

Learning, Diversity and Adaptation in Changing Environments: The Role of Weak Links*

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April 27, 2023

Abstract

Adaptation to dynamic conditions requires a certain degree of diversity. If all agents take the best current action, learning that the underlying state has changed and behavior should adapt will be slower. Diversity is harder to maintain when there is fast communication between agents, because they tend to find out and pursue the best action rapidly. We explore these issues using a model of (Bayesian) learning over a social network. Agents learn rapidly from and may also have incentives to coordinate with others to whom they are connected via strong links. We show, however, that when the underlying environment changes sufficiently rapidly, any network consisting of just strong links will do only a little better than random choice in the long run. In contrast, networks combining strong and weak links, whereby the latter type of links transmit information only slowly, can achieve much higher long-run average payoffs. The best social networks are those that combine a large fraction of agents into a strongly-connected component, while still maintaining a sufficient number of smaller communities that make diverse choices and communicate with this component via weak links.

Keywords: adaptation, Bayesian learning, changing environments, diversity, networks, strong links, weak links.

JEL Classification: D83, D85.

*We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Hewlett Foundation, MIT Quest, and the Mathworks Engineering Fellowship. We thank Ben Golub and Alex Wolitzky for suggestions.

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1 Introduction

Rising threats from economic disruptions, climate change, new pandemics and resurgent nationalism and other extremist ideologies have rekindled interest in understanding what makes societies resilient against challenges (Keck and Sakdapolrak (2013); Brunnermeier (2022)). A large body of literature in ecology and biology, starting with the influential work of Fisher (1958), suggests that diversity is critical for resilience in the face of changing circumstances. Species that lack diversity may be well-suited for a given environment, but then have a hard time adapting to sizable changes. In this paper, we explore the relationship between diversity and adaptation in a social context. Our focus is on one facet of this problem: learning about and adapting to a changing environment.

1.1 Main Argument

We envisage a set of agents that interact with each other and choose between two actions, one of which has higher payoffs. Local interactions and knowledge flows create a force towards choosing the same action as one’s neighbors. However, when all or most agents choose the same action, even if this has currently the higher payoff, learning about dynamically-improving alternatives becomes more difficult and may reduce long-run payoffs.

Formally, we study the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a simple game in which each agent has a utility consisting of a *material payoff*, which depends on whether her action matches the underlying state, and a *network payoff*, which depends on how well her action matches the actions of her closely-associated neighbors. Crucially, the underlying state changes over time according to a Markov chain, necessitating adaptation to this evolving environment. We assume that agents use Bayesian updating to form their beliefs about the underlying state, but in our baseline model simply maximize their current utility, and hence have no reason to experiment. (These results are then extended to the case in which agents maximize their discounted utility).

The need for adaptation in our model creates a network version of the classic exploitation-exploration trade-off: how much should some agents deviate from what is best and experiment to see whether the underlying environment has changed? Differently from standard experimentation problems, however, here the network structure is critical. If agents are closely linked together, they tend to play the same action, both because of local information flows and because of local interactions. But in the case where all agents play the best action today, there is an adaptation problem: when the environment changes and there is a need for adaptation—switching to the now-higher payoff action—such a change does not take place or does so very very slowly. If, on the other hand, the social network has several disconnected components, some of which are playing diverse actions, the society as a whole will discover a change in environment rapidly, but this information will not be transmitted from a local community to the rest of society, because of the disconnected nature of the social graph.

Our main argument in this paper is that Granovetter’s idea of “weak links” (Granovetter (1977)), which do not have the same frequency of close interaction but can act as occasional conduits of information, provides a powerful solution to this problem. Building on this idea,

we model weak links as intermittently transmitting information about behavior and payoffs, but without inducing locally-uniform actions. We prove that a society consisting of several clusters that are strongly disconnected but weakly linked can achieve fast adaptation to changing circumstances, while ensuring that most agents take the high-payoff action most of the time.

We also characterize the best social network from the viewpoint of maximizing average long-run payoff. A version of the star network turns out to be the one that achieves the highest average long-run payoff. This star network involves a large number of agents strongly-linked clustered in a star-like node in the middle, with a sufficient number of small communities that are the weakly-connected leaves of this star node. The leaves do the experimentation and ensure that society as a whole quickly learns when the underlying environment changes. The star-like community in the middle exploits both the gains from local interactions and the information benefits, which it quickly acquires from the leaves.

We confirm that weak links are critical for this result by showing that without weak links average long-run payoffs are only a little better than random play, because most agents stay stuck with actions that were once good but have since ceased to be so. In such networks, adaptation to changing environment comes only from slow mutations/mistakes, and under our assumptions, the rate of such switches is much slower than the rate at which the environment changes. This result clarifies that it is the presence of weak links, with an appropriate topology of strong connections, that ensures that society achieves approximately the highest possible payoff.

Our basic analysis is for the case in which agents choose the action that maximizes their current payoff. We additionally show that our results extend to the case in which agents maximize discounted payoffs, provided that their discount rate is not too high. Specifically, we derive a bound on this discount rate such that below this bound, all of our main results continue to hold, and in particular, without weak links, average long-run payoffs are approximately as good as random play, while star-like networks can achieve much higher long-run average payoffs. This bound depends on the strength of local interactions and the maximum degree of the network.

1.2 Broader Context

We view our results as relating not just to the game theory and economics literatures, but also to the broader literature on diversity and adaptation. The theme of diversity is central in biology, but without the key issue that arises in social systems: incentivizing agents to take actions that will preserve diversity.

The adaptation benefits of diversity receive support from studies of several different species. For example, [Agha et al. \(2018\)](#) demonstrate experimentally that cyanobacteria are much more vulnerable to a fungal parasite when they are homogeneous. In fact, in host populations that are kept homogeneous, parasites can spread very rapidly, whereas genetically diverse host populations can resist the parasite much more successfully, because they contain genes that are less vulnerable to the specific parasite and these genes multiply faster in response to invasion. Similar benefits of diversity are observed among bees in response to fluctuations in temperature, as shown in [Fischer \(2004\)](#). Each individual bee's temperature thresholds for huddling and fanning are tied to

a genetically linked trait. Hives that lack genetic diversity in this trait experience unusually large fluctuations in internal temperatures whereas hives with genetic diversity produce much more stable internal temperatures. Thus, the genetic diversity of the bees leads to relatively stable temperatures that ultimately improve the health of the hive.

Even in biological systems, maintaining diversity is a major challenge. One of the most widely-held theories of the benefits of sexual reproduction is precisely that it ensures sufficient diversity within both organisms and populations by mixing alleles from the two parents (see for example [Weismann et al. \(1904\)](#); [Barton and Charlesworth \(1998\)](#); [Burt \(2000\)](#)). As a result, sexual reproduction enables greater fitness via adaptation to changing environments relative to asexual reproduction. Experiments on yeast provide evidence for this hypothesis. In particular, [Goddard et al. \(2005\)](#) genetically modified a strain to create two strands of yeast that are identical, except for the way they reproduce, and confirmed that the sexually-reproduced strand was much more adaptable to harsher environments than the one that reproduces asexually.

Similar adaptation benefits of diversity have been hypothesized in social settings and sometimes documented. [Granovetter \(1977, 1983, 2017\)](#) have argued that new superior technologies spread rapidly in tech clusters, such as Silicon Valley, via weak links, that were created either by communication between employees or managers of different companies or directly by workers moving between companies (see [Saxenian \(1996\)](#), on this pattern in Silicon Valley, and [Jacobs \(2016\)](#), for a more general emphasis on this aspect of communication in urban environments).¹ Other studies emphasize the importance of agents that bridge “structural holes” between different parts of a community ([Burt \(1992\)](#)). This perspective also provides a reinterpretation of the concerns articulated by Robert Putnam ([Putnam et al. \(2000\)](#)) due to the declining importance of diverse organizations, such as bowling alleys, sports clubs and local religious organizations, which can provide the type of weak link that bridge structural holes and communicate information between distinct social groups that otherwise seldom interact. Our context also emphasizes that it is particularly important that this takes place without creating the powerful tendency towards homogeneity that strong links tend to induce.

1.3 Economics and Game Theory Literatures

Within the economics and game theory literatures, our paper is related to a number of distinct literatures. The first is a small literature on adaptation and diversity. [Gross \(1996\)](#) studies the reasons why there is large nontypical variation within species and links this to adaptation. More closely related is [Santos et al. \(2008\)](#) who analyze the role of diversity in public good games and argue that diversity promotes cooperation. The general presumption in much of economics is that diversity in modern societies is conducive to conflict (e.g., see the survey in [La Ferrara and Mele \(2006\)](#)), though a few papers, such as [Montalvo and Reynal-Querol \(2021\)](#), document various

¹[Rajkumar et al. \(2022\)](#) confirm using LinkedIn data that weak links are still central for job finding. They emphasize that there is an “inverted U-shaped relationship between the weak tie strength and job transmission such that weaker ties increased job transmission but only to a point, after which there were diminishing marginal returns to tie weakness.” This is in line with the results in our Proposition 1.

economic benefits from diversity as well.

Several papers in economics study learning dynamics over social networks. Our work is most directly related to the branch that focuses on Bayesian models, such as [Gale and Kariv \(2003\)](#), [Banerjee and Fudenberg \(2004\)](#), [Smith and Sørensen \(2008\)](#), [Callander and Hörner \(2009\)](#), and [Acemoglu et al. \(2011\)](#). In addition, several papers, most notably [Bala and Goyal \(1998, 2001\)](#), [DeMarzo et al. \(2003\)](#) and [Golub and Jackson \(2010\)](#) discuss non-Bayesian learning over social networks. None of these papers consider the problem of adaptation to changing environments, though the issue of balancing conformity from strong linkages vs. sufficient incentives for agents to take different actions comes up in [Smith and Sørensen \(2008\)](#) and [Acemoglu et al. \(2011\)](#). More closely related are a few recent papers that consider the speed of learning in related problems. For example, [Acemoglu et al. \(2022\)](#) characterize the speed of learning with Bayesian agents observing different samples of past online reviews, and we refer the reader to their paper for a discussion of speed of learning results in the literature.

Even more closely related to our work are a few papers studying learning when the underlying state is changing. [Moscarini et al. \(1998\)](#) observe that, unless the underlying state is ‘sufficiently persistent’, there cannot be (Bayesian) cascades on a single action. [Frongillo et al. \(2011\)](#) consider various non-Bayesian learning rules and show that they converge to a steady-state distribution on complete graphs, despite the changing environment. [Dasaratha et al. \(2018\)](#) study a learning model where individuals learn from others and their own private signals, and show that learning is improved when private signals are diverse, which has a related logic to our main results. Finally, [Lévy et al. \(2022\)](#) is also closely related, as they note that, with symmetric agents, all players rapidly converge to the same (consensus) action, even after the underlying state changes. None of these papers, nor any others that we are aware of, study Bayesian learning under a general network and a changing state; characterize which types of networks lead to better learning performance; or model and observe the importance of weak links.

The structure of our model is also connected to the literature on evolutionary or learning dynamics and equilibrium selection. Within this literature, the pioneering work by [Kandori et al. \(1993\)](#) consider an evolutionary model with a finite number of agents randomly matching and playing a two-player coordination game, subject to noise or mutations. They show that the presence of noise reduces the range of long-run “equilibria” (stable configurations), and in particular, in a 2×2 game, evolutionary dynamics lead towards the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. In related work, [Young \(1993\)](#) characterizes the stochastically stable equilibria in a large finite population game subject to random matching and noise. As in [Kandori et al. \(1993\)](#), noise acts as an equilibrium selection device. [Ellison \(1993\)](#) points out that equilibrium selection in [Kandori et al. \(1993\)](#) and [Young \(1993\)](#) is very slow and suggests that local matching—rather than random matching—leads to significantly faster convergence. There are several important differences between our work and this literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, issues of adaptation to a changing environment or the role of diversity are not studied in this literature. Instead, this literature’s focus has been on equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria. Second, rather than evolutionary rules or rule-of-thumb behaviors, we focus on Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a game with a changing underlying state.

Finally, some of the mathematical methods we use are common with the literature on general belief dynamics. [Holley and Liggett \(1975\)](#), for example, study the so-called “voter model”, which is similar to the evolutionary dynamics in [Kandori et al. \(1993\)](#) and [Young \(1993\)](#) based on random matching (whereby influence flows within the randomly-matched pair). In contrast, the stochastic dynamics that emerge from our model is more similar to the “majority dynamics” studied in [Kanoria et al. \(2011\)](#) and [Yildiz et al. \(2010\)](#).

1.4 Rest of the Paper

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and define Bayesian-Nash equilibria. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibria and provide a method to analyze it for general networks. In Section 4, we compare networks with strong and weak links, and analyze networks which provide the highest welfare. In Section 5, we extend these results to forward looking agents, and finally we provide a discussion of our results in Section 6.

2 Model

In this section we introduce the basic environment, describe the network formed by strong and weak links, payoffs, average welfare, and define Bayesian-Nash equilibria.

2.1 Network

We consider a set of agents $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ represented by nodes in an undirected graph G . There are two kinds of links, *strong* and *weak*. We represent strong links with the symmetric matrix $S^G \in \{0, 1\}^{n \times n}$, with the convention that

$$S_{ij}^G = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if agents } i \text{ and } j \text{ have a strong link between them} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The neighborhood of an agent i is defined with respect to strong links, as $N^G(i) = \{j \in V : S_{ij} = 1\}$. The maximum degree of the network is denoted by $d_{\max}^G = \max_{i \in V} |N^G(i)|$.

Weak links, on the other hand, are described by the symmetric matrix $W^G \in \{0, 1\}^{n \times n}$, where similarly

$$W_{ij}^G = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if agents } i \text{ and } j \text{ have a weak link between them} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We also let \mathcal{E}_s^G and \mathcal{E}_w^G denote the set of strong and weak links respectively. Whenever this will cause no confusion, we drop the superscript G .

2.2 Actions and Rewards

Time is continuous and runs to infinity. At each time $t \in [0, \infty)$, agent $i \in V$ chooses an action $a_i(t) \in \mathcal{A} = \{0, 1\}$. The agent's resulting payoff is the sum of two components:

1. a *material payoff* $R_a(t)$, which only depends on the action a taken by the agent and the underlying state of nature (and is thus stochastic);
2. a *network payoff*, which depends on actions in the agent's neighborhood as we describe in Section 2.4.

The need for adaptation arises because the underlying state and thus the material payoffs from the two actions, $R_0(t)$ and $R_1(t)$, change over time. We assume that these changes arrive according to a Poisson clock of rate λ , and denote the (random) instances at which such changes take place by $\{T_k\}_{k=0}^\infty$ and refer to them as *payoff shocks* (and we set $T_0 = 0$). Without loss of any generality, we assume that following the realization of the Poisson clock at time T_k , rewards change at T_k^+ , that is, right after T_k . This implies that the rewards from an action are constant over $(T_k, T_{k+1}]$ for all k . We also simplify our analysis by assuming that the gap between the two actions, $R_0(t)$ and $R_1(t)$, is constant and normalize it to 1, though, crucially, which action has higher payoff naturally changes with the realizations of the Poisson clock. We additionally define $A(t)$ as the action with the higher reward at time t , and denote by $\{A_k\}_{k=1}^\infty$ the action with the higher reward in the time interval $(T_{k-1}, T_k]$.

Summarizing this reward structure, we can write that for all (random) time instances $\{T_k\}_{k=0}^\infty$, we have

$$R_0(T_k^+) - R_1(T_k^+) = \begin{cases} +1 & \text{w.p. } 1/2 \\ -1 & \text{w.p. } 1/2 \end{cases}$$

with $R_0(t) - R_1(t) = R_0(T_k^+) - R_1(T_k^+)$ for all $t \in (T_k, T_{k+1}]$.

Note also that the case where $\lambda = 0$ yields the special case where material payoffs are constant and known. We assume that all agents are initialized (at time $t = 0$) to play Action 0.

2.3 Information Structure

We next describe the information structure, which depends on the nature of strong and weak links.

Strong Links: At all times t , each agent i will have complete information about the action history and associated payoffs from its strongly-linked neighbors in the set $\mathcal{N}(i)$.

Weak Links: In contrast to strong links, weak links transmit information slowly. We model this by assuming that weak links start as “dormant ” and are activated stochastically. Specifically, there is a Poisson clock of rate γ , and each time the clock ticks, one dormant weak link is activated. Furthermore, once a weak link is activated, it transmits information, and then goes to an “inactive” state until another independent Poisson clock, this time of rate ϕ , turns it back to “dormant ”. We explain below the reasoning for this two-stage activation. We first explain how the activated weak link is chosen from the set of all weak links.

Let $\mathcal{W}(t) = \{(i, j) \in \mathcal{E}_w^G : a_i(t) \neq a_j(t), (i, j) \text{ is dormant}\}$. In other words, this is the set of weak links that are dormant and also involve two linked agents playing different actions at time t . This is the set of weak links that are relevant for information transmission—since there is no relevant information to be transmitted between agents that are playing the same action. We assume that, once the relevant Poisson clock clicks, a link is chosen uniformly at random from $\mathcal{W}(t)$. Once this happens, the link becomes active, and information transmission happens through this link, i.e., if the link that is fully activated is (i, j) , then the current action and payoff of individual i is transmitted to j , and symmetrically information from j is observed by i . Once this information has been transmitted, the link enters an inactive state, in which it stays till the Poisson clock of rate ϕ clicks, after which it becomes dormant again.

A couple of comments are useful at this point. First, information transmission on weak links is slow, in contrast to the very fast transmission on strong links. While strong links capture frequent interactions, such as between family members, coworkers or closely-connected agents, weak links transmit information occasionally via gossip or random observation. In terms of our mathematical formulation, a weak link transmits information only after moving from inactive to the dormant state, and then waiting to become active. This slow transmission plays a key role in our results, as we will see. Second, the fact that activated weak links are among those connecting agents playing different actions is consistent with the idea that weak links become active for gossip or information exchange. The main reason this assumption is imposed in our setting is for simplicity: without this assumption, some of the weak links that are activated would not transmit relevant information, and although this does not affect our general results, having activated links that do not transmit useful information makes the coupling arguments we use for the proofs more difficult. Third, the two-stage activation is important to ensure sufficient slowness in information transmission. In particular, if there was no inactive state, it might be the case than the same weak link could be chosen multiple times (since weak links are selected from those playing different actions) while other weak links are never activated. With our two-stage activation, we ensure that once a weak link transmits relevant information, it moves to an inactive state, where it is unable to transmit any information for a certain “backoff” period, dictated by the Poisson clock of rate ϕ , after which it becomes dormant, where it is a contender to become a conduit of information. In this formulation, $\phi \rightarrow \infty$ corresponds to the case where weak links are never in the inactive state, whereas $\phi \rightarrow 0$ corresponds to the case where after a weak link is activated to transmit information, it enters an inactive state forever and will never again transmit information.

2.4 Overall Payoffs and Beliefs

Agents maximize their static, current payoffs (until Section 5, where we introduce forward-looking behavior). As noted above, the overall per-period utility of an agent i taking action a_i at time t is given by

$$\mathcal{U}_i^{a_i}(t) = R_{a_i}(t) + \tau f_i(a, t),$$

where $R_a(t)$ is this agent's *material payoff*, as specified above, while $\tau f_i(a, t)$ is her *network payoff*, with $a = [a_1, a_2, \dots, a_N]$ denoting the entire action profile of this population (though what matters will be the actions of agent i 's neighbors). Specifically, we equate this network payoff with the the number of agent i 's neighbors playing action a_i at time t . That is,

$$f_i(a, t) = \sum_{j \in N^G(i)} \mathbb{I}_{a_j(t)=a_i},$$

where $\mathbb{I}_{a_j(t)=a_i}$ is the indicator function for neighbor j of agent i taking the same action a_i as this agent at time t . Intuitively, this term captures the payoff benefits from coordinating with closely connected agents. The parameter $\tau \geq 0$ designates the importance of this local network payoff.²

While the network payoff is deterministic (given an action profile of other agents), the material payoff is stochastic and depends on the underlying state, as specified above. Hence, agent best responses will depend on their beliefs, which we next describe.

Let $\mu_i(t)$ denotes the belief of agent $i \in V$ that Action 1 has higher reward at time t , i.e., $R_1(t) - R_0(t) = +1$. More formally,

$$\mu_i(t) = \mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\mathbb{I}_{R_1(t) > R_0(t)}],$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}$ denotes expectations according to the information set of agent i at time t , and $\mathbb{I}_{R_1(t) > R_0(t)}$ is the indicator function for $R_1(t) > R_0(t)$. We assume that for all agents $i \in V$, we have $\mu_i(0) = 1/2$, i.e., the agents have no information at time $t = 0$ about which action has the higher material payoff.

The assumption that agents maximize their current payoffs implies that

$$a_i(t) = \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\mathcal{U}_i^a(t)]. \tag{1}$$

Finally, as in [Kandori et al. \(1993\)](#) and [Young \(1993\)](#), we introduce individual trembles. We assume that another Poisson clock of rate $\epsilon > 0$ induces change in behavior. In particular, each time this clock ticks one agent is picked uniformly at random and she ends up taking the opposite action to the one she intended. We refer to this phenomenon as an ϵ -*tremble*. Throughout, we will take ϵ to be small, and in fact much smaller than the rate at which the underlying state changes (λ) and weak links transmit information (γ).

2.5 Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium

We focus on the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of this game. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE) is defined in a standard fashion.

²All of our results in this section remain valid when $\tau = 0$, so that there is no network payoff, but such local payoff interactions become important in the forward-looking case, analyzed in [Section 5](#).

Definition 1 (Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium) An action profile $a = [a_1, a_2, \dots, a_N]$ where $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is a pure strategy BNE if for each i , a_i maximizes the expected payoff in equation (1), given the action profile of other agents a_{-i} , with the expectation in (1), $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}$, taken according to Bayes rule.

2.6 Average Welfare

We evaluate the adaptation success of different social networks by looking at their long-run average payoff (in BNE). This measure is attractive because only societies that rapidly respond to a changing environment can achieve high long-run average payoffs.³ Formally, average payoffs in a society comprised of n agents at time instance T_k is

$$\mathcal{S}_k^G = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{I}_{a_i(T_k)=A_k},$$

where $\{T_k\}_{k=0}^\infty$ are instances of payoff shock and the indicator function $\mathbb{I}_{a_i(T_k)=A_k}$ takes the value 1 when $a_i(T_k) = A_k$ and 0 otherwise. We condition on the social network designated by graph G . Long-run average welfare is then defined as:

$$\mathcal{S}^G = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \mathcal{S}_k^G. \quad (2)$$

A couple of points are worth noting. First, we focus only on instances of payoff shock, since in between payoff shocks nodes are (potentially) in a transient state, trying to learn through strong and weak links about which action has the higher material payoff. Second, we could have equivalently defined long-run average payoffs as the average across all time periods. This alternative definition depends on initial actions, though the weight of these initial actions goes to zero as the limit is taken. The current definition simplifies the exposition without loss of generality.

3 Equilibrium Characterization

In this section, we characterize the BNE and then provide an expression for average welfare in any BNE. Our characterization proceeds as follows. First, we prove a monotonicity property of Bayesian beliefs, establishing that belief dynamics before the next time of information arrival never reverse direction and they jump to the correct probabilities at times of information arrival. Using this characterization, we prove that an agent will only change her action during times of information arrival. Combining this result with the structure of strong links, we show that, except at times of information arrival, strongly-linked components will always play the same action in any BNE. In the last subsection of this section, we provide a characterization of average welfare under this equilibrium structure, using a suitably designed embedded Markov chain, defined over the action profiles of agents in the social network.

³If instead we focused on discounted average payoffs, this would down-weight future failures to adapt to changes.

3.1 Belief Dynamics

The next definition introduces the (set of) times of information arrival. Intuitively, these are time instances for an agent i during which the agent receives “new information”. This can happen because a weak link adjacent to this agent is activated, or a strongly-linked neighbor changes her behavior, or the agent herself has an ϵ -tremble. Formally:

Definition 2 (Last time of new information) *Instance t is a time of information arrival for agent i if one of the following take place at time t :*

- *A weak link adjacent to agent i is activated.*
- *For some $j \in N(i)$, we have $a_i(t) \neq a_j(t)$.*
- *Agent i has an ϵ -tremble.*

Times of information arrival for agent i are then defined as

$$\mathcal{T}_i = \{t : t \text{ is a time of information arrival for agent } i \},$$

and the last instance of information arrival before t is

$$T_i(t) = \sup\{t_i : t_i \in \mathcal{T}_i, \text{ and } t_i \leq t\}.$$

We remind the reader that, given the structure of information specified so far, all instances of information arrival are fully-revealing about which action has the higher (material) reward. Hence, agent i 's belief that action 1 is the better action at a time of information arrival is either 0 or 1.

We also note that agent i 's information set at time t , denoted by $\mathcal{I}_i(t)$, is fully summarized by the last instance of information arrival before time t , $T_i(t)$, and the action profile observed by the agent at this point. Recall that $\mu_i(t)$ is agent i 's belief that action 1 has greater material payoff at time t than action 0, and thus $\mu_i(t) = \mathbb{P}(A(t) = 1 \mid \mathcal{I}_i(t))$ (where also recall that $A(t)$ denotes the action that has higher material payoff at time t , which is common across all agents).

Using this notation, we can now establish a critical property of Bayesian updates, which will enable us to characterize BNE.

Lemma 1 *Bayesian beliefs at time t , $\mu_i(t)$, satisfy the following monotonicity property:*

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_i(T_i(t)) = 1 &\implies \mu_i(t) > \frac{1}{2} \\ \mu_i(T_i(t)) = 0 &\implies \mu_i(t) < \frac{1}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 1 states that once an agent becomes aware of the action with the higher material payoff (which takes place following a time of information arrival), her beliefs remain that this action is




Figure 1: A network which satisfies the assumptions in Example 1

more likely to be the higher-reward action until the next instance of information arrival. Consequently, once an agent believes that, say, action 1, is better at time $T_i(t)$, then she will continue to believe that action 1 is better than action 0 ($\mu_i > 1/2$) until she receives new information.

While Lemma 1 establishes monotonicity of Bayesian beliefs, it does not provide a full characterization of belief dynamics. Such a characterization is difficult in general, though it can be obtained in some special cases, as the next example shows. This example is included purely for illustrative purposes, and in the rest of the paper we only use the monotonicity result in Lemma 1.

Example 1 We now provide a special case of our model in which there is enough symmetry in the network that Bayesian updates can be explicitly characterized and, of course, verifies Lemma 1. In this example, we first impose some restrictions on the graph structure. Specifically, we assume that the graph G satisfies

$$S_{ij}^G = 1, S_{ik}^G = 1 \implies S_{jk}^G = 1 \quad \forall i, j, k \in V$$

and

$$W_{ij}^G = 1 \quad \forall i, j \in V \text{ such that } S_{ij}^G = 0.$$

We have just defined a class of networks where there is a weak link between any two agents not connected by a strong link and agents form islands of strongly linked cliques, i.e., each agent is part of a clique of strongly connected agents. There are several such cliques, forming “islands”. Figure 1 provides an illustration of such a network. Next, we also restrict the weak link structure further, by assuming that each time the Poisson clock (of rate γ) ticks all weak links in the network are activated. Under these assumptions, and as we take the

limit $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, we can characterize the exact belief updates as follows

$$\mu_i(t) = (1 - e^{-\lambda(t-T_i(t))})\frac{1}{2} + e^{-\lambda t}\mu_i(T_i(t)).$$

It is also straightforward to see that the beliefs in this equation satisfy the monotonicity property in Lemma 1.

Belief monotonicity in Lemma 1 immediately yields our next result, which shows that agents only change their action during times of information arrival.

Lemma 2 *For any agent $i \in V$ and all t , we have:*

$$a_i(t^-) \neq a_i(t) \implies t \in \mathcal{T}_i.$$

Hence, if any agent changes her action at time t , then it must be the case that t is a time of information arrival. A direct but important consequence of Lemma 2 is that all agents will remain with their action until one of two events: either there is a weak link activation or an ϵ -tremble.⁴

With these results, we are now ready to characterize the BNE action profiles of the entire network. For this theorem, let us define $\mathfrak{s}_{ij} = 1$ if there is a strongly-connected path that links agents i and j (i.e., there exists a path of agents k_1, \dots, k_K between i and j such that $S_{ik_1} = S_{k_1k_2} = \dots = S_{k_Kj} = 1$). We also say that a network is strongly connected if $\mathfrak{s}_{ij} = 1$ for all $i, j \in V$. Finally, we say that a graph is regular if all agents have the same number of neighbors (and hence $d_{\max} = d_{\min}$).

Theorem 1 *A BNE always exists. Let $a(t) = [a_1(t), a_2(t), \dots, a_N(t)]$ be a BNE action profile for time t . Then:*

- *If $\tau \leq 1/d_{\max}$, all agents linked by a strongly-connected path play the same action. That is, for all $i, j \in V$ and all time periods t ,*

$$\mathfrak{s}_{ij} = 1 \implies a_i(t) = a_j(t).$$

- *If $\tau > 1/d_{\min}$ all agents continue to play same action they were initialized with, i.e., Action 0, at all time periods t .*

In particular, if G is also regular ($d_{\max} = d_{\min}$), then we have $a_i(t) = a_j(t)$ for all $i, j \in V$ and all time periods t .

Theorem 1 greatly simplifies the characterization of any BNE. Specifically, provided that the degree of local payoff interactions, as measured by the parameter τ , is not too large, then all strongly-connected agents and all agents linked via strongly-connected paths always play the

⁴An agent can also receive new information from one of her strongly-linked neighbors, but for this neighbor to change her action in turn requires either a weak link activation or ϵ -tremble.




Figure 2: A heterogeneous BNE, when $\tau = 2/5$.

same action. Notably, this is true even when $\tau = 0$, because strong links perfectly transmit information about the underlying state, creating a powerful force towards all agents playing the same action. Given this information, agents in a strongly-connected component all have the same beliefs about which action has greater material payoff. Consequently, when $\tau = 0$, they will all play the same action. The same conclusion applies when τ is not too large. In this case, there is an additional force, which is a desire to match what one’s local neighborhood is doing. This typically reinforces all agents playing the same action in a strongly-connected component. Nevertheless, the next example shows that when the parameter τ is larger than $1/d_{\max}$, the desire to match one’s neighbors can lead to different actions being played in different parts of a strongly-connected component. The second part of the theorem, however, shows that even in this case, coordination can be achieved if the threshold τ is high enough. However, the downside of such a high threshold is that even if a node knows that Action 1 has the higher material payoff, she continues to play Action 0, since all her neighbors are playing Action 0, and there is more utility in conforming with her neighbors, than in playing the action with the higher material payoff.

Example 2 Figure 2 depicts a network in which different actions can be supported among strongly-connected agents. The figure shows a network with threshold $\tau = 2/5$ where there exists a BNE with different actions within the strongly-connected component. Intuitively, though strongly-connected, the network has two different parts and local actions within each part matter more for payoffs than actions in the other half. This is enough to sustain an equilibrium in which the left side plays Action 1, while the right side plays Action 0. This example shows that if we have a high enough threshold, we can maintain diversity even within a strongly connected network.

3.2 Average Welfare

In this subsection, we provide a general characterization of average welfare along a BNE. This characterization builds on defining an embedded Markov chain over the action profiles of agents in the network.

Note that we use the term “embedded” since we consider the Markov chain in discrete time, although the underlying learning process is happening in continuous time. In particular, transitions

take place in this Markov chain only at times when there is a payoff shock, which will be sufficient for us to keep track of long-run average payoffs (per equation (2)).⁵

Definition 3 (Activation Markov Chain) *An activation Markov chain (AMC) is an embedded Markov chain, where the i^{th} transition happens at time T_i .*

States of AMC: *The states of this Markov chain are denoted by (P, R, B) where:*

- $P \in \{0, 1\}^n$ denotes the BNE action profile played by the agents.
- $R \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes the action which has the higher reward, i.e., if we are in time epoch k , $R = A_k$.
- $B \subseteq \mathcal{E}_w^G$ denotes the set of weak links which are dormant at the end of an epoch.

Transition Probabilities of AMC: *The transition probabilities of this chain are defined as follows:*

$$\mathbb{P}^G((P_l, R_l, B_l)|(P_m, R_m, B_m)) = \frac{1}{2} \times \mathbb{P}^G(P_l, B_l|P_m, R_l, B_m),$$

where $\mathbb{P}^G(P_l B_l|P_m, R_l, B_m)$ denotes the probability that the actions are played according to P_l , and the weak links in B_l are dormant, given the action profile is initialized at P_m , the weak links in B_m are dormant, and the action with the higher material payoff is R_l .

The AMC in Definition 3 encapsulates the behavior of the agents in the network at times of payoff shocks. For example, suppose we are in state m , given by the tuple (P_m, R_m, B_m) at the time of a payoff shock. By definition, before the arrival of the shock, agents are playing according to P_m , and the action with the higher material payoff was R_m . Furthermore, the weak links in B_m are dormant, meaning that they are available to potentially become active. This also means that the weak links in $\mathcal{E}_w^G \setminus B_m$ are inactive. After this shock, R_l is the action with the higher material payoff. Thereafter, weak link activation and ϵ -trembles can induce changes in the action profile of agents. What is particularly convenient in using an embedded Markov chain is that we do not need to keep track of these intermediate changes in action profiles. Rather, it is sufficient to focus on the action profile after all of these changes take place—that is, the action profile that is being played at the time of the next payoff shock, which is denoted by P_l . Furthermore, what information will be transmitted during an epoch depends on which weak links are dormant, we also keep track of these in the state B_l . This also explains why in the transition probabilities there is a 1/2: at the time of the next payoff shock, each one of the two actions is the one with the higher material payoff with probability 1/2.

In summary, the AMC encapsulates the information about transitions between action profiles at times of payoff shocks. This is particularly useful, since from our definition of long-run average payoffs \mathcal{S}^G in equation (2), it is sufficient to know payoffs at times of payoff shocks.

⁵Embedded Markov chains are used in queueing theory, where job arrivals and departures happen in continuous time, but discrete-time representations depending on times of job arrival and departure are sometimes more useful (e.g., [Wolff \(1989\)](#)).

The next theorem exploits this feature and characterizes the long-run average payoffs in terms of the stationary distribution of the AMC.

Theorem 2 *For any (weakly)-connected graph G , the stationary distribution of the AMC in Definition 3, denoted by η^G , exists. Furthermore, long-run average welfare can be expressed as a function of this stationary distribution:*

$$\mathcal{S}^G = \sum_q \eta_q^G f(q),$$

where η_q^G is the stationary probability of state q and $f(q)$ denotes the fraction of agents playing the higher-reward action in state q , given by

$$\begin{aligned} f(q) &= f(P_q, R_q, B_q) \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{v \in V} \mathbb{1}_{P_q(v)=R_q}. \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 2 is one of the main results of the paper and provides a tight characterization of long-run average welfare. In the rest of the paper, we use this characterization to determine which social structures achieve a high degree of adaptation and welfare in a changing environment. This analysis is facilitated by the fact that, as we will see, the stationary distribution of the AMC is relatively straightforward to compute in many graphs (including those we will study in our main results in Theorems 3 and 4).

We will introduce some additional notation here which will be used throughout the rest of the paper. Let us define a *conformal state* as one in which all nodes play the action with the higher material reward and denote the set of all conformal states by C . Similarly, define a *diverse state* as one in which not all agents are playing the same action—so at least one node is playing Action 0 and at least one node is playing Action 1. Let us denote the set of diverse states by D . We define the conditional probability of transitioning to a conformal state as:

$$p^G = \sum_{s \in D} \mathbb{P}^G(C|s) \eta_s^G.$$

Since C is the set of all possible states where all nodes play the same action and this action is the one with the higher reward, we have $\mathbb{P}^G(C|s) = \sum_B \mathbb{P}^G((1, 1, B)|s) + \mathbb{P}^G((0, 0, B)|s)$.

4 Adaptation to Change

In this section, we study which network structures are more adaptable to changing environments—in the sense of generating high long-run average welfare. In the next subsection, we start with another one of our main results: in any network without weak links, long-run average welfare is very low, and in fact only a little bit higher than choosing random actions. Our next result

establishes that an *island network*—where agents are strongly connected within islands (or components) and islands themselves are weakly connected—can potentially achieve higher welfare. Finally, we fully characterize the best network structures from the viewpoint of achieving long-run adaptation, which turns out to be those that have a star-like structure, with a large strongly-connected component in the middle, and weakly-connected leaves providing information to the star component.

4.1 Low Welfare without Weak Links

The next theorem is one of our main results and shows that, without weak links, welfare is very low because society fails to adapt to changes in the underlying state.

Theorem 3 (No fast learning without weak links) *Consider a graph G with no weak links. Suppose that $\tau \leq 1/d_{\max}$. Then:*

$$\mathcal{S}^G \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2(\lambda + \epsilon)}.$$

Furthermore, when $\tau \geq 1/d_{\min}$, we have $\mathcal{S}^G = \frac{1}{2}$.

Theorem 3 shows that the long-run average welfare is low and upper bounded by $1/2 + \mathcal{O}(\epsilon)$ in a network without weak links. Recall that we are interested in economies where ϵ is very small (so that trembles are much rarer than payoff shocks). Specifically, as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, long-run average welfare is no different than an environment in which no agent has any information about the underlying state and all players choose their action randomly. Furthermore, if the threshold τ is sufficiently high, no node will change their action and therefore, the average welfare of such networks will be exactly $1/2$.

While this result may at first appear paradoxical, it is in fact quite intuitive. Consider a social network in which agents learn the underlying state at some point and all coordinate in taking the higher-reward action given this state. Without any weak links and no ϵ -trembles, they will all continue to play this action, but over time the underlying state will change, and in the long run, it will only coincide with the initial state (and thus actions) with probability $1/2$. In this configuration, long-run average welfare would be exactly $1/2$. A social network without weak links but with ϵ -trembles can do a little bit better than this hypothetical situation, because trembles will reveal the underlying state from time to time, enabling all strongly-connected agents that receive this information to switch to the higher-reward action. But when ϵ is small, this adaptation is so slow that it only has a small impact on long-run average welfare, as formally established in Theorem 3.

An immediate implication is that, as we claimed in the Introduction, weak links are essential for fast learning and adaptation in a changing environment. The next subsection shows, however, that substituting weak links for strong ones is not sufficient. The last two subsections then fully characterize how island networks, connected via weak links, can achieve higher welfare and what sorts of networks achieve the highest welfare in this setup.



Figure 3: Two simple networks

4.2 Do Weak Links Necessarily Improve Welfare?

In this subsection, we compare two simple networks shown in Figure 3 to build some preliminary intuition about the role of weak links.

The two networks shown in Figure 3 have two agents each. In the first, both agents are connected via a strong link, and in the second network, the two agents are connected via a weak link. We show in the Appendix that, in fact, Network 2 (with the weak link) has a lower long-run average welfare than Network 1 (with the strong link). The reason is that substituting a weak link for a strong one slows down information transmission and does not alleviate the slow learning problem characterized in Theorem 3. Instead, long-run adaptation requires weak links to be *additional* conduits of information, not substitutes for strong links.

4.3 Adaptation in Island Networks

In this subsection, we consider island networks connected via weak links. While it is hard to characterize the exact welfare for these networks, the next proposition provides an upper bound on the average welfare for these networks. For this proposition, recall that p^G , defined in Section 3.2, corresponds to conditional probability of transitioning to a conformal state (that is, a state in which all agents play the action with the higher reward).

Proposition 1 *Consider an island network G with k islands, each with m_c nodes such that $m_1 \geq m_2 \geq \dots \geq m_k$. Furthermore, these islands are connected via weak links. Then, average welfare can be upper bounded as follows:*

$$\mathcal{S}^G \leq \underbrace{\left(\frac{2p^G + \frac{\lambda}{\epsilon} p^G}{1 + 2p^G + 2\frac{\lambda}{\epsilon} p^G} \right)}_{(I)} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{1 + 2p^G + 2\frac{\lambda}{\epsilon} p^G} \right)}_{(II)} \times \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\min\{\lceil \gamma/\lambda \rceil, k\}} m_i}{\sum_{i=1}^k m_i} \right)}_{(III)}$$

Proposition 1 gives us an upper bound on the average welfare of island networks with both strong and weak links. Although this bound is not tight, it is informative about the trade-offs that any network faces in achieving high average welfare in a changing environment. Specifically, the right-hand side of Proposition 1 corresponds to the contribution to average welfare from two set of states the network may be in: it may be in a conformal state where all nodes play the action with

the higher reward, and this is captured by term (I); or it may be in a diverse state where there are nodes playing both actions, and the contribution of such states is represented by (II) \times (III).

Starting with term (I), we can see that if p^G is large, welfare in the conformal state will be close to $1/2$ when $\lambda \gg \epsilon$ (which is the case we are focusing on). Intuitively, this captures the problem that when transition to a conformal state takes place very rapidly, there will be little adaptation to changes in the underlying environment. Hence, only networks that have reasonably small values for p^G can achieve high welfare.

Next, turning to the remaining terms, a small value of p^G would ensure that term (II) is also large, but this has to be coupled with (III) being large. This means that either γ/λ is large, or $\sum_{i=1}^d m_i \approx \sum_{i=1}^k m_i$ for $d \ll k$. Yet, γ/λ cannot be large, because this would imply that all weak links can get activated within an epoch, leading to very large p^G . Hence, we must have $\sum_{i=1}^d m_i \approx \sum_{i=1}^k m_i$ for $d \ll k$, which means the largest components of the network must contain most of the nodes. Hence, to achieve a high upper bound long-run average welfare, an island network must be such that its largest component contains most of the agents.

Overall, the upper bound in Proposition 1 highlight the general forces that contribute to high average welfare. We see in particular that in order to achieve adaptation in the face of changing environments:

- a network should be disconnected most of the time, since otherwise it will generate too much conformity of actions, slowing down learning when the underlying environment changes. This is achieved in island networks by having the collection of islands be strongly disconnected. This corresponds to the requirement that p^G should not be too large, which also encapsulates the requirement that γ/λ should not be too large;
- there should nevertheless be information transmission between the disconnected components at reasonable frequencies. This is achieved in the island networks by having weak links that are activated at sufficiently high rates. This corresponds to the requirement that γ/λ is not too small;
- when disconnected, we should still have that a significant fraction of the agents still play the right action. This is achieved in the island networks by having each island be strongly connected and weak links carrying the relevant information to sufficiently many islands. This corresponds to the requirement that we need the larger islands in the graph to contain most of the nodes, i.e., $\sum_{i=1}^{\lceil \gamma/\lambda \rceil} m_i \approx \sum_{i=1}^k m_i$).

4.4 Most Adaptive Networks

In the previous subsection, we saw how weakly-connected island networks can achieve much higher long-run average welfare than our benchmark of networks without any weak links in Theorem 3. In this subsection, we turn to the question of whether other networks can even do better and characterize the best networks from the viewpoint of adaptation to changing environments. We will

see that the same principles highlighted by Proposition 1 guide the answer to this question. Specifically, we will show that a network structure that balances the need for most agents playing the right action in conformal states and the imperative of maintaining some diversity for information transmission achieves the highest feasible payoff.

Anticipating the class of networks that will have these properties, we define a *star network* with m components and n nodes ($n > m$) as a network with one component which has $n - m + 1$ strongly-connected nodes, and the other $m - 1$ components have size 1. Furthermore, we suppose that each of these $m - 1$ components has one weak link connecting it to the larger component of size $n - m + 1$. See Figure 4 for an example of a star network.




Figure 4: A star network with $n - m$ agents which are strongly connected at the center, and the remaining m agents are connected via weak links to the core.

The next theorem establishes that the star network, depicted in Figure 4, achieves the greatest long-run average welfare among all networks.

Theorem 4 *Given any network G with n nodes, there exists a star network (shown in Figure 4) with the same number of nodes, that achieves a higher long-run average welfare than G , as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ and $\phi \rightarrow 0$ or $\phi \rightarrow \infty$.*

Furthermore, for $\phi \ll \lambda \ll \gamma$, the average welfare of a star network approaches 1 as the number of nodes n and weak links m go to infinity while $m/n \rightarrow 0$.

This theorem establishes two important results. First, a star network (as defined here) achieves the highest long-run average welfare when perturbations, given by ϵ are small, and when transitions of weak links from inactive to dormant is fast (ϕ is large). These conditions are both technical and substantive. Substantively, this result requires ϵ -trembles or mistakes not to be a sufficient source of (exogenous) diversity. Technically, the limit where $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ enables us to focus on the case in which all adaptation to a changing environment comes from agents learning from those who

take different actions. The assumption that either $\phi \rightarrow 0$ or $\phi \rightarrow \infty$ enables us to focus on the edge cases, where we can obtain a sharper characterization.

The second part of the theorem shows that, under the sufficient conditions we impose, average welfare of the star network approaches 1, the highest feasible payoff in this setting. These conditions require that the number of nodes to be large relative to the number of weak links (which highlights the same forces as we emphasized in the previous subsection; we need a significant fraction of agents to choose the higher-reward action in a “diverse” state). For technical reasons, we also send both the number of nodes and the number of weak links to infinity in this result. Finally, we also consider the case where ϕ is small (though not necessarily limiting to zero). This condition still ensures that once a weak link is activated and then becomes inactive, it takes a long time for it to get out of the inactive state.

We now explain why this property is useful for our result and why the two-stage activation process for weak links is important for our analysis in general. First note that without small ϕ , we can have a situation in which we can start with a network in which all nodes are playing the wrong action, then the ϵ -tremble hits one of the agents and the network moves to a diverse state. Since weak link activation is among agents playing different actions, it will first pick the agent hit by the ϵ -tremble, who will transmit relevant information. Then the next time an activation takes place, the node hit by the ϵ -tremble has a high probability of being picked again, and as this happens, the network can quickly transition to a conformal state again. Introducing the two-stage activation process, with the backoff period, thus prevents this same node from being picked in quick succession and helps maintain some amount of diversity. In other words, this feature enables us to avoid situations where the network moves to a diverse state and almost immediately moves back to the conformal state, by having weak links spend a longer duration in the inactive state.

The proof of this theorem relies on the characterization of average welfare provided in Theorem 2. We first show that for any island network G with k components, we can always construct a network in which one component has size $n - k + 1$ and the other $k - 1$ components are all of size 1. This result thus implies that it is sufficient to restrict attention to networks that have this special structure. Second, we show that among all networks with this structure, the star network has the greatest average welfare. The proof of this step is intuitive and exploits the fact that the star network achieves the largest component playing the same action in the middle, while there are sufficient leaves with diversity feeding information to this middle component.

5 Adaptation with Forward Looking Agents

We have so far focused on agents that maximize their current (immediate) payoff, without any weight on future payoffs. If agents are sufficiently patient, they can themselves engage in experimentation in order to find out which action is optimal. Although such experimentation issues

are important and interesting, they are beyond the scope of the current paper.⁶ Nevertheless, it is relevant to investigate whether forward-looking behavior undoes the main economic forces we have identified. The next theorem shows that the answer is no, and provided that agents do not attach too much weight to future payoffs, all of our results generalize. The bound on the discount factor β of the agents depends on the network structure, and for strongly-connected graphs, it can be arbitrarily close to 1, as we established next.

The only difference we now consider is that, rather than choosing actions to maximize current payoffs, as in equation (1), each agent $i \in V$ chooses their action at each time instant to maximize their β -discounted payoff:

$$a_i(t_0) = \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \mathcal{U}_i^{a_t(t_j)}(t) \right]. \quad (3)$$

Here, the times t_i are chosen according to a Poisson clock of rate 1.

The next theorem shows that when the discount factor β is not too large, this problem has an identical solution to what we have focused on so far, thus agents will choose their current-payoff maximizing action and alter it only at times of new information arrival.

Theorem 5 *If the discount factor β satisfies*

$$\beta < \frac{\tau d_{\min}}{2 + \tau d_{\max}},$$

then there will be no experimentation and the solution to equation (3) coincides with

$$\operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E}_{i,t} [\mathcal{U}_i^a(t)].$$

Consequently, Theorems 1-4 apply when agents are forward-looking as well.

Notice that a higher τ translates into a higher bound on β . This is intuitive. An agent has stronger incentives to conform to her (strongly-connected) neighbors' actions when local interactions matter more for payoffs relative to potential gains from individual experimentation. In fact, returning to the second part of Theorem 1, we can see that for strongly-connected networks or regular networks, We can choose τ sufficiently large to make the bound on β sufficiently close to 1.

Conversely, however, one can also show that there are network and discount factor combinations for which individual agents would like to experiment, but we leave further exploration of such situations to future work.

⁶Experimentation over networks is studied, *inter alia*, in Keller et al. (2005), Bonatti and Hörner (2011, 2017), Board and Meyer-ter Vehn (2022)

6 Discussion and Conclusions

Diversity facilitates adaptation in both biological and social systems. In biology, a diverse population is more likely to have sufficient genetic variation to produce successful strategies against invasions by new species, food shortages or new climatic conditions. In social systems, diversity can enable a faster detection of changes in the environment and facilitate appropriate responses. But, in social networks diversity is even more difficult to maintain. This is because diversity is essentially a way of exploring or experimenting with different strategies, while individual agents tend to have an incentive to exploit the higher payoffs of currently high-reward actions. When a social network enables fast transmission of information, however, diversity and sufficient experimentation are exceedingly difficult to maintain, because all agents learn what is the currently optimal action and tend to gravitate towards it.

In this paper, we formalized the tension between diversity and exploiting the high payoff actions. In our model, a collection of Bayesian agents form beliefs about an underlying state and choose their actions in order to maximize the sum of the material payoff (coming from matching the underlying state correctly) and a network payoff (related to coordinating with other agents one is strongly linked to, such as family, kin group, close friends or coworkers). Our formal analysis provides a characterization of the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of this game and provides an explicit formula for determining long-run average payoffs over the social network.

One of our major results establishes that in a network consisting of just strong links, long-run average payoffs are approximately the same as everybody randomly choosing their action. The reason for this is that, with strong links, any information transmission is fast, so all strongly-linked components converge to the same action. Once this happens, learning that the underlying state has changed takes place very slowly, and in the long run, an initial best action is as likely to be wrong as it is to be right, yielding approximately the same payoffs as random choice.

Our main results establish that much higher payoffs can be obtained when strong links and weak links are combined. Weak links, as envisaged by ([Granovetter \(1977\)](#)), involve more infrequent and less tight interactions than strong links, and in our setting, they transmit information more slowly (intermittently) than strong links. When weak links are combined with a structure of strong links that generates multiple distinct (disconnected) communities, there is room for sufficient diversity. Each strongly-connected component will still play the same action, but different components can pursue diverse actions. When the underlying state changes, one of those components will discover it rapidly. Then this information will be transmitted to the rest of society via weak links. We show how a network consisting of strongly-connected islands that are themselves weakly connected to each other achieves this balance and consequently much higher payoffs than networks consisting of just strong links. Social networks that achieve the greatest long-run average welfare are those that have a star-like structure, whereby a large strongly-linked component in the middle is fed information from much smaller leaves via weak links.

Our main results are established for agents who are Bayesian but maximize current payoffs, which precludes individual incentives for experimentation. In the final part of the paper, we demonstrate that our results extend to forward-looking Bayesian agents, provided that their dis-

count factor is less than a certain threshold, so that they do not have incentives to individually experiment. This threshold itself crucially depends on local interactions.

Our paper raises several questions left for future work, and we end with a brief discussion of a few of these.

- Incorporating more forward-looking agents who will engage in some amount of experimentation, though without taking the full social benefits of diverse actions into account, is one important area of research. This would amount to combining insights from the emerging literature on experimentation over networks (such as the works cited in footnote 6) with those emphasized in this paper, which focus on issues of adaptation to changing environments.
- Relatedly, our analysis was simplified by assuming that agents have identical preferences. Preference heterogeneity generates additional diversity, and combining this with our overall framework would be another important direction for theoretical inquiry.
- In addition to future theoretical work, it would be interesting to empirically evaluate the linkages between adaptation and diversity in social systems. As our discussion in the Introduction illustrated, a growing body of work in biology documents the adaptation benefits of diversity. How the magnitude and the mechanics of these benefits differ in social settings is a major question for future research.
- Lastly, and more broadly, our paper provides one example of how improved information exchange and communication in a social setting may generate adverse consequences—in this instance, because it harms diversity and adaptation. As communication technologies continue to improve at a breakneck pace, whether unforeseen consequences in terms of diversity, excessive conformity and adaptation will follow is an important and multifaceted question that deserves serious study.

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Appendix

We prove the results stated in the main paper in the appendix. First, we have the following lemma which will be used in several proofs that follow:

Lemma A1 *Consider a network with n agents. Assume that all agents are initialized to play Action 0, and we have $r_1 > r_0$, so that Action 1 has higher material payoff. Then the probability that there will be at least one agent in the graph which learns about Action 1, before the payoff shock, is given by:*

$$q = \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda + \epsilon}.$$

Proof. The proof is very straightforward. The random shock happens when the Poisson clock of rate ϵ ticks, whereas the payoff shock happens when an independent Poisson clock of rate λ ticks.

Let X denote the random time before the next random switch, and Y denote the random time before the next payoff shock. Therefore, at least one node learns about Action 1 before the payoff shock if $X < Y$. However, since these are independent Poisson clocks, we have that $X \sim \exp(\epsilon)$ and $Y \sim \exp(\lambda)$ and X and Y are independent. Therefore,

$$q = \mathbb{P}(X < Y) = \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda + \epsilon}.$$

which completes the proof. ■

Proof of Lemma 1

Here, we prove the first part of the lemma. Note that the second part follows from exactly the same argument as we just redefine belief to be probability associated with Action 0 being the action with the higher material payoff. First, note that at time $T_i(t)$, we have $\mu_i(T_i(t)) = 1$. This means that at time $T_i(t)$, node i knows that Action 1 has a higher material payoff than Action 0 with probability 1.

Now, the belief update of an agent i can be decomposed into two parts:

- Update due to knowledge of the dynamics of the environment ($\mu_i^e(t)$): This captures the belief update due to a payoff shock.
- Update due to interaction with neighbors ($\mu_i^n(t)$): This captures the belief update of node i , if one of her neighboring nodes has 'learnt' about the other action.

The belief update due to knowledge of the environment evolves as:

$$\mu_i^e(t) = (1 - e^{-\lambda(t-T_i(t))}) \frac{1}{2} + e^{-\lambda(t-T_i(t))} \mu_i(T_i(t)).$$

This can be easily seen as follows: With probability $e^{-\lambda(t-T_i(t))}$ there has been no payoff shock between times $T_i(t)$ and t , and the belief remains $\mu_i(T_i(t))$. With the remaining probability, there

have been one or more payoff shocks, in which case both actions are equally likely to be the ones with the higher reward. In this case, the belief is $1/2$. The crucial property to note here is that $\mu_i^e(t) \geq 1/2$.

The main hurdle in characterizing the exact belief update $\mu_i(t)$, is in writing the explicit form of the belief $\mu_i^n(t)$. Note that as agent i constantly interacts with her neighbors, the fact that there has been no new information from time $T_i(t)$ to t would mean that potentially, some node maybe explored the other action (either through an ϵ -flip or through the activation of a weak link), realized that it wasn't better, and so continued playing the current higher reward action. In other words, the fact that no new information about the other action was received by node i from time $T_i(t)$ to t should reinforce the fact that Action 1 is the higher reward action at time t as well. This is the only property we need to prove monotonicity of beliefs. More formally, we can write the belief at time t as:

$$\mu_i(t) = \int_{T_i(t)}^t [\mu_i^n(\tau)\mu_i(T_i(t)) + (1 - \mu_i^n(\tau))\mu_i^e(\tau)] d\tau.$$

The final step of the proof easily follows by noticing that the term inside the integrand is always greater than $1/2$ (since $0 \leq \mu_i^n(\tau) \leq 1$ and $\mu_i^e(\tau) \geq 1/2$ for all $\tau \in (T_i(t), t)$).

Proof of Lemma 2

We prove this lemma using contradiction. For simplicity assume that $a_i(t^-) = 1$, i.e., Node i plays Action 1 at time t^- . This means that

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,t^-}[R_1(t^-)] + \tau f_i(1, t^-) \geq \mathbb{E}_{i,t^-}[R_0(t^-)] + \tau f_i(0, t^-). \quad (\text{A1})$$

Now, since t is not a time of information arrival, the belief $\mu_i(t)$ will be continuous at time t . In particular, this means that we can take the limit as $t^- \rightarrow t$ in Equation (A1), and the sign of the inequality holds. This implies $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[R_1(t)] + \tau f_i(1, t) \geq \mathbb{E}_{i,t}[R_0(t)] + \tau f_i(0, t)$ which shows that Agent i will continue to play Action 1 at time t .

Therefore, if node i changes her action at time t , this must mean that t is a time of new information for node i . This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 1

Recall that an agent i chooses an action a at time t in order to maximize $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[R_a] + \tau f_i(a, t)$. Suppose Agent i plays Action 0 and one of her neighbors j plays Action 1. In this case, both agents exactly know which action has the higher material payoff. Suppose Action 1 has the higher payoff. This would mean that Agent i is playing the action with the lower material payoff.

However, if Agent i switched to Action 1, her utility would be $1 + \tau f_i(1, t) > 0 + \tau f_i(0, t)$ since $\tau \leq 1/d_{\min}$. Therefore, Agent i would play Action 1 and not 0. This shows that Agent i and all her neighbors must play the same action. Extending the same argument to all nodes which are

connected to Agent i , we have the first part of the theorem.

The second part follows from the fact that all nodes are initialized to play the same action. Suppose all nodes are initialized to play Action 0. Consider Node i . All its neighbors are playing Action 0. Now, suppose node i has an ϵ -flip at time t and learns that Action 1, in fact has the higher material payoff. Then, we have $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[R_1 - R_0] = 1$. However, since $\tau > 1/d_{\min}$, we have $\tau f_i(0, t) > 1$ (since all neighbors are also playing Action 0. Therefore, even though node i knows that Action 1 has the higher material payoff, she continues to play Action 0, since all her neighbors are playing Action 0. This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 2

We first prove that the Markov chain is both irreducible and aperiodic.

Lemma A2 *The Activation Markov Chain in Definition 3 is both irreducible and aperiodic for any graph G*

Proof. Consider the state at time k denoted (P_k, R_k, B_k) . We have (note that we drop the superscript G on $\mathbb{P}(\cdot)$ for convenience):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}((P_{k+1}, R_{k+1}, B_{k+1}) = (P_k, R_k, B_k) | (P_k, R_k, B_k)) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \times \mathbb{P}(\text{No weak link activation or } \epsilon\text{-flip before shock}) \\ &> 0. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, for any state in the Markov Chain, there is a positive probability of staying in the same state. This shows that the Markov chain is aperiodic.

Let $\bar{P}_z = \{z\}^n$ for $z \in \{0, 1\}$ be the action vector where all agents play the action z . Now, consider 2 states, (P_1, R_1, B_1) and (P_2, R_2, B_2) . We show that there is a path of positive probability between these two states. This can be easily seen as follows (here B is any subset of weak links):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}((\bar{P}_{R_1}, R_1, B_1) | (P_1, R_1, B_1)) &> 0 \\ \mathbb{P}((\bar{P}_{1-R_1}, 1 - R_1, B_2) | (\bar{P}_{R_1}, R_1, B_1)) &> 0 \\ \mathbb{P}((\bar{P}_{1-R_2}, 1 - R_2, B_2) | (\bar{P}_{1-R_1}, 1 - R_1, B_2)) &> 0 \\ \mathbb{P}((P_2, R_2, B_2) | (\bar{P}_{1-R_2}, 1 - R_2, B_2)) &> 0 \end{aligned}$$

The first inequality can be seen as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}((\bar{P}_{1-R_2}, 1 - R_2, B_1) | (P_1, R_1, B_1)) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \times \mathbb{P}(\text{Every agent learns the right action by random flipping before shock}) \\ &> 0. \end{aligned}$$

The same argument can be used to establish the next inequality. Therefore, there is a positive probability of moving from any state in this Markov chain to any other state. This shows that the Markov Chain in Definition 3 is irreducible, thereby completing the proof. ■

Now, from Lemma A2, we know that the Markov chain is both aperiodic and irreducible. Therefore, since it also has finitely many states, it has a unique stationary distribution (see for example Aldous and Fill (1995)). Thus the stationary distribution η_i^G is well defined. Now, from Aldous and Fill (1995), we know that the limiting behavior of the Markov chain can be characterized by its ergodic behavior and therefore, we have

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \mathcal{S}_k^G = \mathbb{E}_{\eta^G}[f],$$

which completes the proof of the theorem.

Proof of Theorem 3

In the case of a general graph the only possible equilibria are either all agents play the action with the higher reward or all agents play the lower reward action (from Theorem 1, since $\tau \leq d_{\max}$). we provide an upper bound for the fraction of agents playing the right action. We approximate the Markov chain described in Section 3.2 with the following 2 state Markov Chain.

- G - where all agents play the action with the higher reward.
- B - where all agents play the action with the lower reward.

The transition probabilities of this 2 state Markov chain is given by:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{G}|\mathbf{B}) = \frac{1}{2}(1 + q), \quad \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{G}) = \frac{1}{2}(1 - q).$$

Here q denotes the probability that some agent will learn about the better action through a random flip, as derived in Lemma A1.

Using these transition probabilities, we have (here η_i denotes the stationary distribution at state i):

$$\eta_{\mathbf{B}} = \frac{1}{2}(1 - q) \quad \eta_{\mathbf{G}} = \frac{1}{2}(1 + q).$$

Using Theorem 2, this leads to the average welfare of any connected graph with only strong links given by:

$$\mathcal{S}^G = \frac{1}{2}(1 + q).$$

Now, substituting the value of q from Lemma A1, we get the final result.

Analysis of Figure 3

For ease of exposition, we consider the limiting behavior when $\phi \rightarrow \infty$, whereby the weak link is either active or dormant at all times. From Theorem 3, we know that the average welfare of

Network 1 is given by:

$$\mathcal{S}^{G_1} = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \lambda} \right).$$

Next, we compute the average welfare of Network 2. There are three possible states: (i) **G** (both nodes play the action with higher reward) (ii) **B** (both nodes play the action with lower reward) and (iii) **M** (exactly one node plays the action with higher reward). Consider the transition probabilities to state **B**:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{G}) = \frac{1}{2} \times (1 - q), \quad \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{B}) = \frac{1}{2} \times (1 - q), \quad \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{M}) = 0.$$

This shows that the relation between the steady state probabilities of **G** and **B** is given by:

$$\eta_B^{G_2} = \eta_G^{G_2} \times \frac{1 - q}{1 + q}.$$

Now, the average welfare of the second network is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{S}^{G_2} &= \eta_G^{G_2} + \frac{1}{2} \eta_M^{G_2} \\ &= \eta_G^{G_2} + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \eta_G^{G_2} - \eta_B^{G_2}). \end{aligned}$$

From here, it is easy to see that G_2 has a lower welfare than G_1 . Suppose $\eta_G^{G_2} = \eta_G^{G_1} - t$ for some $t > 0$, we have:

$$\mathcal{S}^{G_1} - \mathcal{S}^{G_2} = t - \frac{t}{2} \times \left(1 + \frac{1 - q}{1 + q} \right) > 0.$$

This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 1

The proof follows from a carefully designed Markov chain to substitute in Theorem 2. Consider the Markov chain with the following states:

- **G** - where all agents play the action with the higher reward.
- **B** - where all agents play the action with the lower reward.
- **M** - where there is at least one node which playing Action 0, and at least one node playing Action 1.

The transition probabilities between these states is given by (we ignore terms which involve higher powers of ϵ . Also, we have used Lemma A1 to substitute the value of q):

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{G}) &= \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \lambda}, & \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{G}) &= \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{\lambda}{\epsilon + \lambda} \\
\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{B}) &= \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \lambda}, & \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{B}) &= \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{\lambda}{\epsilon + \lambda} \\
\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{M}) &= 1 - p^G, & \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{M}) &= 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Using these transition probabilities, we get the stationary distribution

$$\eta_M^G = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{2\lambda p^G}{\epsilon} + 2p^G}, \quad \eta_G^G = \frac{\frac{\lambda p^G}{\epsilon} + 2p^G}{1 + \frac{2\lambda p^G}{\epsilon} + 2p^G}.$$

Now, in order to derive an upper bound on the average welfare, all that is left to do is to find an upper bound on the average welfare in the diverse state (we denote it as \mathcal{S}_M^G).

First, note that if there was no weak link activations, the average welfare would just be $\approx 1/2$ (since we average out over payoff shocks). However, on average, there are γ/λ weak link activations every epoch. Now, in order to derive an upper bound, we assume that these weak link activations inform the largest components of the island network. Therefore, we can upper bound the average welfare in a diverse state as:

$$\mathcal{S}_M^G \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\min\{\lceil \gamma/\lambda \rceil, k\}} m_i}{\sum_{i=1}^k m_i}.$$

Therefore, using the fact that the average welfare of the graph can be written as $\mathcal{S}^G = \eta_G + \eta_M \times \mathcal{S}_M^G$, we complete the proof.

Proof of Theorem 4

We first prove the part of the theorem which says that a star network is optimal.

Note that the case where $\phi \rightarrow 0$ follows easily. This case corresponds to the situation where once a weak link transmits information, the link becomes inactive and can never be used again. Since the star network with the middle component having the maximum number of nodes corresponds to the case where the maximum number of nodes have access to information flowing through weak links, it has the highest probability of learning from a weak link, and therefore will have the highest welfare. We next focus on the case where $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, and $\phi \rightarrow \infty$. In particular, this means that all weak links are always dormant or active, and furthermore, since ϵ is negligibly small, we only have to consider its affect when transitioning from a conformal state (since the ϵ shocks are the only way to get out of these states).

We first define a few quantities which will be useful to present our results. Note that the results are based on Theorem 2, for which we need to characterize the Markov Chain Definition 3. First, we define:

$$\mathcal{H}_{n,m} = \{\text{Island networks with } n \text{ nodes and } m \text{ components}\}.$$

Every graph in $\mathcal{H}_{n,m}$ consists of $m+1$ islands of strongly connected agents which are connected through weak links. Define

$$d_k^G = \sum_{\text{states } i \text{ where exactly } k \text{ components play the right action}} \eta_i^G.$$

In words, d_k^G represents the steady state probability that exactly k components play the action with the higher material payoff. Now, we have the following property for d_k^G for all graphs in the class $\mathcal{H}_{n,m}$.

Lemma A3 *For all graphs $G \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m}$, we have:*

$$d_k^G = d_k,$$

i.e., the distribution of the number of components playing the right action is the same for all graphs in class $\mathcal{H}_{n,m}$.

Proof. Consider the following Markov Chain representation of the general Markov chain in Definition 3 for a network G :

- States: s_k , for $0 \leq k \leq m+1$.

Here, the state s_k denotes all the action profiles, where exactly k blocks play the right action. Note that for a graph G , d_k^G is the stationary probability of state s_k in this Markov chain. This is an embedded Markov chain where the state of the system is observed each time there is a payoff shock.

Now, for a graph G let $\mathbb{P}_{s_k}^G(\cdot)$ denote the transition probability to any state s_j from state s_k for a graph G . We show that this transition probability is the same for all graphs $G \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m}$. This can be easily seen as follows.

- Transition from state s_0 or s_{m+1} : This happens initially due to a random flip with probability ϵ . This is common for all graphs G .
- Transition from any other state: This happens due to the activation of weak links. Since the activation of each weak links, adds one more block to play the right action, the only factor which determines the transitions are the number of weak link activations (since we are working in the limit $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ and $\phi \rightarrow \infty$). Since all graphs in $\mathcal{H}_{n,m}$ have the same number of components, and each weak link adds exactly one new block to the number of blocks playing the right action, we have that this transition probability is also common for all graphs $G \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m}$.

Therefore, since the events which trigger a transition between states is common for all graphs G and have the same probabilities, the transitions $\mathbb{P}_{s_k}^G(\cdot)$ is common for all graphs G . Finally,

since the transition probabilities are the same for all graphs G , we have that the final stationary distribution would also be the same, thereby completing the proof of the lemma. ■

Now, note that there are several possible orientations under the constraint that k out of the $m + 1$ blocks play the right action. However, for $k = 0$ and $k = m + 1$ there is exactly one orientation: All agents play the bad action, or all agents play the good action respectively. Let η_G^G and η_B^G denote the steady state probability of the all good and all bad states for graph G respectively. We have the following corollary.

Corollary A1 *For all graphs $G \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m}$, we have:*

$$\eta_G^G = \eta_G, \quad \eta_B^G = \eta_B.$$

Next, we define:

$$\mathcal{I}_{n,m} = \{\text{Island networks with } n \text{ nodes and } m \text{ components, where one has } n - m + 1 \text{ nodes and the others just have 1 node}\}.$$

First, we show that for any island network in $\mathcal{H}_{n,m}$, we can always find another network in $\mathcal{I}_{n,m}$ which has a higher average welfare. This is shown in the following lemma:

Lemma A4 *For any graph $G \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m}$, there exists a graph $G' \in \mathcal{I}_{n,m}$ such that $S^G \leq S^{G'}$.*

Proof. Note that the average welfare for a graph with m components, each with k_i nodes ($i = 1, 2, \dots, m$) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} S^G &= \sum_s \eta_s^G f(s) \\ &= \sum_s \eta_s^G \left[\sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb{1}(\text{component } i \text{ plays the action with higher reward in state } s) \right] \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^k \zeta_i^G m_i. \end{aligned}$$

Here ζ_i denotes the steady state probability that component i will be playing the action with the higher material payoff. Let $k^* = \underset{i}{\operatorname{argmax}} \zeta_i^G$, i.e., k^* is that component in G which has the highest probability of playing the better action in steady state.

Now, consider another network with the same weak link structure, but all nodes are in component k^* , and all other components have only a single node. Let this network be denoted by G' . Note that $G' \in \mathcal{I}_{n,m}$. Furthermore, note that G' will have the same distribution d_k as the graph G , and in particular, $\sum \zeta_i^G = \sum \zeta_i^{G'}$ (from Lemma A3). Also, since we are adding more nodes to the component k^* , we will have $\zeta_{k^*}^{G'} \geq \zeta_{k^*}^G$. This clearly shows that

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{S}^G &= \sum_{i=1}^k \zeta_i^G m_i \\
&= \zeta_{k^*}^G m_{k^*} + \sum_{i \neq k^*} \zeta_i^G m_i \\
&\leq \zeta_{k^*}^G (n - m + 1) + \sum_{i \neq k^*} \zeta_i^G \\
&\leq \zeta_{k^*}^{G'} (n - m + 1) + \sum_{i \neq k^*} \zeta_i^{G'} \\
&= \mathcal{S}^{G'}.
\end{aligned}$$

which completes the proof. ■

Therefore, Lemma A4 tells us that it is enough to restrict our attention to graphs in $\mathcal{I}_{n,m}$. We refer to the component with $n - m + 1$ nodes as the core of the graph G .

We move our attention to a different representation of the markov chain. Consider the chain shown in Figure




Figure 5: Two networks to compare

The the two states are the following:

- Core Good (CG) - These represent the states where the core component comprising of $n - m + 1$ agents play the right action.
- Core Bad (CB) - These represent the states where the core component comprising of $n - m + 1$ agents play the wrong action.

Let η_{CG}^G and η_{CB}^G denote the stationary distribution of this chain. Note that these stationary distributions must satisfy:

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_{CG}^G &= \sum_{\text{states } i \text{ where core is good}} \eta_i^G \\
\eta_{CB}^G &= \sum_{\text{states } i \text{ where core is bad}} \eta_i^G.
\end{aligned}$$

We have the following crucial lemma which characterizes the behavior of star networks:

Lemma A5 *We have:*

$$\eta_{\mathbf{CG}}^{G_{star}} \geq \eta_{\mathbf{CG}}^G, \quad \forall G \in \mathcal{I}_{n,m}.$$

Proof. First, note from Corollary A1, we have that the state where all blocks play the right action (or all blocks play the wrong action) have the same probability for all graphs $G \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m}$.

Next, note that from any diverse state where the core is bad, i.e., any diverse state in \mathbf{CB} , the probability of moving to a state in \mathbf{CG} is the same for G_{star} , i.e.,

$$\mathbb{P}^{star}(\mathbf{CG}|s) = p_1 > 0, \quad \forall s \in \mathbf{CB}.$$

This is because in the star network with diverse states, any weak link activation would let the core know about the correct action and then the new state will be in \mathbf{CG} . The rest of the weak link activations do not matter. Other events which lead to a state in \mathbf{CG} , like the payoff shock, or ϵ -flip remains the same, independent of the state s in \mathbf{CB} .

Next, for any other graph $G \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m}$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}^G(\mathbf{CG}|s) \leq p_1, \quad \forall s \in \mathbf{CB}.$$

Note that this is because, from a diverse state, at least one weak link activation is needed to inform the core about the right action. It might be possible that more than one weak link activation is needed (depending on the structure of G , as well as the state s). Furthermore, the other events which lead to a state in \mathbf{CG} , like the payoff shock, or ϵ -flip remains the same, independent of the state s in \mathbf{CB} or the graph G .

These two observations leads to the following inequality for the transition probabilities for the Markov chain in Figure 5.

$$\mathbb{P}^{star}(\mathbf{CG}|\mathbf{CB}) \geq \mathbb{P}^G(\mathbf{CG}|\mathbf{CB}).$$

By exactly the same argument, we have

$$\mathbb{P}^{star}(\mathbf{CG}|\mathbf{CG}) \geq \mathbb{P}^G(\mathbf{CG}|\mathbf{CG}).$$

Finally, Inequalities (??) and (??) on the transition probabilities give us the desired result. ■

Now, we put all these results together to get the final theorem. From Lemma 2, we have that

the average welfare for a graph G is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_i \eta_i^G f(i) &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^m \sum_{i_k} \eta_{i_k}^G [(n - m + 1) \mathbb{1}(\text{core good}) + k - \mathbb{1}(\text{core good})] \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^m \left[(n - m - 1) \sum_{i_k} \eta_{i_k}^G \mathbb{1}(\text{core good}) + k \sum_{i_k} \eta_{i_k}^G \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^m \left[(n - m) \sum_{i_k} \eta_{i_k}^G \mathbb{1}(\text{core good}) + k d_k \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \left[(n - m) \sum_{k=1}^m \sum_{i_k} \eta_{i_k}^G \mathbb{1}(\text{core good}) + \sum_{k=1}^m k d_k \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \left[(n - m) \eta_{\text{CG}}^G + \sum_{k=1}^m k d_k \right].
\end{aligned}$$

which is maximized when η_{CG}^G is maximized. Now from Lemma A5, we have that the star network maximizes this probability and therefore this completes the proof of the first part of the theorem.

The second part of the theorem is derived by trying to maximize the probability that the core component is playing the action with the higher material payoff. In order to achieve this, not that if we have $\gamma = \mathcal{O}(m^{1/2}\lambda)$ and suppose $\phi = \mathcal{O}(m^{-1/4}\lambda)$, we have that the probability of a weak link being activated in an epoch $\rightarrow 1$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$. This implies that in every epoch, the core component will play the better action with probability approaching 1, as m grows to ∞ . The average welfare in the limit can be lower bounded by just the average welfare of the core component, which is given by $(n - m + 1)/m$ which goes to 1, since $m/n \rightarrow 0$. This completes the proof of the second part of the theorem.

Proof of Theorem 5

When the Poisson clock (of rate 1) of Agent i ticks, we say that an agent becomes ‘active’. When Agent i becomes active at time t , let its belief be $\mu_i(t) = 1/2$. This means that all its neighbors are playing the same action. For sake of convenience, assume that this is Action 0. In this case, the per time step reward would be $R_0 + \tau f_i(0) > R_0 + \tau d_{\min}$ where d_{\min} is the minimum degree of the graph.

If instead, agent i decides to explore and play Action 1, the reward would be R_1 . However, after exploring, agent i will certainly know which action is better.

Since the difference between rewards is always 1, we assume that the higher reward action has a reward 1, and the lower reward is 0.

Using this, the total expected reward after exploring can be upper bounded as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[R_1] + \mathbb{E} & \left[\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j (R_{a(i,t_j)} - R_{1-a(i,t_j)} + \tau(f_i(a(i,t_j)) - f_i(1-a(i,t_j)))) \right] \\
& \leq \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \mathbb{E} [R_{a(i,t_j)} - R_{1-a(i,t_j)} + \tau(f_i(a(i,t_j)) - f_i(1-a(i,t_j)))] \\
& \leq \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j (1 + \tau d_{\max}) \\
& = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} (1 + \tau d_{\max}).
\end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, if the agent does not explore, the expected sum can be lower bounded as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[R_1] + \mathbb{E} & \left[\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j (R_{a(i,t_j)} - R_{1-a(i,t_j)} + \tau(f_i(a(i,t_j)) - f_i(1-a(i,t_j)))) \right] \\
& \geq \frac{1}{2} + \tau d_{\min}.
\end{aligned}$$

Now, if

$$\frac{1}{2} + \tau d_{\min} > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} (1 + \tau d_{\max}),$$

then the agent will have no incentive to deviate.

Simplifying this inequality, we have:

$$\tau d_{\min} > \beta(2 + \tau d_{\max}),$$

which gives us the condition that if:

$$\beta < \frac{\tau d_{\min}}{2 + \tau d_{\max}},$$

then the agents will have no incentive to deviate.