution limit, I use this limit to define the threshold for years before 2006. See Appendix Figure A4 for robustness to the bandwidth threshold.

\textsuperscript{27}Appendix Figures A5 and A6 show robustness to not imposing any tenure restrictions on the sample.

\textsuperscript{28}See Appendix Section G for a description of the “worker flows” method I use to account for firm ID relabeling.

\textsuperscript{29}First, the way I define annual employment spells would classify the following as a job-to-job transition: employed at firm \( A \) in January of year 1, unemployed for 22 months, employed at firm \( B \) in December of year 2. Surveys that measure point-in-time labor force status (e.g., employment in March of each year) would not count this as a job-to-job transition. Second, restricting the sample to lower-earning workers and workers in their first five years of job tenure results in higher job transition rates.

\textsuperscript{30}Narrow-industries are four-digit NACE 2008 codes. Within broad-industry transitions are within the same coarse industry but not the same four-digit industry. Across-industry transitions are across coarse industries. See Appendix Section H for details.
varying lengths of unemployment between jobs.\footnote{Given how monthly employment is defined, EE transitions can include up to one month of unemployment between transitions.}

To measure what types of firms the noncompete ban increased transitions to, I define different measures of firm quality that capture wage and non-wage characteristics.\footnote{All firm quality measures are ten-year moving averages lagged by one year (e.g., quality for year $t$ is average quality from $t - 10$ to $t - 1$). This definition avoids a job separation at time $t$ mechanically affecting firm quality at time $t$. For a firm's AKM coefficient in year $t$, I use the AKM coefficient estimated using all transitions from years $t - 10$ to $t - 1$.} For non-wage measures of firm quality, I consider firm size, a firm’s share of white-collar workers, the average tenure of employees at a firm, a firm’s “poaching index” (the share of a firm’s hires from other firms rather than nonemployment), a firm’s “churn rate” (the number of separations plus hires divided by total employees), and a firm’s separation rate to unemployment. Average tenure, the poaching rate, and the churn rate are “revealed preference” measures of firm quality because desirable firms are able to retain their current employees and can poach employees from other firms (Bagger and Lentz, 2018). The separation to unemployment rate captures a measure of firm-specific job security (Jarosch, 2015). For wage characteristics, I calculate each firm’s average earnings and its AKM fixed effect (Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013).

My main earnings outcome is the annual change in an individuals’ “daily wage” from their primary employer. Using the measures of daily labor force status and annual earnings from each employer, I construct the daily wage as annual earnings divided by days worked.\footnote{The right-censoring of earnings at the social security maximum does not affect my analysis since I exclude high-earners.} Consequently, the earnings measure accounts for differences in annual days worked but not hours per day. For each person-year observation, I use the earnings from the primary (longest-duration) employer.

**Summary Statistics** Table 1 provides summary statistics for the final sample of employees in 2005 (one year before the reform). The statistics are presented separately for treated employees (earnings below the threshold) and control employees (earnings above the threshold). Employees in the treated earnings range are less likely to be male or white-collar workers and have lower average job tenure and experience. They are also more likely to be employed at lower-quality firms (e.g., firms with lower average tenure and higher separation risk). Finally, they have higher overall job-to-job transition rates and a larger share of these transitions are across- versus within-industry.

## 5 Difference-in-Differences Empirical Strategy

My difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy compares the outcomes of employees affected by the noncompete ban to employees unaffected by the ban due to either the earnings or contract signing date threshold. The two “differences” in this strategy are (1) employees who signed their contract before and after March 2006 and (2) employees whose monthly earnings were above and below the threshold.
earnings threshold. Thus, the strategy tests whether the difference in outcomes for high- versus lower-earners changed for employment spells that started after March 2006.

**Dynamic and Pooled Specifications** The main estimating equation for employee \( i \) at time \( t \) is

\[
Y_{it} = \sum_n \gamma_n [S_{it} = n] + \sum_n \delta_n [S_{it} = n] \times D_{it} + D_{it} + X_{it}' \beta + \epsilon_{it}
\]  

(1)

where \( S_{it} \) is the employment spell starting year, \( D_{it} \) is an indicator for being in the treated earnings range (e.g., monthly earnings below the threshold), and \( X_{it} \) includes individual- and firm-level covariates. All specifications include year fixed effects (FEs) and two-digit industry FEs.\(^{34}\) All specifications also include earnings percentile FEs but Appendix Figures A9 and A10 show that the paper’s main results are qualitatively the same dropping these controls.\(^{35}\) I refer to this set of controls as the **baseline controls**. I also present results adding progressively richer controls to address potential identification threats. The outcomes of interest, \( Y_{it} \), include indicators for job transitions, changes in firm quality, and earnings changes defined in Section 4.

The coefficients of interest are the \( \delta_n \) estimates of the interaction between starting an employment spell in year \( n \) and earning below the ban threshold. These coefficients capture the average differences in the outcome variable for individuals in the treated versus control earnings range for each employment spell starting cohort. I normalize \( \delta_{2005} \) to zero so all estimates are relative to 2005.

To increase precision and report a single treatment estimate, I also estimate a “pooled specification.” This specification averages the effects across groups of spell cohorts by estimating

\[
Y_{it} = \sum_n \gamma_n [S_{it} = n] + \sum_m \delta_m [S_{it} \in [L^m, U^m]] \times D_{it} + D_{it} + X_{it}' \beta + \epsilon_{it}.
\]  

(2)

Here, \( \delta_m \) captures the average difference in outcomes for workers in the treated versus control earnings ranges across all employment spells starting between \( L^m \) and \( U^m \). The \([L^m, U^m]\) groups are \([1995 − 1999], [2000 − 2004], [2006 − 2010], \) and \([2011 − 2013]\). Since 2005 is omitted from all groups, the estimates are relative to 2005.

In both specifications, I cluster standard errors at the earnings percentile level. This accounts for treatment being correlated within an earnings percentile and an employment spell starting.

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\(^{34}\)The baseline controls do not include job-tenure because job tenure is collinear with the year and spell starting year controls. However, since the spell cohorts are balanced on job tenure (due to the job tenure restrictions), the tenure controls are less important. Appendix Figures A5 and A6 present results without tenure restriction but with parametric tenure controls.

\(^{35}\)The earnings percentile FEs account for mechanical changes in the composition of the treated and control groups due to changes in the earnings threshold over time. This threshold is indexed to the nominal social security contribution limit which increases each year to keep up with inflation. In the 1990s, this limit shifted slightly in real terms which changed the composition of workers just around the threshold (i.e., the threshold increased from the 48th to the 50th percentile of the earnings distribution resulting in higher-earning workers just below the threshold). The earnings percentile FEs adjust for these shifts. Consequently excluding these FEs leads to some pre-trends in job mobility from 1995-1990. Since all mobility and earnings outcomes are changes from time \( t \) to \( t + 1 \) and these FEs are at time \( t \), they are not “bad controls.”
Identifying Assumptions and Endogeneity Concerns  The identifying assumption for this empirical strategy is a conditional parallel trends assumption. The assumption is that absent the policy change, conditional on the included covariates, the difference in average outcomes between employees in the treated and control earnings ranges would not have varied for different employment spell cohorts. The first testable prediction of this assumption is that there should be parallel trends for spells that started before 2006. I test for this by reporting estimates of \( \delta_n \) for spells that started between 1995-2005. A second prediction is that for outcomes less likely to be affected by the noncompete ban, we should not detect treatment effects. I test for this by estimating the effect of the ban on across-industry job transitions and job transitions with intervening unemployment.

One endogeneity concern is that changes in the composition of new hires after the ban might bias my estimates due to selection effects. For example, the noncompete ban may have caused firms to hire employees less likely to switch jobs or to pay employees just above the earnings threshold to avoid the ban. I account for such effects in two ways. First, I add detailed individual- and firm-level controls to the baseline specification (the individual controls). If bias-inducing, compositional changes were related to these covariates, including these rich controls would change the estimates. Second, Appendix Figures A1 and A2, present results from “manipulation tests” around the ban’s earnings threshold. Figures A1 plots the density of employment spells’ starting wages before and after the ban and shows no evidence of bunching around the threshold after the ban. The lack of bunching around the threshold suggests that firms may not have highly valued the noncompetes which is consistent with the small effects I find. Figure A2 plots workers’ predicted job transition and earnings growth rates based on workers’ baseline characteristics and similarly shows not change around the threshold after the ban.

Another potential identification threat is that the treated and control groups could be differentially affected by the business cycle which would violate the parallel trends assumption. I address this concern in three ways. First, I present results that further add time-varying controls that should capture some of the differing sensitivity to business cycle conditions (the time-varying controls). Second, the differing cyclicality could explain a one-time change for a few spell starting

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36 This level of clustering allows for an unrestricted covariance structure within earnings percentiles for different spell starting years. This addresses the issue of serially correlated outcomes in difference-in-difference designs (Bertrand et al., 2004).

37 These include experience by white/blue-collar FEs, age by gender FEs, firm location FEs, tenure controls interacted with treatment, and spell starting month by treatment FEs. The tenure controls are indicators for one or two years of job tenure (see note 34 for why full tenure controls cannot be included). The spell starting month indicators account for the fact that I shift employment spells that started in the first three months of 2006 into 2005 to align with the timing of the policy change.


39 These include year by two-digit-industry by white/blue-collar FEs, Bundesland by year FEs, and contemporaneous GDP growth interacted with an indicator for being in the treated earnings range.
year cohorts but could not explain a persistent change in outcomes starting in 2006. Finally, if the
treatment and control groups were differentially affected by the business cycle, we would expect
differential trends during the pre-period.

6 Results: The Effect of Noncompetes on Job Mobility

This section presents results from estimating the DiD strategy and finds that the noncompete ban
increased job mobility. First, I transparently illustrate the empirical strategy by plotting raw job
transition rates for treated and control employees. Second, I present coefficients from the formal
DiD specification. Across both strategies, I find that the noncompete ban increased the annual
job-to-job mobility rate by about 0.3 percentage points (a two percent increase). This increase was
driven by job transitions between firms in the same narrow industries and job transitions without
unemployment gaps between jobs. This heterogeneity is consistent with the type of job mobility we
would expect to be restricted by noncompetes. Note, all of the outcome variables in this section are
indicator variables for job transitions multiplied by 100.

Graphical Illustration of DiD Strategy  To build intuition for the DiD strategy, I first plot
the raw job transition rates for the treatment and control groups. Figures 2 and 3 plot these rates
for within four-digit industry and overall job-to-job transitions respectively. Panel A of each figure
plots the average annual job transition rate (y-axis) for employees with different contemporaneous
monthly earnings (x-axis). It plots these transition rates separately for employment spells that
started in 2004-2005 (blue squares) and 2006-2007 (red circles). Employees whose earnings are less
than the ban's threshold (left of the dashed line) and who started their employment spell in 2006 or
2007 are eligible for the noncompete ban (i.e., “treated”). Thus, the DiD strategy compares how
the difference in job mobility between the '04-05 and the '06-07 cohorts changed across the earnings
threshold. Panel B plots this difference for each of the earnings bins (solid blue circles) and plots
the average difference for the treatment and control (dashed black lines).

For both within-industry and overall job mobility, these figures show increases in mobility for
the affected cohorts in the treated earnings range. Figure 2 shows that within-industry job mobility
for the 2004-2005 cohort was somewhat higher than the 2006-2007 cohort in the control earnings
range. In the treated earnings range, however, average job mobility was higher for the 2006-2007
cohort. Subtracting these two differences yields a treatment effect of between 0.3-0.4 percentage
points. Similarly, for overall job-to-job mobility in Figure 3, the treatment effect is around 0.5
percentage points. For both figures, it is reassuring that the treatment effect starts close to the
earnings threshold and is not driven by observations farther away from the threshold.

Finally, given the reform’s sharp earnings cutoff, we might expect to see a discontinuity in
job transitions at the threshold. However, measurement error between the reform-relevant earnings concept and the earnings concept in the ASSD make it unlikely that I could detect a discontinuity.\footnote{There are two potential sources of such measurement error. First, I observe annual average earnings while the ban is based on earnings the month before separation. Second, as described in Appendix Section G.2, it is not possible to perfectly map the earnings concept relevant for the ban to the ASSD.}

**Job Mobility DiD Regression Results** I next present the DiD results which expand on the previous visual evidence. Figures 4 and 5 plot the estimated $\delta_n$ coefficients from equation 1 (i.e., the interactions between indicators for spell starting years and earnings in the treated range).

I first present results for within-four-digit-industry job transitions. The hollow blue coefficients in Panel A of Figure 4 plot the $\delta_n$ coefficients for within industry transitions with the baseline controls. The estimates for spells starting between 1995-2004 are relatively stable which supports the lack of pre-trends before the ban was implemented.\footnote{There is slight evidence of an anticipation effect in 2005. This is plausible if many employees signed their employment contracts after first receiving earnings in the ASSD (e.g., provisional employment periods) or if some employers interpreted the ban as applying to all spells starting in 2006 (I include spells that started in the first three months of 2006 in the 2005 cohort). As discussed in Appendix Section E, prior to 10 months before the reform was implemented, there was little public discussion of the reform so anticipation effects earlier than this are unlikely.} Starting in 2006, the estimated coefficients increase and remain elevated between around 0.2 and 0.4 (i.e., the annual probability of a within-industry job transition increased by between 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points). Relative to the baseline within-industry transition rate of 3.6 percent, this represents a six to eleven percent increase.

These within-industry transition results are robust to controlling for both individual and firm characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. The red solid triangles in Figure 4 present estimates that add detailed individual-level controls (see footnote 37) and the results are almost identical to the baseline specification. The hollow black circles in Panel B plot the estimates from adding the time-varying and macroeconomic condition controls (see footnote 39). With these controls, the estimates after 2005 are unaffected and some of the negative estimates in the pre-period are no longer significant. As discussed in Section 5, this effect stability across specifications suggests that the results are not driven by selection effects or differential business-cycle sensitivities.

Figure 5 presents the same estimates for overall job-to-job transitions and reveals a similarly sized treatment effect. While the estimated coefficients are somewhat nosier with only the baseline controls, the treatment effects are still relatively stable after adding the individual- and time-varying controls. Across all three specifications, the noncompete ban increased the annual rate of overall job-to-job transition rate of 16 percent, this represents around a two percent increase.

To summarize the annual event-study coefficients as a single estimate, Table 2 includes results from estimating the pooled specification in equation 2. The treatment effects are very similar to the average event-study coefficients in Figures 4 and 5. The estimated treatment effect for within-
four-digit industry transitions for spells that started in 2006-2010 with the richest set of controls, column (3), is 0.23 percentage points (std. err. = 0.07). Additionally, the estimates for both pre-trend time periods are indistinguishable from zero. The same estimate for overall job-to-job transitions, column (6), is 0.27 percentage points (std. err. = 0.10). In Section 8, I interpret these magnitudes relative to the first stage, macroeconomic fluctuations in the job transition rate, and other estimates of the mobility effects of noncompetes.

Heterogeneity by Transition Type and Industry To provide evidence that the mobility effects are from the noncompete ban, I split up job transitions into categories more and less likely to have been affected. For the figures discussed below, the estimates are from the pooled specification with baseline controls. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 present estimates from the other specifications. First, I present estimates separately for within- versus across-industry job transitions. Since noncompetes could only restrict mobility between firms in the same “line of business”, we would expect larger effects on the within-industry transitions. Panel A. of Figure 6 includes pre-trend and treatment effect estimates for within four-digit industry (already presented), other within-industry (i.e., job transitions within the same coarse NACE industry but not the same four-digit industry), and across-industry job transitions. For the two new outcome variables, the pre-trend estimates are insignificant. For the estimated treatment effects, the impact on within four-digit industry transitions is more than five times larger than other estimates and the only significant estimate. The difference is more striking considering that the base rate for within-industry transitions is about one-third of the base rate for across-industry transitions (3.6 % versus 9.5 %). This heterogeneity provides strong evidence that the increased job mobility was driven by the noncompete ban.

Next, I further separate within-industry job transitions into transitions with and without periods of unemployment between jobs. Since noncompetes were sometimes enforced via waiting periods, job transitions with unemployment spells between jobs should have been either unaffected or decreased by the ban. Panel B. of Figure 6 presents estimates of the effect on within four-digit industry job transitions split up into direct employer-to-employer (EE) transitions and transitions with 1–3, 4–6, and 7+ months of unemployment (EUE) between the jobs. The effect on EE transitions is more than double the other estimates. The effect on transitions with seven-plus months of unemployment between jobs is significant but only a 0.05 percentage point increase.

Finally, I estimate which industries are driving the increase in within-industry job transitions. I then compare this heterogeneity to anecdotal accounts of where low-earning noncompetes were prevalent before the ban. Figure 7 presents separate estimates of the within-industry treatment effect for fourteen coarse industry groups. I find positive and significant effects for wholesale and

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42 I do not include transitions with only other types of nonemployment between jobs because such nonemployment may include transition types that were affected by the noncompete ban (e.g., transitions to self-employment or minor employment).
retail trade, transportation, and administration and support. Additionally, I find large positive but insignificant effects in information and communication and finance and insurance. This industry heterogeneity lines up with anecdotal accounts of where noncompetes were prevalent before the ban from analyzing newspaper articles and the legislative debate around the reform. These accounts reveal examples of noncompetes for salesmen and furniture retailers (wholesale and retail trade), taxi drivers (transportation), mobile phone companies (information and communication), and temporary help workers (administration and support). The only two industries where I found examples of noncompete use but I do not estimate mobility effects are tourism (accommodation and food services) and hairdressers (other services). For these two industries, however, the confidence intervals are large enough such that I cannot rule out meaningful increases in job mobility.

**Addressing Biases from the Above andBelow Threshold Comparison** A potential concern with these results is that there may be biases from comparing workers just above and below an earnings threshold. First, since a non-trivial share of the labor market was affected by the ban, there may have been general-equilibrium effects that spilled over to the control group. For example, noncompetes could affect overall labor market dynamism by changing firms’ vacancy posting choices (Starr et al., 2019). If these equilibrium changes affected both the treated and control groups, they could bias my estimates. Second, dynamic considerations could change the treatment intensity for workers closer versus farther from the threshold. For example, a worker with earnings just below the threshold might not accept a job paying just above the threshold if it came with a noncompete.

To address these concerns, I estimate a series of “donut-hole” specifications that leave out progressively larger groups of workers immediately around the threshold. Assuming that the general equilibrium spillovers are larger between employees with more similar earnings, dropping workers right around the threshold should eliminate some of the bias. Appendix Figure A3 shows the overall and within-industry job mobility estimates dropping up to 10 percentage points around the threshold (i.e., only including workers between 75 and 90 % and 110 and 125 % of the threshold). Across these specifications, both of the job transition estimates remain significant and actually increase slightly. Appendix Figure A11 presents results from the donut-hole specifications for the paper’s main earnings results and they are also qualitatively the same across specifications. Overall, these results show that the general equilibrium and dynamics concerns are unlikely to substantially bias my estimates.

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44 Supporting this assumption, Nimczik (2018) shows that, in Austria, employees at firms with similar pay premia are more likely to be in the same endogenous labor market.

45 This suggests that either spillovers or dynamic considerations could be somewhat downward biasing the overall effects. However, the estimates in Figure A3 are statistically indistinguishable across the bandwidths. The p values from z tests of equality between the 0 % and 10 % “donut holes” are .72 and .71 for within-industry and overall job mobility respectively.
Another plausible spillover is that changes in noncompete use norms after the ban may have also decreased their use for the control group. Two institutional details provide evidence against such changes. First, survey evidence after the ban does not show any decrease in noncompete prevalence for higher-earners.\footnote{In 2005-2006, 44\% of employees earning above €3,630 per month had a noncompete in their contract compared to 45\% of employees earning above €4,230 in 2011-2012 (See Figures 1 for 2005-2006 and Vevera (2013) for 2011-2012).} Second, the ban’s earnings threshold was increased in 2015 which suggests that noncompetes above the threshold were still a policy concern (Crisolli and Deur, 2017).

### Job Mobility Robustness

The job mobility estimates are robust to relaxing several assumptions about sample selection and my empirical specifications.

First, I vary the bandwidth around the earnings threshold that determines the size of the treated and control earnings ranges. Appendix Figure A4 presents estimates for within-industry and overall job-to-job mobility where the included bandwidth varies from 5\% to 50\% of the threshold. For thresholds very close to the cutoff, the estimates are noisy due to the smaller sample size but for bandwidths between 20-50\%, the estimates are significant and stable for both outcomes.

Next, I relax the restriction limiting the sample to employees with less than six years of job tenure. Appendix Figure A5 plots results analogous to the event-study estimates in Panel B in Figures 4 and 5 for the full sample. Appendix Figure A6 is a summary figure that compares the headline estimate from the paper to the same estimates for the full sample (including subsequent firm quality and earnings results). Across both figures, the results are qualitatively the same. The job mobility point estimates are slightly smaller for the full sample which is consistent with noncompetes having a larger impact on individuals earlier in their job tenure.

Finally, I show robustness to defining treatment based on workers’ total earnings rather than just salaries (see Appendix Section G.2 for details). Appendix Figures A7 and A8 are analogous to the full-sample robustness figures but with this new treatment definition. The results are qualitatively the same as the main results but the overall mobility estimates are slightly less precise.

### 7 Results: Firm Quality and Earnings Effects

I next analyze the ban’s impact on transitions to higher- versus lower-quality firms and its impact on workers’ earnings. I find that the ban disproportionately increased transitions to higher-quality firms (e.g., firms with higher average tenure or average earnings). Additionally, the ban had a larger effect on transitions with earnings increases than on transitions with earnings decreases. Finally, even though the ban disproportionately affected transitions with earnings increases, I cannot detect an effect on overall earnings growth rates for treated workers. These findings can be reconciled because the number of additional job transitions is small enough that their effect on overall earnings
growth is hard to detect.

Transitions to Higher- versus Lower-Quality Firms  I first estimate whether the noncompete ban systematically increased job mobility to higher-quality firms based on different measures of firm quality. This analysis allows us to test whether relaxing barriers to mobility allows workers to move up the “job ladder” to higher-quality firms. Consequently, it also tests for a specific channel through which noncompetes can hurt workers by preventing them from finding better firms.

I estimate the pooled specification in equation 2 but split up the indicator for an overall job transition into transitions to higher- versus lower-quality firms. The outcome variable for transitions to higher-quality firms is defined as follows for individual \( i \) employed at firm \( j(i,t) \) at time \( t \)

\[
Y_{it} = 100 \times 1 \left[ j(i,t + 1) \neq j(i,t) \text{ AND } \text{Firm Quality}_{j(i,t+1),t} > \text{Firm Quality}_{j(i,t),t} \right] \tag{3}
\]

and defined analogously for transitions to lower-quality firms. Although I compare employees’ firms at time \( t \) and \( t + 1 \), I use the firm quality of both firms at time \( t \). This ensures that switching firms will not mechanically affect their quality.\(^{47}\) The measures of firm quality include firm size, white-collar share, the average tenure of employees at the firm, the share of new hires from unemployment compared to employment, the churn rate, the annual separation to unemployment rate, average earnings of workers at the firm, and AKM firm-fixed effects. I normalize these measures so increases in the quality measures always indicate higher quality.

Figure 8 presents the estimated treatment effects for transitions to higher- versus lower-quality firms. It shows that the reform disproportionately increased transitions to higher-quality firms based on all measures except for firm size, the firm’s white-collar share, and firm AKM fixed effects. The left panel of Figure 8 includes the estimated effect on transitions to higher-quality firms and the right panel includes transitions to lower-quality firms. For firm quality based on tenure, churn rate, separations to UE, and average firm earnings, the estimates for transitioning to higher-quality firms are all significant and above 0.25. The corresponding estimates for transitions to lower-quality firms are all below 0.15 and insignificant.\(^{48}\) These estimates indicate that the noncompete ban disproportionately increases transitions to higher-quality firms based on measures of firm job security and “revealed-preference” measures of firm quality. For firms’ white-collar share, hire from UE rate, and AKM firm-fixed effects, the reform increased transitions to higher- and lower-quality firms by roughly the same amount. For firm size, however, the increased job transitions are entirely

\(^{47}\) As described in Section 4, using 10-year lagged measures of firm quality also ensures no mechanical relationship between separations and changes in firm quality. The comparison of firm quality measures in the same time period also ensures that secular trends in the distribution of firm quality will not affect whether job transitions are to higher-quality firms.

\(^{48}\) The p values from a z test of equality between the higher- versus lower-quality coefficients are 0.21, 0.04, 0.09, and 0.12 respectively for average tenure, churn rate, separations to unemployment, and average earnings. For estimates with the time-varying controls, the p-values are 0.07, 0.03, 0.24, and 0.05.
transitions to smaller firms. One explanation for this firm-size result is that noncompete agreements for low-earning workers may have primarily been used by large firms.

**Transitions with Earnings Increases versus Decreases** To assess whether the reform-induced transitions were also to higher-paying jobs, I separately estimate the reform’s effect on transitions accompanied by earnings increases versus earnings decreases. This analysis tells us whether workers benefited from the relaxed mobility restrictions by finding higher-paying jobs. Additionally, it tests whether relaxing mobility restrictions leads to workers moving up a job ladder based on their earnings at different firms.

Mirroring the firm-quality analysis, the outcome variable for transitions accompanied by earnings increases is defined as follows for individual $i$ at firm $j(i,t)$ at time $t$:

$$Y_{it} = 100 \times 1 [j(i,t+1) \neq j(i,t) \text{ AND } \ln \text{Earnings}_{i,t+1} > \ln \text{Earnings}_{i,t}].$$

(4)

The outcome for earnings decreases is defined analogously. The earnings measure is the average nominal “daily wages” from each employees’ primary employer each year. Thus, for job movers, the measure only includes earnings from their (primary) post-separation employer in year $t+1$.

I first present the annual event-study figures separately for job transitions with earnings increases and earnings decreases. Specifically, Figures 9 and 10 present the $\delta_n$ coefficient estimates from equation 1 with the outcome defined by equation 4. Figure 9 includes all job-to-job transitions while the outcome for Figure 10 also requires that the job transition is within the same four-digit industry. Panel A. in each figure presents the estimates for earnings increases while Panel B. presents estimates for decreases. For overall transitions, the results show a persistent increase in job transitions accompanied by earnings increases starting in 2006 (up to a 0.5 pct. pt. increase) and a smaller and more delayed increase in job transitions accompanied by earnings decreases (less than a 0.25 pct. pt. increase). For the transitions with earnings increases, there is some evidence of an anticipation effect in 2005 which masks potentially larger effects after 2006 (see note 41 for reasons why such anticipation is plausible). The within-industry results are similar where the coefficients after 2005 are the same size for earnings increases and decreases but the transitions with earnings increases again show evidence of an anticipation effect in 2005.

To summarize these annual estimates into a single treatment effect while accounting for the potential anticipation effect, I next present estimates from a modified version of the “pooled specification.” Specifically, I estimate the specification in equation 2 but change the omitted year to 2004 so all estimates are relative to two years before the reform.49 Table 3 presents estimates from this specification for job transitions with earnings increases versus earnings decreases. With the most

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49The pooled groups in this specification are [1995 − 1999], [2000 − 2003], [2005], [2006 − 2010], and [2011 − 2013].
detailed controls, overall job transitions with positive earnings changes increased by 0.52 percentage points (std. err. = 0.16) compared to an insignificant impact on overall job transitions with earnings decreases (point estimate = -0.06 and std. err. = 0.13). These estimates are statistically different with p values from z tests of equality of 0.02 and 0.00 for the individual and time-varying specifications respectively. Similarly, for within-industry job transitions, the effect on transitions with earnings increases was larger than the effect on transitions with decreases (.25 with std. err. = 0.07 versus 0.12 with std. err. = 0.06). Here the p values are 0.18 and 0.12.

One potential concern is that this analysis attributes earnings increases that individuals would have experienced without a job transition to the transition. For example, earnings might increase each year due to inflation. In this case, the outcome defined by Equation 4 would treat all job transitions as transitions with earnings increases despite that workers would have gotten these pay raises away. To account for this, I redefine the outcome as job transitions with increases in earnings quantiles. This definition accounts for the fact that different parts of the earnings distribution may experience different earnings growth each year. Table A3 presents the same results as in Table 3 but with this earnings quantile outcome. Across all specifications, the results are almost identical.

Finally, Figures A6, A8, and A10 show that these results are robust to relaxing the tenure restriction, defining treatment based on total earnings, and dropping the earnings percentile controls.

**Overall Earnings Growth Effects** Although the reform disproportionately increased transitions accompanied by earnings increases, this might not have led to a noticeable increase in overall earnings growth. Accordingly, I next estimate the impact of the reform on earnings growth for all workers and specifically for job stayers. This analysis helps us understand the different channels through which noncompetes affect workers’ earnings growth. For example, noncompetes could only restrict earnings growth through job transitions or they could also restrict earnings growth for job stayers.

To analyze the reform’s effect on overall wage growth, I estimate the annual DiD specification with the following individual-level log earnings changes as the outcome

\[
Y_{i,t} = 100 \times \left[ \ln (w_{i,t+1}) - \ln (w_{i,t}) \right].
\]  

(5)

Since the outcome variable is earnings log differences and the independent variable is the treatment level, this specification estimates how the noncompete ban affected workers’ earnings growth rates. Specifically, an estimate of 0.5 is approximately a 0.5 percentage point increase in the annual earnings growth rate. Consequently, this specification does not pick up effects of the ban on workers’ starting earnings (see Appendix Section C for details). Panel A. of Figure 11 plots the treatment effect estimates for the entire sample. Panel B. presents the results with the sample restricted to job stayers (i.e., employees with the same primary employer in subsequent years).
In both samples, there is no evidence of excess earnings growth for cohorts treated by the noncompete ban. After 2005, the estimated effects on earnings growth are generally insignificant and below 0.2 (i.e., approximately a 0.2 percentage point increase in the earnings growth rate). The coefficient estimates before 2005 are also relatively stable and generally insignificant which is consistent with parallel trends in earnings growth. Table 4 presents estimates for the same outcomes and samples but from the pooled specification described in equation 2. For the specifications corresponding to the previous figures (columns (1)-(4)), the earnings growth point estimates are below 0.07 and the confidence intervals can rule out increases of more than 0.16 percentage points.

**Earnings Growth Robustness** I estimate several robustness checks to ensure that the lack of earnings effects is not driven by variable definitions, spillovers, or the sample selection.

First, to address the possibility of spillover wage effects on non-treated workers and other concerns with comparing workers immediately above and below the threshold, I estimate the “donut-hole” specifications discussed in Section 6 for one-year earnings changes. Figure A11 shows that the insignificant effect on earnings growth overall and for job stayers is robust to leaving out progressively larger groups of workers right next to the earnings threshold.

Second, since the earnings concept does not incorporate hours, transitions to and from part-time work are a potential concern (Halla et al., 2020). To address this, columns (5)-(8) in Table 4 present the same results but restrict the sample to males. Since prime-age men are more likely to be employed full-time, the hours concern is less applicable. Across these male-only results, the point estimates are below 0.1 and the treatment and 2000-2004 pre-trend estimates are insignificant.

Third, the one-year estimates may mask larger long-term effects due to wage stickiness or volatile one-year earnings fluctuations. Table 5 addresses this by presenting longer time horizon estimates. Specifically, it presents the same results as columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 but for log-earnings differences up to five years in the future. For one to four years, the estimates are less than 0.15 and insignificant. For five years, the effect with individual controls is positive and significant but it becomes insignificant when the time-varying controls are added. Overall, these results show that the small earnings effects persist even when measures over longer time horizons.

Fourth, the estimates may be sensitive to the specific earnings concept used. To address this, Appendix Table A4 presents the estimated one-year effects using alternative earnings measures. Columns (3) and (4) use changes only in employees’ salaries that do not include bonus payments or other sources of earnings. Columns (5) and (6) winsorize earnings growth at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Across all these earnings concepts, the estimated impact on log earnings growth remains insignificant and I can still rule out increases above 0.2.

Finally, Appendix Figures A6, A8, and A10 show that the lack of an overall earnings effect
is also robust to relaxing the job tenure restriction, defining treatment based on workers’ total earnings, and dropping the earnings percentile fixed effects.

**Earnings Growth versus Level Effects** The previous results analyzed the effect of the ban on individual-level earnings growth but not the effect on workers’ starting earnings levels. As discussed in Section 2, many of the prominent stories of how noncompetes could depress workers’ earnings operate through changes in wage growth and not starting wages (e.g., preventing workers from moving to better jobs or from using outside job offers to bargain for higher wages).

There are, however, two pieces of evidence that speak to the effect on starting earnings. First, the lack of bunching of starting wages around the ban’s threshold and the smoothness of workers’ average characteristics across the threshold both suggest small effects on starting wages (Figures A1 and A2). Second, Appendix Figure A12 plots the raw, wage profiles over time for workers who started an employment spell before and after 2006 and whose initial earnings were below the earnings threshold. Although starting earnings are higher for workers who started a new job after the ban than before the ban, there is a similar difference across time for ineligible employment spells (i.e., spells with initial earnings above the threshold). Thus, this analysis also does not provide any support for the ban affecting workers’ starting earnings.\(^{50}\)

8 Discussion: Magnitudes and Policy Implications

In the previous sections, I presented three core findings about the effect of the noncompete ban on employees’ job mobility, job quality, and earnings. First, the ban increased job mobility. Second, the increased transitions were disproportionately to higher-quality firms and were accompanied by earnings increases. Third, the ban did not have a noticeable impact on overall earnings growth. In this section, I interpret the magnitudes of the mobility and earnings effects relative to overall trends in Austria and other estimates in the literature. Additionally, I discuss some institutional details about noncompetes in Austria that help rationalize the core findings and provide some lessons for the ongoing debate about noncompetes for low-earning workers.

**Benchmarking the Job Mobility Estimates** One interpretation of the magnitude of my job mobility estimates is what they imply for how an individual worker’s job mobility would change with and without a noncompete. This interpretation requires calculating the treatment-on-treated (ToT) effect of the ban by scaling up the previously discussed reduced-form estimate by the estimated...

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\(^{50}\)This analysis of starting earnings should be interpreted with some caution because the reform’s treatment assignment is based on a worker’s starting earnings. Thus, treatment effects on starting earnings could affect who is classified in the treated and control groups. Consequently, I do not study the effect on workers starting earnings more formally.
pre-reform, noncompete prevalence of 0.33.\textsuperscript{51} Figure 12, Panel A. plots these ToT estimates of 0.70 percentage points for within-industry job transitions and 0.82 for overall job transitions. Relative to the base rates, these represent 20\% and 5\% increases in job transitions respectively. Thus, at an individual level, a noncompete had a sizable impact on the probability that an individual would switch jobs within the same narrow industry.

An alternative interpretation of the magnitude of my job mobility estimates is to compare the overall impact of the ban to job mobility trends in Austria over this time period. This interpretation is motivated by current policy discussions that the rise of noncompetes could explain declining labor market dynamism. To evaluate this interpretation, Figure 12, Panel B. plots the annual job-to-job mobility rates from 2000-2018 for employees in the treated earnings range in red and for the control range in blue. In black, it plots the counterfactual job-to-job mobility rate if noncompetes were not banned which is implied by my estimates. Relative to annual fluctuations in the job mobility rate, the effect of the noncompete ban is relatively small; the mobility rate fluctuated between 1 to 1.5 percentage points each year while the ban only increased mobility by 0.27 percentage points.

Two facts reconcile the relatively large treatment-on-treated effect of the reform on within-industry transitions with the small effect on overall transitions. First, only around 33\% of low-earning employees had a noncompete before the ban. Second, noncompetes only legally restricted a small share of affected workers' job transitions (e.g., within four-digit industry transitions only represented 22\% of total transitions).\textsuperscript{52} To see how these facts relate to the overall effect on job mobility, consider the following decomposition (see Appendix Section D for details)

\[
\% \Delta \text{Job Transition Probability} = \frac{\text{Share Workers w/ Noncompete}}{33\%} \times \frac{\% \text{Transitions Restricted}}{22\%} \times \frac{\% \text{ToT on Restricted Transitions}}{20\%} = 1.5\%.
\]

The left-hand side is the percent effect of the ban on treated workers' overall job-to-job transition rate. It is equal to the share of workers with noncompetes (\textit{Share Workers w/ Noncompetes}) times the share of employees' job transitions that were restricted by noncompetes (\textit{% Transitions Restricted}) times the percent treatment-on-treated effect of the ban on restricted job transitions (\textit{\% ToT on Restricted Transitions}). This decomposition shows that the relatively large ToT effect on within-industry job transitions (a 20\% increase) is scaled by 0.33 \times 0.22 which results in the small overall impact on job mobility of 1.5\%. In other words, the ban had a large effect on the types of job transitions restricted by noncompetes for workers with noncompetes. However,

\textsuperscript{51}This scaling assumes full compliance with the ban (e.g., no use of illegal noncompetes after the ban). Additionally, if the effects of the noncompete ban spilled over to other workers in the labor market as found by Starr et al. (2019) and Johnson et al. (2020) in the U.S., this would bias this ToT scaling. Yet, the “donut-hole” specification results in Figures A3 and A11 do not provide strong evidence in support of these spillovers which mitigates this concern.

\textsuperscript{52}This 22\% estimate may overestimate the share of restricted transitions because there may be within-industry transitions that were not restricted by noncompetes. For example, across-region job transitions are generally harder to legally restrict.
taking into account that low-earning workers frequently switch jobs across industries and that only one-third of workers had noncompetes yields a much smaller effect on overall job mobility. This decomposition could also be useful for benchmarking the effects of noncompetes in other settings.

My estimates of the effect of noncompetes on job mobility for low-earning workers are also much smaller than similar estimates in the U.S. For example, Lipsitz and Starr (2020) find that a ban on noncompetes for low-earning workers in Oregon increased treated workers’ annual job-to-job mobility rate by 3.6 percentage points (i.e., the intention-to-treat effect). This is an order of magnitude higher than my estimate. Furthermore, the estimated prevalence of noncompetes for low-earning workers in the U.S. is actually lower than the survey evidence from Austria (Starr et al. (2020) estimate a 14% prevalence for hourly workers). Consequently, the decomposition in equation 6 implies that noncompetes in the U.S. must have either restricted a larger share of job transitions (e.g., through a broader legal interpretation or noncompete “abuse” by employers) or their effect on restricted transitions was much larger than in Austria.

**Benchmarking the Earnings Estimates** Section 7 showed that the noncompete ban disproportionately increased job transitions with earnings increases but it had no detectable effect on overall earnings growth. These results can be reconciled by the fact that the increase in job transitions was small and the ban had no impact on earnings growth for job stayers. To see this, consider this decomposition of the effect of the ban on overall earnings growth if the ban only affected earnings by increasing job transitions (see Appendix Section F for details)

\[
\frac{E[\Delta \ln(w_{it})|T] - E[\Delta \ln(w_{it})|C]}{\text{Earnings Treatment Effect}} = \text{Pr}[\text{Mover}_{it}] \times \left( \frac{E[\Delta \ln(w_{it})|T, \text{Mover}] - E[\Delta \ln(w_{it})|C, \text{Mover}]}{\text{Earnings Change for Marginal Movers}} \right) .
\]  

This expression shows that the difference in earnings growth between the treated, \(T\), and control, \(C\), groups is equal to the increase in the job transition rate times the average earnings growth rate changes for these marginal movers. Since I have estimated the ban’s effect on job transitions, the earnings effect only depends on the average earnings change for the marginal transitions. Appendix Figure A13 plots the implied earnings effect from equation 7 for the job mobility estimate and different values of earnings changes for the marginal movers. The figure shows that the only way to get a detectable effect on workers’ overall earnings growth rates is for implausibly large earnings change for the marginal movers (e.g., almost 50% increases in earnings).

My estimated impact of noncompetes on low-earning workers’ earnings is also much smaller than recent estimates in the U.S. For example, Lipsitz and Starr (2020) and Johnson et al. (2020) both find that restrictions on noncompete enforceability in the U.S. substantially increased workers’

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53 To make their estimates comparable to mine, I annualized the monthly estimate in Column (1) of Table 5 of Lipsitz and Starr (2020). Specifically, I report the annualized (base rate + treatment effect) minus the annualized base rate.

54 The policies were not identical as the Oregon policy also included restrictions on noncompete enforceability for higher-earners.
wages. As discussed in the previous section, however, my analysis only considers the effect on individual-level earnings growth rates which could explain this difference.

My estimates are, however, consistent with some other recent work analyzing the effects of job mobility restrictions on workers. My result that the ban increased job transitions to higher-quality firms and higher-paying jobs is consistent with Nekoei and Weber (2017)’s finding in Austria that extended unemployment benefit duration led to workers finding higher-quality reemployment firms. Second, although Caldwell and Harmon (2019) find that better employment outside options increase incumbent workers’ earnings, they do not find evidence of this channel for workers in the bottom half of the skill distribution which supports my lack of earnings effects for job stayers. One explanation for these findings is that individual-level wage bargaining is less common for low-earning workers (Brenzel et al., 2014; Hall and Krueger, 2012). On the surface, my earnings results appear inconsistent with Hafner (2020)’s finding that relaxed mobility restriction for low-earning French workers increased job stayers’ earnings. However, those effects could be driven by firm-level earnings changes. Since the Austrian reform was at the individual level, it is harder to study the impact on firm-wide wages but this is a promising area for future research.

Austrian Institutional Details and Broader Relevance There are two institutional details about noncompetes in Austria that could explain the relatively small effects of the ban on workers’ mobility and earnings. Both details suggest lessons for the broader discussion about noncompetes.

First, noncompetes could legally only be enforced for narrowly defined competitors. For example, case law suggests that a noncompete that restricted a refrigerator salesman from moving to a competitor that sold dishwashers would not be upheld (Crisolli and Deur, 2017). However, low-earning workers in Austria frequently transitioned jobs across industries. Thus, noncompetes only legally restricted a relatively narrow set of their job opportunities. Additionally, the presence of free and accessible legal advice for all employees through the Chamber of Labor made it easier for employees to understand the scope of their noncompetes and harder for firms to enforce illegal noncompetes. For example, as of March, 2021, the first link when you Google “Konkurrenzklausel Österreich” is an accessible guide from the Chamber of Labor explaining when noncompetes are enforceable (Arbeiterkammer, 2020). Consequently, in other settings where the legal scope of noncompetes is narrow and they are unlikely to be abused, we would also expect relatively small effects. Alternatively, when within-industry transitions represent a larger share of workers’ overall job transitions, we would expect larger effects.

Second, although survey evidence indicates that over 30% of low-earning workers had a non-compete before the ban, this may overestimate the true prevalence. For example, one explanation for the rise of noncompetes was the use of boilerplate employment contracts that included noncompetes.

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If some employers had no intention of enforcing these noncompetes or were unaware of them, the true prevalence could have been lower. This lower prevalence would suggest larger individual-level, ToT effects. Consequently, estimates of what share of noncompetes in employment contracts ever stand a chance of being enforced would be helpful for understanding their true prevalence.

9 Conclusion

I analyze a ban on noncompete clauses in employment contracts for low-earning workers in Austria to study the effect of noncompetes on workers’ job mobility, job quality, and earnings. I find that the ban increased workers’ job mobility. Specifically, it increased transitions to higher-quality firms and job transitions accompanied by earnings increases. These results thus reject the argument that noncompete clauses will have no impact on low-earning workers because their labor markets are perfectly competitive. They also provide evidence that one channel through which noncompetes hurt workers is by restricting them from improving job quality through “job hopping.” I do not, however, find that the ban noticeably increased workers’ overall earnings growth rates. Additionally, the job mobility effects that I find are small relative to macro trends in job mobility in Austria. The small magnitude of the effect on overall mobility can be explained by the relatively narrow legal interpretation of which job transitions noncompetes could restrict and that not every low-earning worker in Austria had a noncompete before the ban. But my findings suggest that in other contexts where noncompetes restrict more job transitions, there might be large effects on job mobility that could affect the allocation of workers to different types of firms.

In addition to improving our understanding of noncompetes, this paper highlights how exogenous variation in job mobility costs paired with employer-employee data is useful for testing different theories of job mobility and wage setting. For example, my finding that noncompetes prevented workers from moving to higher-quality firms based on wage- and non-wage measures supports the presence of job ladders in these characteristics for low-earning workers in Austria. Similar work in other labor markets (e.g., other countries or for higher-earning workers) or using other types of variation in job mobility costs (e.g., changes at the firm- or labor-market level) could further our understanding of which theories best describe different labor markets.
References


Tageszeitung, Tiroler (2005) “AK will Aus für Konkurrenzklause,” Tiroler Tageszeitung”.


Figure 1: Prevalence of Noncompete Clauses in Employment Contracts, 2005-2006

Note: The figure presents the share of employees who report a noncompete in their employment contract from a 2005-2006 survey conducted jointly by the Arbeiterkammer, ÖGB, and FH Wiener Neustadt on clauses in employment contracts. The sample size of individuals who responded to this question was 807 employees. 5% of individuals in the lowest-earning category, 2% of individuals in the middle category, and no individuals in the highest category responded “do not know.” The survey also found that the prevalence of noncompetes was higher for younger workers, more educated workers, and workers who did not have a works council at their company.
Figure 2: Raw Transition Rates for Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions

Panel A. Transition Rate Levels

Annual Within-Industry Transition Rate (× 100)

Noncompetes Banned (Treated) Noncompetes Allowed (Control)


Ratio of Earnings to Noncompete Earnings Cutoff

Note: See the Figure 3 note.

Figure 3: Raw Transition Rates for Overall Job-to-Job Transitions

Panel A. Transition Rate Levels

Annual Job-to-Job Transition Rate (× 100)

Noncompetes Banned (Treated) Noncompetes Allowed (Control)


Ratio of Earnings to Noncompete Earnings Cutoff

Note: Figures 2 and 3 plot the raw job transition rates for the first two “treated years” (i.e., employment spells that started in 2006 and 2007) and the previous two “control years” by employees’ contemporaneous annual earnings. Panel A in each figure plots the average transition rate for employees binned by the ratio of their earnings to the ban’s earnings threshold. Panel B. in each figure plots the difference for each earnings bin between the treated and control years. The outcome variable for Figure 2 is an indicator variable for an annual job transition between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. The outcome variable for Figure 3 is an indicator variable for any annual job-to-job transition. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a transition rate 2 represents a 2 percentage annual probability of transitioning jobs.

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Figure 4: DiD Estimates for *Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions*

Panel A. Baseline and Individual Controls

Panel B. Individual and Time-Varying Controls

Base Rate: The annual four-digit industry transition rate for the treated earnings range in 2005 was 3.6 %.

Note: See the Figure 5 note.

Figure 5: DiD Estimates for *Overall Job-to-Job Transitions*

Panel A. Baseline and Individual Controls

Panel B. Individual and Time-Varying Controls

Base Rate: The annual job-to-job transition rate for the treated earnings range in 2005 was 16.0 %.

Note: Figures 4 and 5 plot the estimated coefficients on the interaction between starting an employment spell in year \( n \) and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the \( b_6 \) coefficients in equation 1). The outcome variable for Figure 4 is an indicator variable for an annual job transition between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. The outcome variable for Figure 5 is an indicator variable for any annual job-to-job transition. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.2 represents a 0.2 percentage point increase in the annual probability of transitioning. Standard errors are clustered at the earnings percentile level. The baseline controls include year fixed effects, two-digit industry by white/blue-collar fixed effects, and earnings percentile fixed effects. The individual controls add experience by white/blue-collar fixed effects, age by gender fixed effects, Bundesland fixed effects, tenure controls that vary by treatment, and spell starting month fixed effects that vary by treatment. The time-varying controls add two-digit industry by white/blue-collar by year fixed effects, Bundesland by year fixed effects, and annual GDP growth rates interacted with treatment.
Figure 6: Job Transition Heterogeneity: Transition Type and Unemployment Durations

Panel A. Within- versus Across-Industry Transitions

Annual Job Transition Rate ($\times 100$)

Panel B. Within-Industry Trans by UE Duration

Annual Within-Industry Transition Rate ($\times 100$)

Base Rates: The base rates for the treated earnings range in 2005 were: four-digit industry transitions = 3.6 %, other within-industry transitions = 0.7 %, within-industry EE transitions = 0.4 %, and within-industry EUE (7+ months) transitions = 0.4 %.

Note: This figure plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the $\delta_m$ coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The different colored estimates are from separate specifications with different outcome variables. The Pre-Trends estimates are for spell starting years from 2000-2004 and the Treatment estimates for spell starting years from 2006-2010. The four-digit industry transition is an indicator variable for an annual job transition between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. The other within-industry transitions are transitions within the same coarse-industry but not the same four-digit industry. The across-industry transitions are transitions between two firms in different coarse industries. The outcomes in Panel B. split up within-four-digit industry transitions based on the duration of unemployment between jobs. Since job transitions with only non-unemployment between jobs are excluded, the base rates will not add up to the total within-industry job transition rate. Standard errors are clustered at the earnings percentile level. These estimates are from the baseline control specification. See Table A1 and A2 for the estimates from the other specifications.
Figure 7: Within-Industry Job Transition Heterogeneity by Industry

Note: This figure plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the 2006-2010 $\delta_m$ coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2) estimated separately for different coarse industry groups. I do not present results for smaller industry groups that yield noisy results. These include agriculture, mining, electricity and gas, water, and sewage, activities of households as employers, and extraterritorial organizations. The within-industry transition outcome is an indicator variable for an annual job transition between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. Standard errors clustered at the earnings percentile level. These estimates are from the baseline control specification.

Figure 8: Job Transitions to Higher- versus Lower-Quality Firms

Note: This figure plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the 2006-2010 $\delta_m$ coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2) estimated separately for job transitions to higher- versus lower-quality firm outcome variables. Firm quality measures are normalized so that positive changes are “better” (for the firm’s hire rate from unemployment, churn rate, and separation to unemployment rate, a transition to a firm with a lower rate indicates a transition to a higher-quality firm). See Section 4 for the quality measure definitions and Section 7 for the outcome variable definition. Although overall job-to-job transitions should be the sum of transitions to higher- and lower-quality firms, this equality does not hold in the data because firm quality measures are missing for some firms. These estimates are from the baseline control specification. Standard errors are clustered at the earnings percentile level.
Figure 9: Job Transitions by Earnings Changes: Overall Job-to-Job Transitions

Panel A. Earnings Increases

Panel B. Earnings Decreases

Job Transition Rate with Earnings Increases (× 100)

Note: See the Figure 10 note.

Figure 10: Job Transitions by Earnings Changes: Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions

Panel A. Earnings Increases

Panel B. Earnings Decreases

Within-Industry Transition Rate with Earnings Increases (× 100)

Note: Figures 9 and 10 plot the estimated coefficients on the interaction between starting an employment spell in year \( n \) and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the \( \delta_n \) coefficients in equation 1). The outcome variables in the left panels (right panels) are indicators for job transitions with earnings increases (decreases) defined by equation 4. Figure 9 considers overall annual job-to-job transitions and Figure 10 considers annual job transitions between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.2 represents a 0.2 percentage point increase in the annual probability of transitioning with an earnings increase or decrease. Standard errors are clustered at the earnings percentile level. The individual controls include year fixed effects, two-digit industry by white/blue-collar fixed effects, earnings percentile fixed effects, experience by white/blue-collar fixed effects, age by gender fixed effects, Bundesland fixed effects, tenure controls that vary by treatment, and spell starting month fixed effects that vary by treatment. The time-varying controls add two-digit industry by white/blue-collar by year fixed effects, Bundesland by year fixed effects, and annual GDP growth rates interacted with the treatment indicator.
Figure 11: DiD Estimates for Individual Log Earnings Differences

Panel A. Overall Earnings Differences

Panel B. Earnings Differences for Stayers

Base Rate: The \( \ln \) earnings diff base rate for the treated earnings range in 2005 was 3.2 overall and 4.3 for job stayers.

Note: Figure 11 plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction between starting an employment spell in year \( n \) and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the \( \delta_n \) coefficients in equation 1). The outcome variable is the annual change in employees’ log earnings from their primary employer defined in Section 4. The left panel includes all employees with a non-missing earnings change and the right panel restricts the sample to job stayers. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.5 is approximately a half percentage point increase in the annual earnings growth rate. Standard errors clustered at the earnings percentile level. See the Figure 10 note for a description of the controls.

Figure 12: Benchmarking the Magnitude of the Job Mobility Effects


Note: The blue bars in Panel A plot the annual job transition base rates for the treated earnings range in 2005. The red bars in Panel A add the treatment-on-treated estimates implied by the reduced-form point estimates (Columns (3) and (6) in Table 2) and the pre-reform prevalence of 0.33 (i.e., the reduced-form estimate divided by the first stage) to the base rates. I assume that the first stage is known with certainty so that the standard errors scale linearly. Panel B. plots the annual job-to-job transition rate over time with the main analysis’s sample restrictions for the treated earnings range (red) and the control earnings range (blue). The job mobility rate for the control range is rescaled to be equal to the treated rate in 2000. The black lines plot the implied effects of my reduced-form estimates of the impact of the noncompete ban on overall job transitions on the annual rate. The effect size increases over time because a larger share of employees is eligible each year following 2005. The solid (dashed) black line plots the point estimate (confidence intervals).
### Table 1: Treatment and Control Summary Statistics
#### 2005 with Tenure Restriction (≤ 5 Years)

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churn Rate</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire from UE Share</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Log Monthly Earnings</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Base Rates (Scaled by 100)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job-to-Job Transition Rate</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>36.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Four-Digit Industry</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>18.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Within Industry</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>16.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Earnings Change</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>19.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample Size</strong></td>
<td>274,615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table presents the average individual and firm characteristics for the main analysis sample in 2005 (one year before the reform was enacted). All of the sample restrictions in section 4 are used including the restriction that all individuals have less than or equal to five years of job tenure. The summary statistics are for observations with non-missing within four-digit industry job transitions. Experience is defined over the past 25 years. The within four-digit industry job transitions are annual job transitions between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. The other within-industry transitions are transitions within the same coarse-industry but not the same four-digit industry. The across-industry transitions are transitions between two firms in different coarse industries. See footnote 29 for some explanations why these transition rates are higher than other estimates of job transition rates in Austria. The firm characteristics are all lagged ten-year moving averages that do not include the current year. The **Separation to UE Rate** is the annual probability of separating from the firm to unemployment. The **Churn Rate** is defined as the annual number of separations plus hires divided by total employees (by definition it is between 0 and 2). The **Hire from UE Share** is the share of all new hires that were from unemployment rather than other firms. Consistent with a right-skewed firm size distribution, the median firm-size is 37 employees for the treated earnings range and 50 employees for the control earnings range.
### Table 2: Pooled DiD Estimates – Within-Industry and Overall Job-to-Job Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Transition Type:</th>
<th>Within Four-Digit Industry</th>
<th>Overall Job-to-Job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’95-'99</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’00-'04</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’06-'10</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’11-'13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>8,625,616</td>
<td>8,353,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table presents the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the $\delta_m$ coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The outcome variable for the left three columns is an indicator for an annual job transition between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry and for the right three columns it is an indicator for any job-to-job transition. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.2 represents a 0.2 percentage point increase in the annual probability of transitioning. Standard errors clustered at the earnings percentile level. The baseline controls include year fixed effects, two-digit industry by white/blue-collar fixed effects, and earnings percentile fixed effects. The individual controls add experience by white/blue-collar fixed effects, age by gender fixed effects, Bundesland fixed effects, tenure controls that vary by treatment, and spell starting month fixed effects that vary by treatment. The time-varying controls add two-digit industry by white/blue-collar by year fixed effects, Bundesland by year fixed effects, and annual GDP growth rates interacted with treatment.

### Table 3: Pooled DiD Estimates – Job Transitions with Earnings Increases versus Decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Transition Type:</th>
<th>Overall Job-to-Job</th>
<th>Within Four-Digit Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition Condition:</td>
<td>Earnings Increase</td>
<td>Earnings Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’95-'99</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’00-'03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’06-'10</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × ’11-'13</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7,732,960</td>
<td>7,732,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The specification, controls, and clustering are described in the Table 2 note. The spell starting year groups are different than the other pooled specifications and are [1995 – 1999], [2000 – 2003], [2005], [2006 – 2010], and [2011 – 2013]. I do not report the coefficient for 2005 but the annual estimates are presented in Figures 9 and 10. The outcome variables for the Earnings Increase (Decrease) columns are indicators for job transitions with earnings increases (decreases) defined by equation 4. The first four columns include overall annual job-to-job transitions and the last four columns include within-industry transitions. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.2 represents a 0.2 percentage point increase in the annual probability of transitioning with an earnings increase.
Table 4: Pooled DiD Estimates – One-Year Log Earnings Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Restriction:</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Job Stayers</th>
<th>All Males</th>
<th>Male Stayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2)</td>
<td>(3) (4)</td>
<td>(5) (6)</td>
<td>(7) (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '95-'99</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.14 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '00-'04</td>
<td>0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '06-'10</td>
<td>0.02 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.15 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '11-'13</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7,732,960</td>
<td>7,732,920</td>
<td>5,676,424</td>
<td>5,676,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base Rates: The one-year log earnings difference base rate for the treated earnings range in 2005 was 3.2 for the full sample, 4.3 for job stayers, 4.2 for all males, and 4.5 for male job stayers.

Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the \( \delta_m \) coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The outcome variable is individual-level, one-year log earnings changes. The first two columns present results for the full sample. The third and fourth columns restrict the sample to job stayers. The last four columns restrict the sample to only males. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.5 is approximately a half percentage point increase in the annual earnings growth rate. The baseline controls include year fixed effects, two-digit industry by white/blue-collar fixed effects, and earnings percentile fixed effects. The individual controls add experience by white/blue-collar fixed effects, age by gender fixed effects, Bundesland fixed effects, tenure controls that vary by treatment, and spell starting month fixed effects that vary by treatment. The time-varying controls add two-digit industry by white/blue-collar by year fixed effects, Bundesland by year fixed effects, and annual GDP growth rates interacted with treatment.

Table 5: Pooled DiD Estimates – Longer Time Horizon Earnings Log Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earnings Log Diff Horizon:</th>
<th>1-Yr</th>
<th>2-Yr</th>
<th>3-Yr</th>
<th>4-Yr</th>
<th>5-Yr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '06-'10</td>
<td>0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7,732,960</td>
<td>7,337,307</td>
<td>6,990,233</td>
<td>6,606,076</td>
<td>6,149,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earnings Log Diff Horizon:</th>
<th>1-Yr</th>
<th>2-Yr</th>
<th>3-Yr</th>
<th>4-Yr</th>
<th>5-Yr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '06-'10</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7,732,920</td>
<td>7,337,266</td>
<td>6,990,191</td>
<td>6,606,038</td>
<td>6,149,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the \( \delta_m \) coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.5 is approximately a half percentage point increase in the annual earnings growth rate. Standard errors clustered at the earnings percentile level. The individual controls include year fixed effects, two-digit industry by white/blue-collar fixed effects, earnings percentile fixed effects, experience by white/blue-collar fixed effects, age by gender fixed effects, Bundesland fixed effects, tenure controls that vary by treatment, and spell starting month fixed effects that vary by treatment. The time-varying controls add two-digit industry by white/blue-collar by year fixed effects, Bundesland by year fixed effects, and annual GDP growth rates interacted with the treatment indicator.
A Appendix Figures

Figure A1: Manipulation Test – Density of Employment Spells by Starting Monthly Earnings


Note: This figure plots the density of employment spells by employees’ earnings at the start of the spell. To capture starting earnings, the sample is restricted to individuals with one year of job tenure (i.e., the first observation of each individual by firm combination). The left panel plots the density for spells starting in 2004-2005 (pre-reform spells) while the right panel plots the density for spells starting in 2006-2007 (post-reform spells). A McCrary (2008) test around the threshold yields a t stat of -1.17 for treated spells starting in 2006-2007 (i.e., the t test from testing whether the density of spells is discontinuous from just above versus just below the earnings cutoff). If firms manipulated workers’ earnings to avoid the ban, we would expect bunching just above the threshold (e.g., a positive and significant t stat).

Figure A2: Manipulation Test – Predicted Outcomes by Starting Monthly Earnings

Panel A. Predicted Job-to-Job Transition Rate     Panel B. Predicted One-Year Log Earnings Difference

Note: This figure plots the average predicted job transition rate and log earnings difference for employment spells unaffected by the ban (2004-2005) and employment spells that started right after the ban (2006-2007). The sample is restricted to employees with one year of job tenure. The variables used in the prediction model include experience by female FEs, age by female FEs, earnings percentile by white/blue-collar by female FEs, and region by white/blue-collar by female FEs. The prediction model was estimated on pre-reform employment spells that started from 2002-2005. The predicted means are different than those presented in Table 1 because the sample for this analysis is restricted to individuals with one year of job tenure.
Figure A3: Job Mobility DiD Estimates – “Donut-Hole” Robustness

Panel A. Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions

Panel B. Overall Job-to-Job Transitions

Note: Figures A3 and A4 plot the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the $\delta_m$ coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The Pre-Trends estimates are the coefficient on spell starting years from 2000-2004 and the Treatment estimates are the coefficient on spell starting years from 2006-2010. The outcome variable for Panel A is an indicator variable for an annual job transition between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. The outcome variable for Panel B is an indicator variable for an annual job-to-job transition. These estimates are from the time-varying control specification. Standard errors are clustered at the earnings percentile level. Figure A3 uses an overall bandwidth of 25% but varies the bandwidth around the earnings threshold that is excluded from the sample. For example, the 10% donut-hole specification includes employees earning between 75 and 90% of the threshold in the treated group and employees earning between 110% and 125% of the threshold in the control group. Figure A4 varies the bandwidth around the noncompete earnings threshold from 5% to 50%. A bandwidth of 25% indicates that all observations with earnings between 75% and 125% of the threshold are included in the sample.

Figure A4: Job Mobility DiD Estimates – Bandwidth Robustness

Panel A. Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions

Panel B. Overall Job-to-Job Transitions

Note: See Figure A3 note.
Figure A5: Job Mobility DiD Estimates – “Full Sample” Robustness

Panel A. Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions

Panel B. Overall Job-to-Job Transitions

Note: This figure presents the same estimates as Panel B in Figures 4 and 5 with two differences. First, the sample is no longer restricted to individuals with less than or equal to five years of job tenure. Consequently, I now also include employment spells starting in 2014 and 2015. Second, to account for the fact that job tenure is now mechanically different across spell starting year cohorts, all specifications include parametric controls for job tenure (linear, cubic, quadratic, and indicators for one and two years of tenure) interacted with being in the treated earnings range. To identify the collinear tenure, year, and spell starting year effects, I restrict the job tenure profile to be flat after 15 years. This is also a common solution to canonical age, time, and cohort effects collinearity problem (see e.g., Card et al. (2013)).

Figure A6: Summary Robustness Figure – “Full Sample” Robustness

Note: This figure presents the papers’ main results (Main Estimates) and the same results including the “full-sample” of job tenure observations (Full-Sample Robustness). The full-sample robustness results include the same changes as described in the Figure A5 note. The main Job Trans Types estimates match the results in Tables 2 and A1. The main Trans by Earnings estimates match the results in Table 3. The main Earnings Changes estimates match the results in Tables 4 and 5. The Baseline results include the baseline controls and the Time-Varying results include the time-varying controls.
Figure A7: Job Mobility DiD Estimates – “Total Earnings” Robustness

Panel A. Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions

Panel B. Overall Job-to-Job Transitions

Note: This figure presents the same estimates as Panel B in Figures 4 and 5 except that individuals’ total annual earnings are used to define their treatment status instead of just their salaries. See Section G.2 for more details on the differences in these earnings concepts and how they relate to the legal earnings threshold. The change in earnings concept affects who is included in the treated and control earnings groups and affects the earnings percentiles used as controls.

Figure A8: Summary Robustness Figure – “Total Earnings” Robustness

Note: This figure presents the papers’ main results (Main Estimates) and the same results defining treatment based on individuals’ total earnings (Total Earnings Robustness). The total earnings robustness results include the same changes as described in the Figure A7 note. The main Job Trans Types estimates match the results in Tables 2 and A1. The main Trans by Earnings estimates match the results in Table 3. The main Earnings Changes estimates match the results in Tables 4 and 5. The Baseline results include the baseline controls and the Time-Varying results include the time-varying controls.
Figure A9: Job Mobility DiD Estimates – “Earnings Percentile Controls” Robustness

Panel A. Within Four-Digit Industry Job Transitions

Note: This figure presents the same estimates as in Figures 4 and 5 except that the individual earnings percentile fixed effects are excluded from both specifications. I present the baseline and time-varying specifications, and not the individual-control specification because the baseline specification is the one that is affected by omitting these controls.

Figure A10: Summary Robustness Figure – “Earnings Percentile Controls” Robustness

Note: This figure presents the papers’ main results (Main Estimates) and the same results excluding individual earnings percentile fixed effects from the controls (‘Earnings Percentile Controls’). The main Job Trans Types estimates match the results in Tables 2 and A1. The main Trans by Earnings estimates match the results in Table 3. The main Earnings Changes estimates match the results in Tables 4 and 5. The Baseline results include the baseline controls and the Time-Varying results include the time-varying controls.
Figure A11: Earnings Change DiD Estimates – “Donut-Hole” Robustness

Panel A. Overall Earnings Differences

Panel B. Earnings Differences for Stayers

Note: Figure A11 plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the \( \delta_m \) coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The Pre-Trends estimates are the coefficient on spell starting years from 2000-2004 and the Treatment estimates are the coefficient on spell starting years from 2006-2010. The outcome variable in the annual change in employees’ log earnings from their primary employer defined in Section 4. The left panel includes all employees with a non-missing earnings change and the right panel restricts the sample to job stayers. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.5 is approximately a half percentage point increase in the annual earnings growth rate. These estimates are from the time-varying control specification. Standard errors are clustered at the earnings percentile level. The figure uses an overall bandwidth of 25% but varies the bandwidth around the earnings threshold that is excluded from the sample. For example, the 10% donut-hole specification includes employees earning between 75 and 90% of the threshold in the treated group and employees earning between 110% and 125% of the threshold in the control group.

Figure A12: Wage Profiles for Treated and Untreated Employment Spells

Note: This figure plots the average log nominal monthly earnings for individuals starting a ban eligible (earnings under the threshold) and ban ineligible (earnings above the threshold) employment spell from 2004-2005 and from 2005-2006. It only includes employees whose earnings their first year of employment were between 75% and 125% of the earnings threshold. It follows these employees over the next five years regardless of whether or not they move employers (e.g., an individual starting a job in 2006 under the threshold will be in the Ban Eligible (2006-2007 Spells) category even if she later earns above the earnings threshold).
Table A1: Job-to-Job Transition Heterogeneity: Within- versus Across-Industry Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Transition Type:</th>
<th>Within 4-Digit Industry</th>
<th>Other Within-Industry</th>
<th>Across-Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '95-'99</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '00-'04</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '06-'10</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '11-'13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations (1,000s)</td>
<td>8.626</td>
<td>8.354</td>
<td>8.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the $\delta_m$ coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The outcome variable for the left three columns is an indicator variable for an annual job transition between two firms in the same four-digit NACE industry. The outcome variable for the next three columns is an indicator variable for transitions within the same coarse-industry but not the same four-digit industry. The outcome variable for the last three columns is an indicator variable for transitions between two firms in different coarse industries. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.2 represents a 0.2 percentage point increase in the annual probability of transitioning. Standard errors clustered at the earnings percentile level. The baseline controls include year fixed effects, two-digit industry by white/blue-collar fixed effects, and earnings percentile fixed effects. The individual controls add experience by white/blue-collar fixed effects, age by gender fixed effects, Bundesland fixed effects, tenure controls that vary by treatment, and spell starting month fixed effects that vary by treatment. The time-varying controls add two-digit industry by white/blue-collar by year fixed effects, Bundesland by year fixed effects, and annual GDP growth rates interacted with treatment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Transition Type:</th>
<th>EE Trans</th>
<th>EUE Trans (1-3 months)</th>
<th>EUE Trans (4-6 months)</th>
<th>EUE Trans (7+ Months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '95-'99</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '00-'04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '06-'10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '11-'13</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>8625616</td>
<td>8353564</td>
<td>8353525</td>
<td>8625616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the spell starting year groups and having contemporaneous earnings in the treated range (the $\delta_m$ coefficients from the pooled specification in equation 2). The outcome variables split up within four-digit industry transitions based on the duration of unemployment between jobs. For example, an EUE Transition (4-6 months) means that an employee transitioned between two jobs in the same industry but spent 4-6 months unemployed between the jobs. For EUE transitions with 7+ months of unemployment, the individual must be employed at each of the two firms for at least one month in two consecutive years. Transitions with intermediate spells of nonemployment that do not include any unemployment are excluded because they may include labor market states that are more similar to employment (e.g., self-employment or minor employment). A spell that includes both unemployment and other types of nonemployment between jobs, however, is included. For example, a job-to-job transition with three months of unemployment and then three months of self-employment between jobs would be classified as an EUE 4-6 month transition. The outcome variables are scaled by 100 so a coefficient estimate of 0.2 represents a 0.2 percentage point increase in the annual probability of transitioning. Standard errors clustered at the earnings percentile level. The baseline controls include year fixed effects, two-digit industry by white/blue-collar fixed effects, and earnings percentile fixed effects. The individual controls add experience by white/blue-collar fixed effects, age by gender fixed effects, Bundesland fixed effects, tenure controls that vary by treatment, and spell starting month fixed effects that vary by treatment. The time-varying controls add two-digit industry by white/blue-collar by year fixed effects, Bundesland by year fixed effects, and annual GDP growth rates interacted with treatment.
Table A3: Pooled DiD Estimates – Job Transitions by Earnings Quantile Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Transition Type:</th>
<th>Overall Job-to-Job</th>
<th>Within Four-Digit Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earnings Increase</td>
<td>Earnings Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '95-'99</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '00-'03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '06-'10</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '11-'13</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This figure presents the same estimates as in Table 3 except that the earnings transitions are classified based on individuals’ earnings quartiles rather than nominal earnings changes. Specifically, I define the outcome variable based on 2000 year-specific earnings quantiles:

\[ Y_{it} = 100 \times 1 \left[ j(i, t + 1) \neq j(i, t) \text{ AND } \text{earn}_{qnt_{i,t+1}} > \text{earn}_{qnt_{i,t}} \right]. \]

Defining the transitions based on earnings quantile changes accounts for the fact that individuals may have experienced earnings growth regardless of whether or not they switched jobs.

Table A4: Pooled DiD Estimates – One-Year Log Earnings Difference Robustness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earnings Concept:</th>
<th>Total Earnings</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Winsorized Earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '95-'99</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '00-'04</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '06-'10</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × '11-'13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This figure presents the same estimates as in Table 4 with two different earnings concepts as the outcome variables. The outcome variables are different measures of individual-level, one-year log earnings differences. The first two columns present results for total earnings. The third and fourth columns use only individuals’ salaries (i.e., excluding special payments and bonuses). The fifth and sixth columns winsorize total earnings differences at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
C Interpretation of the First Differenced Earnings Regressions

Conceptually, the results estimating the effect of noncompetes on workers’ overall wage growth (e.g., Figure 11 and Tables 4 and 5) are similar to results from estimating the following regression

\[ 100 \times \left( \ln(w_{i,t+1}) - \ln(w_{i,t}) \right) = \beta \cdot T_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \]  

(A1)

Here \( T_{i,t} \) is an indicator for whether an individual \( i \) at time \( t \) had a noncompete in her employment contract. In my analysis, treatment is instead an indicator for noncompete eligibility but the interpretation remains the same if the estimate is properly scaled by the effect of eligibility on the actual use of noncompetes (i.e., the first stage). The estimated treatment effect \( \beta \) is consequently the effect of having a noncompete at time \( t \) on workers’ earnings growth from time \( t \) to \( t + 1 \). To quantitatively interpret \( \beta \), note that log-differenced earnings approximate earnings percent changes

\[ 100 \times \left( \ln(w_{i,t+1}) - \ln(w_{i,t}) \right) \approx 100 \times \frac{w_{i,t+1} - w_{i,t}}{w_{i,t}} \]  

(A2)

Consequently, a one-unit increase in \( \beta \) represents a one percentage point increase in the annual earnings growth rate. For example, a coefficient of 0.5 in Table 4 would represent a 0.5 percentage point increase in annual earnings growth.

To see why this specification captures the effect of noncompetes on workers’ earnings growth rather than starting earnings, imagine that noncompetes also linearly affect workers’ starting level of earnings. Assuming that within each employment spell individuals’ noncompete treatment does not change, this effect would be differenced out because it would affect both \( \ln(w_{i,t+1}) \) and \( \ln(w_{i,t}) \) the same. There are, however, two reasons why an individuals’ noncompete status might change between periods \( t \) and \( t + 1 \). First, the employee might change jobs. But by focusing on job-stayers in Figure 11, the original interpretation is preserved. Second, in my analysis, \( T_{i,t} \) represents noncompete eligibility. While working for the same employer, an employees’ noncompete eligibility could change (e.g., if at the start of their employment they earned below the earnings threshold but their earnings then increased to above the threshold). In this case, \( \beta \) would also pick up some of the effect of noncompetes on workers’ earnings levels. However, these cases seem sufficiently rare that they likely do not affect the interpretation of \( \beta \) as capturing the effect of noncompetes on workers’ earnings growth rather than any effect of noncompetes on the level of earnings.

D Overall Job Transition Effect Decomposition

The purpose of this decomposition is to decompose how large of an impact a noncompete ban would have on overall job-to-job mobility depending on (1) the share of workers who had a noncompete before the ban, (2) the share of workers’ job transitions that were restricted by noncompetes before the ban, and (3) the effect of a noncompete on the transitions that were restricted by the ban. Let the overall average job transition rate for a group of workers be \( \text{E} \left[ Y_i | X_i \right] \) where \( X \in \{T,C\} \) is an indicator for whether the workers were treated by a noncompete ban, \( T \), or not treated \( C \).

Some workers have noncompetes when not treated and other workers do not so average job

\[ ^{55} \text{Note that if noncompetes increased workers’ starting earnings, this would actually increase the earnings growth for workers with } T_{i,t} = 0 \text{ because I measure earnings changes from time } t \text{ to } t + 1 \text{ and only workers with } T_{i,t} = 0 \text{ can go from not having a noncompete to having a noncompete.} \]

\[ ^{56} \text{Note, that here treatment and control are different than the treated and control earnings ranges used in the paper’s main analysis. Instead, it is clearer to think of control workers as the workers below the earnings limit before the ban was enacted and treated workers as workers below the earnings limit after the ban was enacted.} \]
mobility is equal to the following where \( NC = 1 \) indicates having a noncompete when not treated

\[
E[Y_i|X_i] = E[Y_i|X_i, NC_i = 1] \times Pr(NC_i = 1) + E[Y_i|X_i, NC_i = 0] \times Pr(NC_i = 0) \tag{A3}
\]

I assume that the noncompete ban only affects workers who would have had noncompetes absent the ban (i.e., \( E[Y_i|X_i, NC_i = 0] \) does not depend on \( X_i \)). This assumption rules out GE effects that might spill over from the workers with noncompetes to workers without noncompetes.

The quantity of interest is the percent change in the job transition rate between the treated and control groups which we can rearrange as follows

\[
\frac{E[Y_i|T_i] - E[Y_i|C_i]}{E[Y_i|C_i]} = Pr(NC_i = 1) \times \frac{E[Y_i|T_i, NC_i = 1] - E[Y_i|C_i, NC_i = 1]}{E[Y_i|C_i]} + Pr(NC_i = 0) \times \frac{E[Y_i|T_i, NC_i = 0] - E[Y_i|C_i, NC_i = 0]}{E[Y_i|C_i]} \tag{A4}
\]

\[
= 0 \text{ by assumption} \tag{A5}
\]

Additionally, not all job transitions might be affected by noncompetes. Let \( Y_i = Y_i^A + Y_i^U \) where \( Y_i^A \) are affected job transitions (e.g., within-industry transitions) and \( Y_i^U \) are unaffected transitions (e.g., across-industry transitions). By assumption, \( E[Y_i^U|T_i, NC_i = 1] = E[Y_i^U|C_i, NC_i = 1] \) since the noncompete ban doesn’t have an effect on unaffected transitions. Plugging \( Y_i = Y_i^A + Y_i^U \) into equation A4 yields

\[
\frac{E[Y_i|T_i] - E[Y_i|C_i]}{E[Y_i|C_i]} = Pr(NC_i = 1) \times \frac{E[Y_i^A|T_i, NC_i = 1] - E[Y_i^A|C_i, NC_i = 1]}{E[Y_i^A|C_i]} \tag{A6}
\]

\[
= Pr(NC_i = 1) \times \frac{E[Y_i^A|C_i]}{E[Y_i^A|C_i]} \times \frac{E[Y_i^A|T_i, NC_i = 1] - E[Y_i^A|C_i, NC_i = 1]}{E[Y_i^A|C_i]} \tag{A7}
\]

\[
= \frac{\text{Share Workers w/ Noncompetes}}{33\%} \times \frac{\text{% Transitions Restricted}}{22\%} \times \frac{\text{% ToT on Restricted Transitions}}{20\%} = 1.5\% \tag{A8}
\]

The terms in equation A7 correspond to the terms in equation 6 where

- \( Pr(NC_i = 1) \) = the share of workers with a noncompete when they are not banned.

- \( \frac{E[Y_i^A|C_i]}{E[Y_i^A|C_i]} \) = the share of workers’ job transitions that are restricted by a noncompete. In this context, it is the share of all job transitions that are within the same four-digit industries because it was difficult for noncompetes to legally prevent broader transitions.

- \( \frac{E[Y_i^A|T_i, NC_i = 1] - E[Y_i^A|C_i, NC_i = 1]}{E[Y_i^A|C_i]} \) = the percentage treatment effect on affected job transitions. In this context, it is the effect of the reform on within-industry job transitions scaled by the estimated pre-reform prevalence of noncompetes.

Note, the 1.5 percent increase is slightly smaller than the headline estimate of two percent because it extrapolates from the within-industry job transition point estimate rather than the overall job transition point estimate.
E Institutional Details of the 2006 Reform

In this section, I describe the political process leading up to the 2006 noncompete ban. The analysis is based on searching for “Konkurrenzklausel(n)” in the legislative records provided by the Austrian Parliament, the Archive of Austrian Press Releases by the Austrian Press Agency (APA-OTS), and Wiso-Net from 2000-2020. There are two main takeaways from this analysis relevant for the interpretation of my empirical results.

1. Before May 2005 (10 months before the bill was enacted), there was no public discussion of the noncompete ban. Between May 2005 and March 2006, however, the legislative debate about noncompetes was covered by newspapers. Additionally, the eventual earnings limit was not proposed until Nov 2005. Consequently, while some anticipatory behavior by employers between May 2005 and March 2006 is possible (e.g., employers stopping putting noncompetes in employees’ contracts), any anticipatory behavior before that window is unlikely.

2. The reform’s exact earnings cutoff appears to have been agreed upon through a fairly idiosyncratic negotiation process (e.g., the proposed limits ranged from €324 to €3,600 per month) and the limit was unrelated to other policy discussions. This provides reassurance that the limit was chosen somewhat randomly and not based on (future) mobility changes for workers above and below the limit.

The first legislation concerning noncompetes in Austria was passed in 1921 and banned noncompetes for workers earning less than 120,000 Kronen and for restrictions beyond an employees’ current “line of business.” The nominal limit of 120,000 Kronen (soon converted into a Shillings limit), however, was quickly eaten away by inflation rendering it effectively non-existent. With the introduction of the Euro in 2002, the earnings limit was removed from the legislation.

In 2003, the opposition party, the Social Democrats Austria (SPÖ), introduced a bill to parliament that would completely ban noncompetes in employment contracts. The justification in the bill was that noncompetes impede workers’ job mobility and that they were increasingly used for low-wage workers including workers in tourism, hospitality, and seasonal workers.

In May 2005, the governing Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) introduced a bill countering the SPÖ’s proposal that would only ban noncompetes for “marginal employment” (earning less than €324/month). In response, the SPÖ and the Chamber of Labor launched a public campaign arguing for the complete abolition of noncompetes (Zeitung, 2005). Over the next few months, major newspapers start covering the prevalence of noncompetes and the ongoing political debate (Vavra, 2005; Meickl, 2005; Presse, 2005).

During this debate Christoph Klein of the Chamber of Labor suggested that the earnings limit should be €3,000/month (Nachtichten, 2005).

In November of 2005, a coalition of parties amended the ÖVP’s bill to set the threshold for banning noncompetes to €2,048 per month (the final 17/30ths of the social security maximum that eventually passed). At the time, however, there was still a push from other parties and the Chamber of Labor to include a higher limit (e.g., Karl Öllinger argued that the limit should instead be €3,600 per month (Marschall, 2005)). On March 1st 2006, the bill passed and went into effect on March 17th for white-collar workers and on March 18th for blue-collar workers.

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57 See Angestelltengesetz Art. 1 §36 in effect from 1921-2001.
58 See Angestelltengesetz Art. 1 §36 in effect from 2002-2006.
59 Relatedly, a report from the Parliamentary Committee on Labor and Social Affairs observed that “noncompete clauses are agreed not only among highly skilled and well-educated workers, but to an increasing extent also among poorly educated and low-income workers” and that these agreements “impose disproportionate impediments on workers’ mobility” (Walch and Silhavy, 2005).
60 Prior to 2005, I did not find any major newspaper articles concerning noncompetes or covering the legislative debate.
61 See page 302 of the parliamentary records from December 2005 for a discussion of this negotiation.
F Earnings Effects from Increased Transitions Power Calc.

For this power calculation, I am interested in understanding how large of an impact on overall wage growth can result from just increasing job-to-job transitions (potentially with earnings increases). Let individual $i$ at time $t$ have a wage $w_{i,t}$. The overall treatment effect on wage growth that I estimate is the difference between average wage growth for treated workers and control workers

$$ \text{Earnings Treatment Effect} = E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|T] - E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|C]. $$  \hfill (A9)

To help decompose changes in earnings growth from job movers versus job stayers, we can classify individuals as always stayers, always movers, and complier movers. Always stayers do not move jobs regardless of the noncompete policy. Always movers move jobs regardless of the noncompete policy. Complier movers only move jobs when noncompetes are banned. With these classifications, overall wage growth for group $X \in \{T, C\}$ is equal to

$$ E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|X] = E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|X, \text{Always Stayer}] \times \Pr(\text{Always Stayer}) + $$

$$ E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|X, \text{Always Mover}] \times \Pr(\text{Always Mover}) + $$

$$ E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|X, \text{Complier Mover}] \times \Pr(\text{Complier Mover}) \hfill (A10-12) $$

For this power calculation, I assume that the noncompete ban only affects workers by increasing their propensity to switch jobs. This consequently affects the earnings growth of the complier movers because they get the earnings growth from moving to a new firm rather than staying at their original firm. This assumption implies that the earnings growth for stayers and for always movers is not affected by the policy change (i.e., $E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|X, \text{Always Stayer}]$ and $E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|X, \text{Always Mover}]$ do not depend on $X$).\footnote{I am assuming away the existence of defier movers who move jobs when noncompetes are allowed but do not move jobs when noncompetes are banned. Some general equilibrium effects (e.g., the crowding out of available spots at some firms) could result in defier movers.}

Under this assumption, the overall effect on earnings growth is

$$ E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|T] - E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|C] = \left( E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|T, \text{Complier}] - E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|C, \text{Complier}] \right) \times \Pr(\text{Complier}) \hfill (A13) $$

Consequently, to benchmark the effect on overall wage growth, we need estimates of the difference in wage growth for compliers under treatment and control and of the share of individuals who are compliers.

1. The share of individuals who are compliers is the estimated treatment effect of the policy on overall job-to-job transitions. I pick the estimate in Column (6) of Table 2 of 0.0027 (note the estimates in that table are scaled by 100). I also present estimates that assume this share is equal to the lower and upper confidence intervals of the same estimate (0.07 and 0.47 respectively).

2. I conservatively assume that $E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|C, \text{Complier}]$, the wage growth for the compliers if they stay in their same job, is equal to zero. This is empirically false but will overestimate how large of an effect job transitions will have on overall earnings growth. Instead, I could\footnote{Using counteroffers to increase your wages through on-the-job search would imply that $E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|X, \text{Always Stayer}]$ could be affected by treatment. Yet, Figure 11 does not find any detectable impact on stayers’ wages. It is also possible that treatment would affect the entire distribution of wage changes for movers (e.g., if workers would have transitioned across industries before the ban but now can transition to a better job in their same industry). Yet, Figure 6 and Table A1 do not provide strong evidence of a decrease in across-industry job transitions which we might expect if this were the case.}
assume that $E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|\mathcal{C}, \text{Complier}]$ is equal to the average earnings growth for job stayers after the reform.

3. I vary $E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|T, \text{Complier}]$ between 0 and 0.5 where 0.5 implies that all marginal movers increase their log earnings by 0.5 when they move jobs which is roughly a 65% increase in earnings. This is more than an order of magnitude larger than the average earnings increases experienced by job switchers.

For the compliers’ earnings changes under control and treatment, I assume there is no uncertainty so that the only uncertainty in the overall earnings effect is from the estimate on the effect on job-to-job transitions.

Figure A13 presents the overall earnings effects implied by Equation A13 for different values of $E[\Delta \ln(w_{i,t})|T, \text{Complier}]$ and the point estimate and confidence intervals for $\text{Pr} (\text{Complier})$. The solid red line plots the implied overall earnings effect using the $\text{Pr} (\text{Complier})$ point estimate in Table 2, Column (6). The two dashed red lines use the confidence intervals for that point estimate. The horizontal dashed black line is the upper bound of the confidence interval of the estimated overall earnings effect in Table 4. Consequently, comparing the red and black lines tells us for what values of earnings growth for the marginal job movers, would the implied effect from the estimated increase in job transitions be above the confidence interval for the estimated overall effect on earnings.

Figure A13 shows that the earnings changes for job switchers would need implausibly large such that the effect just from increased job transitions would show up in the effect on overall earnings growth. Using the point estimate for the effect on job transitions (the solid red line) the average earnings log difference for these induced job transitions would need to be almost 0.4 or almost a 50% increase in earnings for the effect to be outside the estimated confidence interval for overall earnings growth. Even using the upper bound of the estimated effect on job transitions (the upper dashed red line) the average earnings log difference for the induced job transitions would need to be above 0.2 or a 22% increase in annual earnings. Overall, the figure helps reconcile why I find that the reform increased job transitions with earnings increases but that I find no detectable impact on overall average wage growth for the treated workers. The effect on job transitions is too small for it to have a significant impact on overall wage growth for plausible values of earnings changes for job switchers.
Figure A13: Effect of Job Transitions on Earnings Growth – *Power Calculation*

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**Note:** This figure presents a power calculation of how large of an impact on overall wage growth can result from just increasing job-to-job transitions estimated in Table 2. The y-axis plots the overall change in earnings for the treated versus control groups. The x-axis varies the change in earnings for *complier job movers* (e.g., the job movers who are induced to move jobs because of the noncompete ban). The solid red line plots the effect on overall earnings taking the point estimate from Table 2 of the effect on overall job transitions. The dashed red lines plot the effect instead using the upper and lower confidence interval values of the estimated job transition effect. The thicker dashed black line is the upper bound of the estimated effect on overall earnings growth from Table 4.
G Sample Construction Details

G.1 Creating Consistent Firm IDs Across Time

Firm IDs in the ASSD may change for administrative reasons without any economic rationale (Fink et al., 2010). In my context, this would create spurious job transitions and spurious new employment spells (e.g., if firm A changed its ID to B in 2006, it would look like there are many new employment contracts starting in 2006 when all workers would actually have the same employment contract as beforehand). To account for these ID changes, I use a “worker-flows approach” that follows similar approaches in Austria and Germany (see Fink et al. (2010) and Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013) respectively). Note that while I use this classification for all firms, they will be less precise for smaller firms (e.g., 3 out of 4 workers going to the same other firm is less strong evidence of an ID change than 300 out of 400). Specifically, I create a set of consistent firm IDs as follows:

1. For each year, I take each firms’ employees in December of that year.

2. For firm IDs that have employees one year, have no employees for at least one following year, and then appear again, I make a new firm ID for the second set of firm observations. The rationale here is that for classifying firm characteristics, the firm is likely very different when it reappears after a few years without employees (e.g., new management, new ownership, etc.).

3. Define the year of firm entry and exit as follows:

   (a) A firm (enters) exits in a given year if that year is the (first) last year the firm is observed with employment.

   (b) If a firm’s size increases by more than 20-fold (e.g., a firm that increases employment from 10 to 201 employees) and the firm entered in the previous five years, I also count the large increase as the year the firm entered. The reason is that there are observations of firm spin-offs or firm ID changes where first a few workers move to the new firm and then the ID changes. For example, in year \( t \), 3 employees move and in year \( t + 1 \), the remaining 2,000 workers move. If I classified the entry year as year \( t \), I would not then classify this transition as a firm ID change.

   (c) If a firm’s size decreases to less than 5% of previous employment and exits in the next five years, I count the year of the large decrease as the year of firm exit. The reason is similar to above (e.g., often a firm will reduce all of its employment in year \( t \) except for a few employees that leave the following year).

4. For each firm \( A \) in year \( t \), I classify all of the worker flows to the firm from year \( t - 1 \) to year \( t \) and the flows out of the firm from year \( t \) to year \( t + 1 \). For example, I classify what share of workers stayed at the firm, what share of workers exited the firm to other firms, and what share of the workers exited to nonemployment. I then further classify the largest share of workers who all exited to the same other firm each year. I calculate similar quantities for where worker flows came from each period.

5. Using the worker flows to and from each firm, I classify firm exits as follows:

   (a) **Continuing Firm:** Firm \( A \) does not exit.

   (b) **Firm Exit – Death:** Firm \( A \) exits. Less than 70% of its employees moved to the same firm.
(c) Firm Exit – ID Change: Firm A exits. More than 70% of its workers moved to firm B. Firm B entered in year $t+1$ and more than 70% of its workers came from Firm A.

(d) Firm Exit – Acquisition by New Firm: Firm A exits. More than 70% of its workers moved to firm B. Firm B entered in year $t+1$ but less than 70% of its workers came from Firm A.

(e) Firm Exit – Acquisition by Existing Firm: Firm A exits. More than 70% of its workers moved to firm B. Firm B did not enter in year $t+1$.

6. Using the worker flows to and from each firm, I classify firm entry as follows:

(a) Incumbent Firm: Firm A did not enter.

(b) Firm Entry – Natural: Firm A enters. Less than 70% of its employees came from the same firm.

(c) Firm Entry – ID Change: Firm A enters. More than 70% of its workers came from the same firm B. Firm B exited in year $t-1$ and more than 70% of its workers went to Firm A.

(d) Firm Entry – Spinoff from Exiting Firm: Firm A enters. More than 70% of its workers came from firm B. Firm B exited in year $t-1$ but less than 70% of its workers went to Firm A.

(e) Firm Entry – Spinoff from Continuing Firm: Firm A enters. More than 70% of its workers came from firm B. Firm B did not exit in year $t-1$.

7. If firm A has a Firm Exit – ID Change to firm B, the firm ID for B is replaced with A. These replacements are done chronologically so if $A \rightarrow B$ and then $B \rightarrow C$, then both firms B and C will have their firm IDs replaced with A. Note, I do not replace any firm IDs for acquisitions by new firms or existing firms. The rationale here is that the biggest motivation for changing the firm IDs is to figure out when switching from firm A to firm B would have actually resulted in a new employment contract (which determines eligibility for the noncompete ban). For an acquisition, it is plausible that the employees would need to sign a new employment contract. For the job transition outcomes, I exclude job transitions due to any of the above types of firm exits. So acquisitions will not create spurious job transitions as part of the outcome variables.

G.2 Mapping the ASSD Variables to the Treatment Definition

In this section, I describe how to map the earnings variables and spell-starting dates in the ASSD to the earnings concepts and contracts signing dates specified in the noncompete legislation.

Mapping the Earnings Concepts In the ASSD, I observe two earnings concepts: normal payments, bezug, and special payments, sonderzahlung. The earnings concepts correspond to different legal earnings concepts that are treated differently by the Social Security Act (Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz). The general distinction between the two types of payments is that bezug includes payments that are granted at the frequency of the contribution periods (e.g., at a monthly frequency). Sonderzahlung includes payments that are granted at a frequency that is longer than the contribution periods. The primary component of sonderzahlung is 13th and 14th monthly payments referred to as Christmas and holiday payments. These components are negotiated by the trade unions but are included in almost all collective bargaining agreements. Sonderzahlung
also includes profit-sharing payments, anniversary bonuses (e.g., bonuses for working at a company for 25 years), and similar payments. The normal payments then include normal monthly salary payments, overtime payments, hardship allowances, and other payments that are granted at the frequency of the contribution periods.

For the noncompete ban, a different definition of earnings applied. The literal translation of the legislation describing the earnings relevant for the ban is “remuneration due for the last month of employment” (für den letzten Monat des Dienstverhältnisses gebührende Entgelt). While this translation suggests only looking at workers’ salary in the month before the termination, the legal interpretation is different. First, between 2006-2015, employers interpreted the definition of earnings to include the 13th and 14th monthly payments. In 2015, the legislation was changed such that only 12 months of salary were considered for the ban. Second, some Supreme Court cases after 2006 clarified whether other parts of earnings should be included the determine eligibility. These cases clarified that non-salary payments that were paid on a “regular basis” should be included for determining eligibility. These could include regular commission payments or bonus payments. However, “one-time” payments were not to be included (e.g., bonuses for working at a company for 25 years). Given that Supreme Court cases were required to clarify the interpretation of whether these payments were included, it is unclear whether or not most companies included these payments for determining noncompete eligibility right after the ban. See Theuer (2010) for more details and references about the debate around which payments should be considered when determining noncompete eligibility.

Based on the above descriptions of the ASSD earnings concepts and the earnings concept relevant for the ban, it is not clear whether or not to include sonderzahlung when defining individuals’ noncompete eligibility. Some parts of sonderzahlung were commonly understood to be included when determining eligibility (e.g., the 13th and 14th monthly payments), other parts were legally included but it is unclear how widely understood this was (e.g., regular commission or bonus payments), and other parts were not legally included (e.g., anniversary bonuses payments). Consequently, for the main analysis, I define treatment based only on workers’ normal payments but scale these payments up to take into account the 13th and 14th monthly payments that most workers receive.\(^{64}\) Formally, I define treatment as

\[
\text{Annual Normal Payments}_{i,t} \times \frac{1}{12} \times \frac{14}{12} < \frac{17}{30} \times \text{Maximum Monthly Social Security Contribution}_t.
\]

(A14)

Note, that the average normal payments are only for the firm that the employee is currently employed at. Since I only observe annual payments for each firm, however, there will be some measurement error if workers experience within-year salary changes. For example, if a worker went from earning €1,000/month to €1,200/month within the year this could affect her eligibility for the noncompete ban but I would only observe her average monthly earnings over the whole year.

To assess the robustness of this way of defining the earnings concepts, Appendix Figures A7 and A8 present the main results in the paper instead defining treatment based on total earnings (including both normal payments and special payments). Formally, the treatment definition for

\(^{64}\)Even if a collective bargaining agreement does not specify additional payments, firms may still make payments over 14 months rather than 12 months for tax-related reasons. Some collective bargaining agreements include 15 months of payment (e.g., workers in the banking sector). Consequently, this treatment definition will classify some workers with 15 monthly payments who were legally in the control group as treated. The total earnings robustness results presented in Appendix Figures A7 and A8 account for this and would properly classify these workers with 15 months of salary payments.
these robustness checks is

\[ \text{Annual Total Payments}_{i,t} \times \frac{1}{12} < \frac{17}{30} \times \text{Maximum Monthly Social Security Contribution}_{t}. \]

\( (A15) \)

**Mapping Spell Starting Dates**  The second component of defining treatment is mapping the labor market status data in the ASSD to “contract signing dates” relevant for the noncompete ban. For each employment spell in the ASSD, I define the spell’s starting month (i.e., when the worker signed their employment contract) as the first month I see that worker employed at that firm. There are a few reasons why this classification might lead to some measurement error

- I classify employees’ monthly employment based on which firm they are employed at on the 15th day of the month. Consequently, the actual starting date may have actually been in the previous month. However, the actual ban cutoff dates were the 16th and 17th of March so this classification works well for separating treated and untreated workers in 2006.

- Workers might sign their employment contracts before they start working at a firm. This would lead to the spell starting date in the ASSD being later than the contract signing date.

- Workers may be initially on temporary contracts or prohibitional periods before signing their formal employment contracts. This would lead to the spell starting date in the ASSD being before the contract signing date.

The one other difficulty with assigning spells to treatment versus control is that the reform affected spells that started in the middle of 2006. To account for this, I assign spells that started in the first three months of 2006 as having started in 2005 (i.e., control employment spells). To account for the fact that this mechanically changes the composition of employment spells in 2005 and 2006 (i.e., the 2005 cohort will have extra spells that started in the first three months of the year and the 2006 cohort will have no spells that start in the first three months of the year), the specifications with *individual controls* include fixed effects for which month each employment spell started in. These fixed effects are interacted with the treated earnings indicator.

**H  NACE 08 Industry Codes**

The industry codes available in the ASSD correspond to four-digit NACE 08 industry codes. See [here](#) for more details about these industry codes. All references to four-digit industry codes in the paper correspond to the four-digit NACE codes. Examples of four-digit industries are *retail sale of telecommunications* (4422), *retail sale of computers* (4421), *book publishing* (5811), and *newspaper publishing* (5813). References to *coarse* industry codes are NACE industry letter groupings (i.e., the NACE sections). The reason for using this grouping rather than one-digit NACE codes is that one-digit NACE codes do not always correspond to the same broad industries (e.g., software publishing is in the one-digit NACE industry 5 while computer programming is in one-digit NACE industry 6 but they are both in NACE section J - Information and Communications).
Appendix References


