Papers
Working Papers
Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model (joint with Daron Acemoglu)
A Model of Political Repression and Extremism
Publications
A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation (joint with Glenn Ellison) Accepted, RAND Journal of Economics
Reputational Bargaining with Minimal Knowledge of Rationality Econometrica, Accepted.
Cooperation with Network Monitoring Review of Economic Studies, Accepted.
(previous title: "Repeated Public Good Provision")
Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions), Accepted.
Indeterminacy of Reputation Effects in Repeated Games with Contracts (2011) Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 595-607.
The Economics of Labor Coercion (joint with Daron Acemoglu) (2011) Econometrica, 79, 555-600.
Dynamic Monopoly with Relational Incentives (2010) Theoretical Economics, 5, 479-518.
Fully Sincere Voting (2009) Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 720-735.
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