Measuring Strategic Data Manipulation: Evidence from a World Bank Project

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Abstract

We develop new statistical tests to uncover strategic data manipulation that occurs when fraud is committed. Data produced by humans follow different patterns than naturally occurring data, which motivates an analysis of digit distributions. Our method is a battery of 10 digit tests that capture different dimensions of data manipulation and estimate the level of suspected fraud. We apply this method to a World Bank development aid project in Kenya. We find evidence consistent with higher levels of fraud in harder to monitor sectors and in a Kenyan election year when graft also had political value. Our results are validated by a large-scale forensic audit of the same project that was conducted using different techniques, which found extensive levels of suspected fraudulent transactions that correlate by district with our results. This new method is an effective way to detect falsified cost reports and facilitate monitoring in difficult-to-audit circumstances. (JEL Codes: D73, O22, H83, C49)*

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1. Introduction

Fraud is made easier when poorly monitored individuals have greater opportunities to misreport financial data. These opportunities arise out of information asymmetries: between a firm’s owners and its employees or between bureaucrats and the public they serve. Common strategies to reduce the information gap involve greater transparency, monitoring, and auditing. Methods that improve monitoring and that can help guide audits are important for closing this information gap and inhibiting fraudulent conduct.

In this paper, we present a prediction algorithm for detecting aberrant patterns in expenditure reporting data. Our method uses 10 statistical tests that uncover digit patterns arising when humans fabricate data; the number of failed tests predicts the level of suspected fraud. This method exploits the fact that human generated data are different from naturally occurring data. Our method is different from other forms of anti-fraud machine learning, which have focused on reported values such as the debt-to-equity ratio, or institutional details like the presence of a Big 4 auditor (Perols, 2011). Uniquely, our method is externally validated by an independent forensic audit that was conducted on transaction-level data supporting the expenditure totals that we analyze. The outcome of our method, the number of tests failed per district, is statistically significantly correlated with the level of suspected fraudulent and questionable transactions from the forensic audit.¹

Our paper uses a battery of tests that capture various aspects of strategic data manipulation. In one new test, we expand the statistical power of Benford’s Law testing, which checks whether digits conform to the appropriate statistical distribution. In a second new test, we consider the value of the reported digits, and test whether individuals overuse high digits in valuable digit places, reflecting efforts to pad expenditures. This test is particularly important for fraud
detection, because it differentiates the intent to defraud from benign misreporting or error. We supplement these tests with 8 other tests that capture economic and political incentives to steal, as well as the behavioral limitations that humans face when fabricating data.

The data for our paper are from a large World Bank development project in Kenya. In response to an external complaint, the World Bank conducted a two-year forensic audit of the project (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011). It was revealed that, before the forensic audit, the Bank’s financial controls, monitoring, and existing audit mechanisms were not capturing the extreme level of suspected fraud that existed. This case provides an opportunity both to observe heavily manipulated data and to validate our method with a forensic audit.

We expect that this method will prove useful in other settings where monitoring proves challenging, such as investment in developing markets. Indeed, the SEC has recently warned that investors in emerging markets face risk due to limited and unreliable financial reporting (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2020). Our method can be used for ongoing monitoring to achieve early detection of irregularities, and to assist audits by guiding sample selection for deeper investigation. This method also has the advantage that it does not require collaboration with potentially uncooperative auditees.

Our work reveals two important substantive findings. First, we find significant inflation of expenditures during the 2007 Kenyan presidential election year. This is consistent with reports from project staff members that World Bank funds were being syphoned into the Kenyan presidential election campaign of 2007, which is widely accepted to have been a stolen election (Gibson & Long, 2009). Second, all of our tests point to a high level of embezzlement from the project. Our digit tests show a failure rate across Kenyan districts ranging from 3/10 to 7/10, with 7/10 tests failed for all districts. This tracks the findings for the same districts from the
World Bank forensic audit, which shows 44 to 75 percent suspected fraudulent or questionable transactions, with an average of 66 percent across all districts.\textsuperscript{2} Our tests reveal response to economic and political incentives, as well as higher levels of manipulation in harder-to-monitor types of spending, all consistent with rational crime theory (Becker, 1968) and previous empirical results (see, e.g. (Olken B. A., 2007)).

This paper relates to different strains of both the accounting and economics literature. Defond and Zhang (2014) provide a review of the auditing literature in accounting, addressing such issues as audit quality and the role of auditing in diminishing corporate fraud. Duflo et al (2013) show that monitoring the monitors reduces auditor capture in India. Our method addresses both the benefits and limitations of auditing that these literatures identify, as it is a scalable, low-cost monitoring procedure that does not require the cooperation of those who may be implicated in fraud.

In the fraud detection space, our work adds to a growing literature of novel methods for detecting impropriety and measuring data quality. Du et al. (2020) measure the fidelity of firms’ reported earnings using a hidden Markov model. Fang and Gong (2017) present an algorithm for detecting overbilling in medicine by translating procedures billed into hours worked. Perols et al (2017) provide a novel method for fraud detection using data analytic methods based on the partitioning and sampling of data. Our method complements these; while previous papers rely on the values of self-reported data, our method relies instead on the patterns of such data.

Digit analysis and the use of Benford’s Law are not novel to this paper; however, our method both develops new digit tests and sharpens existing methods through improved statistical power. Digit analysis has had considerable impact in forensic auditing (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997; Durtschi, Hillison, & Pacini, 2004), and its other applications to the detection of data
manipulation are widespread.3 We advance this literature in two ways: first, by improving statistical power we allow for the disaggregation of data, which is crucial to pinpointing fraud as a “needle in a haystack.” Second, the existing Benford’s Law literature has focused on aberrant patterns but has failed to distinguish between strategic misreporting, which seeks to gain profit for the fraudster and subvert detection, from innocuous or accidental misreporting.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our dataset and the context of the World Bank project. Section III motivates our digit analysis tests with a discussion of the economics of data manipulation and an overview of the mathematical principles that govern digit distributions. Section IV presents our statistical tests and results. Section V validates our results by comparison to the World Bank forensic audit of the same project. Section VI concludes.

2. Setting and Data

We analyze data from the Kenyan Arid Lands Resource Management Project (World Bank, 2003). This World Bank project ran from 1993 to 2010, eventually serving 11 original arid districts and 17 semi-arid districts that were added after 2003. This community driven development project spent $224 million USD targeting the most impoverished people in the heavily drought-prone regions of Kenya. It funded small infrastructure (such as schools, dispensaries, and water systems), income-generating activities (such as goat restocking), drought and natural resource initiatives, and training exercises for villagers.

The flow of funds for this project followed the standard World Bank model. The loan was made from the Bank to the Kenyan government. The Kenyan government set up a national headquarters office and 28 district offices to run the project; over 400 Kenyans were on staff.
The entire project was overseen by a full-time World Bank permanent staff member based either in Washington or Nairobi. The money flowed from the World Bank to the Kenyan Treasury in tranches approved by the World Bank following review of financial statements. Within Kenya, the headquarters office approved district level budgets (where the majority of the money was spent). Districts spent many of their funds themselves on operations, development projects administered by the district staff, and training exercises. Districts also gave grants for village projects, and the villages submitted their accounts to the district offices. The data used in these analyses are from the original 11 arid districts that received funds from the project and cover the years 2003 to 2009. These districts were all subject to the same project rules and the same level of monitoring. They also share many similar characteristics: their economies depend primarily upon livestock and they are among the poorest in Kenya; they are remote from centers of power, sparsely supplied with infrastructure (roads, schools, health services, access to clean water, and electricity); and their populations are largely uneducated. These similarities are important because they allow us to make the assumption that there were no legitimate reasons to expect differences in digit patterns across districts.

The expenditure and participant data used in these analyses were extracted from quarterly electronic project reports produced by each of the 11 districts. These reports break out the expenditures and numbers of male and female participants associated with most activities undertaken by the project in a given district and year. Each line item expenditure represents the total expenditures for that project, for example: a classroom, a goat restocking project, or a well rehabilitation.

Interview data with project staff indicate that usually only 1 or 2 individuals from a district were involved in reporting the data for a specific project component—usually the district head of
that component and the head of the district office. Components included natural resources and
drought management, community driven development, and support for local development.
These district officers had considerable latitude over the number and magnitude of expenditures
per line item within their budget categories.

The project had several tiers of monitoring oversight. The district staff was subject to
oversight from both project headquarters in Nairobi and to a lesser extent from the World Bank
official overseeing the project. The World Bank official periodically brought in a team of
foreign experts for a supervisory mission that visited offices and toured some of the micro-
development projects. All district offices and the headquarters office were audited at least
annually by the Kenya National Audit Office. In addition, the World Bank supervisor
occasionally hired an external Kenyan auditor to review the accounts of selected districts. All
financial reports were reviewed by the Kenyan Treasury, the World Bank project supervisor, and
the World Bank administration in Washington.

Despite standard World Bank monitoring procedures, there are strong reasons to believe
that embezzlers perceived the probability of detection was low. Over the many years that the
project ran, monitoring missions consistently rated project financial management “satisfactory,”
right up to the beginning of the forensic audit. The project renewal document (World Bank,
2003, p. 84) labelled the financial management and performance of the project “exemplary.”
Further, its financial management system was used as a model for another project (World Bank,
2007). The annual audits by the Kenya National Audit Office did point to relatively minor
financial irregularities from time to time, but nothing that caused much trouble for the project or
staff. In short, a potential embezzler could have arrived at the conclusion that there was little
chance of getting caught, and that if one did get caught, there were few or no consequences.
That was the situation up until 2009. Neither the World Bank’s standard monitoring procedures, nor the Kenyan government’s audits, would have lead an embezzler to anticipate the scrutiny the project eventually received.

In 2009, following an external complaint, the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) began a broad forensic audit of the project that lasted 2 years and culminated in a public report (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011). Auditors sampled 2 years’ worth of receipts for 7 districts, 5 of which were arid districts examined in this analysis. They examined 28,000 transactions. The auditors worked from actual project receipts and supporting documents, such as cashbooks, bank statements, and vehicle logs. They also travelled to the districts to conduct interviews with suppliers to verify the legitimacy of suspicious transactions. We conduct digit analysis on the reported total expenditures for each of these transactions, such as the total cost of a training exercise, while the forensic auditors investigated the underlying individual receipts for the same transactions.

According to the then head of anti-corruption investigations at the World Bank (Stefanovic, 2018), no other field-verified, transaction-based, forensic audit of this scope has taken place for any World Bank project before or since this one.

Two characteristics of the structure of the project’s self-reported data facilitate our analyses. First, we have data from 11 arid districts with similar demographics, livelihoods, and ecological conditions, reporting on similar activities, and subject to the same monitoring, reporting, and project rules. We proceed from the null hypothesis that digit distributions will be similar across districts. Second, we have data on the number of reported participants in hundreds of activities, which are often a count of people who responded to an open invitation for a village training exercise. This allows for comparisons of the digit patterns in financial data with the
patterns in beneficiary data. When the same pattern of deviations from theoretical distributions appears in both the expenditure and the participant datasets, it is strongly indicative of human tampering.

3. Theory

We motivate our statistical testing with a theoretical framework for the incentives of those who are tasked with producing expenditure reports. Those who report, typically bureaucrats, face a decision either to accurately report spending or to fabricate such data. The statistical properties of the observed data result from this decision, and this theoretical framework provides predictions of the differences between legitimate and fabricated data.

3.1 The Statistical Properties of Truthfully Reported Data

Using a set of receipts dedicated to a single transaction, such as the construction of a classroom, an honest bureaucrat calculates the sum of all the construction related receipts and enters the total in the report. These data follow the digit patterns of natural data, as they accurately reflect the data without human interference. Across the socio-economically and ecologically similar regions of this World Bank project, we expect similar patterns in the financial data when reporting is conducted honestly.

Benford’s Law describes the natural distribution of digits in financial data. Benford’s Law is given mathematically by (Hill, 1995):

\[ P(D_1 = d_1, \ldots, D_k = d_k) = \log_{10} \left( \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{k} d_i \times 10^{k-i}} \right) \]

We have, for example, the probability that the first three digits are “452”:
In the first digit place, Benford’s Law produces an expected frequency of 30.1 percent of digit 1 and 4.6 percent of digit 9. In later digit places, this curve flattens, and by the 4\textsuperscript{th} digit place the distribution is nearly identical to the uniform distribution, with expected frequency 10.01 percent of digit 1 and 9.98 percent frequency of digit 9 (Hill, 1995) (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997). Table 1 shows the full digit-by-digit place table of expected frequencies under Benford’s Law. Datasets known to follow Benford’s Law include financial data and population data, but also everything from scientific coefficients to baseball statistics (Amiram, Bozanic, & Rouen, 2015; Diekmann, 2007; Hill, 1995) (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997).

\[ P(D_1 = 4, D_2 = 5, D_3 = 2) = \log_{10} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{452} \right) \]

The intuition behind Benford’s Law is revealed if one imagines it as a piling-up effect: increasing a first digit from 1 to 2 requires a 100 percent increase, while increase from a first digit of 8 to 9 requires a 12 percent increase (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997). Furthermore, Benford’s Law arises from data drawn as random samples from random distributions (Hill, 1995). Because numbers that have been repeatedly multiplied or divided will limit to the Benford distribution (Boyle, 1994), financial data can be expected to follow this natural phenomenon (Hill, 1995) (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997).

The appropriateness of Benford’s Law for analysis of our data set is confirmed by the conformance of the first digits to the Benford distribution, as we show later. The nature of our expenditure data, which are based upon sums of numerous receipts that in turn include sums and multiplication of price times quantity, provides a theoretical basis for why we can expect Benford’s Law to be the appropriate null hypothesis distribution. In our analyses, we
consistently performed robustness checks by also comparing our observed data to the uniform distribution. The statistical significance under the uniform distribution was even greater than those reported here. Finally, regardless of Benford’s Law, tests of later digit places, particularly last digits, should be uniformly distributed under most conditions, and we perform these statistical tests as well.  

3.2 The Statistical Patterns of Manipulated Data

Bureaucrats have an incentive to falsify expenditure data and embezzle both for personal gain as well as to satisfy kickback demands from superiors. Embezzlers weigh the costs and benefits of such behavior, including the probability of getting caught and the size of the penalty, in line with a rational decision to commit crime (Becker, 1968). The costs of getting caught may include payoffs to auditors or others who detect their fraud, or career consequences for those who are sanctioned. There may also be career consequences for refusing to participate in fraud perpetrated by one’s superiors. Cheating behavior may however be inhibited by personal or social values that provide disutility to dishonest behavior.

When a bureaucrat decides to fabricate data, we expect that they will manipulate the data to maximize payout and minimize the probability of detection. This can consist of a variety of behaviors. Bureaucrats falsifying reports are often subject to budget constraints within categories of expenditure but have flexibility over the value of each activity within that category; this was true in the World Bank project we analyzed. Money can be skimmed either by adding line items that were never paid out (for example, ghost employees or trainings that never happened), or by padding the line items of genuine activities. Padding can take many forms, including over-invoicing arrangements with contractors, in which case the outside party was aware, or by
inflating the final expense in the report, which puts a premium upon keeping the reporting secret so that the contractors, beneficiaries, and other potential whistle blowers never know the official expenditure claimed for a project. In line with a rational decision to commit fraud, we can expect that reporters increase data tampering in response to greater incentives to steal, and attempt to produce data that appear random to subvert detection. Furthermore, we expect that bureaucrats expend lower effort in subverting detection for data that are less likely to be monitored.

Bureaucrats who choose to produce false data face behavioral limitations on their ability to successfully do so. When experimental subjects are asked to produce random numbers, studies consistently show patterns of human digit preferences. In a study where students were asked to make up strings of 25 digits, their results followed neither the Benford distribution nor the uniform distribution (Boland & Hutchinson, 2000). The patterns produced by the subjects varied greatly, with individuals exhibiting different preferences for certain digits. Other experiments have shown similar results of individual digit preferences, confirming the inability of humans to produce random digits (Chapanis, 1995; Rath, 1966).

It is possible that specific digit preferences are culturally influenced, in which case it is instructive to have a culturally representative baseline for comparison. Evidence of specific digit preferences from Africa comes from an overview of African census data. A phenomenon known as age heaping occurs when people are approximating their age; demographic records show a preference for certain ages. Many Africans of older generations do not know their exact age, and their responses to census takers represent their best approximation. This is an example of humanly generated data that shows specific digit preferences. Among the African censuses, we see a strong preference for the digits 0 and 5, with secondary strong preferences for 2 and 8, and
disuse of 1 and 9 (Nagi, Stockwell, & Snavley, 1973; UN Economic and Social Council Economic Comission for Africa, 1986). These same digit patterns occur in our data; both 0 and 5 are so heavily overrepresented that we omit them in many of our analyses and analyze only digits 1-4 and 6-9.

4. Digit Tests and Results

We provide a set of non-overlapping tests that capture different ways in which data can be manipulated. Our tests fall into four categories: a novel test to increase statistical power, tests of strategic intent to deceive, tests that measure responses to incentives, and robustness checks that include standard tests from the literature. To account for multiple tests, we use a Bonferroni correction: we divide our desired significance level (.05) by the number of tests (10) and set a significant level of $p = .005$, used throughout our analyses.

4.1. Increasing Statistical Power: All Digit Places Beyond the First

A simple, powerful test of data manipulation is conformance of the observed digits to Benford’s Law. Such tests are frequently performed in a single digit place, using the first, second, or last digit place (Diekmann, 2007; Beber & Scacco, 2012). In implementing our test, we take two novel approaches. First, we test multiple digit places simultaneously. Compared with single digit place tests, a simultaneous analysis of multiple digit places increases sample size for statistical testing and therefore vastly increases statistical power. The increase in sample size afforded by simultaneous digit place analysis is especially helpful when analysis can benefit from data disaggregation, resulting in low $n$. Second, we omit the first digit when conducting this analysis, because individuals tampering with data may not have complete control
over the leading digit or may avoid changing it to subvert detection. This has the potential of a more powerful fraud detector because the noise of the first digit, which may have been left clean strategically, is eliminated. The first digit test is presented as a robustness check later.

We use a two-way chi square test to compare the contingency table of all digit places beyond the first against the Benford distribution. We omit 0 and 5 from this analysis, which may be subject to rounding for legitimate reasons, and which we handle separately in a test for excess rounding. For each digit place (2nd digit, 3rd digit, etc.), the frequency of each digit (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9) is compared with the expected frequencies given in Table 1.

Figures 1 and 2 present the data of all digit places beyond the first for expenditure (Figure 1) and participant data (Figure 2). The data are projected onto one axis for visualization. Among the expenditure data for all districts in Figure 1, we see a strong preference for digits 2 and 8, underreporting of 1 and 9, and overall non-conformance to the expected Benford distribution ($p = 3.9 \times 10^{-15}$). Strikingly, these same digit patterns appear in the participant data (Figure 2), and the result for all district data combined is again highly significant ($p = 5.7 \times 10^{-51}$). This pattern is also consistent with the humanly generated African census pattern described earlier.

In 8 of our 11 districts we reject the null hypothesis that all digit places conform to Benford’s Law for both the expenditure data and the participant data at the $p < 0.005$ level.

[Figure 1 Here]

[Figure 2 Here]

The lack of conformance to the expected distribution, consistency with known humanly generated data from African census studies, and similar patterns across both expenditure and participant data, are strong indicators that these data have been tampered with.\textsuperscript{10}

4.2. Strategic Intent: Padding Valuable Digit Places
The first test demonstrates that the data do not conform to Benford’s Law, but does not demonstrate the directionality of how people are manipulating the digits. Evidence that data are being fabricated consistently in the direction of increasing payment to the embezzlers is important evidence of intentionality. While there may be a strong correlation between firms and individuals whose paperwork is sometimes incomplete or missing, and actual embezzlement, it is not necessarily the case that sloppy bookkeepers are misappropriating funds. For this reason, evidence that points to consistently profitable deviations from expected digit distributions, or evidence of strategic efforts to avoid detection, bring us a step closer to deducing intent to defraud.

As discussed in Section 3.2, bureaucrats falsifying data can be expected to inflate values in order to receive greater illicit reimbursement. We identify padding of expenditures by measuring overuse of high digits based on the monetary value of the digit place. We hypothesize that individuals fabricating data do so strategically, and therefore place additional high digits in the more valuable digit places.

Benford’s Law governs the distribution of digits by the number of positions from the left (1st digit, 2nd digit). However, the value of a digit depends on the digit’s position from the right (e.g. 1s, 10s, 100s place), and this value determines the incentive to manipulate a digit. Therefore, basic tests of conformance to Benford’s law are not sensitive to the value of the digit being manipulated.

To overcome this limitation, we compute the expected mean under Benford’s Law by digit place from the right (10s, 100s), using the length of the numbers in our dataset to match left-aligned digit places and right-aligned digit places. We compare the observed mean of our data to the expected mean under Benford’s Law. This is the difference of means statistic, for which a
positive value indicates a mean greater than the expected mean under Benford’s Law. We then perform a Monte Carlo simulation of 100,000 Benford-distributed digits in each digit place, compare the difference-of-means statistic of the project data to the simulated data, and find the probability of observing our results under the Benford distribution. Appendix A contains technical details of this process.

Figure 3 shows the project data against the Benford expected distribution. The 0 line indicates the Benford mean; anything above the line represents an overuse of high digits, and anything below the line represents an underuse. The project data in the 10,000s place exceed 100 percent of the 100,000 simulated Benford-conforming datasets ($p = 1.0 \times 10^{-5}$). We also see a significantly high mean ($p = 2.3 \times 10^{-4}$) in the thousands place. At the district level there is statistically significant evidence of padding in the 10,000’s place for 8 of 11 districts. Ten thousand Kenyan shillings was worth approximately $150 USD in 2007.

[Figure 3 here]

Perhaps the most interesting finding in Figure 3, which points to intention to conceal, is the decline in the use of high digits as one goes from the 10,000s to the 1,000s, 100s, 10s, and 1s places. This is consistent with a strategy of padding extra high digits in the high value places and compensating by underutilizing high numbers in the low digit places. The human data generators may have been trying to avoid detection from an auditor or supervisor, who might otherwise have noticed the overuse of high numbers in any given table in the report.

Next, we test for response to incentives. We begin with political incentives to embezzle additional money in a presidential election year. We then turn to two examples consistent with the hypothesis that embezzlers divert their cheating behavior to places where they are less likely to be detected.
4.3. **Response to Incentives: Election Year Effects**

Interview data frequently cited the connection between syphoned project funds and the controversial presidential political campaign of 2007. The association between corruption and political campaigns has also been noted in other studies (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008). The next test partitions our data by project year to examine whether the evidence is consistent with higher rates of embezzlement in the presidential election year 2007. We look for padding of high digit numbers by project year by analyzing the proportion of high to low digits (6, 7, 8, and 9 versus 1, 2, 3, and 4) in all digit places beyond the first. We conduct a chi-square test on the contingency table of high versus low digits in each digit place. We expect that the probabilities of high and low digits should follow the total probability of those digits from Benford’s Law in each digit place. We project this contingency table onto one axis for visualization.

As we see in Figure 4, while all other years slightly underused high digits on average, in 2007 (the only presidential election year) there was a statistically significant overuse of high digits ($p = 6.5 \times 10^{-6}$). This is consistent with a greater incentive to embezzle during a presidential election year to support political campaigns.

[Figure 4 here]

4.4. **Response to Incentives: Sector Effects**

Economic theory (Becker, 1968) and empirical work e.g. (Olken B. A., 2007) indicate that individuals are more likely to cheat when there is a lower risk of detection. The training and transport sectors of this (travel, fuel, and vehicle maintenance) provided greater opportunities for
individuals to pad expenditures when compared to the civil works and goods and equipment sectors, because the latter left physical evidence of spending, while the former did not. For example, tracking down nomads who were reported as present for a training exercise in a remote village two years prior to an audit is all but impossible. Similarly, project fuel can be diverted to private vehicles while leaving no trace. Therefore, we predict that individuals fabricating data for these sectors may do so with less effort expended on deception. To detect this, we look for evidence of a greater incidence of repeated numbers among training, travel and vehicle expenditures. We plot the percentage of repeated line items that match year, district, and amount, for each of the districts by sector. Figure 5 shows this result.

For each district, we conduct a Welch’s unequal variance t-test of the number of repeats in the training and transport sector versus the civil works and goods and equipment sectors combined. Seven of 11 districts and the all district test have statistically higher repeats in that sector. Turkana, Garissa, and Tana River Districts, where other sectors have higher percentages of repeats, provide evidence that there is no structural reason for this phenomenon. Given that most of these line items are at least five digits, exact digit repetition is not likely to be common, yet we find that exact repeats in the training sector make up 55 percent of line items in Baringo, but only five percent in Turkana. While we don’t know what the empirically honest level of repeating should be, there is no known legitimate reason for there to be more repeated line items in some districts than others.

The difference in rates of repeating across districts likely reflects differences in vulnerability to monitoring among different political territories. For example, Baringo is the home of former President Moi, who was still immensely powerful and may have provided
political cover from project oversight. While measurement of political “protection” is beyond the scope of this paper, our tests explore the extent to which districts vary in their response to monitoring.

4.5. Response to Incentives: Unpacking Rounded Numbers

Project staff had an incentive to inflate the number of participants in training activities because they claimed food expenses for each participant at 100 Kenyan Shillings (about $1.50 USD) per person, per day. The authors of the annual district reports also had reason to expect that participant data would not be as carefully scrutinized as expenditure data. First, the impact of participants on expenditures was obscured because it was only one component of the full costs of a single training exercise, and second, training exercises in remote villages are notoriously difficult to verify. With the threat of oversight reduced, we speculate that less effort was devoted to covering up data fabrication.

We further surmise that officers fabricating participant data may have begun with an embezzlement target in mind, which they converted to a round number of participants. This total number of participants was then split into males and females, as was required for reporting. Therefore, we expect greater indicators of data fabrication when the total number of male and female participants sums to a round number.

To test this, we analyze the distribution of all but first digits of numbers of total participants (males and females) when their sum ends in a 0 versus a non-0 digit. We perform a chi-square test on the contingency table of digits in digit places beyond the first, versus Benford’s Law. Theoretically, the breakout of participant data by gender should show statistically identical digit distributions between these conditions. However, we see a much higher instance of 2s and 8s
and low incidence of 1s and 9s when the gender specific data come from a pooled number that ends in 0 (Figure 6A). This pattern is consistent with humanly generated data and not with naturally occurring data. There is still evidence of human generation in the data when the gender total is not round, Figure 6B ($p = 1.9 \times 10^{-6}$), but the statistical significance is even higher in the rounded data, Figure 6A ($p = 2.6 \times 10^{-64}$ in the sample of all districts). For 8 out of 11 districts, we reject the null hypothesis that the total of male and female participant data are Benford conforming ($p < 0.005$).

[Figure 6AB here]

Our remaining four tests are adapted and modified from existing literature. These tests encompass a set of digit analytic techniques common in the forensic analysis literature but with improved statistical power due to small innovations in how our tests are conducted. We include them to demonstrate robustness and to simultaneously add additional dimensions to our multiple test analysis prior to our exploration of its external validity.

4.6. Robustness Checks: Comparisons of District Patterns in Rounding and Repeating

Our next two tests uncover patterns consistent with human tampering, as evidenced by substantial variation across districts without a plausible, naturally occurring explanation. It is common for auditors to look for both high levels of rounded and repeated data, and these are often viewed as potential evidence of human tampering (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997; Nigrini, Benford's Law, 2012). In the absence of theoretically acceptable levels of rounding and repeating, we compare districts to each other, as there is no known reason to expect differences among them.
The Kenyan shilling was 66 to $1 USD in 2008. Its value was low enough that many receipt data would legitimately show high levels of 0s and 5s in the terminal digit places. However, one must bear in mind that these expenditure data represent sums of many receipts; it takes only one receipt ending in a non-0 or 5 to create a different terminal digit for the entire transaction, and it is these transaction totals that we are examining.

We count the number of rounded digits, tallying the number of trailing 0s (0, 00, 000, etc.), or digits in terminal strings of 5, 50, or 500, as a fraction of the number of digits in each line item. For example: the number 30,000 has 4 rounded digits out of 5 (80%); the number 12,350 has 2 rounded digits out of 5 (40%); and the number 11,371 has 0 rounded digits. Rather than indicating individual line items, counting rounded digits is a more sensitive indicator because it penalizes use of numbers such as 10,000 (4 rounded digits) more than the use of a number such as 10,600 (2 rounded digits).

Figure 7 shows the average percentage of rounded digits by district:

[Figure 7 Here]

While we don’t know the empirically honest level of rounding that should occur in the dataset, there is good reason to expect that the same type of retailers, servicing the same type of contracts in economically and demographically similar districts, practiced the same rates of rounding. In the absence of an expected level of rounding, we compare districts to each other. For each district, we conduct a Welch’s unequal variances t-test to compare the mean percentage rounding to all other districts. For example, the statistical test for Baringo compare the level of rounding in Baringo to the level of rounding in the 10 other districts combined. We conduct a one-tailed test to check for excessive rounding and define statistical significance at p < 0.005.
Exactly repeated numbers are also a red flag for auditors (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997). Our hypothesis is that embezzlers expended less effort in data fabrication when there was less reason to expect scrutiny. Repeated values are consistent with low-effort data fabrication. One such example is remote training exercises, which are particularly hard to verify, as we discussed earlier.

A specific example from the Tana District Report of 2003-6 illustrates the problem of repeated data (Republic of Kenya, 2006). On page 49, we find 8 training exercises listed that took place in different villages for three weeks, each from March 5-27. The district had neither enough vehicles, nor enough training staff to run 8 simultaneous trainings. Among the 8 expenditures listed, we find the identical cost (245,392 Kenyan Shillings) listed for 3 different trainings, and another number (249,447) exactly repeated twice. Trainings are the summed costs of the per diems for 4-5 trainers and 1 driver (at different rates), the cost of fuel to the destination, stationary for the seminar, and 100 Kenyan Shillings per day, per trainee, for food costs. The number of trainees for each of these seminars is listed, and they range from 51 to 172. The expenses reported do not track the estimated food costs, as one would expect; indeed, the cost of training for 172 trainees should have exceeded all of the amounts listed.

In our calculations, repeating numbers refer to the use of identical expenditure amounts for completely different activities. We define an exact repeat to be an expenditure matching year, district, sector, and expenditure value. There is no correction for rounding in the repeating data, as we wish to maintain the independence of our tests for rounding and repeating.

Figure 8 shows the results for the percentage of line items that repeat exactly. As with rounding, the empirically truthful level of repeating is unknown but there is no reason for patterns across districts to differ. We compare each district’s average amount of rounding to all
other districts, using a Welch’s unequal variance t-test, and conduct a one-tailed test for excessive rounding as compared to all other districts. We see wide variation across districts: Baringo approaches 50 percent, while Turkana repeats about 5 percent. Figures 7 and 8 flag different districts in rounding and repeating behavior, indicating that these two tests pick up different signals. This test also differs from the test of repeats by sector: the sector test compared differences in repeating within a district, with the assumption that repeating should be constant across sectors. This test explicitly compares the number of repeats across districts, on the basis that repeating should be constant in different geographical regions.

[Figure 8 here]

4.7. Robustness Checks: First Digits

Next, we test conformance to the Benford distribution in the first digit place of the expenditure data, where we expect digits to follow (Hill, 1995):

\[
P(\text{First Digit} = d) = \log_{10} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{d} \right)
\]

Figure 9A plots this distribution as a solid line and shows the conformance of the first digits to Benford’s Law. Data from the full sample of districts are not statistically significantly different from the expected distribution \((p = 0.089)\) under a chi-square test. This supports the hypothesis that Benford’s Law is the appropriate theoretical distribution for our dataset. Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that all of the first digit data are unmanipulated. First, people may resist tampering with the first digit to avoid detection. Second, pooled data may cancel out different individual signatures of manipulation and replicate Benford’s Law (Diekmann, 2007). This becomes evident when we look at the data from individual districts where the reports were constructed. Figure 9B shows the first digits from Ijara district, with \(p = \)
2.3 \times 10^{-13}. Ijara District uses the digit 2 in the first digit place almost twice as often as predicted. Seven of our 11 districts are significantly different from Benford’s Law at the \( p < 0.005 \) level.

[Figure 9AB here]

4.8. Robustness Checks: Digit Pairs

Underuse of digit pairs, e.g. 11, 22…99, is a common feature of humanly produced data (Boland & Hutchinson, 2000; Chapanis, 1995). Other applications of digit analysis examine the last two digits (Nigrini, 2012), or explicitly test for digit pairs (Beber & Scacco, 2012).

Among the participant data, we expect a uniform distribution of terminal pairs, 9 of 99 pairs. We omit the pair 00, in case it is affected by rounding. We compare the observed number of digit pairs against the expected proportion using a binomial test, where the number of trials is the total combination of terminal digits observed. These data most typically record the number of women and men (listed separately) who showed up in response to an open invitation to appear for a training exercise in their village. To avoid use of first digits, we use participant data only if it has 3 or more digit places. This test is performed on the sum of male and female participants. A digit pair analysis of participant data is shown in Figure 10. Five of the 11 districts significantly underuse final digit pairs in the participant data at \( p < 0.005 \) significance, as does the combined sample of all districts (\( p = 2.5 \times 10^{-10} \)).

[Figure 10 here]

Due to the low value of the Kenyan shilling, rounding in the last digit places may be legitimate in expenditure data. Therefore, an equivalent analysis of expenditure data is not justified, as an underuse of digit pairs (e.g. 22) is confounded by a legitimate use of rounding.
(e.g. 20). For this reason, we confine our analysis to the beneficiary data, where there is no legitimate reason for rounding in the ones place, as participant data are reported as exact counts of people who show up.

4.9. **Summary: Application of Digit Tests**

These ten tests, taken together, comprise a set of largely non-overlapping analyses along different dimensions of potential data manipulation. We expect that our new tests, especially the powerful test using all digit places, and our second test, which can capture strategic padding of high digit places, should prove useful in many contexts. By facilitating the full use of our attribute data, this battery of tests helps reveal the magnitude of potential fraud in this project, as well as the important finding that aid funds were very likely being diverted to campaign coffers during a highly controversial presidential election year that lead to extreme violence (Gibson & Long, 2009).

This exact battery of tests is not a turnkey system for digit analysis in all circumstances. Some characteristics of this dataset, such as the comparison of expenditure to beneficiary tests, are particular to these data. The exact set of tests that can be performed on other datasets depends on both the incentives for manipulation in that dataset, as well as the specifics of the
attribute data that are available. Our 10 tests serve as an example of the power one can achieve with these techniques.

5. Establishing External Validity: Comparing Digit Analysis to The World Bank Forensic Audit and to Qualitative Data from the Field

The existence of both an independent forensic audit for this World Bank project and rich qualitative data from the field, provides us with a unique opportunity to establish the external validity of our new tests and of digit analysis in general.

5.1 The World Bank Forensic Audit

Table 2 compiles the results of 10 tests for each district. To address type 1 error due to the number of tests we conduct, we perform a Bonferroni correction and divide our desired significance level (0.05) by the number of tests (10). This sets a significance level of 0.005. These 10 tests avoid almost all overlap and pinpoint different aspects of data manipulation. In the bottom row, we sum the number of failed tests by district, which averages 5.4 out of 10 and ranges from 3 to 8.

[Table 2 here]

The results of our method are statistically significantly correlated with the results of the World Bank’s forensic audit. In Table 3 we compare the results of our digit analyses by district to the results of the World Bank forensic auditors (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011). The World Bank audit found that 4 of the 5 districts for which we have both digit and audit results had 62-75 percent suspected fraudulent or questionable expenditures. In our digit analysis, we rejected the null hypotheses for those same 4 districts in 5 to 6 of our 10 digit tests.
The remaining district, Tana River, had lower levels of suspected fraud in the audit than the other districts (44 percent), and we rejected the null on 3 of our 10 digit tests. A Pearson’s correlation test of the 5 districts for which we have both digit tests and the World Bank audit shows a correlation of .984, and a 95% confidence interval of [.784, .999]. We reject the null hypothesis of no correlation at the 5% significance level, with $p = 0.0022$. The World Bank’s forensic audit confirms the findings from our digit analysis tests.

[Table 3 here]

We also find significant digit violations in all of the unaudited districts we examine, which is consistent with the conclusions of the auditors that these problems were systemic throughout all sectors and all districts of the project. Of the remaining 6 districts that were not audited by the World Bank, we see that half (Mandera, Ijara, Baringo) have among the highest number of digit analysis violations (8, 7, and 6) in our sample. This underscores the potential gains of using digit analysis as a diagnostic for targeting costly auditing techniques to ensure that the worst offenders are not missed.

5.2 Qualitative Data from the Field

Qualitative research has the advantage that it can provide the substantive details necessary to understand how complex systems work. It provides the context to identify conflicting incentives and design flaws exacerbating the risk of fraud. While forensic audits and digit analysis help us identify specific instances and levels of likely fraud, they do not provide all the information required to design better monitoring systems to control future fraud. This section draws from thousands of pages of interviews with people familiar with this project’s operation. To understand how the project operated on the ground, we draw upon the insider knowledge of
project employees and beneficiaries, contractors, consultants, civil servants, World Bank employees, investigative reporters, politicians, and members of civil society (see Ensminger, 2017 for more details).

The Arid Lands project functioned within the corrupt institutional environment of Kenya. In 2009, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Kenya 146th out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2009). Both then and now, Kenya qualifies as a systemically corrupt country: corruption and impunity are the norm, and the political system facilitates the theft of government resources, including those from projects such as this one. Independent interviews and the INT forensic audit provide cross-corroborating details pointing to high-level government complicity in this theft.11

The specified flow of project funds was from the Kenyan Treasury to the project headquarters to districts and then villages. According to diverse sources, the reality was that there were kickbacks flowing up and out at every level. Demands for kickbacks began with senior government officials external to the project. It is alleged that headquarters staff met some of those demands with funds embezzled from their own budget. However, the project specified that the bulk of the funds had to be sent to the districts, which posed a challenge for headquarters staff to get that money back. Interviewees report that this occurred in the form of monthly “envelopes” sent from districts back to headquarters as kickbacks. Some districts were able to avoid many requests from headquarters for kickbacks because their districts were home to powerful national political actors who provided protection. But in many cases, this did not mean less embezzlement, just different recipients.

Even accounting for the corrupt environment in which this project operated, the fraud risk of this project was exacerbated by poor design. Two of these design flaws can be directly linked
to resulting weakness in the monitoring systems: staff hiring and staff discretion in the choice of which villages received projects.

It is often said that the “tone at the top” matters. This is arguable even more the case when the surrounding institutional environment is systemically corrupt. Many of the senior staff in the Arid Lands project were seconded from their permanent ministry jobs, to which they expected to return, thus creating conflicts of interest and dual loyalty. This arrangement produced pressure to engage in fraud in collaboration with their home ministries. The project was effectively plugged directly into existing corruption networks that syphoned funds from the project upward to senior politicians and government civil servants. These features differentiate the project from a more successful World Bank community-driven development project in Indonesia (the KDP). Specifically because the designers of the Indonesian project understood that they were operating in a similarly corrupt institutional environment, they went out of their way to create recruitment mechanisms independent of corruption centers in the government (Guggenheim, Crises and Contradictions: Understanding the Origins of a Community Development Project in Indonesia, 2006) (Guggenheim & Wong, 2005).

Given the pressure on the top layer of Arid Lands management to kick funds upward, in addition to their desire for personal accumulation, it was important that they have obedient subordinate staff beneath them, especially in the districts. According to numerous sources, this was achieved by hiring staff who were underqualified for their jobs. Many did not have the minimum educational qualifications required for their jobs and were not subjected to competitive selection. Their high opportunity costs meant that they were more likely to comply with corrupt demands from headquarters.
A second design flaw resulted from granting the district officers nearly complete discretion over the selection of villages receiving projects. Project guidelines specified that selected villages would choose their own committees to manage the finances and monitor the project. In reality, the district officers were often approached by savvy villagers who agreed to collaborate with the officers in exchange for negotiated kickbacks from the village project (see Ensminger (2017) for details). As co-conspirators with the district offices, the village oversight committees aligned with the district staff against the interests of their own villagers. Many alternative designs would have improved upon this one. For example, the more successful Indonesian KDP project employed a competitive village selection model for projects (Chavis, 2010).

The design flaws in staffing and village selection contributed to many of the monitoring issues in the project. Village committees were tasked with monitoring their own projects, together with district project staff, but as we have noted, they were collaborating in the fraud. Villagers themselves faced information asymmetries and incentives that hindered whistleblowing. First, it was not in the interest of either the district officers or the village committee to share the project specifications with the community. Without knowing what they were supposed to be receiving, it was impossible for villagers to know if funds were being misused. Second, the villagers were easily intimidated. The intended beneficiaries of these micro projects were truly the world’s poorest citizens, living on less than $2 per day. They were grateful for any benefits from the project. It took years for individual villagers to begin to protest. Given the staffing problem from top to bottom, there was almost no one for them to complain to who had power within the organization. Villagers were often bought off cheaply. If they persisted, the village was threatened that it would be cut-off from all future projects. This
was the result of vesting monopoly discretion for the allocation of projects with the district offices; their leverage over villagers was all but absolute.

Given all of the alleged embezzlement in this project, it is worth exploring how the World Bank’s internal supervision processes failed to catch the ongoing fraud. Numerous Kenyan government and World Bank offices signed off on regular financial reviews. A task team leader (TTL) from the World Bank was assigned to overall supervision, and the TTL brought in regular oversight missions of oversees experts. The Kenya National Audit Office conducted annual audits of all of the project’s offices, and the TTL also commissioned special audits from the Nairobi branch of international audit firms for subsets of districts.

One explanation for poor World Bank supervision is misaligned incentives. World Bank financial management staff, task team leaders, and outside missions are resource and time constrained. World Bank project managers themselves perceive that the Bank does not create the right incentives for them to engage in monitoring and evaluation (Mansuri & Rao, 2013, p. 302). To the extent that task team leaders are rewarded by the size of their project portfolios, finding evidence of large-scale fraud in one’s own projects is not likely to be a career-advancing move. Conflicts of interest were also present in the task team leader’s management of the outside experts brought in to provide periodic oversight. Many staff on this project commented that the same experts appeared time and again to oversee the project; they felt that fresh eyes that were less friendly with project management would have been more likely to see the problems. Outside experts may also face conflicts of interest, including real or perceived pressure to give positive evaluations in order to continue their relationship with the task team leader and to stay in
good graces with the World Bank. These conflicts of interest are analogous to those between firms and outside auditors.

Both standard internal and external auditing of this project failed to catch most of the kinds of abuses flagged by the World Bank’s forensic audit. Numerous interviewees described the friendly relations enjoyed between the project staff and the regular Kenyan auditors who visited headquarters and the districts annually. As described, there was more socializing than examination of accounts, and the same auditors returned year after year. The project officers were less worried about professional or legal ramifications if the auditors found issues than they were that this would increase the leverage that auditors had over the office to extract a higher bribe. A particularly compelling report about the bribing of auditors came from a petrol station owner in a district capital: he explained that he always knew ahead of time when the project’s auditors were about to arrive in town. He did business with the project and had large cash holdings. Just before the auditors arrived, the project staff would visit him to collect 200,000 Kenyan shillings (about $3000) to pay the auditors. These funds were repaid in over-invoiced petrol. The World Bank task team leader also ordered periodic audits of select districts from international firms in Nairobi. According to interviewees who were closely involved, those audits were just as unsatisfactory as the ones run by the Kenyan National Audit Office.

The qualitative investigation of this project points to many ways in which project design contributed to fraud risk and the reasons why standard World Bank supervision failed to catch it. What happened with the findings of the forensic audit speaks volumes about the enduring systemic nature of corruption in Kenyan institutions. Upon completion of their audit, the Integrity Vice-Presidency of the World Bank filed their report (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011), conducted a joint exercise with the Kenya National Audit Office to validate
their results, and also made that report public (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency and
Internal Audit Department, Treasury, Government of Kenya, 2011). In a highly unusual action,
the Kenyan Government was required to repay $3.8 million USD of the inappropriately
accounted funds from their sample. INT then submitted their supporting evidence to the Kenyan
Anti-Corruption Agency (KACC) for follow-up investigation. To the best of our knowledge, no
further investigation was undertaken and no one from the project was indicted or prosecuted.

6. Conclusion

We present new methods to detect data tampering and demonstrate their use on data from a
World Bank project in Kenya. In circumstances where auditing is difficult, high levels of fraud
can persist, driven by the information asymmetry between those administering money and those
providing the funds. Our statistical tests rely on expenditure reports to find patterns consistent
with profitable misreporting and attempts to evade detection. An independent forensic audit of
the same project strongly correlates with our digit analysis results, lending external validity to
the method and the substantive findings. This algorithm helps close the gap of information that
allows such misreporting.

Our method involves new statistical tests that will be broadly applicable to the study of
misreported data. Our new test of overuse of high digits in valuable digit places relates aberrant
digit patterns to the monetary value of the digit place and uncovers patterns consistent with
profitable deviations as well as attempts to evade detection. This is consistent with intentional
behavior and underscores the value of our method in circumstances where those committing
fraud seek to avoid detection. Another of our new tests, employing Benford’s Law to analyze
multiple digit places, provides a statistically powerful test applicable to even relatively small
datasets. The ability to work on smaller sample sizes allows more multi-dimensional analyses, such as our comparisons across districts, years, and sectors.

The substantive findings of this project attest to the need for, and importance of, better measures and identification of fraud. The forensic auditors determined that 66% of the district transactions they examined were suspected fraudulent or questionable. On average, the districts we examined failed 53% of the all district digit tests. We also demonstrate that more suspicious patterns emerge in a presidential election year, consistent with allegations that World Bank funds were illegally diverted to fund political campaigns. Tools such as this one that help facilitate monitoring are critical to help prevent similar issues in the future.

This method works even when traditional forms of monitoring are challenging or expensive, as is often the case in the developing world. Our method could have been used in real time monitoring of this project to reduce potential fraud, or in the forensic audit of this project to identify and target the worst offending districts, three of which were missed in the World Bank audit sample. In addition, it requires minimal cooperation from those inside the organization or government, who may have an incentive to impede an investigation. Auditors and monitors, particularly those operating in contexts with weak oversight and institutional barriers to fraud, will benefit from the use of this method.

We foresee the use of our method in a variety of new applications. Firms that invest in developing markets may choose to use our method to conduct their own form of monitoring. This method can be used to test the authenticity of data supplied by governments in compliance with international ecological and environmental agreements, or to verify pollution and labor data supplied for treaty compliance. In the modern environment where big data proliferates, stronger tools to analyze these data for strategic and profitable manipulation are necessary.
Bibliography


### TABLE 1: EXPECTED DIGIT FREQUENCIES UNDER BENFORD’S LAW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Digit</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.1197</td>
<td>0.1018</td>
<td>0.1002</td>
<td>0.10002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3010</td>
<td>0.1139</td>
<td>0.1014</td>
<td>0.1001</td>
<td>0.10001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1761</td>
<td>0.1088</td>
<td>0.1010</td>
<td>0.1001</td>
<td>0.10001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1249</td>
<td>0.1043</td>
<td>0.1006</td>
<td>0.1001</td>
<td>0.10001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0969</td>
<td>0.1003</td>
<td>0.1002</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>0.10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.0792</td>
<td>0.0967</td>
<td>0.0998</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>0.10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0669</td>
<td>0.0934</td>
<td>0.0994</td>
<td>0.0999</td>
<td>0.09999</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0.0999</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0512</td>
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<td>0.0986</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0458</td>
<td>0.0850</td>
<td>0.0983</td>
<td>0.0998</td>
<td>0.09998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source is (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997, p. 54)
We ran 10 digit tests on each of 11 districts. The tests were chosen to analyze different, non-overlapping aspects of the data. Given the large number of tests, a Bonferroni correction was used to establish 0.005 as the acceptable $p$ – value for our tests. Failed tests at the 0.005 level are indicated in bold. We tabulate the number of significant tests for each district in the bottom row.
# TABLE 3. DIGIT TESTS BY DISTRICT COMPARED TO WORLD BANK INT FORENSIC AUDIT RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Digit Tests (Number Failed Out of 10)</th>
<th>INT Audit (Percent Suspected Fraudulent and Questionable Transactions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wajir</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garissa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tana</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandra</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Not Audited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijara</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Audited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baringo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Not Audited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyale</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not Audited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsabit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not Audited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not Audited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source for the INT forensic audit data is (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011).
FIGURE 1: ALL DIGIT PLACES BEYOND THE FIRST AGAINST BENFORD’S LAW FOR EXPENDITURE DATA

All districts combined \( p = 3.9 \times 10^{-15}; n = 9371 \).
FIGURE 2: ALL DIGIT PLACES BEYOND THE FIRST AGAINST BENFORD’S LAW FOR PARTICIPANT DATA

All districts combined ($p = 5.7 \times 10^{-51}; n = 7385$).
We compare the observed mean by digit place from the right to the Benford expected mean in each sector. Zero reflects conformance to the Benford expected mean. Positive values indicate the mean is higher than Benford’s Law predicts. The observed pattern is consistent with a strategy of high digits in high digit value places and then underusing them in low digit value places to even out the digit distribution. We perform a Monte Carlo simulation of Benford-conforming datasets and compare our observed statistics to the simulated statistics to produce p-values. Compared to a sample of 100,000 simulations, using data from all sectors, we observe the following statistics: 10,000s place \( p = 1.0 \times 10^{-5} \), 1,000s \( p = 2.3 \times 10^{-4} \), 100s \( p = 0.33 \), 10s \( p = 0.10 \), 1s \( p = 0.061 \).
FIGURE 4: ELECTION YEAR EFFECTS IN EXPENDITURE DATA

Percentage of high digits (6, 7, 8, 9 versus 1, 2, 3, 4) in all digit places but the first, for all districts, by year. 2007 was a Presidential election year. 2007 has a statistically significant presence of high digits ($p = 6.5 \times 10^{-6}; n = 1945$.)
Percentage of line item expenditures repeated exactly, matching on district, year, and sector. We test whether harder-to-verify expenditures from training exercises, travel, and vehicles are more likely to be repeated than expenditures in civil works projects and purchases of goods and equipment. The districts of Baringo, Ijara, Isiolo, Mandera, Marsabit, Samburu and Wajir, and all districts combined, show statistically significantly higher repeats ($p < 0.005$).
Digit breakout of all but the first digit (excluding 0s and 5s) when the total of male and female participants sums to a rounded number or an unrounded number. For the rounded data, $p = 2.6 \times 10^{-64}; n = 2975$. For the unrounded data, $p = 1.9 \times 10^{-6}; n = 4410$. 
Average percentage of digit places rounded in expenditure data by district. For each district, we compare the level of rounding to the level in all other districts and conduct a one-tailed t-test for excessive rounding. Ijara, Isiolo, Mandera, and Marsabit are statistically significant in their overuse of rounding ($p < 0.005$).
Percentage of exactly repeated expenditure entries by district for a given annual report. For each district, we compare the level of repeating to the level in all other districts and conduct a one-tailed t-test for excessive repeats. Baringo, Isiolo, and Mandera are statistically significant in their overuse of repeating ($p < 0.005$).
(A) All districts combined ($p = 0.089; n = 4339$). (B) Ijara District only ($p = 2.3 \times 10^{-13}; n = 386$).
We test for underuse of digit pairs such as 11, 22, and 33. Baringo, Garissa, Ijara, Marsabit, Wajir, and all districts underuse digit pairs under a binomial test with $p < 0.005$. 
Appendix A

Difference of Means Statistics with Monte Carlo Simulations

We compute the mean by digit place in the last five digits from the right among 5, 6, and 7 digit numbers. We eliminate 0s and 5s from this computation and reweight Benford’s Law as before. This gives us a mean for each of the 10,000s, 1,000s, 100s, 10s, and 1s digit places for those numbers that have all of these digit places. In each digit place from the right (1s, 10s, etc.), we compute the Benford expected mean as follows: for 5-digit numbers, the Benford mean in the 10,000s place is the mean of the 1st digit; for 6 digit numbers, the Benford mean in the 10,000s place is the mean of the 2nd digit; etc. For each number length and digit place from the right, we can compute an expected mean under Benford’s Law. We then combine our data from different string lengths, weighting the sample by how many numbers come from each length.

This process gives us a mean of the digit place from the right, as well as an expected mean of the digit place from the right under Benford’s Law. The difference in these values is the difference in means statistic. Positive values indicate a weighted mean that exceeds the weighted Benford’s Law, indicating padding. Negative values indicate a weighted mean that is below the weighted Benford’s Law, indicating overuse of low digits.

In order to determine significance of each of our statistics, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation. We generate 100,000 datasets that are identical to the digit lengths observed in our dataset. Open-source code for simulating Benford-distributed numbers was used with permission (Debowski, 2003). Code for matching Benford-conforming numbers with the lengths of our data was produced in Python. For each simulated dataset, we remove 0s and 5s and compute the means by digit place from the right as well as the Benford expected mean, identically to the above. For each of the 100,000 datasets, we produce a difference of means
statistic. We then compare our observed difference of means statistic to these simulations. The
\( p \)-values reported are the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of our difference of
means among the simulated statistics. That is, if our statistic exceeds 90% of the simulated
values, its \( p \)-value is 0.10. Because there are 100,000 samples, there is a minimum \( p \)-value of 1
in 100,000.

_Last Digits_

The literatures on both forensic auditing and election fraud emphasize analysis of the
terminal digits, which should be uniformly distributed if they represent the fourth digit place or
beyond (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997; Beber & Scacco, 2012). Results on the terminal digit are
presented in Appendix Figure 1AB and show exceptional statistical significance for both
expenditure and participant data. We exclude this test from our aggregate analysis later because
it is by the test of conformance to Benford’s Law in our test of all digit places beyond the first
and we wish to maintain independence in our test set.
APPENDIX A FIGURE 1AB: LAST DIGIT EXPENDITURE AND PARTICIPANT DATA AGAINST THE UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION.

(A) Expenditure data \((p = 1.5 \times 10^{-9}; n = 851)\). (B) Participant data \((p = 7.0 \times 10^{-26}; n = 5850)\).
The INT audit used a conservative differentiation for its classification of “suspected fraudulent” versus “questionable” expenditures (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011, p. 114) which served to reduce the amount of money that Kenya was required to refund to the World Bank. Questionable expenditures, which did not have to be refunded, were defined as follows: “Examples of questionable expenditure for this audit would include: misappropriation through apparent fraud and corruption; funds that have been embezzled (where there is evidence that it is more likely than not that embezzlement has occurred); funds that have not been used for the intended purpose (e.g. buying textbooks rather than fixing the roof); funds spent for goods not provided or services not rendered at the time of payment (e.g., purchasing fuel on account); funds spent for expenditures that breach GOK [Government of Kenya] regulations (e.g. failure to comply with imprest requirement).”

The World Bank flagged 66% of the district transactions as suspicious; of these, 49% were classified as suspected fraudulent and 17% as questionable.

Other uses include the detection and monitoring of election fraud (Mebane, 2008; Beber & Scacco, 2012; Mack & Stoetzer, 2019), IMF data manipulation (Michalski & Stoltz, 2013), campaign finance fraud (Cho & Gaines, 2012), scientific data fabrication (Diekmann, 2007), fraud in international trade (Cerioli, Barabesi, Cerasa, Menegatti, & Perrotta, 2019), customs fraud (Barabesi, Cerasa, Cerioli, & Perrotta, 2018), and enumerator integrity during survey research (Bredl, Winker, & Kötschau, 2012; Judge & Schechter, 2009; Schräpler, 2011).

We exclude the line item expenditures for the actual community driven development projects from our analysis. These expenditures were grants that were subject to caps, and as such are not appropriate for digit analysis. However, we do use data (expenditures and numbers of
participants) from the training exercises and transport costs that supported these activities, as they were not subject to caps.

5 The World Bank referred the Arid Lands case to the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission after completing a joint review together with the Kenya National Audit Office, which confirmed the findings and resulted in the Kenyan government’s agreement to repay the World Bank $4 million USD for disallowed charges (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency and Internal Audit Department, Treasury, Government of Kenya, 2011). It is noteworthy that despite this action, no one from the senior management of this project was prosecuted or fired, and this speaks to the probability of consequences in the current Kenyan context.

6 For example, this is the only such audit on the World Bank INT website.

7 In the study of elections, the use of Benford’s Law has been contested based on concerns over the distributions of data that produce voting counts (Mebane, 2011; Deckert, Myagkov, &Ordeshook, 2011; Beber & Scacco, 2012). However, these criticisms do not extend to our financial dataset or individual participant counts, both of which come from distributions that can be expected to conform to Benford’s Law. Specific auditing guidelines over which types of data conform to Benford’s Law includes these types of data (Durtschi, Hillison, & Pacini, 2004).

8 There was a premium placed upon keeping reporting data private in this project, even from high level officers working in the district offices. One of the author’s spent 2 years negotiating with the World Bank for access to these reports and was granted access only after intervention from the Board of the Bank on the grounds that the original project document (the PAD) promised that these data would be made public (World Bank, 2003). Even so, only about 2/3 of the reports were ever released. It is possible that the data in the missing reports would have pointed to even more data manipulation than we see here.
Individual digit place analyses beyond the first in existing literature include second and last digit analysis. (Beber & Scacco, 2012; Diekmann, 2007). However, testing individual digit places results in multiple-hypothesis testing issues, which a two-way chi square test avoids.

We do not include a test of the last digit place among our 10 tests because it is technically subsumed under this test, and we wish to avoid non-independence across our tests. Benford’s Law predicts a uniform distribution in digit places beyond the fourth; that is, there is no reason that more data should end with a 4 instead of a 3. For comparison to other studies, we include the results of last digit analysis in the Appendix. In the last digit test, both the expenditure and the participant data diverge significantly from the predicted distributions. We do not include the last digit in the final tally of tests (discussed later) to preserve independence of tests.

The relationship between the Arid Lands project and the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), a partially government-owned bank, serves to illustrate the kind of relationship that existed between the project and the Kenyan government. Most of the accounts of the project were held at KCB offices all over the country. The INT audit report details numerous ways in which the Kenya Commercial Bank appeared to be complicit with project staff in defrauding the program. The KCB also refused to turn over 49% of the cleared checks requested by the auditors, even though the terms of agreement between the Kenyan Government and the World Bank required cooperation with the World Bank’s auditors. Among the checks that were turned over to the auditors there were many irregularities. The KCB cashed numerous checks made out to “Commissioner of VAT” that were never presented to VAT (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011, pp. 6-7). In these cases, the original payee’s name had been crossed out on the face of the check and another was substituted (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011, p.
Several branches of the KCB provided altered bank statements to the auditors in which the words “cash withdrawal” were removed from the transaction description field.

Interviewees consistently report that many Arid Lands staff at all levels were implicated in embezzlement, but they also note that not everyone participated or benefitted. Some staff and former staff were deeply troubled by what they knew was going on. Some chose to leave if they could find reasonable employment elsewhere. Others stayed but paid a steep price in terms of career advancement as a consequence of refusing to participate in the fraud. Many more were unwilling partners who were asked to do things like sign duplicate travel receipts even though they did not receive double reimbursement. The INT audit also found evidence of such double dipping. Receipts for the same activities were being submitted to both the projects and the UN and even other World Bank projects that were also collaborating with the project (World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency, 2011).

In theory, there was a district steering committee (DSG) that also supervised project selection and project monitoring. Civil works projects were also supervised by government engineers who had to sign off on the plans and the work progress. According sources, including members of the DSG and contractors from many different districts, both the DSG and the government offices that signed off on projects were compromised and ineffective (see Ensminger (2017) for more details).

Senior staff in the Indonesian KDP project deployed several mechanisms to encourage both internal and external criticism of the project’s performance, including on corruption. They designed an innovative mechanism for independent journalists to investigate and report on corruption in the project (Guggenheim, 2006) (Wong, 2003); academics were also invited to research and report on corruption (Olken B. A., 2007; Olken B. A., 2009). Finally, they
commissioned a number of World Bank reports on corruption that were made public (Woodhouse, 2002) (Woodhouse, 2012). They used this research to inform their experimentation with different mechanisms of project design. This contrasted markedly from the secretive climate that interviewees described for the Arid Lands.

Readers may be concerned that publication of these methods will provide potential fraudsters with the means to beat the monitors. They need not worry. Engineering a Benford-conforming dataset is a more challenging statistical exercise than is ensuring that digits are uniformly distributed. It would also require centralization across an organization, and matching of all supporting documentation, such as coordination of date-stamped receipts, cashbooks, vehicle logs, cancelled checks, and bank statements. Furthermore, each individual instructed to fabricate data would still face the same incentive to self-deal, which would undercut efforts to produce aggregate results consistent with Benford’s Law. Such coordination would also expose leadership to high risk of detection.