Could Gentrification Stop the Poor from Benefiting from Urban Improvements?

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When policymakers invest in urban infrastructure—such as train lines, parks, and schools—they provide infrastructure to a place and not to particular people. This raises an important challenge: if people are mobile within cities, an improvement in one neighborhood may lead to an inflow of richer people who push up local prices and displace the poor. This process of infrastructure-induced gentrification (IIG) has led to much debate about the proper design and impact of urban investment (see, e.g., Kennedy and Leonard 2001).

This paper investigates mechanisms that may lead to IIG using a general equilibrium urban commuting model. Our goal is to elucidate the channels through which IIG occurs and understand how policy choices mitigate or accentuate gentrification. We show that a standard urban model can lead to a full range of gentrification outcomes and illustrate through model simulation which elasticities are important for generating IIG. We also show that it is important to account for general equilibrium forces when understanding the distributional impacts of urban change. Simple empirical heuristics, such as relative changes in rent or population, do not necessarily sign the relative welfare impact between groups.

Our companion paper Balboni et al. (2020) investigates these issues using panel data we collected in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, as the city rolled out a bus rapid transit (BRT) system.

I. Model

The model is a standard urban commuting model based on Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). We augment the model to allow for several channels through which different types of people (“rich” and “poor”) may differ. We then study how each of the following differences between types affects the welfare consequences of urban infrastructure.

- **Share of Income Spent on Housing.**—If the poor spend more of their income on housing, they will be more exposed to endogenous rent changes.
- **Endogenous Type-Specific Amenities.**—High rents may lead to an increase in high-type amenities (such as fancy coffee shops), which are valued less by lower-income residents.
- **Spatial Comparative Advantage.**—If the poor sacrifice less income when moving from an optimal location, they will be more responsive to infrastructure, but need not indicate that poor incumbents gain more than rich incumbents.
- **City Design.**—How heterogeneous are neighborhoods? If IIG displaces the poor, welfare impacts will depend on whether they can find accommodation they value in other parts of the city.
- **Housing Market Integration and Returns to Scale in Building High-Quality Housing.**—If the cost of building housing suitable for the rich decreases as the ratio of rich to poor in a neighborhood increases, then this will strengthen displacement pressure.
- **Policy Design.**—Does a policy target rich or poor residents? For example, building public parking lots may only be relevant to the rich who own cars.
- **Persistence of Individual Heterogeneity.**—Incumbents choose initial locations based on an idiosyncratic productivity shock. If productivity is not persistent, incumbency...
effects are less relevant compared with average effects.

A. Welfare Changes

Let the indirect utility of a location \( o \) be given by \( v_o^\tau \). Individual \( i \), who is of type \( \tau \in \{L,H\} \), chooses the location that maximizes

\[
\max_{i} v_{i,o}^\tau \epsilon_{i,o},
\]

where \( \epsilon_{i,o} \) is \( i \)'s idiosyncratic productivity shock for location \( o \). If \( \epsilon_{i,o} \) is Fréchet distributed with shape parameter \( \theta^\tau \), then

(i) Commuting gravity: the share of type-\( \tau \) workers choosing location \( o \), \( \pi_{o}^\tau \) is given by

\[
\pi_{o}^\tau = \frac{(v_{o}^\tau)^{\theta^\tau}}{\sum_{o'}(v_{o'}^\tau)^{\theta^\tau}},
\]

(ii) Average welfare:

\[
W^\tau = \kappa^\tau \left( \sum_{o'}(v_{o'}^\tau)^{\theta^\tau} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta^\tau}}.
\]

Consider a policy shock that leads to a change in the indirect utility of a location and, via general equilibrium effects, the indirect utilities of all other locations. Let the change in indirect utility be given by \( \hat{v}_{o}^\tau \), where the caret accent denotes “change” in the notation of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008).

In our companion paper Balboni et al. (2020), we derive the following expressions for the average change in welfare across the city and the average change in welfare for people (“incumbents”) who started in each location.

(i) Change in average welfare:

\[
\hat{W}^\tau = \left( \sum_{o'}\pi_{o'}^\tau (\hat{v}_{o'}^\tau)^{\theta^\tau} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta^\tau}}.
\]

(ii) Change in incumbency welfare under perfect persistence of shocks is a weighted sum of the destinations \( o' \) that people in \( o \) choose to move to (using \( o \rightarrow o' \) to denote those that move):

\[
\hat{W}_{o}^\tau = \sum_{o'}\pi_{o'}^\tau \hat{v}_{o'}^\tau E_F^{\tau}(\epsilon_{i,o'} | o \rightarrow o') W^\tau = \frac{\sum_{o'}\hat{v}_{o'}^\tau (\pi_{o'}^\tau)^{\frac{1}{\theta^\tau}} \pi_{o'o} E_F^{\tau}(\epsilon_{i,o} | o \rightarrow o')}{\kappa^\tau \pi_{o}^\tau}.
\]

We show in the companion paper that (a) the migration probability depends on the relative utility gain of a location, with \( \pi_{o'o} > 0 \) if and only if \( \hat{v}_{o'} > \hat{v}_{o} \) and (b) this formula can be expressed in a closed form “exact hat” representation.

(iii) If productivity shocks are imperfectly persistent and \( \rho \in [0,1] \) is the proportion of the population that redraws their idiosyncratic shock each period, the incumbency gain is given by

\[
\hat{W}_{o}^\tau | \rho = \rho \hat{W}^\tau + (1 - \rho) \hat{W}_{o}^\tau.
\]

B. Indirect Utility for a Commuting Model

To convert this model into an urban commuting model, we redefine the index \( o \) as a live-work pair. We define the indirect utility of living in location \( l \) and working in location \( w \) as

\[
v_{lw}^\tau = B_l^\tau \omega_w^\tau (r_l^\tau)^{-1} \cdot m^\tau \cdot \eta^\tau,
\]

where \( B_l^\tau \) is the (type-specific) amenity level in the live location \( l \), \( \omega_w^\tau \) is the (type-specific) wage rate in the work location \( w \), \( r_l^\tau \) is the (type-specific) rental cost in \( l \), and \( \eta^\tau \) is the commuting cost between \( l \) and \( w \). The parameter \( \beta^\tau \) represents the share of income that type-\( \tau \) households spend on housing. The term \( m^\tau \) represents the strength of endogenous amenity spillovers: endogenous amenity is a function of average rents \( \hat{B}_l = (r_l^\tau)^{-m^\tau} \); we represent this term by substituting it into indirect utility, yielding the exponent \( m^\tau \) on rent. Finally, \( \eta^\tau \) converts commute time to a utility cost.

\[\footnote{\kappa^\tau \text{ is a type-specific constant related to the } \Gamma \text{ function.}}\]
C. Housing Market

We assume that housing expenditure, $R_l^\tau$, is a constant fraction of earnings. The total expenditure on housing in location $l$ depends on the commuting patterns of people who live there, where $\text{earn}_{lw}^\tau$ is the average wages of type-$\tau$ people who live in $l$ and work in $w$:

$$R_l^\tau = \beta^\tau \sum_w \pi_{lw} \text{earn}_{lw}^\tau.$$  

We combine this with an arbitrage condition that allows for imperfect integration (modeled by the parameter $\lambda$) between the housing market and determines relative rents:

$$\frac{r_l^H}{r_l^L} = \left(\frac{\pi_l^H}{\pi_l^L}\right)^\lambda.$$  

D. Output Per Unit of Human Capital

We assume a location-specific production function

$$Y_w = \bar{A}_w \left(\sum_\tau A_w^\tau Z_w^\tau\right)^\alpha T_w^{1-\alpha},$$  

where $Z_w^\tau$ is the total amount of type $\tau$ human capital working in location $w$, $A_w$ is an exogenous location $w$ productivity, $A_w^\tau$ is an exogenous location $w$ productivity for those of type $\tau$, and $T_w$ is the amount of land available for firms in location $w$. This production function treats $L$ and $H$ types as perfect substitutes, and so it will be the case that $\omega_o^L = \omega_o^H$.

II. Gentrification Definitions

We consider three related concepts:

(i) Neighborhood Composition.—Does the ratio of low residents to high residents change?

(ii) Welfare of Incumbents.—Do rich incumbents gain more than poor ones?

(iii) Average Welfare.—Across the city, do the rich gain more than the poor?

We say that a neighborhood experiences weak gentrification if the proportion of rich residents increases $\hat{\pi}_l^H/\hat{\pi}_l^L > 1$ but welfare gains for poor incumbents are less than those for rich incumbents. The neighborhood experiences strong gentrification if the number of poor residents decreases $\hat{\pi}_l^L < 1$. This gentrification is compensated if the incumbents have a net welfare gains $\hat{W}_o^L > 1$ and is uncompensated if the poor incumbents have a net welfare loss $\hat{W}_o^L < 1$.

III. Model Simulations

The goal of this section is to simulate the model for different parameter values to show that the model can produce a full range of welfare outcomes. We simulate a simple three-location (slum, suburb, downtown) model where the three locations are connected to enable commuting (see schematic in Figure 1). In this environment, we consider the effect of a slum beautification project that increases the amenity in the slum.

A. Baseline Economy

Our baseline specification considers the effect of a policy that improves the amenity of the slum by 5 percent equally for both $L$ and $H$ types. The baseline economic environment is

- Amenities: $\{\text{Downtown, slum, suburb}\} = \{1, 0.5, 2\}$;
• Productivities: \{\text{Downtown, slum, suburb}\} = \{2, 1, 1\};
• Housing expenditure share: \(\beta^L = 0.4, \beta^H = 0.2\);
• Endogenous amenity favoring the rich: \(m^L = 0.4, m^H = 0\);
• Integrated housing market: \(\lambda = 0\);
• Equal scope for comparative advantage: \(\theta^L = \theta^H\).

Figure 2 plots the impact on population sorting and welfare after the slum improvement. The baseline economy displays weak gentrification: as the slum becomes more attractive, both low and high move in, but poor incumbents see a smaller increase in welfare. The population of low types increases by 6.8 percent, and that of high types increases by 14 percent. In the baseline case, the rental markets are integrated, so the increase in housing demand leads to a 7.4 percent rise in rents for both types. The welfare increase for incumbents is positive—1.9 percent for low incumbents and 3.4 percent for high ones—with the high types receiving a larger gain because they spend a smaller proportion of their income on housing and so are less exposed to rent increases. Finally, the policy has a small but positive welfare effect across the city. On average, low types receive a welfare gain of 0.2 percent and the high types a gain of 0.1 percent; the gain is larger for low types, as they face compensating general equilibrium effects through lower rents in other parts of the city.

B. Alternative Simulations

We now consider alternative parameterizations to illustrate model mechanisms. Outcomes are presented in Table 1.

Starting with preference parameters, we first consider a case where rich and poor spend the same share of their income on housing. Both groups experience the same proportional increase in welfare—a 3.1 percent gain for the incumbents and a 0.1 percent gain across the city as a whole. Next, we consider endogenous amenities that favor the rich. This accentuates the cost of high rents for low-income households. The welfare gain for poor incumbents falls from 1.9 percent to 1.2 percent. We then consider the role of asymmetric comparative advantage by decreasing the parameter \(\theta^H\) and increasing the parameter \(\theta^L\). Changing these parameters has two effects: first, it increases the relative dispersion of the productivity shocks for high types, increasing the importance of the match between individual and place for high types. Second, because of the greater specificity of skill, the migration elasticity of low-income workers is higher than that of high-income workers. Low types now move in to benefit from the higher amenities proportionally more (2.2 percentage points more, compared with 7.2 percentage points less in the baseline). Still, the overall gain in population is smaller. The lower influx of people leads to a smaller increase in rents and larger welfare gains for low incumbents relative to baseline (2.1 percent versus 1.9 percent). Despite low types appearing to value the policy more than high types (they move in more), the incumbency gain is still lower for low incumbents than it is for high ones (2.1 percent compared with 3.5 percent).

Next, we consider the effect of the underlying structure of the city. In our baseline
economy, the suburb has a high amenity value, and the initial population allocation has many fewer people (both low and high) living in the slum. If the neighborhoods are more homogeneous ex ante, more of the population is initially living in the slum. As a result, the inflow into the slum is smaller, and hence, house prices do not rise as much. This proportionally affects the low incumbents, who receive a gain of 2.6 percent compared to 1.9 percent in the baseline simulation. Because more people initially live in the slum, the overall benefits of the improvement are also larger. On average, low types across the city receive a 1.6 percent welfare gain (compared to 0.2 percent in the baseline).

We then consider the effect of imperfectly integrated housing markets by setting $\lambda = -0.3$. This represents decreasing costs of converting land to high-type housing. As a result, the rental increase for high-type households is smaller than that faced by low-type households (4.6 percent versus 7.3 percent), leading to a larger gap in the welfare gain of high incumbents compared to low incumbents.

The next row considers the effects of an amenity improvement targeted towards the rich. An example could be the impact of building parking garages in a setting where only higher-income people have cars. We model this as an improvement in the slum amenity of 5 percent for the rich while leaving the slum amenity unchanged for low types. This policy leads to strong uncompensated gentrification: low-income people move out of the slum in absolute terms, and the welfare of the initial low types who were living in the slum falls by 1.5 percent. Across the city, the welfare of low types falls by 0.2 percent, mostly reflecting the losses of poor incumbents. In comparison, incumbent high types receive a gain of 4.1 percent (the average welfare of high types is unchanged across the city).

Finally, we show the importance of the persistence of the idiosyncratic shock in determining the incumbency effect. If all residents redraw their shock every period, then the initial location does not reveal any information about the individual match of that location the following period. As a result, an incumbent has the same average characteristics as the average resident in the city, and so the incumbency welfare gains are equivalent to the average welfare gain.\footnote{Note that this is true in the current model because there are no costs of migrating.}

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<th>Table 1—Impact of Slum Improvement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preference parameter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equalize housing share</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong endogenous amenities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rich stronger comparative advantage</td>
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<td>City design</td>
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<td>Equal baseline amenities in slum/suburb</td>
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<td>Redraw idiosyncratic shock</td>
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Notes: Table shows proportional change for slum neighborhood. A value greater than one indicates a net gain. All simulations except for the last row assume that idiosyncratic shocks are fully persistent.
These simulations also illustrate another important reason to use a spatial general equilibrium model when analyzing urban investments’ impact. Simple heuristics, such as examining the relative gain in rent or the relative inflow of people, are not enough to sign the relative incumbency effects. This is clearly seen in the counterfactual that increases the scope for comparative advantage between low and high types. There was a larger relative inflow of low types than high types in that simulation, yet low incumbents fared worse than high ones. In most of the other simulations, the welfare gain of high incumbents was larger than the welfare gain of low incumbents despite the two groups often facing the same increase in rental rates.

IV. Conclusion

Across the world, especially in low-income countries, urbanization is increasing, necessitating investment in infrastructure to improve city environments. These investments are place based: if people are mobile within a city, improvements in one neighborhood may lead to higher rental rates, pushing out the poor and leading to gentrification. Our goal in this paper was to use a spatial general equilibrium model to illustrate the channels that lead to IIG. While simple, the model leads to a wide range of outcomes ranging from pro-poor to pro-rich. Our companion paper Balboni et al. (2020) considers the impact of one such intervention, the introduction of the BRT system in Dar es Salaam.

REFERENCES


