

OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION

MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52-301
Cambridge, MA 02139
mfelix@mit.edu
<http://economics.mit.edu/grad/mfelix>

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION

332 Franklin St, Apt 700
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 413-437-0105

MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER

Professor Robert Townsend
rtownsen@mit.edu
617-452-3722

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR

Ms. Julia Martyn-Shah
jmshah@mit.edu
617-253-8787

DOCTORAL STUDIES Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2021
DISSERTATION: “Essays on the Effects of Public Policy”

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Benjamin A. Olken
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, **E52-542**
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-324-5085
bolken@mit.edu

David G. Atkin
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, **E52-550**
Cambridge, MA 02139
203-936-9367
atkin@mit.edu

Arnaud Costinot
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, **E52-534**
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-3399
costinot@mit.edu

PRIOR EDUCATION Mount Holyoke College 2011
BA, Magna Cum Laude, Mathematics and Economics

CITIZENSHIP Brazil, US Permanent Resident **GENDER:** Female

LANGUAGES Portuguese (native), English (fluent), Spanish (competent), French (competent)

FIELDS Primary Fields: Development and International Trade

Secondary Fields: Labor Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE Math Camp for MIT’s DEDP Master’s Program 2021
Instructor

15.027 – Opportunities in Developing Economies (MIT Sloan) Expected
Teaching Assistant to Professor Tavneet Suri 2021

RELEVANT POSITIONS	<p>Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab Graduate Research Assistant to Professor Benjamin A. Olken</p> <p>National Bureau of Economic Research Full-time Research Assistant to Professors Joshua Angrist and Parag Pathak</p> <p>Innovations for Poverty Action Part-time Research Assistant to Professor Michael Kremer</p> <p>Cornerstone Research Senior Analyst (2013-14), Analyst (2011-13)</p>	<p>2016-present</p> <p>2014-15</p> <p>2014-15</p> <p>2011-13</p>
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS	<p>George and Obie Shultz Fund at MIT</p> <p>MIT Graduate Fellowship</p> <p>MIT Ida Green Fellowship</p> <p>Phi Beta Kappa (<i>early induction</i>)</p> <p>Susan Cane Stone '46 Scholarship</p> <p>Nancy Lewin '80 Scholarship</p> <p>C. V. Starr Scholarship</p> <p>Eulalia Donoso Conde Scholarship</p> <p>Sarah Williston Prize</p> <p>MHC International Internship Program Grant</p> <p>Gina Jacobsen Prize in Mathematics</p> <p>Datatel Scholarship – Highest Prize</p> <p>Hubbell Prize for Excellence in French</p> <p>Laurel Fellowship for Study Abroad</p>	<p>2019</p> <p>2016</p> <p>2015</p> <p>2011</p> <p>2011</p> <p>2010</p> <p>2010</p> <p>2010</p> <p>2010</p> <p>2010</p> <p>2010</p> <p>2009</p> <p>2009</p> <p>2009</p> <p>2009</p>
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES	<p>Referee: American Economic Review, American Economic Review: Insights</p>	
RESEARCH PAPERS	<p>“The Impact of Trade on Firm Labor Market Power: Evidence from Brazil” (Job Market Paper)</p> <p>Growing evidence suggests that import competition has long-lasting negative effects on local wages and employment. Why? I study a potential mechanism: trade-induced increases in firm labor market power. I first present theoretical and empirical evidence linking import competition to labor market concentration. I then investigate the implications for wage markdowns, the standard measure of firm labor market power. Using employer-employee linked data, tariff reductions from Brazil's 1990s tariff reform, and a framework of labor market oligopsony, I find that a 10 percent increase in import competition increased wage markdowns by 0.07 percent. However, this effect is too small to account for trade's large negative effect on wages, suggesting that: 1) even in oligopsony frameworks, sizable changes in labor market concentration can still be inconsequential for wage markdowns; 2) the negative effects of trade on wages were driven instead by reductions in the marginal revenue product of labor (i.e. price markups, demand, productivity), rather than by increased firm labor market power.</p>	

“Tax Administration vs. Tax Rates: Evidence from Corporate Taxation in Indonesia” (with M. Chatib Basri, Rema Hanna, and Benjamin Olken).

R&R at American Economic Review.

We compare two approaches to increasing tax revenue: tax administration and tax rates. We show that when Indonesia moved top regional firms into “Medium Taxpayer Offices,” with high staff-to-taxpayer ratios, tax revenue more than doubled. Examining non-linear changes to corporate income tax rates, we estimate an elasticity of taxable income of 0.59. Combining these estimates, improved tax administration is equivalent to raising rates on affected firms by 8 percentage points. Improved tax administration flattened the relationship between firm size and enforcement, reducing the “enforcement tax” on large firms. On net, improved tax administration can have significant returns for developing countries.

“Charter Schools and Suspensions: Evidence from Massachusetts Chapter 222”

I evaluate the impact of Massachusetts Chapter 222—a policy that limited charter schools’ ability to suspend students—on student suspensions and test scores. Comparing charter attendance effects before vs. after Chapter 222, I find that Chapter 222 reduced charter suspensions by roughly 10 percentage points, but had no impact on charter learning. I then use variation in lottery offers and applicants’ pre-lottery suspensions to separate the effect of suspensions from that of charter attendance on test scores. Suspensions appear to be unrelated to achievement in charters, while the causal effect of charter attendance on test scores is large and positive.

**RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS**

“Labor Market Effects of Domestic Outsourcing: Evidence from Brazilian Security Guards” (with Michael Wong)

“A Quasi-Experimental Approach to Identifying Labor Market Boundaries: Evidence from Brazilian Workers” (with Sean Wang)