

OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION

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HOME CONTACT INFORMATION

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DOCTORAL STUDIES	Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Ph.D., Economics, Expected completion June 2025	
	ADVISORS	
	Professor Ben Olken MIT Department of Economics 77 Massachusetts Ave, E52-542 Cambridge, MA 02139 (617) 253-6833	Professor Tobias Salz MIT Department of Economics 77 Massachusetts Ave, E52-460 Cambridge, MA 02139 (617) 715-2266
PRIOR EDUCATION	Harvard University Bachelor of Arts in Environmental Science and Public Policy, <i>magna cum laude</i> with highest honors (GPA 3.91)	2017
CITIZENSHIP	United States of America, Iceland	
LANGUAGES	English (native), Icelandic (native), German (reading)	
FIELDS	Environmental Economics, Public Finance, Industrial Organization	
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy (14.03), Teaching Assistant to Prof. Tobias Salz	2023
RELEVANT PRIOR POSITIONS	Research Associate to Profs. Simon Jäger and Benjamin Schoefer, MIT	2018-2019
	Pre-Doctoral Fellow, Education Innovation Laboratory at Harvard University	2017-2018
	Research Intern, Resources for the Future	2016
	Research Intern, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency	2015
	Research Assistant to Prof. Laura Anadon, Harvard Kennedy School and Belfer Center Arctic Initiative	2014-2016
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS	MIT Graduate Conference Travel Grant, \$500	2023
	US NMFS-Sea Grant Fellowship, \$54,166 per year for up to 3 years	2022-
	George and Obie Shultz Fund, \$5,534, \$8,415	2020, 2021
	Graduate Fellow, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University	2020-
	National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship	2019-2022

Enel Endowment Prize for Best Undergraduate Thesis in Environmental Economics	2017
Environmental Science and Public Policy Undergraduate Thesis Prize	2017
Phi Beta Kappa	2016

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Refereeing: *American Economic Review: Insights*

Presentations:

NMFS-Sea Grant Fellows Research Symposium, NOAA HQ (2023)
North American Association of Fisheries Economists Forum (2023)
Academic Workshop for Icelandic Economists Abroad (2023)

Other Activities:

Berkeley-Sloan Summer School in Environmental & Energy Economics (2020)

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Additionality and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Conservation Auctions” (with Anna Russo)

Incentive programs are a popular policy tool in pursuit of environmental goals, but critics argue that a lack of “additionality” — the extent to which participants change behavior — undermines or even reverses their value. We formalize this policy challenge with a framework in which a regulator incentivizing environmental services, either directly or through the trade of offset contracts, faces a selection market if costs are correlated with treatment effects. We develop an empirical framework to test for, quantify, and evaluate policy in the presence of selection and apply it to the US Department of Agriculture’s landmark conservation program, the Conservation Reserve Program. Participants bid for conservation contracts in a scoring auction, and we compile a unique dataset linking bids to incentivized outcomes to estimate both unobserved conservation costs and marginal treatment effects. We first examine treatment effects of contracting in a regression discontinuity design around the winning score and document evidence consistent with additionality concerns: only 27% of participants change behavior. We then develop and estimate a joint model of bidding and potential outcomes to evaluate welfare and policy counterfactuals. We document evidence of adverse selection — quantities traded in offset markets would be 25% below efficient levels — and substantial welfare gains of 32-80% from setting differentiated prices across participants. Finally, we present alternative auction designs that could increase welfare by over 90% relative to the status quo.

“Who Gets the Fish? Labor Reallocation and Permit Markets”

Reacting to depleted environmental commons, governments design regulations that reduce extraction from the commons through the exit of firms and workers. A motivation to ease disruptions in local communities—i.e. maintaining jobs—might make a government keep less productive firms in the commons while lessening the cost of transitions in local communities. The tension depends on the assortative matching of firms to workers and the existing frictions in the labor market. I investigate this tension in the Icelandic fisheries, where a comprehensive tradable permit market was put in place and it is possible to link individual fishers both to their vessels’ catch and characteristics and to comprehensive tax data that tracks their employment and

earnings histories even outside of the fisheries. With this unique data, I can investigate the earnings and employment outcomes of crewmembers who exit the fishery after the tradable permit system is imposed, to understand the nature of the outside options available to fishers across a variety of demographic characteristics. I will assess productivity at the firm and worker level to show the degree to which the market-based scheme caused the most productive firms to exit and how that relates to the exit of the most productive workers. Using a simple fixed-effects exercise, I find that the exit induced by introduction into the permit market causes low-productivity workers to exit and their incomes to fall. The correlation between the comparative advantage of workers and the productivity of firms will inform how counterfactual regulations targeting firms of different productivities would impact labor markets.

OTHER RESEARCH

With Michael C. Droste, James H. Stock, and Christopher D. Walker. 2020.
“Identification and Estimation of Undetected COVID-19 Cases Using Testing Data from Iceland.” NBER Working Paper No. 2752.

With Jan-Horst Keppler. 2018. Chapters 5 and 8. In *Full Costs of Electricity Provision*. OECD: Paris, France.