Lecture 7: The Role of the State and Different Political Regimes

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Introduction

- So far, distortionary policies associated with “taxes” (broadly construed)
- They reduce the extent to which investors are residual claimants.
- Such property rights undoubtedly important.
- But is this the main channel through which political economy impacts economic interactions?
Two caveats (hopefully empirically relevant)

1. **Oligarchy versus democracy**: oligarchy protects the property rights of producers, but creates other (perhaps more dynamic) distortions
   - in particular, static versus dynamic distortions

2. **The role of the state**: weak versus strong states
   - weak states that have limited ability to raise taxes may be worse for development
Simple Model of Elite Control

- Infinite horizon economy populated by a continuum of risk-neutral agents, with discount factor equal to $\beta < 1$.
- Unique non-storable final good denoted by $y$.
- The expected utility of agent $j$ at time 0 is given by:

$$U_0^j = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t c_t^j,$$

where $c_t^j \in \mathbb{R}$ denotes the consumption of agent $j$ at time $t$ and $E_t$ is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time $t$.

- Suppose that each individual dies with a small probability $\epsilon$ in every period, and a mass $\epsilon$ of new individuals are born (with the convention that after death there is zero utility and $\beta$ is the discount factor inclusive of the probability of death).
- We will consider the limit of this economy with $\epsilon \to 0$. 
Occupations

- production workers versus capitalists/entrepreneurs.
- All agents have the same productivity as workers, their productivity in entrepreneurship differs.
- Agent $j$ at time $t$ has entrepreneurial talent/skills $a^j_t \in \{A^L, A^H\}$ with $A^L < A^H$.
- To become an entrepreneur, an agent needs to set up a firm, if he does not have an active firm already.
- Setting up a new firm may be costly because of entry barriers created by existing entrepreneurs.
States

- Each agent therefore starts period $t$ with two state variables:
  - skill level $a^j_t \in \{A^H, A^L\}$
  - $s^j_t \in \{0, 1\}$ denoting whether the individual has an active firm.

- We refer to an agent with $s^j_t = 1$ as a member of the “elite,” since he will have an advantage in becoming an entrepreneur (when there are entry barriers), and in an oligarchic society, he may be politically more influential than non-elite agents.
Decisions

- Within each period, each agent makes the following decisions:
  - an occupation choice $e^j_t \in \{0, 1\}$, and in addition if $e^j_t = 1$, i.e., if he becomes an entrepreneur,
  - investment, employment, and hiding decisions, $k^j_t$, $l^j_t$ and $h^j_t$, where $h^j_t$ denotes whether he decides to hide his output in order to avoid taxation (since the final good is not storable, the consumption decision is simply given by the budget constraint).

- Agents also make the policy choices in this society.

- Three policy choices:
  - a tax rate $\tau_t \in [0, 1]$ on output,
  - lump-sum transfers to all agents denoted by $T_t \in [0, \infty)$,
  - cost $B_t \in [0, \infty)$ to set up a new firm.
Production

- An entrepreneur with skill level $a^{j}_t$ can produce

$$y^{j}_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (a^{j}_t)^{\alpha} (k^{j}_t)^{1-\alpha} (l^{j}_t)^{\alpha}$$ (2)

- Suppose that all firms have to operate at the same size, $\lambda$, so

$$l^{j}_t = \lambda.$$

- Suppose also that the entrepreneur himself can work in his firm as one of the workers, which implies that the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur is 0.
Profits

- Given a tax rate $\tau_t$ and a wage rate $w_t \geq 0$ and using the fact that $l_t^j = \lambda$, the net profits of an entrepreneur with talent $a_t^j$ at time $t$ are:

$$\pi \left( k_t^j \mid a_t^j, w_t, \tau_t \right) = \frac{1 - \tau_t}{1 - \alpha} (a_t^j)^\alpha (k_t^j)^{1 - \alpha} \lambda^\alpha - w_t \lambda - k_t^j. \quad (3)$$

- If taxes are too high, he can choose to hide his output, $h_t^j = 1$. In this case, he avoids the tax, but loses a fraction $\delta < 1$ of his revenues, so his profits are:

$$\tilde{\pi} \left( k_t^j \mid a_t^j, w_t, \tau_t \right) = \frac{1 - \delta}{1 - \alpha} (a_t^j)^\alpha (k_t^j)^{1 - \alpha} \lambda^\alpha - w_t \lambda - k_t^j.$$  

- This implies that taxes are always constrained to be:

$$0 \leq \tau_t \leq \delta.$$
Profit Maximization

- The (instantaneous) gain from entrepreneurship for an agent of talent $z \in \{L, H\}$ as a function of the tax rate $\tau_t$, and the wage rate, $w_t$, is:

$$\Pi^z (\tau_t, w_t) = \max_{k^j_t} \pi \left( k^j_t \mid a^j_t = A^z, w_t, \tau_t \right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

- Note that this is the net gain to entrepreneurship since the agent receives the wage rate $w_t$ irrespective (either working for another entrepreneur when he is a worker, or working for himself—thus having to hire one less worker—when he is an entrepreneur).

- The gain to becoming an entrepreneur for an agent with $s^j_t = 0$ and ability $a^j_t = A^z$ is

$$\Pi^z (\tau_t, w_t) - B_t = \Pi^z (\tau_t, w_t) - \lambda b_t,$$

where $b_t \equiv B_t / \lambda$ is the cost imposed by the entry barriers.
Market Clearing

Market clearing condition:

\[
\int_0^1 e_t^j l_t^j dj = \int_{j \in S_t^E} \lambda dj \leq 1, \tag{5}
\]

where \( S_t^E \) is the set of entrepreneurs at time \( t \).
Evolution of State Variables

- Law of motion of the vector \( (s^j_t, a^j_t) \) given by

\[
s^j_{t+1} = e^j_t, \tag{6}
\]

with \( s^j_0 = 0 \) for all \( j \), and also \( s^j_t = 0 \) if an individual \( j \) is born at time \( t \).

- And

\[
a^j_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
A^H & \text{with probability } \sigma^H \text{ if } a^j_t = A^H \\
A^H & \text{with probability } \sigma^L \text{ if } a^j_t = A^L \\
A^L & \text{with probability } 1 - \sigma^H \text{ if } a^j_t = A^H \\
A^L & \text{with probability } 1 - \sigma^L \text{ if } a^j_t = A^L 
\end{cases}, \tag{7}
\]

where \( \sigma^H, \sigma^L \in (0, 1) \).

- Suppose that \( \sigma^H \geq \sigma^L > 0 \), so that skills are persistent and low skill is not an absorbing state.
Fraction of high skill agents in the stationary distribution is

\[ M \equiv \frac{\sigma^L}{1 - \sigma^H + \sigma^L} \in (0, 1). \]

Suppose that

\[ M \lambda > 1, \]

so that, without entry barriers, high-skill entrepreneurs generate more than sufficient demand to employ the entire labor supply.
Timing of Events

- Entrepreneurial talents/skills, $[a_t^i]$, are realized.
- The entry barrier for new entrepreneurs $b_t$ is set.
- Agents make occupational choices, $[e_t^i]$, and entrepreneurs make investment decisions, $[k_t^i]$.
- The labor market clearing wage rate, $w_t$, is determined.
- The tax rate on entrepreneurs, $\tau_t$, is set.
- Entrepreneurs make hiding decisions, $[h_t^i]$. 
Policy Choices

- Entry barriers and taxes will be set by different agents in different political regimes.
- Taxes are set after the investment decisions, which can be motivated by potential commitment problems whereby entrepreneurs can be “held up” after they make their investments decision.
- Once these investments are sunk, it is in the interest of the workers to tax and redistribute entrepreneurial income.
Equilibrium Concept

- Focus on the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), where strategies are only a function of the payoff relevant states.
- For individual $j$ the payoff relevant state at time $t$ includes his own state $(s^j_t, a^j_t)$, and potentially the fraction of entrepreneurs that are high skill, denoted by $\mu_t$, and defined as
  \[
  \mu_t = \Pr\left(a^j_t = A^H \mid e^j_t = 1\right) = \Pr\left(a^j_t = A^H \mid j \in S^E_t\right).
  \]
- $x^j_t = \left(e^j_t, k^j_t, \ldots, h^j_t\right)$: the vector of choices of agent $j$ at time $t$,
- $x_t = \left[x^j_t\right]_{j \in [0, 1]}$: the choices for all agents,
- $p_t = (b_t, \tau_t)$: vector of policies at time $t$.
- $p^t = \{p_n\}_{n=t}^\infty$: the infinite sequence of policies from time $t$ onwards,
- $w^t$ and $x^t$: sequences of wages and choices from $t$ onwards.
Economic Equilibrium

- $s_0^j = 0$ for all $j$, and suppose $b_0 = 0$, so that in the initial period there are no entry barriers (since $s_0^j = 0$ for all $j$, any positive entry barrier would create waste, but would not affect who enters entrepreneurship).

- Since $l_t^j = \lambda$ for all $j \in S^E_t$, profit-maximizing investments are given by:
  \[ k_t^j = (1 - \tau_t)^{1/\alpha} a_t^j \lambda. \]  
  \[ (8) \]
  Investment increasing in the skill level of the entrepreneur, $a_t^j$, and decreasing in the tax rate, $\tau_t$.

- Net current gain to entrepreneurship, as a function of entry barriers, taxes, equilibrium wages, for an agent of type $z \in \{L, H\}$ is then
  \[ \Pi^z (\tau_t, w_t) = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \tau_t)^{1/\alpha} A^z \lambda - w_t \lambda. \]  
  \[ (9) \]
Value Functions

- Let us denote the value of an entrepreneur with skill level $z \in \{L, H\}$ as a function of the sequence of future policies and equilibrium wages, $(p^t, w^t)$, by $V^z (p^t, w^t)$, and the value of a worker of type $z$ in the same situation by $W^z (p^t, w^t)$.

- Then,
  \[
  W^z (p^t, w^t) = w_t + T_t + \beta CW^z (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}),
  \]
  where
  \[
  CW^z (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) = \sigma^z \max \left\{ W^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}), V^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) - \lambda b_{t+1} \right\}
  + (1 - \sigma^z) \max \left\{ W^L (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}), V^L (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) - \lambda b_{t+1} \right\}.
  \]

- Intuition: a worker of type $z$ receives a wage income of $w_t$ (independent of his skill), a transfer of $T_t$, and the continuation value $CW^z (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1})$. 
To understand this continuation value, note that the worker stays high skill with probability $\sigma^z$, and in this case, he can either choose to remain a worker, receiving value $W^H(p^{t+1}, w^{t+1})$, or decide to become an entrepreneur by incurring the entry cost $\lambda b_{t+1}$, receiving the value of a high-skill entrepreneur, $V^H(p^{t+1}, w^{t+1})$.

The max operator makes sure that he chooses whichever option gives higher value.

With probability $1 - \sigma^z$, he transitions from high skill to low skill, and receives the corresponding values.
Value Functions (continued)

- For entrepreneurs:

\[
V^z (p^t, w^t) = w_t + T_t + \Pi^z (\tau_t, w_t) + \beta CV^z (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}),
\]

(12)

where \(\Pi^z\) is given by (9) and

\[
CV^z (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) = \sigma^z \max \left\{ W^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}), V^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) \right\}
\]

(13)

\[
+ (1 - \sigma^z) \max \left\{ W^L (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}), V^L (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) \right\}
\]
Finally, let us define the *net value* of entrepreneurship as a function of an individual’s skill $a$ and ownership status, $s$,

$$NV \left( p^t, w^t \mid a_t^j = A^z, s_t^j = s \right)$$

$$= V^z (p^t, w^t) - W^z (p^t, w^t) - (1 - s) \lambda b_t,$$

where the last term is the entry cost incurred by agents with $s = 0$.

The max operators in (11) and (13) imply that if $NV > 0$ for an agent, then he prefers to become an entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurship Choices

- Straightforward to see that

\[ NV \left( p^t, w^t \mid a^j_t = A^H, s^j_t = 0 \right) \geq NV \left( p^t, w^t \mid a^j_t, s^j_t = s \right) \geq NV \left( p^t, w^t \mid a^j_t = A^L, s^j_t = 1 \right) \]

- In other words, the net value of entrepreneurship is highest for high-skill existing entrepreneurs, and lowest for low-skill workers. However, it is unclear ex ante whether

\[ NV \left( p^t, w^t \mid a^j_t = A^H, s^j_t = 0 \right) > NV \left( p^t, w^t \mid a^j_t = A^L, s^j_t = 0 \right) \]

or the other way round.
Entrepreneurship Choices (continued)

- Two different types of equilibria:
  1. **Entry equilibrium** where all entrepreneurs have $a^j_t = A^H$.
  2. **Sclerotic equilibrium** where agents with $s^j_t = 1$ become entrepreneurs irrespective of their productivity.

- An entry equilibrium requires the net value of entrepreneurship to be greater for a non-elite high skill agent than for a low-skill elite, i.e.,
  $$NV\left(p^t, w^t \mid a^j_t = A^H, s^j_t = 0\right) \geq NV\left(p^t, w^t \mid a^j_t = A^L, s^j_t = 1\right).$$

- Define $w^H_t$ such that at this wage rate,
  $$NV\left(p^t, [w^H_t, w^{t+1}] \mid a^j_t = A^H, s^j_t = 0\right) = 0,$$ that is,
  $$w^H_t \equiv \max\left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \tau_t)^{1/\alpha} A^H - b_t + \frac{\beta}{\lambda} \left( CV^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) - CW^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) \right) ; 0 \right\}; \quad (14)$$
Similarly, let $w_t^L$ be such that
\[ NV \left( p^t, [w_t^L, w^{t+1}] \mid a_t^i = A^L, s_t^i = 1 \right) = 0, \]
that is,
\[
\begin{align*}
w_t^L & \equiv \max \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \tau_t)^{1/\alpha} A^L \\
& \quad + \frac{\beta \left( CV^L (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) - CW^L (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) \right)}{\lambda}, 0 \right\}. \tag{15}
\end{align*}
\]
Entry Equilibrium

Given these definitions, the condition for an entry equilibrium to exist at time $t$ can simply be written as

$$w_t^H \geq w_t^L.$$  \hfill (16)

A sclerotic equilibrium emerges, on the other hand, only if the converse of (16) holds.
Equilibrium Wages

- In an entry equilibrium, i.e., when (16) holds, we must have that

\[ NV \left( p^t, w^t \mid a^i_t = A^z, s^i_t = 0 \right) = 0. \]

- Why?

- This implies that the equilibrium wage must be

\[ w^e_t = w^H_t. \]  \hspace{1cm} (17)
Entry Equilibrium (continued)

Labor supply and labor demand when (16) holds and there exists an entry equilibrium.
Sclerotic Equilibrium

In this case, wages are still given by \( w_t^e = w_t^H \) because of \( \varepsilon > 0 \).

Labor supply and labor demand when (16) does not hold and there exists a sclerotic equilibrium.
Composition of Entrepreneurs

- Law of motion of the fraction of entrepreneurs with high skills is

\[
\mu_t = \begin{cases} 
\sigma^H \mu_{t-1} + \sigma^L (1 - \mu_{t-1}) & \text{if } (16) \text{ does not hold} \\
1 & \text{if } (16) \text{ holds}
\end{cases}.
\quad (18)
\]

starting with \( \mu_0 = 1 \).
Democratic Equilibrium

- In democracy, policies made by majoritarian voting.
- In MPE, after investments are made, the median voter, a worker, wishes through distribute as much as possible, thus
  \[ \tau_t = \delta. \]
- Moreover, entry barriers reduce wages (from (14)), thus
  \[ b_t = 0. \]
- Than in equilibrium:
  \[ V^H = W^H = W^L = W = \frac{w^D + T^D}{1 - \beta}, \quad (19) \]
  where \( w^D \) is the equilibrium wage in democracy, and \( T^D \) is the level of transfers, given by \( \delta Y^D \).
Democratic Equilibrium (continued)

**Proposition:** A democratic equilibrium always features $\tau_t = \delta$ and $b_t = 0$. Moreover, we have $e_t^j = 1$ if and only if $a_t^j = A^H$, so $\mu_t = 1$. The equilibrium wage rate is given by

$$w_t^D = w^D \equiv \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \delta)^{1/\alpha} A^H,$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

and the aggregate output is

$$Y_t^D = Y^D \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \delta)^{1 - \alpha \over \alpha} A^H.$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

- Aggregate output is constant over time
- Also perfect equality because the excess supply of high-skill entrepreneurs ensures that they receive no rents.
Oligarchy Equilibrium

- Policies are determined by majoritarian voting among the elite.
- At the time of voting over the entry barriers, $b_t$, the elite are those with $s_t = 1$, and at the time of voting over the taxes, $\tau_t$, the elite are those with $e_t = 1$.
- Let us start with the taxation decision among those with $e_t = 1$.
- It can be proved that as long as

$$\lambda \geq \frac{1}{2} \frac{A^H}{A^L} + \frac{1}{2},$$

then both high-skill and low-skill entrepreneurs prefer zero taxes, i.e., $\tau_t = 0$.

- Condition (22) requires the productivity gap between low and high-skill elites not to be so large that low-skill elites wish to tax profits in order to indirectly transfer resources from high-skill entrepreneurs to themselves.
- When condition (22) holds, the oligarchy will always choose $\tau_t = 0$. 

\[ \text{(22)} \]
Oligarchy Equilibrium (continued)

- Then anticipating this tax choice, at the stage of deciding the entry barriers, high-skill entrepreneurs would like to maximize $V^H \left( [b_t, 0, p^{t+1}], [w_t, w^{t+1}] \right)$, while low-skill entrepreneurs would like to maximize $V^L \left( [b_t, 0, p^{t+1}], [w_t, w^{t+1}] \right)$.

- Both of these are maximized by setting a level of the entry barrier that ensures the minimum level of equilibrium wages.

- Equilibrium wage, given in (17), will be minimized at $w_t^H = 0$, by choosing any

$$b_t \geq b_t^E \equiv \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} A^H + \beta \left( \frac{CV^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1}) - CW^H (p^{t+1}, w^{t+1})}{\lambda} \right).$$

(23)

- Without loss of any generality, set $b_t = b_t^E$. 
Oligarchy Equilibrium (continued)

- Aggregate output in equilibrium is:

\[ Y_t^E = \mu_t \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} A^H + (1 - \mu_t) \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} A^L, \]  

(24)

where \( \mu_t = \sigma^H \mu_{t-1} + \sigma^L (1 - \mu_{t-1}) \) as given by (18), with \( \mu_0 = 1 \).

- Since \( \mu_t \) is a decreasing sequence converging to \( M \), aggregate output \( Y_t^E \) is also decreasing over time with:

\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} Y_t^E = Y_\infty^E \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \left( A^L + M (A^H - A^L) \right). \]  

(25)

- The reason for this is that as time goes by, the comparative advantage of the members of the elite in entrepreneurship gradually disappears because of the imperfect correlation between ability over time.
Oligarchy Equilibrium (continued)

- Also high degree of (earnings) inequality.
- Wages are equal to 0, while entrepreneurs earn positive profits

**Proposition:** Suppose that condition (22) holds. Then an oligarchic equilibrium features $\tau_t = 0$ and $b_t = b^E$, and the equilibrium is sclerotic, with equilibrium wages $w^e_t = 0$, and fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs $\mu_t = \sigma^H \mu_{t-1} + \sigma^L (1 - \mu_{t-1})$ starting with $\mu_0 = 1$. Aggregate output is given by (42) and decreases over time starting at $Y_0^E = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} A^H$ with $\lim_{t\to\infty} Y_t^E = Y_\infty^E$ as given by (25).
Comparison between Democracy and Oligarchy

- First, as long as \( \delta > 0 \), then
  \[
  Y^D = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \delta) \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} A^H < Y^E_0 = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} A^H.
  \]

- Therefore, for all \( \delta > 0 \), oligarchy initially generates greater output than democracy, because it is protecting the property rights of entrepreneurs.

- However, the analysis also shows that \( Y^E_t \) declines over time, while \( Y^D \) is constant, the oligarchic economy may subsequently fall behind the democratic society.

- Whether it does so or not depends on whether \( Y^D \) is greater than \( Y^E_\infty \) as given by (25).
This will be the case if
\[(1 - \delta)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}} A^H / (1 - \alpha) > \left( A^L + M (A^H - A^L) \right) / (1 - \alpha), \]
or if
\[(1 - \delta)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}} > \frac{A^L}{A^H} + M \left( 1 - \frac{A^L}{A^H} \right). \] (26)

If condition (26) holds, then at some point the democratic society will overtake ("leapfrog") the oligarchic society.
Comparison between Democracy and Oligarchy (continued)

**Proposition:** Suppose that condition (22) holds. Then at $t = 0$, aggregate output is higher in an oligarchic society than in a democratic society, i.e., $Y_0^E > Y_D$. If (26) does not hold, then aggregate output in oligarchy is always higher than in democracy, i.e., $Y_t^E > Y_D$ for all $t$. If (26) holds, then there exists $t' \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for $t \leq t'$, $Y_t^E \geq Y_D$ and for $t > t'$, $Y_t^E < Y_D$, so that the democratic society leapfrogs the oligarchic society. Leapfrogging is more likely when $\delta$, $A^L/A^H$ and $M$ are low.

- Oligarchies are more likely to be relatively inefficient in the long run:
  - when $\delta$ is low, meaning that democracy is unable to pursue highly populist policies
  - when $A^H$ is high relative to $A^L$, so that high-skill comparative advantage is important
  - $M$ is low, so that a random selection of agents contains a small fraction of high-skill agents, making oligarchic sclerosis highly distortionary.
Comparison between Democracy and Oligarchy (continued)

Figure 3: Comparison of aggregate output in democracy and oligarchy. The dashed curve depicts output in oligarchy when (26) holds, and the solid line when it does not.
Other Systems?

- Can other political systems do better?
- Yes, for example, delegate taxes to entrepreneurs and entry barriers to workers
- But, generally not feasible.
- Political power “indivisible”: if the system is democratic, the party in power can also decides taxes.
New Technologies and Institutional Flexibility

- Democracies also more flexible.
- Suppose that at some date $t' > 0$, there is an unanticipated and exogenous arrival of a new technology, enabling entrepreneur $j$ to produce:

$$y^j_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (\psi \hat{a}^j_t)^\alpha (k^j_t)^{1-\alpha} (l^j_t)^\alpha,$$

where $\psi > 1$ and $\hat{a}^j_t$ is the talent of this entrepreneur with the new technology.
- Suppose $l^j_t = \lambda$ for the new technology as well, entrepreneur $j$’s output can be written as

$$\max \left\{ \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (\psi \hat{a}^j_t)^\alpha (k^j_t)^{1-\alpha} \lambda^\alpha, \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (a^j_t)^\alpha (k^j_t)^{1-\alpha} \lambda^\alpha \right\}.$$
Also to simplify the discussion, assume that the law of motion of $\hat{a}_t^j$ is similar to that of $a_t^j$, given by

$$\hat{a}_{t+1}^j = \begin{cases} 
A^H & \text{with probability } \sigma^H \text{ if } \hat{a}_t^j = A^H \\
A^H & \text{with probability } \sigma^L \text{ if } \hat{a}_t^j = A^L \\
A^L & \text{with probability } 1 - \sigma^H \text{ if } \hat{a}_t^j = A^H \\
A^L & \text{with probability } 1 - \sigma^L \text{ if } \hat{a}_t^j = A^L
\end{cases} \quad (27)$$

Comparative advantage shifts to a new set of entrepreneurs.
Democracy will immediately switched to the new technology, thus

\[ \hat{Y}_D \equiv \frac{\psi}{1 - \alpha}(1 - \delta)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} A^H. \]

In contrast, switch to new technology will be delayed in oligarchy in oligarchy.
General Issues

- Tradition in political science: strength of the state and state capacity important for development
- Why?
- Not clear, but in practice, richer and institutionally stronger countries raise a higher fraction of GDP is tax revenue.
- Perhaps strength of the state related to public good provision?
- Strength of the state also related to limiting the ability of local strongman and local elites to pursue certain policies that may be growth-regarding.
Figure 1
Tax Revenue and Income 1990-2000

Log GDP per Capita (Penn World Tables)

Tax Revenue as % of GDP (WDI)
Environment

- Time is discrete and indexed by $t$.
- There is a set of citizens, with mass normalized to 1, and a ruler.
- All agents discount the future with the discount factor $\beta$, and have the utility function

$$u_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j [c_{t+j} - e_{t+j}],$$

where $c_{t+j}$ is consumption and $e_{t+j}$ is investment (effort), and we assume that the ruler incurs no effort cost.
- Each citizen $i$ has access to the following Cobb-Douglas production technology to produce the unique final good in this economy:

$$y_t^i = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} A_t^\alpha (e_t^i)^{1-\alpha},$$

where $A_t$ denotes the level of public goods (e.g., the state of the infrastructure, or the degree of law and contract enforcement between private citizens), at time $t$. 
Environment (continued)

- The level of $A_t$ will be determined by the investment of the ruler
  - a certain degree of state investment in public goods, the infrastructure or law-enforcement is necessary for production;
  - in fact, investment by the state is complementary to the investments of the citizens.
- The ruler sets a tax rate $\tau_t$ on income at time $t$.
- Each citizen can decide to hide a fraction $z_t^i$ of his output, which is not taxable, but hiding output is costly, so a fraction $\delta$ of it is lost in the process.
- This formulation with an economic exit option for the citizens is a convenient, though reduced-form, starting point.
- Given a tax rate $\tau_t$, the consumption of agent $i$ is:
  \[
  c_t^i \leq \left[ (1 - \tau_t) (1 - z_t^i) + (1 - \delta) z_t^i \right] y_t^i, \tag{30}
  \]
  where tax revenues are
  \[
  T_t = \tau_t \int (1 - z_t^i) y_t^i \, di. \tag{31}
  \]
The ruler at time $t$ decides how much to spend on $A_{t+1}$, with production function

$$A_{t+1} = \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha) \phi}{\alpha} G_t \right]^{1/\phi}$$

(32)

where $G_t$ denotes government spending on public goods, and $\phi > 1$, so that there are decreasing returns in the investment technology of the ruler (a greater $\phi$ corresponds to greater decreasing returns).

The term $\left[ (1 - \alpha) \frac{\phi}{\alpha} \right]^{1/\phi}$ is included as a convenient normalization.

In addition, (32) implies full depreciation of $A_t$, which simplifies the analysis below.

The consumption of the ruler is whatever is left over from tax revenues after his expenditure and transfers,

$$c^R_t = T_t - G_t.$$
Timing of Events

- The economy inherits $A_t$ from government spending at time $t - 1$.
- Citizens choose their investments, $\{e_t^i\}$.
- The ruler decides how much to spend on next period's public goods, $G_t$, and sets the tax rate $\tau_t$.
- Citizens decide how much of their output to hide, $\{z_t^i\}$.
First-Best Allocation

- The first best allocation maximizes net output:
- Given by public goods investment

\[ A_t = \beta^{1/(\phi-1)} \]

and

\[ e_t^{fb} = \beta^{1/(\phi-1)} \text{ and } y_t^{fb} = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \beta^{1/(\phi-1)}. \]
Exit options:

\[
 z_t^i \begin{cases} 
 1 & \text{if } \tau_t > \delta \\
 [0, 1] & \text{if } \tau_t = \delta \\
 0 & \text{if } \tau_t < \delta 
\end{cases}
\]

Given (33), the optimal tax rate for the ruler is

\[
 \tau_t = \delta. 
\]

Next, investment decisions:

\[
 e_t^i = (1 - \delta)^{1/\alpha} A_t. 
\]

Substituting (34) and (35) into (31), the equilibrium tax revenue as a function of the level of infrastructure is

\[
 T (A_t) = \delta y_t = \frac{(1 - \delta)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} \delta A_t}{1 - \alpha}. 
\]
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (continued)

- The ruler will choose public investment, $G_t$ to maximize his net present value, written recursively as:

$$V(A_t) = \max_{A_{t+1}} \left\{ T(A_t) - \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)\phi} A_{t+1}^{\phi} + \beta V(A_{t+1}) \right\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (37)

- First-order condition for the ruler:

$$\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} A_{t+1}^{\phi-1} = \beta V'(A_{t+1}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (38)

- The marginal cost of greater investment in infrastructure for next period must be equal to to the greater value that will follow from this.

- The envelope condition:

$$V'(A_t) = T'(A_t) = \frac{(1 - \delta)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} \delta}{1 - \alpha}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (39)

- The value of better infrastructure for the ruler is the additional tax revenue that this will generate, which is given by the expression in (39).
Equilibrium actions of the ruler are:

\[ A_{t+1} = A[\delta] \equiv \left( \frac{\beta (1 - \delta)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \delta}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}} \]

and

\[ G_t = \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha) \phi} (A[\delta])^\phi, \]

(40)

And therefore:

\[ V^*(A_t) = \frac{(1 - \delta)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} \delta A_t}{1 - \alpha} + \frac{\beta(\phi - 1) (1 - \delta)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} \delta}{(1 - \beta) (1 - \alpha) \phi} A[\delta]. \]

(41)
Summarizing:

**Proposition:** There exists a unique MPE where, for all $t$, $\tau_t (A_t) = \delta$, $G (A_t)$ is given by (40), and, for all $i$ and $t$, $z^i (A_t) = 0$ and $e^i (A_t)$ is given by (35). The equilibrium level of aggregate output is:

$$Y_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \delta) \frac{(1 - \alpha) / \alpha}{A [\delta]}$$

for all $t > 0$ and

$$Y_0 (A_0) = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \delta) \frac{(1 - \alpha) / \alpha}{A_0}.$$
Second Best

- What is the level of $\delta$—economic strength of the state—that maximizes output.
- Considered a problem

\[
\max_{\delta} Y_t(\delta) = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \delta)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} A[\delta],
\]

where $A[\delta]$ is given by (40).
- The output maximizing level of the economic power of the state, denoted $\delta^*$, is

\[
\delta^* = \frac{\alpha}{\phi(1 - \alpha) + \alpha}.
\]
Second Best (continued)

- If the economic power of the state is greater than $\delta^*$, then the state is too powerful, and taxes are too high relative to the output-maximizing benchmark.
  - This corresponds to the standard case that the political economy literature has focused on.
- In contrast, if the economic power of the state is less than $\delta^*$, then the state is not powerful enough for there to be sufficient rents in the future to entice the ruler to invest in public goods (or in the infrastructure, law-enforcement etc.).
  - This corresponds to the case of “weak states”.
    - With only limited power of the state to raise taxes in the future, the ruler has no interest in increasing the future productive capacity of the economy.
Political Power of the State

- Do the same insights applied to the political power of the state?
- Generally yes,
Extended Environment

- Citizens decide replacement: $R_t \in \{0, 1\}$.
- After replacement, the existing ruler receives 0 utility, and citizens reclaim a fraction $\eta$ of the tax revenue and redistribute it to themselves as a lump sum transfer, $S_t$.
- Replacement is costly: the cost of replacing the current ruler with a new ruler equal to $\theta_tA_t$, where $\theta_t$ is a nonnegative random variable with a continuous distribution function $\tilde{F}_\lambda$, with (finite) density $\tilde{f}_\lambda$.
- Assume that
  \[
  \frac{\tilde{f}_\lambda (x)}{1 - \tilde{F}_\lambda (x)} \text{ is nondecreasing in } x \text{ and } \tilde{F}_\lambda (0) < 1, \quad (A1)
  \]
  which is the standard monotone hazard (or log concavity) assumption.
Timing of Events

- The economy inherits \( A_t \) from government spending at time \( t - 1 \).
- Citizens choose their investments, \( \{ e_t^i \} \).
- The ruler decides how much to spend on next period’s public goods, \( G_t \), and sets the tax rate \( \tau_t \).
- Citizens decide how much of their output to hide, \( \{ z_t^i \} \).
- \( \theta_t \) is realized.

Citizens choose \( R_t \). If \( R_t = 1 \), the current ruler is replaced and the tax revenue is redistributed to the citizens as a lump-sum subsidy \( S_t = \eta T_t \).
Markov Perfect Equilibrium

- Suppose

\[ \delta \in (\delta^*, \alpha), \]  

where \( \delta^* \) is given by (43).

- This assumption ensures that taxes are always less than the value \( \alpha \) that maximizes ruler utility, and also allows the potential for excessively high taxes (i.e., \( \tau > \delta^* \)).

- Citizens will replace the ruler, i.e., \( R_t = 1 \), whenever

\[ \theta_t < \frac{\eta T_t}{A_t}. \]

- Therefore, the probability that the ruler will be replaced is

\[ \tilde{F}_\lambda (\eta T_t / A_t). \]
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (continued)

- To simplify the notation, define
  \[ T(\tau_t) = \frac{(1 - \tau_t)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}}{1 - \alpha} \tau_t. \]  
  \(45\)

- Also parameterize \(\tilde{F}_\lambda(x/\eta) = \lambda F(x)\) for some continuous distribution function \(F\) with (finite) density \(f\). Then

\[ V(A_t) = \max_{\tau_t \in [0,\delta], A_{t+1}} \left\{ (1 - \lambda F(T(\tau_t))) \left( T(\tau_t) A_t - \frac{\alpha}{\phi(1 - \alpha)} A_{t+1}^\phi \right) \right. \]
\[ + \beta (1 - \lambda F(T(\tau_t))) V(A_{t+1}) \} . \]  
  \(46\)

- Now the ruler’s maximization problem involves two choices, \(\tau_t\) and \(A_{t+1}\), since taxes are no longer automatically equal to the maximum, \(\delta\).
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (continued)

- In this choice, the ruler takes into account that a higher tax rate will increase the probability of replacement.
- The first-order condition with respect to $\tau_t$ yields:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{T}(\tau_t)}{\partial \tau_t} \times [(1 - \lambda F(\mathcal{T}(\tau_t))) - \lambda f(\mathcal{T}(\tau_t)) \left(\mathcal{T}(\tau_t) - \frac{G_t}{A_t} + \beta \frac{V(A_{t+1})}{A_t}\right)] \geq 0,$$

(47)

and $\tau_t \leq \delta$ with complementary slackness

- The envelope condition is now

$$V'(A_{t+1}) = (1 - \lambda F(\mathcal{T}(\tau_{t+1}))) \mathcal{T}(\tau_{t+1}).$$

(48)

- It only differs from the corresponding condition above, (39), because with probability $\lambda F(\mathcal{T}(\tau_{t+1}))$, the ruler will be replaced and will not enjoy the increase in future tax revenues.
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (continued)

- Using this, the first-order condition with respect to $A_{t+1}$ implies that in an interior equilibrium:

$$A_{t+1} = A[\tau_{t+1}] \equiv \left( \alpha^{-1} \beta (1 - \lambda F(\mathcal{T}(\tau_{t+1}))) \left(1 - \tau_{t+1} \right)^{1-\alpha} \tau_{t+1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}}$$

- The optimal value of $A_{t+1}$ for the ruler depends on $\tau_{t+1}$ since, from the envelope condition, (48), the benefits from a higher level of public good are related to future taxes.

- Also suppose:

$$\left(1 - \frac{\beta}{\phi} (1 - \lambda F(0)) \right)^2 - (\phi - 1) \frac{\beta}{\phi} (1 - \lambda F(0)) > 0. \quad (A3)$$

- This assumption requires $\beta (1 - \lambda F(0))$ not to be too large, and can be satisfied either if $\beta$ is not too close to 1 or if $\lambda F(0)$ is not equal to zero.
Proposition: Suppose (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold. Then, in the endogenous replacement game of this section, there exists a unique steady-state MPE. In this equilibrium, there exists $\lambda^* \in (0, \infty)$ such that output is maximized when $\lambda = \lambda^*$. 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (continued)

- Similar to the case of the economic power of the state, there is an optimal level of the political power of the state.
- Intuitively, when $\lambda < \lambda^*$, the state is too powerful and taxes are too high and citizens’ investments are too low.
- When $\lambda > \lambda^*$, the state is too weak and taxes and public investments are too low.
- The intuition is also related to the earlier result.
- When the state is excessively powerful, i.e., $\lambda < \lambda^*$, citizens expect high taxes and choose very low levels of investment (effort).
- In contrast, when $\lambda > \lambda^*$, the state is excessively weak and there is the reverse holdup problem; high taxes will encourage citizens to replace the ruler, and anticipating this, the ruler has little incentive to invest in public goods, because he will not be able to recoup the costs of current investment in public goods with future revenues.
Consensually Strong States

- Neither the analysis of the economic or the political power of the state generate a pattern in which better institutional controls lead to greater government spending.

- But comparison of OECD to Africa might suggest such a pattern.

- Why would this be the case?

- One possibility: go beyond MPE

- Consensually Strong States: citizens have low costs of replacing governments, a new look at SPE, where if the government does not follow citizens’ wishes, it is replaced.

- Consensually Strong States can generate the pattern of greater public good provision in situations of better controls on government.
What Is the State?

- Max Weber defined a state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.”
- Many states do not have such a monopoly and without it have little hope of enforcing rules, regulations, and laws, providing property rights and public goods.
- Presumption in the existing literature: this is because of the weakness of the state and ‘modernization’ will ultimately strengthen the state and ensure monopoly of violence.
But

In many polities, the central state exists side-by-side, and in fact in a ‘symbiotic’ relationship with non-state armed actors.

Examples:

- Waziristan in Pakistan;
- Kurdish areas in Iraq;
- the Mafia in the south of Italy;
- Southern United States after the Hayes-Tilden agreement of 1877;
- Colombia.

Weak states or symbiotic relationship between central state and periphery?
Imagine there is an incumbent politician/party facing an election. The country is divided into regions some of which are controlled by non-state armed actors. The incumbent decides which regions to ‘take back’ (in the limit establishing a monopoly of violence) and chooses a policy vector in the election. Non-state armed actors have preferences over policies and can coerce voters to support one candidate over another. This creates an electoral advantage for incumbent politicians they favor and reduces the incentives to eliminate these non-state actors.
Implications

- This would imply that paramilitaries will tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to the incumbent executive and that this effect is larger in areas where the President would otherwise not do well.

- Thus non-state armed actors can persist because they can be in a *symbiotic relationship* with the executive.
  - On the one hand, paramilitaries deliver votes to the President and in addition elect legislators who support the executive.
  - On the other, the executive delivers laws and the policies that the paramilitaries prefer.

- In addition, policies chosen to appease paramilitaries rather than provide public goods and services to the population.
In recent years Colombia has been dominated by two main non-state armed actors:

- the ‘left-wing’ Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC—The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and
- the ‘right-wing’ paramilitary forces which in 1997 coalesced into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC—United Self-Defense Organization of Colombia).

After the foundation of the AUC in 1997 a strategic decision was taken to influence national politics (possibly taken at Santa Fé de Ralito in 2001 where members of the AUC, politicians and members of congress signed a document calling for the ‘refounding of the country.’)
The Involvement of Paramilitaries in Politics

- In 2005 accusations of involvement of the AUC in the elections of 2002. Scandal with the demobilization of Jorge 40 and his 2,000 strong block on March 10, 2006 in La Mesa, César.

- Jorge 40’s computer fell into the hands of government officials and it contained emails ordering his men to recruit peasants to pretend to be paramilitaries during demobilization ceremonies and also listed over 500 murders, and many links between politicians and paramilitaries.

- So far around 30,000 paramilitaries have “demobilized” in this process.

- As of April 22, 2008, 62 members of Congress and the Senate were official suspects, 33 lawmakers, including Mario Uribe, President Uribe’s cousin, were in jail awaiting trial for links with paramilitaries.
Who Are the Representatives?

Table 1: Top 20 Senators by Vote Share in Paramilitary Presence Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senator</th>
<th>Third Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Param. Zones</th>
<th>Reelection</th>
<th>Just.&amp; Peace Law</th>
<th>Investigated/Arrested</th>
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<tr>
<td>GNECCO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61.88</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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Impact of Paramilitaries on Elections

- Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos show that after the decision of the AUC to enter politics (i.e., after 2001), the presence of paramilitaries in a municipality is robustly correlated with greater vote shares of ‘third parties,’ typically connected with paramilitaries and supporting right-wing positions.

- Also paramilitary presence correlated with ‘electoral concentration’ for Senate and Congress elections in 2002 and the vote share of Presidential Uribe, in 2002 and more so in 2006.

- No robust effects of guerilla presence on voting patterns.

- Generally, the data support the idea that paramilitaries have a large impact on elections. Consistent with the case study literature.
Further Evidence

- Consider the vote in 2005 in the senate to re-introduce two clauses of the Justice and Peace Law which had been vetoed in Congress. These two clauses were to stop former paramilitaries being charged with sedition (avoiding possible extradition), and a limit of the length of prison services they could serve.

- Evidence that the presence of paramilitaries in areas where senate lists received a high proportion of their votes helps to predict the way Senators on the list vote.

- This variable also predicts which Senators were subsequently arrested for connections with paramilitaries.

- See Table 1.
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<td>CORDOBA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20.14</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>
Consider now whether or not the persistence of paramilitaries after the 2002 election is related to voting patterns in 2002.

In line with the predictions discussed above, paramilitaries tend to persist more in a municipality, the greater the vote share of President Uribe in 2002. This effect is smaller, the greater was the historical extent of conservative support in the municipality.

The intuition for this last finding is that in places with strong historical support for conservatives Uribe was confident of winning and therefore needs the support of paramilitaries less.
The Symbiotic Relationship

- Large case study literature suggests that Uribe has delivered to paramilitaries (lenient Justice and Peace Law, refusal to support suspension of alternates in the legislature for arrested politicians).
- One can look at the roll call vote in 2004 to change the constitution to allow for Presidential re-election.
- Result: the greater the proportion of votes a Senate list received in paramilitary areas, the greater the proportion of Senators on the list that voted for re-election.
Related idea in Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni: civil wars, and thus the lack of power of the central state in many parts of the territory, persist in many African countries because the elites are afraid of increasing the power of the military.

- Extreme example: Sierra Leone.

The elite (often the politicians controlling the coffers) have a choice:

- Increase the power of the military. This will end the civil war, but then will unleash a series of further political changes, either necessitating greater power sharing with the military, or other political reforms.
- Keep the military weak. This will lead to the persistence of civil wars, but the elite can still grab a little rents.
Conclusions

- Perspective on property rights important.
- Political failures are often associated with weak property rights, expropriation and corruption, leading to low returns.
- But, there are other, richer political economy interactions important in understanding the development process.
- This lecture: two examples,
  1. Entry barriers protecting oligarchies
  2. Power of the state in political equilibrium, interacting with public good provision.