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Delays in claiming social security benefits

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Abstract

This paper focuses on Social Security benefit claiming behavior, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using financial calculations and simulations based on an expected utility maximization model, we show that delaying benefit claim for a period of time after retirement is optimal in a wide variety of cases and that gains from delay may be significant. We find that approximately 10% of men retiring before their 62nd birthday delay claiming for at least 1 year after eligibility. We estimate hazard and probit models using data from the New Beneficiary Data System to test four cross-sectional predictions. While the data suggest that too few men delay, we find that the pattern of delays by early retirees is generally consistent with the hypotheses generated by our theoretical model.

Keywords: Social security benefit; Claiming behavior; Utility maximization model; New Beneficiary Data System; Cross-sectional predictions

Social Security (SS) is the largest entitlement program in the United States today, providing income support for retired and disabled workers and their families. The concurrent growth in this program and decline in the labor force participation of older men has motivated an extensive literature investigating how SS influences retirement behavior. There is another large literature investigating the transfers induced by SS across and within cohorts.

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One common feature of the work in this area has been the assumption that individuals claim benefits as soon as they are eligible — either upon retirement, or upon turning age 62 if retirement is before that age. However, as with other social insurance programs, there is a *take-up decision* associated with claiming SS benefits. Individuals need not claim their benefits immediately upon retirement, or upon turning age 62. By delaying claiming, workers increase the benefits paid to them and their spouses, through the actuarial adjustment. As we demonstrate below, it is optimal in a wide variety of cases to delay claiming benefits for a period of time after eligibility. Moreover, for at least one group, men retiring before their 62nd birthday (the age of first eligibility for benefits), claiming delays are empirically important: roughly 10% of these retirees delay claiming for at least 1 year.

This *dynamic take-up* consideration suggests that standard computations of both the retirement incentives of SS and the redistribution through SS may be biased. Moreover, we are not aware of any in-depth analysis of this take-up behavior. An examination of the extent to which observed claiming patterns are consistent with rational choice theory may have important implications for aspects of SS design and reform.

The purpose of our paper is to investigate delays in SS benefits claiming and to explore their implications. We do so in five steps. First, in Section 1, we provide relevant institutional background on the SS program. We highlight the fact that retirement provides only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for receiving SS benefits.[1] We briefly review the SS literature, emphasizing areas where realistic consideration of claiming behavior can affect analysis.

In Section 2, we turn to a theoretical examination of claiming delays. We begin with a discussion of the benefit rules to explore how worker characteristics such as mortality expectations, wealth, age difference with spouse, and relative earnings of spouses may influence claiming delays. Then we use simulations of financial gains from delay to generate cross-sectional predictions that can be tested in our empirical analysis. We also present simulation results based on an expected utility maximization model with liquidity constraints, as we recognize that financial calculations in general *understate* the incentives to delay relative to the optimization of a risk averse utility function. This is because SS provides a real annuity valued by risk averse individuals with an uncertain date of death; individuals buy more of this annuity by delaying, so delays are more attractive with risk aversion.

Section 3 presents evidence that claiming delays are empirically relevant. We use data from the New Beneficiary Data System (NBDS), a survey of SS claimants in the early 1980s. This survey provides administrative data on work and benefits histories which allows us to form a relatively precise measure of claiming delays. We highlight the differences in delays by early retirees, those retired before their 62nd birthday, and later retirees, those retiring after their 62nd birthday. We

[1]This discussion applies only to those under age 70; at age 70, benefits are paid out regardless of retirement.

confirm our findings using more recent data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). While we do not attempt to quantify the predicted prevalence of delayed claiming, delay appears to be far less prevalent than the theory predicts.

Nevertheless, in Section 4, we investigate whether the claiming behavior of men in our sample is consistent with our cross-sectional predictions. We present both hazard and probit models of delays. We find support for three hypotheses. Specifically, we find that men with longer life expectancies have longer delays; that delays follow an inverse U-shaped pattern as wealth increases; and that men with younger spouses have longer delays. On the other hand, we do not find support for the prediction that single men should have shorter delays. Section 5 concludes by summarizing our findings and considering the implications for previous research on SS and for SS design and reform.

1. Background

1.1. Institutional features

Understanding the motivation for our analysis requires a brief overview of how benefits are determined. Individuals are fully insured for retired worker benefits once they have worked 40 quarters in the covered sector. Benefits are computed as follows: nominal taxable annual earnings before age 60 are converted into age $60 using a wage index, the 35 highest years of indexed earnings (indexed before age 60 but not after) are averaged and divided by 12 to generate the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), and a non-linear formula is applied to the AIME to generate the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) on which monthly benefits are based.

Fully insured individuals can claim retired worker benefits if they are at least age 62. If they want to claim benefits, however, they are subjected to an earnings test: if their earnings exceed a ceiling amount, benefits are reduced by 50 cents for each additional dollar of earnings (if age 62–64) or 33 cents for each additional dollar of earnings (if age 65–69). In 1998, this ceiling was $9120 of annual earnings for 62–64 year olds, and $14 500 for 65–69 year olds. There is also a monthly earnings test that individuals may use for 1 year only, usually the year of retirement. In 1995, the monthly earnings test ceiling was $760 for 62–64 year olds and $1208 for 65–69 year olds. In the year that the monthly earnings test is applied, individuals may have annual earnings above the annual earnings test ceiling but may still receive full benefits for any months in which they earned less than the monthly earnings test ceiling. Any benefit reduction from the earnings test is offset by higher benefits upon full retirement, through the actuarial adjustment.[2]

Monthly benefits also depend on age at claiming. If individuals claim at the

[2]Gruber and Orszag (1999) provide a description of the operation and implications of the earnings test.

normal retirement age (NRA) of 65, the monthly benefit equals 100% of the PIA.[3] If they claim between age 62 and age 65, there is an *actuarial reduction* in the benefit of 5/9% for each month of claiming before age 65. Thus workers claiming on their 62nd birthdays have a benefit equal to 80% of PIA. If they claim after age 65, there is a *delayed retirement credit*. For respondents in the NBDS, the credit was only 1% per year; this is much smaller than the actuarial reduction, generating a kink at age 65 in the schedule of benefits as a function of age at claiming.[4]

A key feature of this institutional structure is that *retirement need not be concurrent with claiming*. For example, if individuals retire at age 62, they need not claim on their 62nd birthday. As we document below, in many cases total expected discounted benefits are increased by delaying for some months.

Calculating the advantages of delaying is complicated by the family benefits structure of SS. Spouses are eligible for dependent spouse benefits and may also be entitled to retired worker benefits on their own record; however, spouses receive only the larger of the two amounts. The dependent spouse benefit is 50% of the retired worker's PIA, can be claimed once the dependent spouse is 62 and the worker has claimed, and is subject to an actuarial reduction if the dependent spouse claims before 65. Surviving spouses of retired workers are entitled to a survivor benefit of 100% of the retired worker's PIA; the benefit can be claimed once the survivor is 60 and may be reduced depending on the survivor's age when benefits begins. Also the benefit may be reduced depending on the worker's ages at claiming and at death. Claiming the survivor benefit implies foregoing the survivor's retired worker or dependent spouse benefit. We return to the question of how family benefits affect incentives for delays below.

1.2. Previous literature

The concern that this benefits structure might have important implications for retirement incentives has motivated an enormous literature on the effect of SS on retirement, reviewed in Hurd (1990) and Diamond and Gruber (1999). The first strand of this literature uses aggregate information on the labor force behavior of workers at different ages over time to infer the impact of SS. Hurd (1990) and Ruhm (1995) find a spike in the age pattern of retirement at 62 and show that this peak has grown over time as SS benefits have increased; Burtless and Moffitt (1984) show that there was no peak before claiming at 62 became an option. There is also a spike in retirement at age 65, which is consistent with the unfair actuarial

[3]The NRA is scheduled to rise in a series of steps, reaching 67 for workers attaining age 60 in the year 2022 or later.

[4]The delayed retirement credit is rising over time, and is scheduled to reach 8% per year for those attaining age 62 in the year 2005 or later.

adjustment for work beyond age 65. Blau (1994) finds that nearly 25% of the men in the labor force on their 65th birthday retire in the next quarter; this hazard rate is 2.5 times as large as the rate in surrounding quarters.

The second strand of this literature uses micro-data sets with SS benefit determinants or ex-post benefit levels to measure the incentives to retire across individuals, then estimates retirement models as a function of these incentives. This large literature is reviewed at length in Coile and Gruber (1999). There are a variety of techniques employed in this literature. Earlier papers modeled retirement status or transitions to retirement as a function of Social Security benefit levels or the present discounted value of future Social Security entitlements (SS 'wealth', or SSW). More recent work has considered retirement dynamics as a function of the evolution of SSW, examining either accruals for an additional year of work, or the entire future evolution of Social Security (and private pension) wealth with additional years of work. While the techniques differ across papers, the conclusion of this literature has generally been that Social Security has large effects on retirement, but that they are small relative to the time trend in male retirement over the past 40 years.[5]

This literature, however, suffers from a potential weakness that has thus far been ignored: the endogeneity of the timing of SS benefits claiming and therefore of the benefit level. The key independent variable in many (but not all) cross-sectional estimation, SS benefits, may confound potentially exogenous characteristics which determine benefits, such as lifetime earnings, with the endogenous take-up decision. For example, consider two individuals who retire at the same point (their 61st birthday) and are identical in every respect except time preference. Impatient individual B claims benefits at 62, while patient individual A delays until age 65 and receives a higher benefit. Regression analysis would show that higher SS benefits do not cause earlier retirement. But in fact these two individuals have the same PIAs and thus face the same menu of retirement benefit choices. This suggests that by using actual SS benefits received rather than PIA to model retirement incentives, some previous studies may have misstated the incentives.

The literature which has used accrual rates or other measures of the evolution of SSW is also affected by ignoring the endogenous claiming decision. These measures all assume that retirement and claiming are on the same date. But if claiming can be delayed, it affects the accrual rate, leading again to mismeasurement of the key regressor. That is, if claiming is distinct from retirement, then it limits the impact of additional work on wealth accruals; the major impact is from delayed claiming, so that it has relatively little implication for work decisions.

[5] An notable exception to this conclusion is the work of Krueger and Pischke (1992), who noted that the benefit cut for the 'notch generation' of the late 1970s and early 1980s was not associated with any slowdown in the trend towards early retirement.

Another strand of the literature stresses differential distributional outcomes within and across generations arising from SS (Hurd and Shoven, 1985; Boskin et al., 1987; Steuerle and Bakija, 1994). This literature has found significantly lower net returns for: recent and future cohorts relative to older cohorts; low earners relative to high earners in previous cohorts; high earners relative to high earners in current and future cohorts; the short lived relative to the long lived; and for single men relative to married men. But this literature has also ignored delayed claiming. The ability to delay claiming increases the redistribution of the system, for example, from short lived to long lived, as the long lived gain differentially by delaying claiming. SS also differentially affects those who are liquidity constrained and those who are not.

A full analysis of the problem of delayed claiming would model jointly the retirement and the claiming decision. Such a model is beyond the scope of the current effort. Rather, our goal is 3-fold: to demonstrate theoretically that delayed claiming is often worthwhile; to document empirically that delayed claiming is a relevant phenomenon, at least for some classes of retirees; and to assess whether delays in claiming follow the cross-sectional patterns suggested by theory.

There has been some previous work that has acknowledged delayed claiming as a theoretical issue. Clark and Gohmann (1983) discussed the shape of the budget constraint, allowing for delayed claiming after retirement. Mirer (1998), a paper written simultaneously with ours, also makes the point that it may be optimal in many contexts to delay claiming. But neither of these theoretical analyses consider the cross-sectional determinants of claiming delay, nor do they present any empirical evidence on either the magnitude or determinants of claiming.

2. When is it optimal to delay claiming?

In this section, we illustrate the incentives for claiming delays under the US Social Security System by presenting two simulation approaches. The first technique is a purely financial calculation of the expected present discounted values (EPDV) of future net benefit streams for a single worker and for a married couple. We examine the variation in incentives for claiming delays among subgroups of the population with different characteristics.

The second technique is expected utility maximization under liquidity constraints. This technique has the advantage of capturing the value of SS as a real annuity to a risk averse person with an uncertain date of death. However, due to computational complexity, we calculate the expected utility maximization model for a single worker only, leaving a full household optimization model for future work. Before turning to the simulations, we review the benefit rules to explain how factors such as mortality expectations affect incentives for claiming delays.

2.1. Benefit rules

Consider a single male who is fully insured for retired worker benefits, has just turned 62, and has stopped working.[6] He could claim benefits immediately and begin receiving a monthly benefit of $0.8 \cdot \text{PIA}$. Alternatively, he could delay claiming for some period of time. Consider the effect of waiting 1 year and claiming on his 63rd birthday: he forgoes 1 year of benefits, but receives a monthly benefit of $0.867 \cdot \text{PIA}$ for the rest of his life, an increase of 8.33%. Thus, claiming delays involve the sacrifice of current benefits for a higher future benefit level.

To evaluate this tradeoff, he considers his life expectancy and discount rate. A longer life expectancy creates a stronger incentive to delay because the higher future benefit level is expected to last longer. A lower discount rate creates a stronger incentive to delay because future benefits are valued more highly. The operative discount rate, in turn, will depend at least partly on both wealth levels and bequest motives, in a manner described in more detail below.

The family structure of Social Security benefits is also relevant for the claiming decision.[7] In general, married workers will have a greater financial incentive to delay than will single workers, since by doing so they not only raise the value of their future benefits, but also their spouse's survivor benefits as well. On the other hand, being married lowers the annuity value of Social Security, since the couple can provide some self-insurance against mortality risk (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Brown and Poterba, 1999).

A couple's claiming delays are also affected by the age difference between the spouses. Consider a 62-year-old husband with a wife who has never worked, making the decision as to whether to delay claiming for 1 year. While the change in value of the worker's benefit does not depend on the age of his wife, the expected values of both her spouse benefit and her possible survivor benefit do vary with her age. To see some of the elements that go into the calculation model, let us contrast the cases where the wife is also 62 and where the wife is 61, considering the setting where she claims benefits as soon as she can. If the husband delays for a year, then a 62-year-old wife must delay claiming the spouse benefit by a year, while a 61-year-old wife is not affected, since she could not have claimed anyway. Whether this increases or decreases the value of the spouse benefit depends on whether the actuarial adjustment for the spouse benefit is more

[6] The rules for male and female retired workers are the same; we refer to a male since the empirical work is focused on men. The rules are slightly different with birthdays on the first and second days of the month. Benefit levels (whether claimed or not) are adjusted annually to reflect cost-of-living adjustments.

[7] We will, for ease of exposition, discuss family benefits only in the context of spousal benefits. A small fraction of Social Security beneficiaries also receive family benefits for other dependents as well.

or less than fair; that is, whether the reduced year of dependent benefits receipt of for the 62-year-old wife is more or less than adequately compensated by the actuarial adjustment.

The situation is more complex for the survivor benefit, since the impact of her age on the expected gain from his delay depends on whether the size of her survivor benefit is affected by his actuarial reduction or not. That is, the survivor benefit might be reduced because of the age at which she claims a survivor benefit or because of a limitation based on the age at which he claimed a benefit. Which of these will control depends on the age at which he dies. If the husband dies sufficiently late that it is his actuarial reduction that matters for her survivors benefit, then it is clear that when the wife is younger the delay in his claiming is worth more, since there are more expected years for which those survivor benefits can be claimed. On the other hand, if the husband dies sufficiently early that it is the wife's claiming decision that is dominant, then the effect of the age difference on the value of delay is ambiguous, since it depends on the size of the actuarial adjustment in the survivor benefit. In the simulations below, it will generally turn out that the incentive for delay is larger with a younger wife, since most of the mass of death probabilities is at older ages. We also note that there are life expectancy difference across women other than those associated with age and that men whose wives have a higher life expectancy have a stronger incentive to delay.[8]

2.2. Financial calculations

We begin with financial calculations which measure how the EPDV of SS benefits varies with months of delay (assuming that the worker is already retired). The EPDV is defined as the discounted flow of future potential benefits paid to the family. The program we developed first computes, for every future month at which a family member may be alive, the benefits corresponding to all possible survival and death patterns in the family, then adjusts them for survival probabilities and inflation and discounts them back to the base year.[9] This computation is repeated for each possible month of benefit claim by the prime earner. Appendix A provides a more detailed explanation of these calculations.

We focus on a household whose prime earner is a male born on 2 January 1930 and alive at age 62. The base year for the simulations is 1992.[10] We make the following assumptions in all cases unless otherwise noted. We assume that the wife

[8]For men with working wives, the ratio of the wife's PIA to the husband's PIA will be potentially relevant. But, as discussed at length in Coile et al. (1997), there is no clear prediction for the relationship between PIA ratios and claiming delays, so we do not consider that variable here.

[9]Deaths may occur on a monthly basis. We use all Social Security rules including future planned adjustments as of 1996.

[10]We use the NBDS, a sample of 1980–81 claimants, in the empirical analysis; however, as there are no relevant rule changes between 1980 and 1992, the simulation results are applicable to the NBDS population.

was born on 2 January 1932 and that the couple has no dependants. We assume that this is a one-earner couple, that the husband stops work before the year containing his 62nd birthday, and that the husband's wage history corresponds to the economy-wide median earnings profile for his age cohort from age 20 to age 50 and is constant in real terms thereafter. We assume that the wife claims benefits as soon as possible.[11] Finally, we assume that the household's discount rate is 3% and that mortality risks correspond to the Social Security Administration's sex- and cohort-specific survival tables.

Table 1 presents the EPDV calculations. Column (b) shows the optimal delay in months. Column 8 shows the EPDV with no delay, column (d) shows the EPDV at the optimal delay, and column (e) shows the difference between these two, which

Table 1
Financial calculations: one-earner couple and single worker

Case	Optimal delay (months)	EPDV			PIA	Change in EPDV /PIA
		Zero Delay	Optimal Delay	Change		
One-earner couple						
Base case	36	206 268	212 538	6270	963	6.51
High mortality risk	34	196 370	200 204	3834	963	3.98
Low mortality risk	36	217 369	226 381	9012	963	9.36
High discount rate	0	151 247	151 247	0	963	0.00
Low discount rate	36	263 513	280 320	16 807	963	17.45
High earnings	36	229 067	236 043	6976	1069	6.53
Low earnings	36	110 809	114 184	3375	518	6.52
Wife 5 years older	0	207 472	207 472	0	963	0.00
Wife 2 years older	12	212 513	214 147	1634	963	1.70
Wife same age	35	208 602	214 127	5525	963	5.74
Single						
Base case	10	117 924	118 126	202	963	0.21
High mortality risk	0	102 113	102 113	0	963	0.00
Low mortality risk	23	134 487	136 473	1986	963	2.06
High discount rate	0	81 884	81 884	0	963	0.00
Low discount rate	36	143 339	146 346	3007	963	3.12
High earnings	10	130 955	131 161	206	1069	0.19
Low earnings	9	63 352	63 455	103	518	0.20

Assumptions for calculations: (1) Household's prime earner is a male born 2 January 1930 and alive at age 62. (2) Base year for simulations is 1992; all values are in $1992. (3) Wife is born 2 January 1932; wife has never worked; couple has no dependants. (4) Worker retires on 62nd birthday; wage history corresponds to economy-wide median earnings profile for worker's cohort from ages 20 to 50 and is constant in real terms after. (5) Wife claims as soon as possible (later of her 62nd birthday or husband's claim date). (6) Household discount rate is 3%; mortality risks correspond to Social Security Administration's sex- and cohort-specific survival tables.

[11] A wife claiming retired worker benefits claims at age 62. A wife claiming dependent spouse benefits claims at the later of age 62 or her husband's date of claim.

is the value of delayed claiming. Column (g) presents the change in EPDV scaled by PIA. As the monthly retired worker benefit is equal to the PIA if the worker claims at age 65, the number in column (g) can be loosely interpreted as the number of additional months of retired worker benefits received in expectation over the worker's lifetime as a result of choosing the optimal delay.[12]

The first row shows the results for the base case with a one-earner couple. In this case, it is optimal for the husband to delay claiming by 36 months to age 65. The delay raises the EPDV of benefits by $6270, or 651% of PIA. This result and those that follow suggest that optimal claiming delays are frequently long and that gains from delay are moderate for a one-earner couple. In the base case, a delay of 36 months would result in an increase of $232 in the couple's monthly benefit check, from $1132 to $1364. Fig. 1 illustrates the EPDV of benefits as a function of delay for a one-earner couple in the base case.

The next six rows of Table 1 show the effect of varying the mortality risk, discount rate, and earnings level. We leave the discussion of these factors to the single worker case; due to a kink in the actuarial adjustment schedule at age 65, optimal delays in the one-earner couple cases bunch up at 36 months, making it difficult to see the effect of these factors. The impact of these factors can be seen in the final column, which shows financial gains from delay; these gains follow the same pattern discussed below for single workers, and are much more sizeable in every case.

The final one-earner couple cases illustrate the effect of varying the age



Fig. 1. EPDV by months of delay: one-earner couple.

[12]Of course, this relationship is not exact unless the worker claims at age 65.

difference between the husband and wife. As expected, we find that an increase in the age difference between the spouses leads to longer delays: the optimal delay is 0 if the wife is 5 years older than the husband, 12 months if she is 2 years older, 35 months if she is the same age, and 36 months if she is 2 years (or more) younger (the base case).

Next we examine results for the single worker cases. In general, delays are shorter and gains from delays are much smaller compared to the one-earner couple cases. This is due to the fact that with couples, delays raise the survivor benefit and potentially the dependent spouse benefit; this is consistent with our earlier statement that married men have a stronger incentive to delay than single men (subject to the noted caveat about intra-family risk sharing). In the single worker base case, the optimal delay is 10 months and the gain from delay is $202, or 21% of PIA. The change in the EPDV as delay increases for a single worker in the base case is shown in Fig. 2.

The next two rows explore the effect of varying mortality risk.[13] As expected, we find that a longer life expectancy leads to longer delays. With increased mortality risk, the optimal delay falls to 0 months, while with decreased mortality



Fig. 2. EPDV by months of delay: single worker.

[13]Mortality risk is altered by multiplying the number of deaths per period by a constant: 0.84 for low mortality, 1.16 for high mortality. To get a sense of the impact of these multipliers, consider the thought exercise where we start with equal numbers of high and low mortality types at age 62; with these high an low multipliers we would end up with 53% low mortality types and 47% high mortality types at age 70. Note that calculations are for given mortality expectations at age 62 with no later health news.

risk, delay rises to 23 months. The gain from delay in the low mortality risk case is $1986, or 206% of PIA.

The next two rows of the table show the effect of varying the discount rate.[14] Above we described how a lower discount rate leads to longer delays. The simulations confirm this: in the high discount rate case, delay drops to 0 months, while in the low discount rate case, delay rises to 36 months. The gain from delay in the low discount rate case is $3007, or 312% of PIA.

The last two rows in the table illustrate the irrelevance of the earnings level for the optimal delay. The optimal delay is approximately 10 months whether we consider a person at the 10th percentile of earnings, at the median, or at the 90th percentile.[15] This is because the PIA scales the expression without changing the shape of the time pattern, apart from rounding.

2.3. Expected utility maximization

The EPDV results in Tables 1 and 2 show that in many cases it is optimal to delay claiming and that the gains from delays can be large in some case. However, if individuals are risk averse, these calculations understate the gains from delays, assuming that real annuities are not available in the market on comparable terms. SS provides a real annuity valued by risk averse individuals with an uncertain date of death.[16] Individuals are able to purchase more of this real annuity by delaying, so delays are more attractive under risk aversion.

The question of how to value a marginal annuity is controversial. Bernheim (1987) argues that only the discount rate, and not survival probabilities, should be used to value a marginal annuity stream for a risk averse individual with an uncertain life span. However, Bernheim assumes that annuities are not available on the margin and that there are no bequest motives. In this paper, we recognize that individuals can vary their annuity holdings on the margin by delaying social security claiming. In addition, Jousten (1998) shows that for a sufficiently strong (and linear) bequest motive, the correct way to value a marginal annuity is actuarial valuation, which takes into account both survival probabilities and the discount rate.

We present simulations from an expected utility maximization model with liquidity constraints to show how the inclusion of risk aversion affects the length of optimal delays and the gains from delay. While liquidity constraints are irrelevant in the financial calculations, since the timing of benefit receipt does not

[14]The discount rate is 1% in the low discount rate case and 6% in the high discount rate case.

[15]We construct earnings histories for the 10th and 90th percentile earnings level by taking the relative position in the last year of earnings (year worker turns 61) to fix the level of the earnings profile and then copying the shape of the earnings profile from the baseline scenario. Delay would be 10 months in all cases except for rounding in the benefit rules.

[16]Crawford and Lillien (1981) model the incentive to work longer because of the increased value of a real annuity; they also assume that Social Security is the only way to get a real annuity.

Table 2
Expected utility maximization: single worker

Bequest motive	CRRA	Wealth (000s)	Financial optimal delay (months)	Exp. utility optimal delay (months)	Wealth equivalent			Change in Wealth Equiv. /PIA
					At zero delay	At financial optimal delay	At exp. util. optimal delay	
No	1	10	10	11	177 796	179 493	179 527	1.80
		20	10	18	179 824	182 143	182 842	3.13
		40	10	27	182 885	185 790	187 746	5.05
		80	10	34	187 090	190 583	194 414	7.61
		120	10	36	190 019	193 886	198 926	9.25
		200	10	36	194 026	198 315	204 858	11.25
Yes	1	10	10	11	143 331	144 285	144 522	1.24
		40	10	18	146 850	147 674	147 681	0.86
		120	10	11	132 195	132 701	132 702	0.53
No	3	40	10	32	203 859	208 198	212 665	9.14

Assumptions for calculations: (1) household's prime earner is a male born 2 January 1930 and alive at age 62. (2) Base year for simulations is 1992; all values are in $1992. (3) Worker retires on 62nd birthday; wage history corresponds to economy-wide median. earnings profile for his age cohort from ages 20 to 50 and is constant in real terms thereafter. (4) Household discount rate is 3%; mortality risks correspond to Social Security Administration's sex- and cohort-specific survival tables. (5) Bequest motive is in the form of a linear utility of bequests term. The linear parameter is set equal to 5.5×10^{-5}. (6) Worker's PIA is $963 in all cases.

matter except through the discount rate, liquidity constraints are key here. In order to purchase more of the real annuity, the individual must delay the onset of the annuity stream. Assuming that the individual has no other income and cannot borrow against SS, he must consume from financial wealth during his delay.[17] An individual with high wealth will delay longer, since he can better afford to consume out of wealth during the delay.

For the simulations, we restrict our attention to the case of a single individual. This is sufficient to illustrate the difference between this model and the financial calculations and avoids the computational burden of a full household optimization model. We use a CRRA specification of the instantaneous utility function of consumption. There are three new parameters: the utility discount rate, the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the initial wealth level. We assume that the utility discount rate is equal to the market interest rate of 3%. In the base case, we use log utility, corresponding to a CRRA of one, and financial wealth of $40 000.

[17]We assume that liquidity constraints are in the form of wealth non-negativity constraints. This seems reasonable for this cohort, especially since it is illegal to use SS as collateral for a loan. We do not consider the role of precautionary balances.

In some simulations, we introduce a linear utility of bequests term.[18] The full model is presented in Appendix B.

Table 2 presents results using expected utility maximization. Columns (d) and (e) show optimal delays under financial calculation and expected utility maximization. The following three columns report wealth equivalents at zero delay, the financial optimal delay, and the expected utility maximizing delay; the wealth equivalent is the amount of wealth an individual requires today to be made as well off as he is by his entitlement to the stream of SS benefits. The final column contains the change in wealth equivalent from choosing the expected utility maximizing delay rather than zero delay divided by the PIA.

We can compare Table 2 to the single worker base case from Table 1. Several pieces of evidence support our prediction that SS benefits are valued more highly under risk aversion. First, the optimal delay is longer using expected utility maximization than financial calculation for any wealth level. Second, for any given delay, the wealth equivalent is higher than the EPDV. Third, the increase in the wealth equivalent from choosing the expected utility maximizing delay rather than zero delay is much larger than the increase in EPDV from choosing the financial optimal delay rather than zero delay.

The first six rows show the effect of varying the wealth level when there is no bequest motive. The expected utility maximizing delay increases monotonically with wealth: the optimal delay is 11 months when wealth is \$10 000, 27 months when wealth is \$40 000, and 36 months when wealth is \$120 000. This is consistent with our explanation that delay is less costly for high wealth individuals.

But these calculations assume that there is no operative bequest motive. Introducing a bequest motive changes the results considerably, because the bequest introduces a new means for high wealth individuals to insure against longer-than-expected longevity. That is, for individuals for whom a linear bequest motive is operative on the margin, there is no valuation of the annuity aspect of SS, since consumption is never reduced to just SS benefits and variation in bequests provides length-of-life insurance.

The interesting implications of introducing a bequest motive are shown in the next panel of Table 2. For the lowest wealth workers, there is no impact of the bequest motive on optimal delays, since they are sufficiently constrained to be fully consuming their wealth and their Social Security benefits (although this does lower the gain from delay in wealth equivalent terms). For the base case workers with \$40 000 in wealth, the bequest motive shortens delay from 27 to 18 months. For the high wealth workers, delay is shortened much further, from 36 to 11 months. This reflects the fact that they no longer value the annuity function of Social Security, as they can use bequests to insure length of life; as a result, optimal delays with very high wealth are now quite similar to those in the linear

[18]The parameter on the linear utility of bequests term is 5.5×10^{-5}; the justification for this value is discussed further below.

case shown in Table 1. Therefore, if there is an operative bequest motive, we may observe an inverse U-shaped pattern of claiming delays as wealth rises: those with medium wealth have longer delays than either those with low or high wealth.

Of course, this is not necessarily the pattern induced by introducing bequests. At a parameter for the utility of bequests that is much lower than the value we have chosen for our simulations, the patterns with bequests would look much like that without bequests; likewise, with a much higher valuation of bequests, individuals would effectively become risk neutral with respect to Social Security and the pattern would look like the financial calculations shown above. We have selected the parameter value for this case to illustrate the possibility of a U-shaped pattern; it is left to the empirical work to demonstrate the empirical relevance of this case.

The final row of Table 2 shows that a larger CRRA leads to a longer delay and a larger wealth equivalent for any given delay. This is because more risk aversion leads to a higher valuation of the annuity value of delay.

2.4. Summary

To recap, our discussion of benefit rules, financial calculations, and utility simulations suggest several conclusions about claiming delays. First, under a wide variety of circumstances, delayed claiming is optimal, and the gains can become quite substantial to doing so (particularly when one considers the annuity value of Social Security benefits). Second, there are some clear predictions from these simulations about the cross-sectional determinants of delays: the incentive to delay is stronger if the claimant has a longer life expectancy; married men generally have a stronger incentive to delay claiming than do single men; the incentive to delay is stronger if the claimant has a larger positive age difference with his wife; and claiming delays may follow an increasing or U-shaped pattern in wealth holdings. The next section documents both the prevalence of claiming delays and the cross-sectional patterns that we observe empirically.

3. Empirical evidence on claiming delays

3.1. Data

The primary data set for this analysis is the Social Security Administration's New Beneficiary Data System (NBDS). The universe for the NBDS is individuals who claimed some form of SS benefits between mid-1980 and mid-1981.[19] The

[19]The NBDS sample includes members of the 'notch generation' (born 1917–1921) as well as individuals born prior to this. Members of the notch generation have lower PIAs than identical individuals born before them and thus may exhibit different retirement behavior. However, the level of the PIA does not affect the optimal claiming delay, as shown in Section 2, and this paper focuses on claiming conditional on retirement; therefore, the presence of 'notch babies' in the sample does not bias the analysis.

survey contains administrative data on annual SS earnings from 1951 to 1991 and dates of benefit receipt matched to 1982 and 1991 survey data on health, wealth, income, and job characteristics. Our sample is all male primary respondents in the NBDS who claimed retired worker benefits, which is 5307 men.[20]

We measure claiming delays in months as the difference between the date of claiming and the later of the date of retirement and the date of the 62nd birthday. We use two definitions of the year of retirement: last year with non-zero earnings and last year with earnings above the SS earnings test cutoff. We define date of claiming as the first month for which benefits were paid, as this is what determines the actuarial adjustment.

The NBDS is an excellent data source because of its large sample size and administrative data on claiming and retirement. But there are two potential sample selection problems. First, the NBDS is a sample of claimants, not a sample from a birth cohort.[21] The sample omits men who die between ages 62 and 70 without having claimed, thus estimates of delays based on the sample may be biased. However, the share of the population sampled in the NBDS that dies without claiming appears to be very small; our calculations comparing NBDS aggregates to Social Security administrative data suggest that it is less than 1%. Second, the NBDS excludes individuals who died after claiming and before the interviews in late 1982, another potential source of bias. However, this does not appear to be a significant problem; only 3% of male retired workers were ineligible for interview, a group that includes both persons who had died and persons who were ineligible for other reasons.

One problem with using earnings histories to determine retirement is that individuals who appear to be retired based on their SS earnings may in fact be working in non-covered employment. We address this possibility as follows. If an individual's self-reported last year worked is later than his 62nd birthday and his job at age 62 is in non-covered employment, we use his self-reported date of retirement; otherwise, we use the SS earnings history to determine retirement. Non-covered employment is defined in one of two ways: employment in the federal, state, or local government sector, or employment for which FICA taxes are not paid.

We confirm some of our findings using the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), both to verify that the problems in the NBDS are negligible and to document whether claiming behavior has changed over time. The HRS is a survey of persons ages 51–61 in 1992 which matches biennial survey data to administra-

[20]The NBDS sample excludes individuals switching from one benefit type to another, so our sample excludes individuals converting from disability benefits to retired worker benefits.

[21]Because the NBDS is a sample of claimants, it contains representatives from nine birth cohorts (men ages 62–70 at claim). As a result, our findings are not representative of a given birth cohort unless retirement and claiming behavior are constant across cohorts and cohorts are the same size, but results are representative of average claiming behavior across this set of cohorts.

tive data on SS earnings and benefits receipt.[22] No HRS respondents were eligible to claim by 1991, the last year of administrative data, so we use spouses who reached age 62 by 1991. We do not use this as our primary data due to its small sample size.

3.2. Results

We divide the NBDS sample into two parts. The 'clean' sample is individuals who retired before the calendar year in which they turn 62. Delays for this group start at the 62nd birthday and are measured exactly. The 'non-clean' sample is individuals who retire in the year in which they turn 62 or above. Delays for this group begin at retirement and rely on an imputed month of retirement, since SS earnings data is annual.[23] Most of our analysis focuses on the clean sample because of the difficulty of measuring delays exactly in the non-clean sample. For the HRS, we do not present results for the non-clean sample, as it has too few additional observations.

We first examine delays in the clean sample. The empirical survivor function is shown in Table 3 and Fig. 3. Two key features of the pattern of claiming are apparent. First, most retirees claim immediately: roughly 80% of men claim in the first month of eligibility, at their 62nd birthday. Second, a significant share of the sample has a long delay: roughly 10% of the sample delays for at least 1 year. The hazard rate, shown in Table 4 and Fig. 4, is very high in the first month, is low for the next three years, and rises again near 36 months (age 65).

These patterns are extremely similar for both definitions of retirement (earnings of zero, and earnings below the earnings test level), both methods of accounting for non-covered employment (government, or no FICA earnings), and in both samples (NBDS, or HRS). We choose as our preferred sample for the remainder of the analysis the NBDS sample that uses the earnings test definition of retirement and that corrects for government employment, because the earnings test sample is larger and because it seems more plausible that people would know the sector of their employment than whether they pay FICA taxes.[24] The percent delaying at least 1 year in the preferred sample is 9.2%, versus 10.7, 7.9 and 9.7% in the other NBDS samples. In the HRS, the percent delaying at least 1 year is 12.7% in the sample analogous to the preferred sample. In fact, the true figure in the HRS may

[22] Retirement and claiming dates are defined the same way as in the NBDS; we adjust for the possibility of work in the government sector using industry, as described above (payment of FICA taxes is not asked in the HRS).

[23] We use monthly earnings (annual earnings/12) from the last year worked before the retirement year to estimate months worked in the retirement year, assuming constant wages. Our results are similar if we assume instead that everyone retires in July or December.

[24] This is the sample used in Figs. 3 and 4.

Table 3
Empirical survivor function: samples of early retirees

Month of eligibility	NBDS				HRS	
	Earnings test		Zero earnings		Earnings test	Zero earnings
	St/Loc/Fed	FICA	St/Loc/Fed	FICA		
1	**0.1905**	**0.2035**	**0.1551**	**0.1720**	**0.2267**	**0.2333**
2	0.1638	0.1747	0.1354	0.1506	0.2000	0.2111
3	0. 1476	0.1590	0. 1224	0.1378	0.1800	0.2000
4	0.1373	0.1490	0.1202	0.1356	0. 1667	0.2000
5	0.1297	0.1416	0. 1139	0. 1294	0.1533	0.1889
6	0.1238	0. 1358	0.1072	0.0228	0.1400	0. 1667
7	0.1146	0. 1270	0.0960	0.1118	0.1400	0.1667
8	0.1073	0. 1213	0.0875	0.1055	0.1400	0.1667
9	0.1014	0.1155	0.0808	0.0990	0.1400	0.1667
10	0.0999	0.1141	0.0808	0.0990	0.1267	0.1444
11	0.0953	0.1097	0.0808	0.0990	0.1267	0.1444
12	**0.0924**	**0.1068**	**0.0787**	**0.0968**	**0. 1267**	**0. 1444**
18	0.0790	0.09 14	0.0688	0.0836	0. 1067	0.1333
24	0.0700	0.0801	0.0604	0.0716	0.0867	0.1222
36	0.0299	0.0380	0.0249	0.0355	0.0467	0. 077 8
60	0.0079	0.0072	0.0096	0.0000	0.0390	0.0638
72	0.0052	0.0067	0.0053	0.0078	0.0260	0.0426
84	0.0039	0.0055	0.0041	0.0065	0.0195	0.03 19
>100	0.0020	0.0032	0.0018	0.0036	0.0065	0.0106
No. of obs	754	793	506	528	150	90



Fig. 3. Empirical survivor function.

Table 4
Empirical hazard function: NBDS sample of early retirees

Month of eligibility	Earnings test		Zero earnings	
	St/Loc/Fed	FICA	St/Loc/Fed	FICA
1	**0.8095**	**0.7965**	**0.8449**	**0.8280**
2	0.1402	0. 1415	0.1270	0.1244
3	0.0989	0.0899	0.0960	0.0850
4	0.0698	0.0629	0.0180	0.0160
5	0.0554	0. 0497	0.0524	0.0457
6	0.0455	0.0410	0.0588	0.8238
7	0.0743	0.0648	0. 1045	−3.9035
8	0.0637	0.0449	0.0885	0.0564
9	0.0550	0. 047 8	0.0766	0.0616
10	0.0148	0.0121	0.0000	0.0000
11	0.0460	0.0386	0.0000	0.0000
12	0.0304	0.0264	0.0260	0.0222
13	0.0357	0.0375	0.0152	0.0238
14	0.0370	0.0233	0.0000	0.0000
15	0.0291	0.0239	0.0297	0.0243
16	0.0096	0.0153	0.0160	0.0249
17	0.0206	0.0259	0.0338	0.0412
18	0.0223	0.0277	0.0378	0.0302
19	0.0203	0.0175	0.0349	0.0287
20	0.0220	0.0267	0.018 1	0.0283
21	0.0211	0.0183	0.0184	0.0152
22	0.0229	0.0268	0.0375	0.0463
23	0.022 1	0.0192	0.0195	0.0148
24	0.01 13	0.0220	0.0000	0.0192
25	0.0229	0.0187	0.0199	0.0168
26	0.0117	0.0 102	0.0000	0.0000
27	0.0251	0.0206	0.0000	0.0000
28	0. 0243	0.0210	0.0405	0.0327
29	0.0498	0.0375	0.0423	0.0279
30	0.0213	0.0223	0.0349	0.0347
31	0. 0435	0.0356	0.0267	0.0219
32	0.0490	0.0399	0.0235	0.0192
33	0.0772	0.0862	0.1202	0.1158
34	0.1454	0. 1347	0.1640	0.1310
35	0. 15 15	0. 1226	0.1281	0.0998
36	0.1786	0.1574	0.2219	0.1627
37	0.4649	0.5474	0.5141	0.5944

be even higher, as we conservatively assume that all right-censored delays end when our observation period ends, which affects 44% of the observations.[25]

Thus, claiming delays are empirically important for early retirees. Nevertheless,

[25]HRS administrative data ends in December 1991. We assume all member of the sample who are still delaying in December 1991 claim in January 1992.



Fig. 4. Empirical hazard function.

the relatively small amount of delays in aggregate appears to contradict the general applicability of gains from delayed claiming that we documented in our theoretical discussion. We return to this point in the conclusion.

For the non-clean sample, the pattern is very different, as shown in Table 5 for the earnings test sample. There is substantial claiming *before* retirement, repre-

Table 5
Empirical survivor function: NBDS sample of later retirees

Month of eligibility	Earnings test				
	Age 62	Age 63	Age 64	Age 65	Age 66+
−1	**0.7932**	**0.5511**	**0.5815**	**0.1554**	**0.0075**
0	0.6850	0.4709	0.5421	0.0946	0.0059
1	0.4171	**0.3897**	**0.4750**	**0.0451**	**0.0050**
2	0.1787	0.2176	0.2648	0.0310	0.0041
3	0.1501	0.1819	0.2136	0.0234	0.0038
4	0.1298	0. 1592	0.1601	0.0160	0.0038
5	0.1149	0.1435	0. 1406	0.0138	0.0035
6	0.0966	0. 1229	0.1178	0.0126	0.0029
7	0.0878	0. 1096	0.1035	0.0090	0.0029
8	0.0727	0.1024	0.0828	0.0079	0.0029
9	0.0660	0.0974	0.0673	0.0067	0.0026
10	0.05 64	0.0856	0.0463	0.0054	0.0020
11	0.0564	0.0790	0.0305	0.0054	0.0020
12	**0.0463**	**0.0697**	**0.0190**	**0.0054**	**0.0020**
24	**0.0155**	**0.0096**	**0.0010**	**0.0038**	**0.0009**
36	**0.0008**	**0.0025**	**0.0000**	**0.0019**	**0.0000**
No. of obs	503	366	502	742	2253

Table 6
Summary statistics: NBDS sample of early retirees

Variable	Weighted data				
	Mean	Standard deviation	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Months of delay	3.53	11.20	0	0	100
Live to age 70	0.83	0.37	–	0	1
Net worth	84 929	186 018	47 000	−131 000	3 334 700
Married dummy	0.76	0.43	–	0	1
Age difference with wife	2.2	4.8	2	−17	23
Pension dummy	0.49	0.50	–	0	1
White dummy	0.87	0.33	–	0	1
Years retired before 62	7.39	8.18	4	1	31
No. of observations	754				

sented by the '−1' row. This reflects two factors: imperfect imputation of the month of retirement and application of the monthly earnings test rather than the annual earnings test. Since both factors cannot, by definition, affect the delay by more than 1 year, we compare the percentage delaying more than 1 year in Table 7 to that in the previous tables. This share is much smaller in the non-clean sample: it is 5% for those retiring at 62, 7% for those retiring at 63, and negligible for those retiring at or after 65.

There are two explanations for our finding that early retirees delay longer. First, as noted above, the optimal delay falls with retirement age past the 62nd birthday; the optimal age of claiming does not vary significantly with the age of retirement, so a later retirement age results in shorter delays. Second, those who retire early may be wealthier on average and, as we documented above, optimal delays rise with wealth over some range of wealth. On the other hand, those who retire earlier may be less healthy on average, which would correspond to shorter delays. These effect of these covariates will be explored in the next section.

Table 6 presents summary statistics for the sample. We use weighted data to correct for oversampling of older claimants. The typical respondent in the sample claims benefits in his first month of benefit eligibility, though the mean claim occurs at 4.5 months due to the skewed nature of the distribution. The typical respondent has an 83% probability of living to age 70; has a net worth of $47 000; is married and 2 years older than his wife; has a 49% chance of having a pension; is white; and has been retired for 4 years.

4. Cross-sectional analysis

The discussion in Section 2 suggests a set of cross-sectional patterns in the incentives to delay. We can verify that delays reflect calculating behavior on behalf of at least some retirees by confirming the patterns in the data. For the cross-

sectional analysis, we use our 'preferred' version of the NBDS clean sample (based on the earnings test definition of retirement and adjusting for public sector employees) because it provides a precise measure of delays and a sufficiently large sample of 754 observations.

In the cross-sectional analysis, we test the four predictions derived in Section 2. First, we consider whether individuals who expect to live longer have longer delays by using data on ex-post realized mortality by age 70 to proxy for mortality expectations at time of claim. Much of the literature on modeling the effects of health suggests that objective measures such as this may be preferable to self-reported measures of health.[26]

Second, we examine whether claiming delays exhibit a declining or inverse U-shaped pattern as wealth rises. One difficulty in using NBDS wealth data to estimate the effect of wealth on delays: the NBDS measures wealth at claiming, while the variable of interest is wealth at age 62. We were unable to obtain data on wealth at age 62, but this should be highly correlated with wealth at claiming. We use total household net worth as our measure of wealth.

Third, married men should have longer delays than single men. Finally, among married men, men with a larger (positive) age difference with their wives should have longer delays.

4.1. Hazard model estimates

The claiming decision is analyzed most naturally in a hazard model framework. A spell in this context refers to a period of claiming delay, which begins when the individual first becomes eligible for SS benefits by being both retired and at least 62 and ends when the individual claims. We assume a proportional hazard specification of the form $h(t) = h_0(t) \cdot e^{B1x1+\cdots+BkXk}$ and use non-parametric estimation of the baseline hazard, $h_0(t)$. Importantly, in this hazard framework, a *negative* coefficient indicates *increased delays*, so that for example we would predict a negative coefficient on living to age 70, a positive or U-shaped relationship with wealth, a negative effect of larger age differences between husband and wife, and a positive effect of being single. To evaluate the coefficients, we compare them to a benchmark of zero: a coefficient of -0.2 means that a one unit change in the variable leads to a 20% decrease in the baseline hazard, and a lower baseline hazard results in longer delays.

The first column of Table 7 presents our hazard model results for the pooled sample of married and single men; for the single men, spousal age difference is set to zero, and a dummy for being single is included in the model. These results provide substantial support for the cross-sectional predictions of the model. First, we find that mortality prospects (as proxied by living until age 70) cause a

[26] While we use mortality by age 70, results are similar using mortality by ages 68–74.

Table 7
Hazard model estimates: NBDS sample of early retirees

Variable	Single and married		Single men		Married men	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E	Coefficient	S.E.
Live to 70	−0.1505	(0.0340)	−0.3822	(0.0754)	−0.0581	(0.0385)
Net worth	−4.08E-04	(2.17E-04)	−2.74E-03	(2.62E-03)	−3.00E-04	(2.20E-04)
Net worth ×2	5.79E-07	(2.13E-07)	8.80E-06	(2.13E-05)	4.34E-07	(2.12E-07)
Net worth ×3	−1.69E-10	(4.69E-11)	−6.25E-09	(3.82E-08)	−1.34E-10	(4.63E-11)
Single dummy	−0.1537	(0.0413)				
Age difference	−0.0051	(0.0031)			−0.0051	(0.0031)
Age diff. missing	−0.0843	(0.0783)			−0.0898	(0.0774)
Pension dummy	0.1870	(0.0318)	0.3123	(0.0826)	0.1653	(0.0342)
White	0.1654	(0.0578)	0.1693	(0.1001)	0.1825	(0.0748)
Years retired	−0.0100	(0.0021)	−0.0087	(0.0044)	−0.0104	(0.0023)
Log likelihood	−4613.48		−889.39		−3300.39	
Chi square	105.18		35.23		55.62	
No. of obs.	754		193		561	

Note: financial assets are in thousands. Dependent variable equals 1 if delay ⩾12 months, 0 if not.

significant delay in claiming; living until age 70 lowers the hazard rate of claiming by 15.1%, a quite sizeable effect. We also see a U-shaped pattern with respect to wealth in the hazard rate: more wealth at first delays claiming, then ultimately speeds it up. This relationship is graphed in Fig. 5. We see that for wealth levels below $450 000, additional wealth causes increases in delays, reflecting the first effect discussed earlier, the increased valuation of annuities through easing of



Fig. 5. Effect of net worth on hazard of claiming.

liquidity constraints. However, for wealth levels beyond this level, additional wealth causes reductions in delays, as the bequest motive presumably becomes operative and the value of the marginal annuity falls.

Strikingly, the coefficient on being single is negative, indicating longer delays for single men. This is very much at odds with the simulations presented above, and there are at least three explanations. The first is that the annuity provided by Social Security may be worth less to a married couple because they are better able to self-insure, as argued by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), which offsets the increased financial value of delayed claiming through the survivor benefit. Second, the bequest motive may operate more strongly for married couples than for single men (one-third of whom are never married), once again reducing the valuation of delayed claiming on the margin. Finally, there may just be other underlying differences between single and married claimants that are not captured in our model. We provide some evidence on these hypotheses below.

The coefficient on the age difference with the spouse is the right sign, with larger age differences leading to more delay, and it is significant at the 10% level. The estimate shows that each year of age difference lowers the hazard by approximately 0.5%, so that having a wife who is 4 years younger reduces the hazard by 2% relative to having a wife who is the same age.

The remaining coefficients in the regression are also of interest. We find that, for each year retired prior to age 62, the hazard is 0.8% lower, so younger retirees have longer delays beyond age 62. The early retiree population includes two groups, those wealthy enough to afford early retirement and those who are sick or have poor job prospects. The fact that we find a significant negative coefficient may indicate that early retirees in our sample are largely drawn from the well-off group; this is consistent with the fact that persons converting from disability to SS benefits, who may make up a large fraction of sick and unemployable early retirees, are not in the sample. Also, the fact that wealth is measured imperfectly, as detailed above, may further explain why this variable may be picking up a wealth effect. Second, we find that a white individual has a 19% higher hazard and a shorter delay.

Finally, we find that having a pension leads to a 30% higher hazard and a shorter delay. There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, pensions may be integrated with SS benefits; if pensions decrease automatically at age 62, men with pensions may claim without delay to maintain a constant income.[27] Second, the fact that the sample is selected on retiring prior to age 62 could affect

[27]Our attempts to test this theory are not entirely successful. First, we find that delays among men with private pension plans are similar to delays among men with government pensions, despite the fact that private pension plans are much more likely to be integrated with SS. Second, we use questions about whether the pension rose or fell at age 62, age 65, or at benefit claim; we find that these factors affect delays as we would expect, but the results are not significant, perhaps due to the small number of people who report such changes in their pension.

the result; for example, men with pensions who retire before age 62 could have higher discount rates and therefore be less likely to delay.

We next separately analyze delays by single and married men. Two interesting features emerge from this division of the sample. First, the effect of mortality on claiming is much stronger for single than for married men, with living until age 70 lowering the hazard by almost 40% for single men and by only 6% for married men. Second, while the pattern of wealth effects is nicely U-shaped for the married sample, as for the overall sample, it is much more variable for the single sample, first declining, then increasing, then declining again.

Both of these findings are loosely consistent with our explanations for the counterintuitive finding that single men delay longer. Married men's delay is less affected by own mortality prospects since they also depend on spouse mortality and since they are partially insured through within-family annuitization. In addition, the wealth pattern is less clearly U-shaped for single men because of a weaker bequest motive; for this population, very high wealth levels lead to longer delays, as would be consistent with the model without bequests. Of course, these results are not dispositive, and our finding of significantly longer delays for single men deserves further study.

4.2. Probit model estimates

Our hazard model considers the marginal impact of individual characteristics on delay in general. But of particular interest is the impact of these characteristics on reasonably long delays, since these are the cases that are of most relevance for both policy-making and empirical work on the behavioral impacts of Social Security. We therefore, in Table 8, reestimate our model as a probit model of the decision to delay claiming at least 12 months. As noted earlier, the mean of this dependent variable is 9.2%.

Each cell in Table 8 shows the probit coefficient, standard error, and the implied percentage point change in delays. We expect all coefficients to change signs, as a positive coefficient in the probit indicates a higher probability of delay. This is precisely what we find. The mortality coefficient remains large and significant, suggesting that living to age 70 raises the odds of delay by 6.1%, which is two-thirds of the baseline rate of delay in this sample of 9.3%. Likewise, we continue to see a U-shaped pattern in wealth holdings; in this case, the peak of the inverse U-shape is at $320 000. But the coefficients on the wealth terms are no longer significant. On the other hand, the coefficient on the age difference is now much more significant than in the hazard model, and implies that each year of age difference increases the odds of delaying by 0.37 percentage points, which is 4% of baseline; that is, a man with a wife who is 4 years younger is 16% more likely to delay 1 year than is a man with a wife the same age. As in Table 7, however, we continue to find a wrong-signed coefficient on the dummy for being single,

Table 8
Probit estimates: NBDS sample of early retirees

Variable	Single and married		Single men		Married men	
	Coefficient [Dprobit]	S.E.	Coefficient [Dprobit]	S.E.	Coefficient [Dprobit]	S.E.
Live to 70	0.6613	(0.1984)	0.9849	(0.3165)	0.3774	(0.2283)
	[0.0611]	(2.17E-04)	[0.1623]	(2.62E-03)	[0.0305]	(2.20E-04)
Net worth	2.01E-03	(1.41E-03)	1.60E-03	(6.72E-03)	1.77E-03	(l.13E-03)
	[2.56E-04]		[3.55E-04]		[1.78E-04]	
Net worth ×2	−3.65E-06	(3.59E-06)	1.54E-05	(5.66E-05)	−3.11E-06	(1.66E-06)
	[−4.65E-07]		[3.41E-06]		[−3. 12E-07]	
Net worth ×3	1.09E-09	(1.65E-09)	−5.11E-08	(1.03E-07)	9.13E-10	(4.53E-10)
	[1.39E-10]		[−1.13E-08]		[9.16E-11]	
Single dummy	0.5220	(0.1309)				
	[0.0819]					
Age difference	0.0291	(0.0136)			0.0286	(0.0139)
	[0.0037]				[0.0029]	
Age diff. missing	0.0186	(0.2423)			−0.0064	(0.2446)
	[0.0024]				[−0.0006]	
Pension dummy	−0.5948	(0.1243)	−0.4695	(0.2290)	−0.6733	(0.1498)
	[−0.0767]		[−0.0950]		[−0.0733]	
White	−0.4548	(0.1510)	−0.4100	(0.2421)	−0.5006	(0.1919)
	[−0.0743]		[−0.1022]		[−0.0696]	
Years retired	0.0279	(0.0061)	0.0204	(0.0112)	0.0329	(0.0073)
	[0.0036]		[0.0045]		[0.0033]	
Log likelihood	−200.75		−78.45		−122.89	
Chi square	80.81		18.47		49.48	
No. of obs.	754		193		561	

Note: (1) financial assets are in thousands. (2) Dependent variable equals 1 if delay ⩾12 months, 0 if not.

which now indicates that being single raises the odds of delay by almost 11%. The other coefficients have similar effects to those found in Table 7.

Thus, our probit estimates confirm the pattern of findings from the hazard model. For mortality and spousal age difference, the effects are much larger in magnitude than in the hazard model, suggesting that these factors may play a larger role in the decision to delay claiming for longer periods of time than to delay for shorter periods. Indeed, if we reestimate these probit models with a dummy for any delay, as opposed to a dummy for long delays, we get much weaker results on mortality and spousal age differences.

5. Conclusions

While there is a large literature on take-up decisions for programs such as UI and AFDC, we are not aware of any previous analysis of SS claiming behavior as

a take-up decision, despite the fact that SS dwarfs these programs in terms of annual expenditures and beneficiaries.[28] Each year, roughly one million male and 750 000 female fully insured individuals reach age 62 and face choices of when to retire and when to claim SS benefits. Thus, understanding of the claiming decision is important for modeling of the impacts of this program.[29] In addition, the SS take-up decision differs from that for UI or AFDC because it is completely a dynamic decision; the question is not whether to take up benefits, but when.

In this paper, we first use financial calculations and simulations of an expected utility maximization model to estimate optimal delays and the gains from delay. We find that delays are optimal in a wide variety of cases and that gains are often significant. In the financial calculations, gains from delay are around 600% of PIA for married couples in our base case. The simulations of the expected utility maximization model for a single worker suggest that optimal delays are longer and that gains from delay may be 10 or more times larger when risk aversion is incorporated.

While we find a much lower prevalence of delay empirically than the theoretical models suggest, we have nevertheless documented that delays are empirically important for early retirees, with approximately 10% of those retiring before age 62 delaying at least 1 year. By contrast, delays are fairly unimportant for later retirees. Moreover, our hazard, and probit modeling suggest that delays are largely consistent with the predictions of the theory. In particular, we find support for three hypotheses: men with longer life expectancies have longer delays; delays follow an inverse U-shaped pattern as wealth increases; and men with younger spouses have longer delays. Surprisingly, however, we do not find that married men have longer delays than single men. Perhaps differences in the claiming estimates across these groups are related to differences in the ability of these groups to self-insure against mortality risk and in their bequest motives.

Our research has implications for the large literature on SS, in particular the estimation of retirement responses to SS and the computation of the distributional effects of the program. As we have discussed, the SS benefit level may be endogenous. Claiming appears to be influenced by factors such as health, wealth, wife's age, and wife's earnings which may also affect retirement propensities. Assuming that individuals claim benefits as soon as they retire overstates the benefit of continued work, as part of the benefit is available to those who retire by delaying claiming. Future work on retirement modeling can use our estimated claiming effects to correct their estimates for delayed claiming.

Researchers studying the distributional effects of the program may also want to

[28]For example, in 1996 there were 43.7 million SS beneficiaries (of which 26.9 million were retired worker beneficiaries), versus 8.1 million UI recipients and 4.5 million AFDC families (or 12.6 million AFDC recipients). In 1996, SS benefits paid were $354 billion, compared to UI benefits of $21 billion and AFDC benefits of $290 billion. All figures are from the *1998 Green Book*, Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives.

[29]Figures are unpublished data from the Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration.

estimate such effects using both the PIA and the actual benefit level; the former shows patterns of redistribution inherent in the system conditional on everyone claiming at age 65, and comparing the latter to the former shows to what extent these patterns are altered by claiming behavior. We feel these issues are particularly relevant now, as the release of the HRS will certainly lead to a new round of research on Social Security.

However, the simulations suggest that the fraction of early retirees claiming immediately at age 62 is much too large. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that immediate claiming is only optimal for those with a much older wife, high mortality risk, or a high discount rate. Thus we suspect that part of the population simply claims immediately without sufficient consideration of intertemporal choice issues. This finding of heterogeneity in the SS population has implications for aspects of SS design and reform. For instance, it may affect the age at which benefits should first be made available, an issue that has been made more salient by the gradual increase in the NRA from 62 to 67. This finding may also raise concerns about the rationality of the savings decision, which is of great importance in the debate over SS reform. For all these reasons, we feel that claiming behavior should be better understood by those interested in Social Security.

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