Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding: 
Imperfect Information and Conflict Dynamics*

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Abstract

Building on theories of international relations, we analyze how mistrust (uncertainty about an adversary’s preferences or capabilities), misperception (imperfect observation of an adversary’s actions), and misunderstanding (non-degenerate higher-order beliefs) can lead to conflict and drive its dynamics. We develop our analysis in the context of three classic models: a one-shot security dilemma or spiral model; a repeated version of the security dilemma that allows for gradual learning about the opponent’s type, as well as the possibility of conflict spirals, traps, and cycles; and a deterrence model. We relate these models to the empirical literature and to current and historical episodes of conflict.

Keywords: conflict, war, coordination games, information, dynamics, escalation, security dilemma, spiral model.

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1 Introduction

A central question of international relations and political economy is what determines the onset and dynamics of conflict between actors such as sovereign nations, alliances, political parties, and ethnic or religious groups. A large body of research attempts to understand conflict as resulting from imperfect information—and, in particular, parties’ uncertainty about their competitors’ preferences and capabilities, as well their past actions and future intentions. This chapter synthesizes and contributes to the literature on the role of imperfect information in driving conflict and its dynamics.

Uncertainty has been viewed as a major cause of conflict since antiquity. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (2003) identified the causes of war between Athens and Sparta as “three of the strongest motives: fear, honour, and interest.” Thucydides seems to have viewed fear as the most important of these motivations, writing that “the nature of the case first compelled us [Athens] to advance our empire to its present height; fear being the primary motive, though honour and interest afterwards came in,” and “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon [Sparta], made war inevitable.” In Richard Crawley’s classic translation of Thucydides, the word “fear” appears 187 times, against 75 for “interest” or “interests” and 91 for “honour.” Fear and misperception have likewise been viewed as major causes of many historical conflicts—including World War I (Tuchman, 1962), the Korean War (Kydd, 2005), and the Iraq War (Debs and Montero, 2014; Coe and Vaynman, 2020)—as well as current geopolitical tensions, such as those surrounding Taiwan and the South China Sea (Kaplan, 2014), and the relationship between the US and China more generally (Allison, 2017).

For example, several prominent accounts of the onset and intensification of World War I emphasize mistrust, misperceptions, and misunderstanding. A well-known account by British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey argued that arms procurements by both sides before 1914 were interpreted as hostile actions, which led to an intensifying arms race, the formation of a web of military alliances, and aggressive international posturing (Grey, 1925). Many scholars believe that no European leaders truly desired a major war, but rather “sleepwalked” into a

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1In his book on applying the logic of “Thucydides’s trap” to contemporary US-China relations, Allison (2017) calls the latter quotation “the most frequently cited one-liner in the study of international relations.”
conflict that they either did not expect to occur, or expected to win easily (e.g., Clark, 2012). Further, once war broke out, allegations of German atrocities early in the war contributed to its escalation, but this cause of escalation was not well-understood by the German side (Horne and Kramer, 2001).

Contemporary tensions between the United States and China over Taiwan illustrate similar dynamics. Both sides argue that relations have worsened because the status quo—wherein the US “acknowledges” China’s claim to Taiwan but also tacitly guarantees Taiwan’s security if it is attacked—has come under stress. But each side blames the other for this development. For instance, in the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated that “Our policy [over Taiwan] is unchanged and unwavering. It has been consistent across administrations. . . unfortunately, that doesn’t seem to be true for the PRC [People’s Republic of China].” But at the same conference, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe maintained that “It is not the mainland that is changing the status quo. It is Taiwan independence forces. . . and outside forces that are trying to change the status quo.” Against this background, several high-profile incidents have been understood completely differently by the two sides. For example, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan was interpreted by most Americans as consistent with the status quo, while China viewed it as a significant escalation. Similarly, when Defense Minister Wei asserted in the Shangri-La Dialogue that China will “fight to the very end” in the event of Taiwanese secession, the American side interpreted this as an escalation, while the Chinese side maintains that this statement simply reaffirmed the status quo.

In this chapter, we distinguish three types of imperfect information, which we can informally define as follows:

**Mistrust:** Uncertainty about an adversary’s preferences or capabilities.

**Misperception:** Imperfect observation of an adversary’s actions.

**Misunderstanding:** Uncertainty about an adversary’s past perceptions/observations or current level of trust.

For example, Sparta’s mistrust of Athens could correspond to fundamental uncertainty about whether Athens’ leaders truly wanted to dominate the Peloponnese, or about the true
strength of the Athenian navy. Sparta could have misperceived a move by Athens if, for example, a low-level Athenian commander or an ally of Athens took an action that was more aggressive than what Athens’ leaders desired. And a misunderstanding could have arisen between Athens and Sparta if, similar to the Taiwan example above, Sparta perceived a naval buildup by Athens as an aggressive move, while Athens viewed the buildup as an affirmation of the status quo and believed that Sparta interpreted it similarly.

In terms of game theory, mistrust corresponds to incomplete information about an opponent’s type, as in models of adverse selection or screening; misperception corresponds to imperfect monitoring, as in moral hazard or repeated-game models; and misunderstanding corresponds to imperfect private monitoring, where players have imperfect information about their opponent’s observations of their own actions.\(^2\) Misunderstanding entails that the players’ higher-order beliefs— their beliefs about their opponent’s beliefs about their own actions and/or type—are non-degenerate. This feature plays an important role in many of the settings we consider.

We explore how mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding drive conflict in the context of three canonical models. We first cover the one-shot security dilemma—also called the spiral model—which is a classic model of how mistrust and misperception can cause conflict between parties that would both prefer to avoid it.\(^3\) The security dilemma is a coordination game where each party is afraid that her opponent is a “bad type,” who always takes a “bad action” such as conflict. It thus incorporates mistrust, but not misperceptions or misunderstandings. If the level of mistrust is sufficiently high—meaning that either party assigns a sufficiently high probability to her adversary being a bad type—then both parties always take the bad action in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, even though they both might truly prefer to coordinate on a peaceful “good action.”

If the security dilemma unfolds sequentially rather than simultaneously, then the possibility that a good action might be misperceived as bad can also contribute to conflict.

\(^2\)It would also be reasonable to count noisy signals of an opponent’s type (as in, e.g., Kydd, 1997; 2005, Chapter 3) as misperceptions, and then to also count uncertainty about these signals themselves as misunderstanding. We stick to our narrower terminology where misperception and misunderstanding pertain to noisy signals of actions.

\(^3\)The seminal reference on mistrust and misperception in international relations is Jervis (1976). Despite having “misperception” in its title, Jervis focuses more on what we call mistrust, as well as on psychological factors. Our terminology is closer to Kydd (1997, 2005).
While misperception—imperfect observation of actions—has long been a critical ingredient of moral hazard and repeated-game models in economics, it has received less attention in theories of conflict. The importance of misperceptions and their interaction with mistrust and misunderstanding is a key theme of the current chapter.

We then analyze a repeated security dilemma, which additionally introduces misunderstanding (as the parties may not observe each other’s past signals) as well as richer conflict dynamics. Here a key idea is that if (mis)perceptions are private—so that a player does not know when her opponent misperceives her action—they lead to divergent beliefs between the two players, and thus to misunderstanding. Misunderstanding has received even less attention in the literature on conflict, but we will see that it can profoundly influence the onset and dynamics of conflict. These dynamics include the possibility of conflict spirals (extended periods of conflict resulting from a single misperception), traps (permanent conflict spirals), and cycles (recurrent spirals interspersed with extended periods of peace).

We finally consider a deterrence model, where one party is tempted to initiate conflict, which the other party tries to deter through the threat of retaliation. In this model, misperception and misunderstanding drive a range of issues, including attribution problems in the presence of multiple adversaries, “salami tactics” and faits accompli, and the potential utility of tripwires and other trigger strategies in dynamic settings.

Overall, we argue that the analysis of mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding in the context of security dilemma and deterrence games can unify a large portion of theoretical literature on conflict in international relations and economics, provide new theoretical insights, inform the empirical literature, and contribute to our understanding of several historical and current episodes of conflict.

This chapter is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by briefly reviewing some classic literature on mistrust and misperception in international relations theory, and by relating this work to the more modern models we focus on. In Section 3, we lay out both simultaneous and sequential versions of the classic one-shot security dilemma, and analyze the roles of mistrust and misperception in this game. The core of the chapter is Section 4, which covers the repeated security dilemma, where misunderstanding and rich conflict dynamics enter the analysis. Finally, Section 5 analyzes deterrence games, with applications
to imperfect attribution of attacks and deterrence in long-run relationships. While this chapter is primarily theoretical, we draw connections to the empirical and historical literatures throughout, paying particular attention to relating the parameters of the models we cover to empirical variables of interest.

2 Fear and Misperception in International Relations

Since Thucydides, many leading thinkers have explored how mutual mistrust can cause conflict or other inefficient outcomes. In *Leviathan* (1651), Thomas Hobbes argued that without external enforcement—as in typically the case in international relations—people would live in a state of “continuall feare and danger of violent death,” leading to war “of every man, against every man”. Hobbes echoed Thucydides’ motives for war, writing that “in the nature of man, we … nd three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.” A century later, in his *Discourse on Inequality* (1755), Jean-Jacques Rousseau considered the problem of two hunters who each decide whether to hunt stag or hare, where hunting stag is successful only if both hunters hunt stag, while each hunter can catch a less valuable hare on his own. Rousseau recognized that the inefficient outcome—hunting hare—may result, just as conflict can result in the security dilemma, and proceeded to provide philosophical arguments in favor of the outcome where both hunters hunt stag. Following these classical thinkers, the general position that fear or mistrust is a primary cause of conflict—even between parties that would prefer to avoid it—is alternately known as Thucydides’ trap, the Hobbesian trap, the security dilemma, or the spiral model. The core model in this chapter is a simple, game-theoretic version of the security dilemma.

The modern theory of international conflict, especially its branch termed “structural realism,” builds on related ideas. Works such as Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) *Theory of International Politics* and John Mearsheimer’s (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* emphasize how

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4David Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) contains similar examples.

5As well as Schelling’s dilemma, after Schelling’s parable of an armed homeowner encountering a burglar in his essay, “The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack” (in Schelling, 1960). There is some inconsistency in terminology in the literature, with some authors using “security dilemma” for prisoner’s dilemma-type games rather than coordination games. We stick to the latter usage.
conflict can emerge from states’ efforts to gain territorial or other advantages over their adversaries, their attempts to preempt others’ attacks, or even their own defensive actions. Waltz, for example, writes, “In an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power. But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety,” (1979, p. 44). Waltz’s view that states are usually “security-seeking” rather than outright “expansionist” makes him a “defensive realist,” in contrast to “offensive realists” like Mearsheimer who emphasize expansionist and competitive motives as well as fear. However, our reading is that the offensive and defensive realists’ views of the security dilemma have much in common. Indeed, for Mearsheimer, the “tragedy” of great power politics is precisely that the logic of strategic competition can force conflict even on states that would prefer to remain at peace. This type conflict is primarily attributed to mistrust: Mearsheimer’s key “bedrock assumptions” include, “states can never be certain about other states’ intentions,” “survival is the primary goal of great powers,” and “great powers are rational actors,” and these assumptions (supposedly) lead to “three general patterns of behavior[. . . ]: fear, self-help, and power maximization” (2001, pp.100–101). Similar factors are also central to many ethnic conflicts, as emphasized for example by Donald Horowitz, who in his seminal study of ethnic conflicts in Africa writes, “The fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end,” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 187).

Mistrust and misperception have been studied more systematically in the literature on the security dilemma, pioneered by Herz (1950) and Butterfield (1951). The seminal contribution in this area is Jervis (1976, 1978), who provided a detailed discussion of how the balance between the offensive and defensive capabilities of rival states, as well as their uncertainty and (mis)perceptions regarding the other side’s intentions, determine the likelihood of conflict. For Jervis, misperceptions were related to psychological factors, errors of judgment, and other systematic mistakes. He also argued that misperception (in our terminology, mistrust) could lead to conflict “spirals,” where each side escalates in response to the other. The run-up to World War I discussed above is a classic example of such a spiral.6

The game-theoretic approach to mistrust was developed by Glaser (1992, 2010) and, 6See also Glaser (2010, Chapter 9) for a discussion of this example, as well as other examples of arms races interpreted through the lens of the security dilemma, in the context of the lead-ups to World War I and II and the Cold War.
especially, Kydd (1997, 2005), who provided a formal analysis of the spiral model, which we reformulate and extend in Section 3.\(^7\) Our view of mistrust is the same as Kydd’s: in a coordination-type game, a state that suspects that its rival is a type that always takes a bad or aggressive action will respond by taking this action itself, even if each side would prefer a peaceful outcome with a very high probability. However, by additionally considering conflict dynamics, misperception, and misunderstanding, this chapter provides several new insights and further refines some of Glaser and Kydd’s results. To give one important example, Kydd shows that in his one-shot model, “tragic spirals between security seekers [normal, rational states] are likely to be a small proportion of observed conflicts, especially as information improves” (p. 75). However, we will see that this is not necessarily true in a dynamic model, where “tragic conflict” can occur with substantial probability even as the probability of misperception vanishes.

Finally, we also mention the literature on “cooperation theory” or “neo-liberal institutionalism” (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986). This literature conceptualizes conflict as defection in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, rather than coordination on an inefficient equilibrium in a coordination game. A basic lesson of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma is that the precision of monitoring (along with the discount factor) determines the viability of equilibrium cooperation, so that “misperception” in our sense of imperfect monitoring plays a key role in this setting (e.g., Fearon, 1998). This literature has focused on the case where signals are public, so that, while misperceptions can arise, misunderstanding—which require uncertainty about an adversary’s past observations—cannot. Neglecting misunderstanding is a significant omission: as we will see, the distinction between public and private signals has critical implications in both repeated security dilemma games and repeated deterrence games.

3 Misperception and Mistrust in the Security Dilemma

3.1 The Security Dilemma

This section lays out a simple version of the classic security dilemma or spiral model, which is a one-shot coordination game with incomplete information. We consider both simultaneous and sequential versions of the game. Both versions capture the importance of mistrust (uncertainty about the opponent’s preferences), while the latter version also introduces misperception (imperfect observation of the first-mover’s action). These one-shot games are the building blocks of the models of conflict dynamics that we introduce in Section 4.

The basic security dilemma has two players, each with two possible actions, which we call dovish (D) and hawkish (H), and two possible types, which we call normal and bad.\(^8\) The payoff of a normal player, as a function of her own action and her opponent’s action, is given by the matrix

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text{opponent’s action} & D & H \\
\text{own action} & D & 1 - l \\
& H & g & 0
\end{array}
\]

where \(l > 0\) and \(g < 1\).\(^9\) These assumptions ensure that for two normal players, the game is a coordination game (also called a stag hunt or assurance game). It has a Pareto-dominant equilibrium \((D, D)\), or peace, and a Pareto-dominated equilibrium \((H, H)\), or conflict. In contrast, a bad player is assumed to always take \(H\), which is essentially equivalent to assuming that \(H\) is a strictly dominant action for a bad player, so that bad types have the same preferences as in a prisoner’s dilemma.\(^10\) The prior probability that player 1 is bad is denoted by \(\mu_0^1\), the corresponding probability for player 2 is denoted by \(\mu_0^2\), and the players’ types are assumed to be independent. The parameter \(\mu_0^1\) thus measures player 2’s fear or mistrust of facing a bad opponent; symmetrically, \(\mu_0^2\) measures player 1’s mistrust. As this

\(^8\)See Fearon (2011) for a constructive critique of these types of simplifying assumptions.
\(^9\)The game is assumed to be symmetric for simplicity.
\(^10\)A small difference is that we do not allow bad players to take \(D\) even off the equilibrium path. This assumption simplifies our analysis, because it implies that a player who sees her opponent take \(D\) can be sure that he is normal.
language indicates, it is equivalent to interpret $\mu_0^1$ as the “true” probability that player 1 is bad or as the probability that (for whatever reason) player 2 assigns to the event that player 1 is bad. What matters for the analysis is that, either way, this probability is common knowledge between the players.

In the international relations literature (e.g., Kydd, 2015; Fearon, 2020), it is standard to call the parameters $g$ and $l$ the *first-strike advantage* and the *second-strike disadvantage*, respectively, as these parameters measure the gain from taking $H$ “first” and the loss when the opponent takes $H$ “first” (relative to the conflict payoff of 0). We follow this terminology, even when we consider the version of the game where the players move simultaneously.

The above general setup, where (i) each player can be normal or bad, (ii) normal types have coordination game preferences, (iii) bad types have prisoner’s dilemma preferences, and (iv) a player’s trust in her opponent is measured by her belief that he is normal, is canonical. In broad outline, the security dilemma dates to Jervis (1976, 1978), and it was formalized by Kydd (1997; 2005, Chapter 2) and Baliga and Sjöström (2004). This setup can be extended in several directions. One important direction is generalizing the assumption of independent binary types to investigate issues such as correlated types, higher-order beliefs, and communication. Papers on these topics include Baliga and Sjöström (2004, 2008, 2012), Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2010), and Acharya and Ramsay (2013). We do not cover this branch of the literature here, as it is addressed in the chapter in this volume by Baliga and Sjöström.\footnote{Baliga and Sjöström’s chapter also surveys other reasons why attempts to avert conflict through bargaining may fail, in the spirit of Fearon (1995) and Powell (1999).}

Another direction is introducing dynamics, along with the concomitant issues of learning about the opponent’s type and the possibility of misperception and misunderstanding. This is the topic of the current chapter.

As discussed previously, we analyze two versions of the basic security dilemma. In the *simultaneous security dilemma*, the players take actions simultaneously. This is the canonical version of the security dilemma, which captures mistrust-induced conflict.

In the *sequential security dilemma*, player 1 takes her action $a_1 \in \{D, H\}$ first, and then player 2 observes a signal $s$ of player 1’s action before taking his own action $a_2 \in \{D, H\}$.\footnotetext{Baliga and Sjöström’s chapter also surveys other reasons why attempts to avert conflict through bargaining may fail, in the spirit of Fearon (1995) and Powell (1999).}
For simplicity, we assume throughout that $s \in \{D, H\}$ with probability distribution

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
\text{player 1’s action} & D & H \\
\hline
\text{player 2’s signal} & 1 - \pi & \pi \\
\end{array}
\]

Thus, if player 1 plays $D$, this action is misperceived as $H$ with probability $\pi$; while for simplicity if player 1 plays $H$, this action is always perceived correctly. We assume (again, largely for simplicity) that the signal is payoff-irrelevant, and that payoffs depend on the underlying chosen actions even if these actions are misperceived. We also note that, since player 1 does not take any further actions following player 2’s observation of the signal $s$, whether or not player 1 as well as player 2 observes $s$—that is, whether the signal $s$ is public or private—is irrelevant in the sequential security dilemma. In contrast, this feature makes a big difference in the dynamic models considered in Sections 4 and 5. In sum, whereas the simultaneous security dilemma represents conflict induced by mistrust alone, the sequential security dilemma captures conflict induced by the interaction of mistrust and misperception.

Kydd (2005, Chapter 3) considers a related model where the players receive exogenous signals of the opponent’s type before playing the simultaneous security dilemma. “Incorrect” signals in Kydd’s model are somewhat akin to misperceptions in our sequential model, and Kydd emphasizes the possibility of “tragic” conflict spirals where normal types take $H$ following incorrect signals of the opponent’s type. However, there are important differences between Kydd’s model and the sequential security dilemma. For example, the sequential security dilemma often has a unique sequential equilibrium, and it is easy to generalize it to richer models of conflict dynamics, as we do in Section 4. Kydd (2000; 2005, Chapter 7) considers a twice-repeated version of the simultaneous security dilemma, which he calls the reassurance game. The reassurance game has a range of equilibria due to signaling considerations. However, Kydd nonetheless derives several interesting implications, for example providing conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium where normal players take $(D, D)$ in both periods, even when the initial level of mistrust is too high to support a peaceful equilibrium in a one-shot security dilemma. The logic here is that taking $D$ in the
first period has an option value, as a player who takes $D$ in the first period can then obtain the $(D, D)$ payoff in the second period when the opponent is good and the $(H, H)$ payoff when the opponent is bad, while if the player takes $H$ in the first period then she obtains the $(H, H)$ payoff in the second period against either opponent type.\textsuperscript{12} We refer the reader to his work for the specifics of these results.\textsuperscript{13}

### 3.2 Empirical Determinants of Mistrust, Misperception, and Offense-Defense Balance

The basic security dilemma model has four parameters: the levels of mistrust $\mu_0^1$ and $\mu_0^2$, the first-strike advantage $g$, and the second-strike disadvantage $l$. The sequential security dilemma adds to this the misperception probability $\pi$. We now discuss what these parameters correspond to in reality.

For each party $i = \{1, 2\}$, the level of mistrust $\mu_0^i$ is the probability that the opposing party $j \neq i$ believes that party $i$ is “truly bad”—thus she will take aggressive actions regardless of his own behavior. Although such negative beliefs about another party can have many sources, one that is often crucial in practice is a history of conflict, violence, or ideological or ethnic division between two groups. The path from past conflict to current mistrust and conflict is the subject of several prominent empirical studies. For example, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) find that exposure to conflict in Africa in the precolonial period (1400 to 1700) predicts greater postcolonial conflict, as well as lower levels of generalized trust and increased levels of ethnic identity, as measured by Afrobarometer. Similarly, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013) find that exposure to ethnic conflict in Uganda in the early 2000s decreased generalized trust and increased ethnic identity. It also appears that other sources of historical traumas can have similar effects. Key studies here include Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016), who show that ethnic groups that were split during the “Scramble for Africa” in the 19th century experienced more political violence in the early 21st century, including more ethnic conflict; and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who show that individuals

\textsuperscript{12}This logic is similar to the “starting small” idea of Waton (1999).

\textsuperscript{13} Kydd (1997) develops another related model where players first get noisy signals about the opponent’s type and then play a game similar to a twice-repeated simultaneous security dilemma. This paper mostly emphasizes the possibility of spirals as in Kydd (2005, Chapter 3), but it also addresses reassurance.
who belong to ethnic groups that were heavily raided during the slave trade exhibit lower levels of generalized trust today.

The empirical content of the misperception probability $\pi$—the probability that, when one party takes an action that is intended to be peaceful or conciliatory (or at least consistent with the status quo), the other party perceives this action as aggressive—is less well-understood. We can speculate that misperceptions may be more likely between individuals or groups with less shared history or culture; when military actions are more difficult to observe (e.g., in the covert or cyber domains); or when media or other aspects of the prevailing information space are less open and free, or are more fragmented as in the modern social media era. There are more nuanced issues as well. For example, while greater media freedom can improve information, it can also enable the spread of conspiracy theories, misinformation, and obfuscation, which can lead to disagreements or differing interpretations concerning historical events.\footnote{In general, there is strong evidence that mass media can play a major role in encouraging political violence. See, e.g., Yanagizawa-Drott (2014).} In Section 4.3, we will give some concrete examples of misperceptions in the context of ethnic conflicts in Colombia and Northern Ireland.

Finally, there is a large literature on the meaning and significance of the first-strike advantage $g$ and the second-strike disadvantage $l$. This is the literature on “offense-defense” balance in international relations (e.g., Schelling, 1966; Jervis, 1978; Van Evera, 1998; see also Kydd, 2005, and Chassang and Padró i Miquel, 2010). This literature focuses on how changes in military technology, as well as other factors like geography or military or civilian tactics, make either aggressive actions or defensive and retaliatory actions more likely to succeed.

### 3.3 Analyzing the Simultaneous Security Dilemma

We now turn to the basic analysis of the security dilemma.

In the simultaneous security dilemma, it is always a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium for normal types to take the aggressive action, $H$. This follows because normal types have coordination game preferences (as $l > 0$ and $g < 1$), so if the normal opponent type as well as the bad opponent type take $H$, a normal player faces $H$ for sure, and thus takes $H$ in
response. We call such an equilibrium \textit{conflictual} or \textit{inefficient}.

The key question is whether it is also an equilibrium for normal types to take the peaceful action $D$, in which case we say the equilibrium is \textit{peaceful} or \textit{efficient}.\footnote{When a peaceful equilibrium exists, there is also a mixed equilibrium, which we ignore.} A peaceful equilibrium exists if and only if it is optimal for the normal type of each player to take $D$ when the normal type of the opponent also takes $D$. This is the case if and only if, for each $i = 1, 2$,

\[
\frac{(1 - \mu_0^i)(1) + \mu_0^i(-l)}{\text{player } j\text{'s expected payoff from } D} \geq \frac{(1 - \mu_0^i)(g) + \mu_0(0)}{\text{player } j\text{'s expected payoff from } H} \iff \mu_0^i \leq \mu_{\text{sim}} = \left(1 + \frac{l}{1 - g}\right)^{-1}.
\]

So, a peaceful equilibrium exists if and only if neither party mistrusts the other too much—specifically, if and only if $\max\{\mu_0^1, \mu_0^2\}$ is below a cutoff $\mu_{\text{sim}}$ (for “simultaneous”). This is the basic insight of the security dilemma. It is important to note that peace requires mutual trust. For instance, if $\mu_0^1 = 0$—so that player 1 is known to be normal—but $\mu_0^2 > \mu_{\text{sim}}$, then the unique equilibrium is conflictual: player 1 must take $H$ because she believes player 2 is likely to be bad, and player 2 must take $H$ because, since player 1’s beliefs are common knowledge, player 2 anticipates that player 1 will take $H$.

We summarize this discussion with a proposition. (In all of our propositions, we describe only the play of the normal type of each player, recalling that the bad type of each player always takes $H$.)

\textbf{Proposition 1} \textit{In the simultaneous security dilemma,}

1. If $\max\{\mu_0^1, \mu_0^2\} \leq \mu_{\text{sim}}$, there are multiple equilibria, including a peaceful equilibrium where both players take $D$.

2. If $\max\{\mu_0^1, \mu_0^2\} > \mu_{\text{sim}}$, there is a unique equilibrium, which is conflictual: both players take $H$.

The cutoff level of mistrust $\mu_{\text{sim}}$ displays natural comparative statics. Observe that $\mu_{\text{sim}}$ is decreasing in the first-strike advantage $g$, because increasing $g$ raises the expected payoff
from playing $H$, which makes playing $H$ more attractive; similarly, $\mu^\text{sim}$ is decreasing in the second-strike disadvantage $l$, because increasing $l$ decreases the expected payoff from $D$. Note also that our normalization of the payoffs from $(D, D)$ and $(H, H)$ also implies that $l$ and $g$ are decreasing in the payoff difference between $(D, D)$ and $(H, H)$. Altogether, we see that a conflictual equilibrium always exists, while a peaceful equilibrium exists if each party’s level of mistrust is low, if peace is much more efficient than conflict, and if the first-strike advantage and the second-strike disadvantage are both small. These are all standard results.\footnote{See, for example, Kydd (2005, Chapter 2).}

### 3.4 Analyzing the Sequential Security Dilemma

The logic of the sequential security dilemma is slightly more complicated, as now the equilibrium conditions are different for the first-mover (player 1) and the second-mover (player 2).

Let us consider player 2 first. In any equilibrium, player 2 must take $D$ after observing the dovish signal $s = D$, as this signal only arises when player 1 takes $D$. Player 2 thus has three possible equilibrium strategies: the 

**peaceful** strategy of taking $D$ after either signal, the 

**escalatory** strategy of taking $D$ when $s = D$ but taking $H$ when $s = H$, and a 

**mixed** strategy of taking $D$ when $s = D$ while mixing when $s = H$. If player 2 believes that the normal type of player 1 (in addition to the bad type) always takes $H$, the escalatory strategy is optimal. If player 2 believes that the normal type of player 1 always takes $D$ then, by Bayes’ rule, his posterior belief that player 1 is bad when he observes signal $s = H$ is given by

$$\mu_1^1 := \left( 1 + \frac{1 - \mu_0^1}{\mu_0^1} \pi \right)^{-1}.$$  

Note that $\mu_1^1 > \mu_0^1$: that is, observing signal $s = H$ makes player 2 trust player 1 less. Just as in the simultaneous security dilemma, it is optimal for player 2 to take $D$ if and only if he believes that player 1 took $H$ with probability less than $\mu^\text{sim}$. Thus, when the normal type of player 1 takes $D$, the peaceful strategy is optimal for player 2 if $\mu_1^1 \leq \mu^\text{sim}$, while the escalatory strategy is optimal if $\mu_1^1 \geq \mu^\text{sim}$. Finally, if the normal type of player 1 mixes,
then any one of the peaceful, escalatory, and mixed strategies can be optimal for player 2, depending on player 1’s mixing probability.

Now consider player 1. If player 2 takes his peaceful strategy then, as in the simultaneous security dilemma, it is optimal for player 1 to take $D$ if $\mu_0^2 \leq \mu_\text{sim}$, and it is optimal for player 1 to take $H$ if $\mu_0^2 \geq \mu_\text{sim}$. If player 2 takes his escalatory strategy, then it is optimal for player 1 to take $D$ if and only if

$$
\left(1 - \pi\right) \left((1 - \mu_0^2)(1) + \mu_0^2 (-l)\right) + \pi (-l) \geq 0
$$

player 1’s expected payoff from $D$

$$
\mu_0^2 \leq \mu_\text{seq} := \left(1 + \frac{l}{1 - \pi (1 + l)}\right)^{-1}.
$$

(player 1’s payoff from $H$

(Here $\mu_\text{seq}$ stands for “sequential.”) Finally, if player 2 mixes, then player 1’s optimal action depends on player 2’s mixing probability.

Putting these observations together, we can describe the (sequential) equilibria of the sequential security dilemma. We say that an equilibrium is **peaceful** if player 1 takes $D$ (when normal) and player 2 takes his peaceful strategy; **escalatory** if player 1 takes $D$ and player 2 takes his escalatory strategy (i.e., $D$ against $D$, and $H$ against $H$); and **conflictual** if player 1 takes $H$ (in which case player 2 also takes $H$). We call any equilibrium other than the conflictual one **non-conflictual**. However, a non-conflictual equilibrium need not be entirely free of conflict. For example, in an escalatory equilibrium both players take $D$ if player 2 correctly perceives player 1’s action, but player 2 takes $H$ if he misperceives player 1’s action.

**Proposition 2** In the sequential security dilemma,

1. If $\mu_0^2 \leq \min \{ \mu_\text{sim}, \mu_\text{seq} \}$ and $\mu_1^1 < \mu_\text{sim}$, the unique sequential equilibrium is peaceful.

2. If $\mu_0^2 \in (\mu_\text{sim}, \mu_\text{seq})$ and $\mu_1^1 < \mu_\text{sim}$, the unique sequential equilibrium involves mixing by both players.

3. If $\mu_0^2 < \mu_\text{seq}$ and $\mu_1^1 > \mu_\text{sim}$, the unique sequential equilibrium is escalatory.

4. If $\mu_0^2 > \mu_\text{seq}$ and $\max \{\mu_0^2, \mu_1^1\} < \mu_\text{sim}$, there are multiple sequential equilibria, including a peaceful equilibrium and a conflictual equilibrium.
5. If $\mu_0^2 > \mu^\text{seq}$ and $\max\{\mu_0^2, \mu_1^1\} > \mu^\text{sim}$, the unique sequential equilibrium is conflictual.

Several points are worth noting here. First, whenever $\mu_0^2 < \mu^\text{seq}$, there is a unique sequential equilibrium, which entails player 1 taking $D$ with positive probability. (Moreover, this probability equals 1 if either $\mu_0^2 < \mu^\text{sim}$ or $\mu_1^1 > \mu^\text{sim}$.) In particular, there is no conflictual equilibrium.\(^{17}\) Non-existence of a conflictual equilibrium in the sequential security dilemma with low initial mistrust contrasts with the situation in the simultaneously security dilemma, where a conflictual equilibrium always exists.\(^{18}\)

Second, note that if $\mu^\text{seq} > \mu^\text{sim}$ and $\mu_0^2 \leq \mu_0^1$, then Propositions 1 and 2 implies that it is easier to sustain a non-conflictual equilibrium in the sequential game than in the simultaneous game. Note that $\mu^\text{seq} > \mu^\text{sim}$ if and only if

$$\pi < \frac{g}{1+l}. \quad (1)$$

Thus, if misperceptions are sufficiently unlikely, $g > 0$, and $\mu_0^2 \leq \mu_0^1$, it is easier to sustain a non-conflictual equilibrium in the sequential game. The intuition is that if $\pi$ is small and $g > 0$ then when player 2 switches from a peaceful strategy to an escalatory strategy, this has a small effect on player 1’s expected payoff from $D$ but significantly reduces player 1’s expected payoff from $H$, which makes $D$ more attractive for player 1. Thus, far from a first-mover advantage sparking conflict, when misperceptions are unlikely sequential moves favor coordination on the peaceful outcome. Sequential moves undermine peace only when the fear of one’s action being misperceived is sufficiently large.

Third, when condition (1) holds, so that $\mu^\text{seq} > \mu^\text{sim}$, the fourth case considered in Proposition 2 cannot arise, so there is always a unique sequential equilibrium (except in knife-edge cases), which is non-conflictual if $\mu_0^2 < \mu^\text{seq}$ and conflictual if $\mu_0^2 > \mu^\text{seq}$. This equilibrium uniqueness property makes the sequential security dilemma a convenient building block for modeling conflict dynamics, which will be our focus in the next section.

Fourth, the unique mixed equilibrium in Case 2 deserves some explanation. When $\mu_0^2 >$

\(^{17}\)To see this, suppose that there is a conflictual equilibrium. Then, if player 1 deviates to $D$, this action will be correctly perceived with high probability, in which case player 2 will respond by taking $D$. When $\mu_0^2 < \mu^\text{seq}$, this implies that taking $D$ is a profitable deviation.

\(^{18}\)This effect is reminiscent of that observed by Lagunoff and Matsui (1997), who show that asynchronous moves force coordination on the good equilibrium in repeated coordination games.
\( \mu^{\text{sim}} \), the equilibrium cannot be peaceful, because if player 2 takes his peaceful strategy, player 1 will respond with \( H \). When \( \mu^{2}_0 < \mu^{\text{seq}} \), the equilibrium cannot be conflictual, because if player 2 takes his escalatory strategy, player 1 will respond with \( D \). And, when \( \mu^{1}_1 < \mu^{\text{sim}} \), the equilibrium cannot be escalatory, because if player 1 takes \( D \), player 2 will respond with his peaceful strategy. Hence, when \( \mu^{2}_0 \in (\mu^{\text{sim}}, \mu^{\text{seq}}) \), and \( \mu^{1}_1 < \mu^{\text{sim}} \), the equilibrium must be mixed: player 1 mixes between \( D \) and \( H \) to keep player 2 indifferent between his peaceful and escalatory strategies, player 2 mixes between these strategies to keep player 1 indifferent. We note that the logic of this mixed equilibrium is somewhat similar to that in the canonical deterrence game considered in Section 5.

We close the current section by considering the comparative statics for \( \mu^{\text{seq}} \), which as we have seen determines whether the unique equilibrium is conflictual or non-conflictual when condition (1) holds. These comparative statics are intuitive, although they are a bit different from those in the simultaneous game. First, observe that \( \mu^{\text{seq}} \) is decreasing in both \( l \) and \( \pi \), because increasing either \( l \) or \( \pi \) decreases the expected payoff from \( D \). However, \( \mu^{\text{seq}} \) does not depend on \( g \), because if player 1 takes \( H \) in the sequential game this action is always met by \( H \). Thus, a non-conflictual equilibrium exists if the first-mover’s level of mistrust is low; if misperceptions are unlikely; if peace is much more efficient than conflict; and if the second-strike disadvantage is small. In particular, a key lesson is that greater mistrust and more frequent misperceptions both threaten the existence of a non-conflictual equilibrium in the sequential security dilemma.\(^{19}\)

4 Misperceptions and Conflict Dynamics

We now move beyond the simple one-shot games of Section 3 to study the impact of misperceptions on conflict dynamics. We will find that these dynamics can be quite rich—encompassing eventual successful learning and coordination on peace, permanent conflict

\(^{19}\)However, since \( \mu^{1}_1 \) is decreasing in \( \pi \), more frequent misperceptions make a non-conflictual equilibrium more likely to be peaceful rather than escalatory. In addition, if (1) fails, more frequent misperceptions can shift the game from Case 5 of Proposition 2 to Case 4, which permits a peaceful equilibrium. Intuitively, when misperceptions are frequent and normal player 1 takes \( D \), player 2 is inclined to take \( D \) even after an \( H \) signal. For this reason, for some parameters (and possibly for some equilibrium selection), the probability that player 2 takes \( H \) is maximized at an intermediate value for \( \pi \). This “so-so signals are worst” effect is emphasized by Fearon (2020).
traps where learning ceases forever, and recurring conflict cycles. These dynamics nevertheless depend on the form of uncertainty and information facing the players in an intuitive manner. As compared to the classical literature on the security dilemma, the models we explore thus highlight a wider range of possible outcomes of international (or ethnic, or political) conflict, as well as locating the causes of these dynamics in misperception and misunderstanding.

Formally, we consider a repeated version of the sequential security dilemma, where the identity of the first-mover alternates between periods. That is, the first-mover will be player 1 in odd periods and player 2 in even periods. This first mover takes an action $a_1^t \in \{D, H\}$, and then the second-mover observes a signal $s_t \in \{D, H\}$ of the first-mover’s action before taking his own action $a_2^t \in \{D, H\}$. To rule out dynamic incentives stemming from strategic experimentation, we assume that both players are infinitely impatient, so that each player maximizes her short-run payoff in each play of the sequential game.\footnote{Because of this assumption, our results will not depend on whether or not the second-mover’s action is observed. For simplicity, we assume that the second-mover’s action is never observed. This assumption implies that the players’ payoffs are not measurable with respect to their information. But we emphasize again that this assumption is inessential and can be relaxed with no substantial implications for our results.} However, the repeated plays of the game are still tied together because each player’s type is assumed to be perfectly persistent across periods. We also assume that misperceptions occur independently across periods.

We consider three variants of this repeated security dilemma game. We begin by informally discussing these variants and the resulting dynamics. The rest of the section is devoted to a more formal analysis.

In the first variant, the players’ perceptions are common knowledge, meaning that the signal $s_t \in \{D, H\}$ is publicly observed by both players (in particular, by the first-mover herself as well as the second-mover). For example, if the first-mover takes $D$ but her opponent misperceives this action as $H$, the first-mover knows that her action was misperceived. We show that in this version of the game, when both players are normal they eventually manage to learn each other’s types and successfully coordinate on a peaceful equilibrium, where they play $(D, D)$ in every period. The key intuition is that when misperceptions are public, the scope for misunderstanding is limited. Repeating the security dilemma then gives each player
as many chances as she needs to convince her opponent that she is normal, which eventual leads to learning and coordination on a peaceful equilibrium. This result is simple but it seems to be novel; we provide a proof in the Appendix to this chapter.

We next consider the case where the players’ perceptions are private, so that the signal $s_t$ is observed only by the second-mover in period $t$. In this case, a player does not know whether her own action is perceived correctly or not. This feature introduces a wider scope for misunderstanding. Now, if the period-$t$ first-mover takes $D$ but perceives her opponent’s first move in period $t + 1$ to be $H$, she does not know if her own period-$t$ action was itself misperceived. If she could recognize when such a misperception occurs, she could “excuse” her opponent’s play of $H$ in period $t + 1$ as a response to an erroneous $H$ signal in period $t$, and could then try to initiate a peaceful outcome. In this setting, however, she cannot recognize such misperceptions, which paves the way to misunderstanding between the two players. In these circumstances, we show that whenever misperceptions are sufficiently rare, normal players become trapped in permanent conflict with positive probability: that is, with positive probability, the conflictual outcome $(H, H)$ is taken in every period. Intuitively, misperceptions at the beginning of the players’ relationship can trap them in a state of conflict, where neither player trusts the other enough to try to initiate a switch to the peaceful equilibrium. As we explain, this result can be viewed as a variant of the “war trap” model of Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013).

Finally, we consider a variant of the model with limited memory. For simplicity, following Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014) we focus on the extreme case where the players have “one-period memory,” so that they are aware only of the action that the opponent took the last time the opponent was the first mover. As we elaborate below, a natural interpretation of this version of the model is that each player represents an infinite dynasty and the two dynasties/groups interact across overlapping generations. We show that this model leads to conflict cycles: there exists an integer $T$ such that the groups fall into persistent conflict whenever a dovish action is misperceived, but revert to the peaceful equilibrium every $T$ periods regardless of their history of actions. Intuitively, with one-period memory a player knows the current state of the groups’ relationship, but not how the relationship got into the current state. Consequently, once the groups have had many chances to fall into accidental
conflict, the players realize that being in conflict is not very informative about the other group’s type, and they rationally attempt to switch to the peaceful equilibrium.

The private misperceptions—and the resulting misunderstanding—that feature in the second and third versions of the model capture a salient aspect of many dynamic conflicts. It is a typical feature of conflict that the two sides disagree about what action initiated the conflict. As the historian of the Irish Republican Army Richard English puts it, “We all have different narratives of what happened. So, I’ll start it when you plant the bomb. You’ll start it when I invaded your country, which is why you planted the bomb. We all have different starting points for evil. Everyone claims to be reacting appropriately to someone else’s violence,” (quoted in Blattman, 2022, p. 152). A similar mechanism seems to be involved in the US-China conflict over Taiwan described in the Introduction. Related forces can also be seen in non-violent conflicts. For example, everyone agrees that polarization and distrust between Democrats and Republicans in the United States are at their highest points in a century or more, but the parties vehemently disagree about the sources of this polarization, each blaming it on the other side’s extremism. The models considered in this section are simple tools for analyzing this kind of effect.

Throughout this section, we simplify the analysis by assuming that $\mu_0^1 = \mu_0^2$ (so the parties’ initial levels of mistrust are identical), and that condition (1) holds (so that the one-shot sequential security dilemma has a generically unique sequential equilibrium). We will also impose genericity assumptions that imply that the first-mover’s equilibrium belief is never exactly equal to $\mu^{\text{seq}}$. Finally, we also assume throughout this section that the common initial mistrust level $\mu_0$ satisfies $\mu_0 < \mu^{\text{seq}}$. By Proposition 2, this implies that the first-mover in the first period of the game takes $D$, because either $\mu_0 \leq \min \{ \mu^{\text{sim}}, \mu^{\text{seq}} \}$ (in which case the first-mover takes $D$ regardless of the second-mover’s strategy) or we have $\mu^{\text{sim}} < \mu_0 \leq \mu_1$, in which case the unique equilibrium in the first period of the game is escalatory, as in Case 3 of Proposition 2. If instead $\mu_0 > \mu^{\text{seq}}$, we are in the trivial situation where, in the unique equilibrium of all the model variants, all players take $H$ at every history.
4.1 Public Misperceptions Lead to Eventual Cooperation

We first assume that the history of period-\(t\) signals \(s_t\) is observed by both parties. For a given equilibrium, we let \(p_t\) denote the \textit{ex ante} probability that the peaceful outcome \((D, D)\) prevails in period \(t\), conditional on the event that both players are normal. We also define the key variable

\[
\mu_n = \left(1 + \frac{1 - \mu_0 - \pi n}{\mu_0} \right)^{-1}.
\]

This is the posterior probability that the opponent is bad when the history contains a total of \(n\) signals of \(H\) from the opponent’s action (and zero \(D\) signals), under the hypothesis that the opponent always plays \(D\) with probability one when he is normal. Note that \(\mu_0\) is the prior, and \(\mu_1\) matches the notation in Section 3.4. Moreover, \(\mu_n\) is increasing in \(n\) (as \(H\) signals are bad news about the opponent’s type), and satisfies \(\lim_{n \to \infty} \mu_n = 1\). We impose the genericity assumption that \(\mu_n \neq \mu^{\text{seq}}\) for all \(n\). We also denote the smallest integer \(n\) such that \(\mu_n > \mu^{\text{seq}}\) by \(n^*\). The main result of this subsection is then as follows.

\textbf{Proposition 3} The repeated sequential security dilemma with public misperceptions has a unique sequential equilibrium. In the equilibrium, \(p_t \to 1\). That is, normal players eventually coordinate on the peaceful outcome with probability 1.

We defer the proof to the Appendix. To see the intuition, suppose the players are in fact both normal, but they are unlucky and get \(H\) signals for many consecutive periods at the start of their relationship, despite both playing \(D\). In this event, at some point (specifically, in period \(T = 2n^*\)) player 2’s belief that player 1 is bad rises above \(\mu^{\text{seq}}\), at which point he switches to taking \(H\). However, because the signals are public, player 1 perfectly understands that player 2 will switch to taking \(H\) at this point even when he is normal, and therefore player 1 does not become more pessimistic herself, even as she keeps observing \(H\) signals after this point in the game. Instead, she understands that it is reasonably likely that player 2 is normal and is taking \(H\) because he is pessimistic about her own type (in particular, her belief that player 2 is bad stays below \(\mu^{\text{seq}}\)), so she continues to play \(D\) until she sees that player 2 perceives her action correctly. At this point, if player 2 is in fact normal, he learns that player 1 is also normal and switches to \(D\), thus ensuring eventual convergence to the peaceful equilibrium.
The key lesson of this model is that misperceptions need not cause conflict if they are commonly understood and recognized by both parties. This observation refines the classical accounts of the role of misperceptions discussed above: we emphasize that conflict is caused not merely by noisy observations per se, but by misperceptions that lead the players’ interpretations of the history of their relationship to diverge. Jervis (1976) himself recognized that such occurrences can arise from psychological biases or irrationally misaligned beliefs, though the role of misunderstandings—as opposed to misperceptions—is not discussed in his work or other works that we are aware of in this literature. In the next subsection, we will see that these misunderstandings can also arise when players are rational but their signals are private information, so that a player cannot easily recognize her opponent’s misperceptions.

4.2 Private Misperceptions Lead to Conflict Traps

We now consider the implications of private misperceptions. The previous subsection showed that public misperceptions do not generate persistent conflict. However, it is usually unrealistic to assume that a player can observe the other side’s misperceptions, especially when misperceptions depend on subjective interpretations or context-specific observations (which are probably the most relevant types of misperceptions in international or ethnic conflicts). For example, Country A is unlikely to accurately perceive whether Country B perceives Country A’s military spending to be at a normal level or a provocatively aggressive one, or whether Country B attributes a border skirmish to a mistake by a hot-headed lieutenant or to a strategic shift by Country A.

Formally, we now assume that signals are observed only by the second-mover. Let us define

\[ \rho_n = \left( 1 + \frac{1 - \mu_0}{\mu_0} \cdot (1 - (1 - \pi)^n) \right)^{-1}. \]

This is the posterior probability that the opponent is bad given that at least one out of \( n \) signals of the opponent’s action takes value \( H \), under the hypothesis that the opponent always plays \( D \) when he is normal. Note that \( \rho_1 = \mu_1 \); \( \rho_n \) is decreasing in \( n \) (for \( n \geq 1 \)); and \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n = \mu_0 \). Intuitively, the more signals are observed, the “less bad” is the news that at least one of them was \( H \). We impose the genericity assumption that \( \rho_n \neq \mu^\text{seq} \) for all \( n \).
For simplicity, we also focus on the case where $\rho_2 > \max \mu_{\text{seq}}$, which suffices to contrast the following result with Proposition 3.

**Proposition 4** Assume that $\rho_2 > \mu_{\text{seq}}$, and consider any sequential equilibrium of the repeated sequential security dilemma with private misperceptions. Whenever a misperception occurs in the first period, the first-mover takes $H$ in every subsequent period, even when both players are in fact normal.

If in addition $\rho_2 > \mu_{\text{sim}}$, whenever a misperception occurs in the first period, the second-mover also takes $H$ in every subsequent period, so that the conflictual outcome $(H, H)$ occurs in every period except the first one.

We again defer the proof to the Appendix. To see the intuition, suppose that player 1 takes $D$ in period 1, but player 2 misperceives this action as $H$. Player 2 then updates negatively about player 1’s type, and responds with $H$ in period 2. The key difference from the previous subsection is that player 2’s misperception itself is not observed by player 1, so player 1 does not know that player 2 updated negatively about her own type. Player 1 only observes signal $H$ in period 2, which makes her update her belief to $\rho_2$: this follows by Bayes’ rule, since player 1 understands that in equilibrium $s_2 = H$ if and only if either player 2 misperceived her action in period 1 (and hence took $H$ in period 2) or player 2 perceived her action correctly in period 1 (and hence took $D$ in period 2) but she misperceived his action in period 2. When $\rho_2 > \mu_{\text{seq}}$, this belief update causes player 1 to take $H$ in period 3. Player 2 then observes signal $H$ in period 3, leaving his belief unchanged (since he understands that both types of player 1 take $H$ in period 3 in response to $H$ in period 2), so he again takes $H$ in period 4, and so on, leading both players to take $H$ in every subsequent period. Thus, a private misperception in the first period of the game causes the players to get stuck in a permanent “conflict trap.”

As this argument shows, the conflict trap is not caused by player 2’s misperception alone, but by the combination of this misperception and misunderstanding—player 1’s imperfect understanding of why player 2 subsequently takes the aggressive action $H$. The analysis

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21That player 2’s negative inference is sufficiently strong to induce this response is a consequence of the assumption that $\rho_2 > \mu_{\text{seq}}$. In particular, player 2’s posterior belief equals $\rho_1$, which exceeds $\mu_{\text{seq}}$ because $\rho_1 > \rho_2 > \mu_{\text{seq}}$. 
thus clarifies that misunderstanding is crucial for permanent conflict, and is itself caused by mistrust and misperceptions.

The analysis and interpretation of this subsection are related to that of Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2013). They analyze a two-player dynamic game with one-sided incomplete information and two-sided noise (so both type-I and type-II errors are possible, in contrast to our model with two-sided incomplete information but only type-I errors). The reasoning of their main result is related to ours and can be explained as follows. Since signals are uninformative when both the normal type and the bad type take the hawkish action (in their model, starting a war), the uninformed player can never learn that the opponent is bad for sure. Because the uninformed player’s beliefs eventually converge (by the martingale convergence theorem), this implies that with positive probability, the normal and bad opponent types take the same actions in the limit, leading to a permanent “war trap.”

Della Vigna et al. (2014) provide evidence suggesting that distrust is a key driver of conflict spirals. They show that Croatians who lived in villages that received Serbian radio signals in the late 2000s—and who were thus exposed to Serbian nationalist content that was created for a Serbian audience—voted more for extreme Croatian nationalist political parties, as well as plastering their villages with more anti-Serbian graffiti. They also found experimentally that exposing Croatian students to the same radio stations increase anti-Serb sentiment.

### 4.3 Limited Memory Leads to Conflict Cycles

In our final variant of the repeated sequential security dilemma, we continue to assume that signals are private, but replace the assumption that players observe the full history of signals with a one-period memory assumption. This setup is intended to capture situations where players have much more precise information about the current state of their relationship—e.g., whether the opponent’s most recent action towards them was aggressive or conciliatory—than about the distant past. The model features uncertainty and disagreement about how and why historical conflicts were initiated, and thus introduces another

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22 This result is in turn related to “learning traps” in dynamic experimentation models such as Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Aghion et al. (1991), since switching from $D$ to $H$ corresponds to stopping experimentation.
dimension of possible misunderstandings between groups. As we will explain, the model also captures settings where each player represents an infinitely lived dynasty, and members of each group/dynasty interact with members of the opposite group in overlapping generations. Our main result in this model will be that the equilibrium involves infinitely recurring conflict cycles, where misperceptions trigger conflicts that persist for a while but ultimately come to an end.

For a concrete example of the type of conflict cycle that the model is supposed to capture, consider the recurrent civil wars in Colombia, fought between the Liberal and Conservative parties and their supporters starting in the early 1850s. The first civil war began in 1851, and it led to neither a long-last conflict trap nor an enduring peace. Instead, hostilities quickly came to an end, only to flare up again in 1854. The two parties then continued to alternate between periods of war and peace, with violent episodes occurring in 1859–63, 1876, 1884–85, 1895, and 1899–1902. After four decades of more peaceful coexistence, conflict resumed in the 1940s, in part because the Conservatives feared that the Liberals were growing more popular and would soon be able to permanently exclude them from power. The growing hostilities culminated in the murder of the Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, which triggered the most notorious episode of civil conflict, *La Violencia*, in 1948. Subsequent widespread agitation led by street mobs in Bogotá was in turn interpreted by the Conservatives as a move against them by the Liberals. The Conservatives’ reaction then led to a further significant escalation, culminating in a long-running civil war. However, even this large-scale civil war did not lead to a permanent trap, as a power-sharing agreement was eventually signed in 1957. Moreover, and consistent with our framework, this agreement did not result because the two sides softened their preferences or resolve—in fact, it was engineered by hard-line leaders, such as the Conservative politician Laureano Gómez. Other examples of stop-and-start conflicts driven by rising and falling levels of fear and distrust include centuries of conflict between France and Germany, the Troubles in Northern Ireland (as described, e.g., in the quote by Richard English above), many ethnic conflicts in post-colonial Africa and the various conflicts in the Balkans, already mentioned previously.

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23 Classic studies of power shifts of this type as causes of war include Fearon (1996) and Powell (2004, 2006).
24 For the details of this history, see Hartlyn (1988) or Safford and Palacios (2002).
Formally, in this subsection we continue to assume that the period-$t$ signal $s_t$ is observed only by the second-mover in period $t$, but we now also assume that when a player is the first-mover in period $t$, she conditions her decision only on the signal she observed in period $t - 1$; and when a player is the second-mover in period $t$, she conditions her decision only on the signal she observes in the current period. A natural interpretation is that the two “players” each represent an infinite dynasty consisting of players who each live for one period and interact with players in the other group according to an overlapping generations structure. Specifically, the player who is born at time $t$ observes the period-$t$ signal $s_t$ and acts as the second-mover in period $t$, and then also acts as the first-mover in period $t + 1$; the players who are born in odd periods all come from dynasty 1, while the players who are born in even periods all come from dynasty 2; and all players from each dynasty have the same type (normal or bad).\footnote{We call the first-mover in period 1 “player 0.” This player does not observe a signal $s_t$, and always takes $a_1 = D$, by the assumption that $\mu^0 < \mu^{\text{seq}}$.}

Let us define $\rho_n$ as in the previous subsection and denote the smallest integer $n$ such that $\rho_n < \mu^{\text{seq}}$ by $T^*$.\footnote{This is well-defined by the assumption that $\mu_0 < \mu^{\text{seq}}$.} Our main result in this subsection is as follows.

**Proposition 5** The repeated sequential security dilemma with one-period memory has a unique sequential equilibrium. In this equilibrium:

1. In every period $t = 1 \mod T^*$, the first-mover (when normal) plays $a_1^t = D$ regardless of $s_t$, and the second-mover (when normal) plays $a_2^t = s_t$ for each $s_t \in \{D, H\}$. That is, the first-mover’s action is peaceful, and the second-mover’s action matches his perception of the first-mover’s action.

2. In every period $t \neq 1 \mod T^*$, the first-mover (when normal) plays $a_1^t = s_{t-1}$ for each $s_t \in \{D, H\}$, and the second-mover (when normal) plays $a_2^t = s_t$ for each $s_t \in \{D, H\}$. That is, the first-mover’s strategy matches her perception of the previous-period first-mover’s action, and the second-mover’s action matches his perception of the current-period first-mover’s action.
This result is a variation of Proposition 1 in Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014).\textsuperscript{27} To see the intuition, suppose that $\rho_1 > \mu_{seq}$, so $T^* \geq 2$. We also adopt the framing where each player represents an infinite dynasty, as explained above. Then, since $\mu_0 < \mu_{seq}$, player 0 (the first-mover in period 1) takes $a_0^1 = D$. If player 1 misperceives this action, she updates her belief to $\rho_1 > \mu_{seq} > \mu_{sim}$, and takes $H$ as both the second-mover in period 1 and as the first-mover in period 2. This causes player 2 to observe $s_2 = H$, but he only updates his belief to $\rho_2$ rather than $\rho_1$, because he understands that $s_2 = H$ may be observed even if the other group is normal because of a misperception in period 1 or period 2. That is, the players understand that the more chances the two groups have had to get into conflict, the less informative the fact that they are currently in conflict is about the other group’s underlying type. Indeed, so long as a single misperception triggers a prolonged conflict, conflict eventually becomes completely uninformative. Formally, since $\lim_{t \to \infty} \rho_t = \mu_0$, a player’s posterior when observing signal $H$ following $t$ periods in which any misperception sparks persistent conflict converges to the prior. But this observation implies that misperceptions cannot trigger permanent conflict: once the groups have had “enough” chances to get into conflict, the occurrence of a conflict becomes completely uninformative about the groups’ underlying types. This then induces a normal first-mover to take $D$ after a while, regardless of the signal she observed in the previous period. By construction, this “restart” occurs for the first time in period $T^* + 1$. As a result, a player who observes signal $H$ in period $T^* + 1$ against becomes very pessimistic about the other group’s type, and conflict resumes.\textsuperscript{29}

The equilibrium of the one-period memory model displays some interesting comparative statics. The most striking of these rely on the endogeneity of the “restart time” $T^*$. For example, $T^*$ is decreasing in $\pi$: when misperceptions are rarer, observing an $H$ signal is

\textsuperscript{27}The only difference is that, for consistency with the other results in this chapter, we here assume that the period-$t$ second-mover’s payoff depends on the first-mover’s action $a_t$ rather than the signal $s_t$, while the 2014 paper makes the opposite assumption in. The proof of the proposition is the same in both cases, except that here we also use the assumption that $\mu_{seq} > \mu_{sim}$ to ensure that, whenever the period-$t$ first-mover’s belief that the opponent is bad is above $\mu_{seq}$, the unique sequential equilibrium play in period $t$ is conflictual, as in Case 5 of Proposition 2.

\textsuperscript{28}If $T^* = 1$, we are left with the trivial equilibrium where the first-mover always takes $D$.

\textsuperscript{29}Banerjee (1993) notes a somewhat similar mechanism in a model of rumors about an investment opportunity. He studies how a rumor becomes less informative over time, as there are more and more chances for the rumor to start. However, his model does not involves “restarts” or cycling.
worse news about the opponent’s type, so the groups must have had more chances to get into conflict before a player is willing to risk playing $D$. In fact, it is not hard to show that $T^*$ must converge to infinity as $\pi \to 0$, and that, moreover, the long-run fraction of periods in which the groups are in conflict remains bounded away from 0 as $\pi \to 0$. In other words, the long-run probability of conflict remains bounded away from zero, even if misperceptions become extremely rare. Intuitively, as $\pi \to 0$ misperceptions becomes extremely rare, but they also become extremely damaging to trust when they do occur, so that on average the groups take longer to return to cooperation following a misperception.

The result that the long-run probability of conflict remains bounded away from 0 as misperceptions become extremely rare contrasts sharply with lessons from classical static models such as Kydd’s. One of Kydd’s key predictions is that “tragic spirals between [normal types] are likely to be a small proportion of observed conflicts, especially as information improves.” This prediction is valid in the context of one-shot games, but it is not valid in an infinite-horizon setting with limited memory. This is because, while making misperceptions rarer does make the onset of “tragic spirals” less frequent, it also makes spirals last longer when they do occur—precisely because the onset of a tragic spiral is “worse news” about the opponent’s type. In this regard, the predictions of our infinite-horizon, limited-memory model are actually closer to Waltz and Mearsheimer’s earlier claims that tragic conflict is likely to be quite prevalent than they are to Kydd’s game-theoretic result that tragic conflict is rare in a one-shot model.\(^{30}\)

A final remark is that the result that cooperation restarts exactly every $T^*$ periods is of course very stylized. This result stems from the assumption that players perfectly observe calendar time $t$, and thus can count how many opportunities there have been for the groups to fall into conflict. An alternative, possibly more realistic model would assume that the players cannot observe calendar time, and instead update their beliefs based on the long-run frequencies of the different signals.\(^{31}\) In Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014), we show that such

\(^{30}\) Another difference from Kydd’s result is that Kydd emphasizes that “convergence on correct beliefs is more likely than convergence on incorrect beliefs,” (2005, p.18). Instead, with limited memory, and arguably often in reality, the players’ beliefs about each other’s type do not converge at all, and beliefs can spend a lot of time far from the truth. This feature would also arise in models where memory is unbounded but players’ types change over time according to a Markov process, as in, e.g., Mailath and Samuelson (2001) or Phelan (2006).

\(^{31}\) This is equivalent to assuming that each player has an improper uniform prior over the time at which
a model also generates cycles, but now cycles are irregular and result from players mixing between \(D\) and \(H\) after observing \(s = H\) in the previous period, rather than taking \(D\) for sure after observing \(s = H\) in certain pre-determined periods as in the baseline model.

### 4.4 Additional Applications

We now briefly discuss a number of additional applications of the framework developed in this section.

The first application concerns the role of third-party mediators—including international organizations such as the United Nations—in supporting peace. Although mediators are often thought to reduce the likelihood of conflict among nations, why this is so is theoretically unclear, since mediators generally lack enforcement power, so any agreement they broker is non-binding. A literature in international relations and economics studies mediators as communication intermediaries that can reduce conflict by reducing mistrust between the parties. One strand of this literature—which is closely related to standard mechanism design (e.g., Myerson, 1982)—considers mediators who can commit to the messages that they send to each party (e.g., recommendations to take aggressive or peaceful actions) as a function of the messages they receive from both of them (e.g., their reporting military strength). The literature often finds such mediators to be effective, and in some cases just as effective as if they could compel the parties to implement a recommended agreement (Goltsman et al., 2009; Horner, Morelli, and Squintani, 2015; Meirowitz et al., 2019).\(^{32}\) A second strand of the literature considers mediators without commitment power. The effectiveness of such mediators depends on their preferences. For example, mediators who only want to achieve peace may be ineffective—intuitively, because they always tell the parties not to fight, and thus cannot credibly convey any useful information—but mediators who are somewhat biased towards one party and are willing to tolerate occasional conflict can still be useful (Kydd, 2003, 2006; Smith and Stam, 2003; Rauchhaus, 2006).

Nevertheless, both of these strands of literature focus on mediation as reducing mistrust she enters the game, rather than perfectly observing calendar time as in the baseline cycles model.\(^{32}\) However, in a setting closer to the models considered in this chapter—where the parties' private information concerns only their own payoffs—Fey and Ramsay (2010) show that mediation is ineffective even with commitment power.
In our framework, the consequences of reducing mistrust and misperceptions are distinct, and they interact in some interesting ways. To see this, consider the conflict cycle model of the previous subsection. If international organizations reduce $\pi$, this makes conflict less likely to be initiated. However, as already noted, this also increases $T^*$, and thus those conflicts that do begin tend to last longer. As a result, the overall impact on conflict intensity and duration from such communication may be small. In contrast, if interactions within the auspices of international organizations also reduce mistrust (lowering $\mu_0$), then the scale of conflict reduction can be much larger. It can be shown that as both $\pi$ and $\mu_0$ go to zero, conflict disappears—in contrast to the case where only $\pi$ goes to zero (Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2014). Hence, in this instance, our analysis highlights the importance of reducing mistrust and misperceptions simultaneously.

Another potentially important consequence of communication and cooperation under the umbrella of international organizations may be to allow countries to recognize each other’s misperceptions, thus reducing misunderstanding. As we have seen, reducing misunderstanding can move the equilibrium from one with conflict traps or cycles (as in Sections 4.2 and 4.3) to a very different configuration—there can still be some short-lived conflicts, but normal parties always manage to secure peace in the long run (as in Section 4.1). Reducing misunderstandings is thus potentially one of the most important roles—and, perhaps, one of the greatest historical successes—of international organizations. At the same time, the general discussion in this chapter also highlights that achieving the degree of communication necessary for removing all misunderstanding may be quite difficult.

The second application we discuss briefly is the idea of Kantian peace—the notion that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other. Kantian peace is one of the major regularities in international relations, though there exists no consensus explanation for this pattern (see Baliga, Lucca, and Sjöström, 2011, for a discussion of this literature, a model of Kantian peace, and new evidence on this pattern). Our framework emphasizes the same types of forces we discussed in the context of the role of international organizations. Democracies may be better able to communicate, reducing misperceptions ($\pi$), but once again, unless this also reduces mistrust, it will not fully eliminate conflict. In this instance, there may be additional channels via which mistrust can be reduced as well. In particular,
Democratic leaders may have less to gain from aggressive actions than autocratic leaders, and if this is broadly recognized, it will translate into lower \( \mu_0 \), and can consequently limit conflict between democracies. Additionally, better communication between democracies may once again reduce misunderstandings. However, free media and open political competition in democracies can also create room for conspiracy theories, rumors, misinformation, and extremist positions, which can increase misperceptions or mistrust between nations. Hence, our framework also highlights some theoretical limits to the possibility that the Kantian peace works through better communication and comprehension between polities.

A third application concerns the question of whether and how conflict traps and conflict cycles can be broken. One possibility is some generation of one of the parties exhibiting “leadership”, for example, acting in a more forward-looking manner or taking actions that are more distinctive, which can become more informative signals of peaceful intentions. A prominent example of such leadership is Nelson Mandela’s actions during the 1995 Rugby World Cup. These took place in the context of the end of white Afrikaner rule in South Africa, which created a period of uncertainty and fear, especially among the white community. This era was thus rife with mistrust and potential misperceptions, which could easily have led to heightened racial conflict. However, Mandela not only consistently advocated peaceful reconciliation and the rights of the white minority, but also took various symbolic actions to demonstrate his commitment to the peaceful resolution of outstanding problems. Famously, during the Rugby World Cup, Mandela wore the jersey of the South African national team, the Springboks, which was until then associated with the apartheid regime. Mandela also personally presented the trophy to team captain Francois Pienaar, an Afrikaner. These symbolic gestures were interpreted as signals of conciliatory intent and helped a smoother transition to democratic rule and broadly peaceful relations between the white minority and the black majority.

Within our model, the possibility for such leadership can be introduced in two complementary ways. The first is to assume that some generations could have more forward-looking preferences and thus internalize the benefits of experimenting with peaceful actions, even in the middle of conflict traps or cycles. The second is to assume that they may be able to
take actions that are less likely to be misperceived. Through either or both channels, such agents can try to shift the equilibrium to a more cooperative one. In the first case, this will be by taking the peaceful action $D$, while regular players would have continued to play $H$. This will be costly for these “leaders” in the short run, but if it can induce more peaceful behavior in the future, their forward-looking utility could increase. In the second case, a leader may choose to take the peaceful action $D$ precisely because he or she recognizes that this is less likely to be misperceived, and this can also shift the equilibrium in a more cooperative direction. Formally combining leadership with the kind of models analyzed in this section is an interesting direction for future research.

5 Misperceptions and Deterrence

Our analysis so far has built on the classic security dilemma or spiral model. The basic insight of this model is that two parties that would both rather coordinate on a peaceful equilibrium may nonetheless be drawn into conflict due to mistrust or misperception. The underlying model is thus a coordination game, and the question of interest is whether the parties can successfully coordinate on the peaceful equilibrium.

We now turn to a related but distinct model, which we term the *deterrence model*. In the deterrence model, the two parties are asymmetric: for the first-mover (or *attacker*), the hawkish action is dominant, while the second mover (or *defender*) wants to match the first-mover’s action. The basic game can thus be viewed as a prisoner’s dilemma on one side and a coordination game on the other. We represent this game with the following payoff matrix:

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
 & H & D \\
\hline
D & -z,g & 1,1 \\
H & 0,0 & x,-l
\end{array}
\]

This second mechanism is studied in Acemoglu and Jackson (2015), which is a related overlapping-generations model with incomplete information. In their setup, each generation also cares about the actions of the next generation, which thus introduces forward-looking behavior. Leadership emerges when there are “prominent” agents whose actions are observed with less noise, and not just by neighboring agents but also by all future generations. This enables these prominent agents to leverage the expectation-anchoring role of their action, potentially shifting the equilibrium from a conflictual one to a more peaceful/cooperative one.
where $l > 0$ and $g < 1$ (so the defender’s preferences are the same as in the security dilemma/spiral model), but also $z > 0$ and $x > 1$ (so $H$ is dominant for the attacker). As in the sequential version of the security dilemma game, player 1 (here the attacker) moves first, and then player 2 (here the defender) observes a signal $s$ of player 1’s action before choosing his own action. While this is not essential, for simplicity we start with the case where the signal distribution is the same as in the sequential security dilemma game: if $a_1 = D$, then the action is misperceived as $H$ with probability $\pi$, while if $a_1 = H$, the action is always perceived correctly. In contrast to the security dilemma, the key insights of the deterrence game can already be seen in the case where there is perfect information about the players’ preferences, and we will therefore begin with this case.$^{34}$

We can begin with the immediate observation that if $\pi = 0$ (so the attacker’s action is perfectly observed), the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the deterrence game has both players taking $D$ along the equilibrium path. This follows because even though $H$ is dominant for the attacker in the above payoff matrix, she understands that a play of $D$ will be met with $D$, while a play of $H$ will be met with $H$, so she prefers to take $D$. This observation captures the basic logic of deterrence. In contrast, if $\pi = 1$ then the defender observes $H$ regardless of the attacker’s action, and it is easy to see that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium then has both players taking $H$: the attacker takes $H$ because this is dominant for him for any fixed action of the defender’s, and the defender therefore anticipates that the attacker takes $H$ and hence takes $H$ in response. As this simple discussion indicates, the scope for deterrence depends on the precision of the defender’s signal.

The basic deterrence model we have laid out is a simple example of an inspection game (Avenhaus, von Stengel, and Zamir, 2002). In an inspection game, an inspectee (the attacker) chooses whether to violate or not violate (here corresponding to actions $H$ and $D$); an inspector (the defender) then observes a signal of the inspectee’s action and chooses whether to sound an alarm or not sound it (again corresponding to $H$ and $D$, respectively); and the players’ preferences over the four pure outcomes $(D, D), (D, H), (H, D), \text{ and } (H, H)$ are the same as in the above payoff matrix. Inspection games emerged in the 1960s in the context

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$^{34}$In other words, we assume that it is common knowledge that the players’ preferences are given by the above payoff matrix.
of military and operations research applications, especially arms control and disarmament, and were later used to analyze pollution control. Inspection-type models entered economics in the guise of auditing games, where, for instance, taxpayers decide whether to cheat on their taxes, and the government decides which taxpayers to audit. Similar models also appear in the conflict literature in the context of unobserved decisions to acquire arms (e.g., Baliga and Sjöström, 2008; Meirowitz and Sartori, 2008; Jackson and Morelli, 2009; Debs and Monteiro, 2014; Meirowitz et al., 2019). As we will see, equilibria in deterrence or inspection games are typically mixed, so that, in particular, the conflict outcome \((H, H)\) is played with positive probability, even though it is common knowledge that both players prefer the peaceful outcome \((D, D)\). This result echoes a key theme of the papers on unobserved arming just mentioned—inefficient conflict occurs with positive probability.

An important simplifying assumption in inspection games (as well as the deterrence game above) is that while \(H\) is dominant for the inspectee/attacker, the inspector/defender truly has coordination game preferences. This assumptions sidesteps another important theoretical issue in deterrence theory, which is that the defender’s threat to play \(a_2 = H\) after a signal that indicates \(a_1 = H\) may not be credible. This issue is known as the search for credibility (e.g., Powell, 1990). It played a critical role in nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, where the key question was the credibility of the threat of starting a nuclear war in response to various actions by the other party. While this is a fascinating issue, in most situations it seems reasonable to suppose that an actor truly prefers to act dovishly towards a potential attacker who refrains for attacking while preferring to act hawkishly against the same attacker when she does attack. In this chapter we proceed under this assumption.

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35 For references, see Avenhuas, von Stengel and Zamir (2002) and Baliga, Bueno de Mesquita, and Wolitzky (2020).

36 In Baliga and Sjöström (2008), what is stochastic is whether an attempt to acquire arms is succesful or not, rather than whether it is undertaken. In Jackson and Morelli (2009), arming is observed but is undertaken simultaneously by both parties, which again generates a mixed equilibrium. In Meirowitz and Sartori (2008), Debs and Monteiro (2014), and Meirowitz et al. (2019), arming is unobserved, and the basic logic is similar to that of an inspection game. These papers are also surveyed in Baliga and Sjöström’s chapter in this volume.

37 For example, Schelling (1966, Chapter 2) wrote, “No one seems to doubt that federal troops are available to defend California. I have, however, heard Frenchmen doubt whether American troops can be counted on to defend France, or American missiles to blast Russia in case France is attacked.”
5.1 Analysis of the Basic Deterrence Game

The key insight of the basic deterrence game is that there is typically a unique sequential equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies: the attacker attacks with a probability \( p \) that makes the defender indifferent between \( H \) and \( D \), and conditional on observing signal \( s = H \) the defender takes \( H \) with a probability \( r \) that makes the attacker indifferent between \( H \) and \( D \). The logic is that if the attacker always attacked, then conditional on observing \( s = H \) the defender would be very confident that \( a_1 = H \) (if we assume that the misperception probability \( \pi \) is sufficiently small, which seems realistic) and would thus always take \( a_2 = H \); but then the attacker would be better off not attacking. Similarly, if the attacker never attacked, then the defender would always take \( a_2 = D \), even after observing signal \( s = H \) (as in this case the defender would be confident that she misperceived the signal). But then the attacker would prefer to attack.

Let us work out this argument more formally, which will also lead us to some interesting comparative static results. First, let \( \beta(p) \) denote the defender’s belief that \( a_1 = H \) conditional on observing \( s = H \), when the attacker’s equilibrium probability of attacking equals \( p \). We will refer to this belief \( \beta(p) \) as measuring how \textit{suspect} the attacker is following signal \( H \). By Bayes’ rule, this belief is given by

\[
\beta(p) = \left(1 + \frac{1-p}{p} \pi \right)^{-1}.
\]

It is easy to check that the defender’s best response is to take \( a_2 = H \) following signal \( s = H \) if and only if:\[^38\]

\[
\beta(p) \geq \beta^* := \left(1 + \frac{l}{1-g} \right)^{-1}.
\]

Note that \( \beta(0) = 0 < \beta^* \) and \( \beta(1) = 1 > \beta^* \), so by continuity there exists a threshold attack probability \( p^* \in (0,1) \) such that \( \beta(p) = \beta^* \) if and only if \( p = p^* \). That is, \( p^* \) is the probability such that, if the attacker attacks with probability \( p^* \) and the defender observes signal \( H \), she is indifferent between responding with \( a_2 = D \) or \( a_2 = H \).

Next, note that when the defender takes \( a_2 = H \) (which we can refer to as \textit{retaliating},

[^38]: Notice that this is the same threshold as \( \mu^{sim} \) in the security dilemma: that is, \( \beta^* = \mu^{sim} \).
i.e., taking a hawkish response to the perceived action of the attacker) with probability $r$ following signal $s = H$, and never retaliates following signal $s = D$, then taking $a_1 = D$ is optimal for the attacker if and only if

$$
(1 - \pi r) (1 - \pi r (z)) \geq (1 - r) (x) + r (0) \iff r \geq r^* := \frac{x - 1}{x - \pi (1 + z)}.
$$

Assuming that $\pi (1 + z) < 1$ (so that misperceptions are sufficiently unlikely), we have $r^* \in (0, 1)$. In this case, in the unique sequential equilibrium of the deterrence game, the attacker attacks with probability $p^* \in (0, 1)$, the defender never retaliates following signal $s = D$, and the defender retaliates with probability $r^* \in (0, 1)$ following signal $s = H$.\textsuperscript{39} We can summarize this discussion with a proposition.

**Proposition 6** *In the basic deterrence game where misperceptions are sufficiently unlikely (i.e., $\pi (1 + z) < 1$), there is a unique sequential equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies: the attacker attacks with probability $p^* \in (0, 1)$, the defender never retaliates following signal $s = D$, and the defender retaliates with probability $r^* \in (0, 1)$ following signal $s = H$.\textsuperscript{39}*

The comparative statics of the unique equilibrium follow a standard mixed strategy logic, but some of them are somewhat counterintuitive at first glance.

For example, both $p^*$ and $r^*$ are increasing in the misperception probability $\pi$: that is, a greater misperception probability leads to both more attacks and more retaliation in equilibrium.\textsuperscript{40} This is a key lesson of the basic deterrence game. To see the intuition, first note that as $\pi$ increases for fixed $p$, the attacker becomes less suspect following an $H$ signal (as this signal becomes more likely to have resulted from a misperception); this makes the defender less inclined to retaliate. Hence, to keep the defender willing to retaliate, the attack probability $p$ must increase. Second, as $\pi$ increases for fixed $r$, the attacker’s payoff from $D$ decreases while his payoff from $H$ remains constant. Hence, to keep the attacker willing to not attack, the retaliation probability $r$ must increase.

\textsuperscript{39}This equilibrium is similar to that in Case 4 of Proposition 2 on the sequential security dilemma. In both cases, the first-mover must mix to keep the second-mover indifferent following an $H$ signal.

\textsuperscript{40}Note that an increase in $\pi$ actually leads to greater retaliation for three distinct reasons: First, holding $p$ and $r$ fixed, an increase in $\pi$ increases the frequency of $H$ signals. Second, an increase in $\pi$ increases $p$, which also increases the frequency of $H$ signals. Third, an increase in $\pi$ increases $r$, the probability of retaliation following an $H$ signal. (Recall that there is never retaliation following a $D$ signal.)
Another standard, but still notable, observation is that each party’s mixing probability is determined only by the other party’s preferences. As attacking becomes more attractive for the attacker (x and/or z increases), the attack probability \( p \) stays constant, while the retaliation probability \( r \) increases to keep the attacker indifferent. As retaliating becomes more attractive for the defender (g and/or l increases), the retaliation probability \( r \) stays constant, while the attack probability \( p \) decreases, as this makes the attacker less suspect following an \( H \) signal, which keeps the defender indifferent.

These basic observations concerning the logic of the deterrence or inspection game have some interesting implications. For example, Tsebelis (1989) used this logic to challenge the canonical idea in the law and economics literature that increasing the fine for criminal activity reduces crime. As Tsebelis pointed out, criminal and law enforcement activities take the form of a deterrence or inspection game, where the police will bother exerting effort to catch criminals only if the crime rate reaches a certain level. From this perspective, the equilibrium crime rate is determined by the preferences of the police, not those of the criminals. Hence, greater fines for criminals will reduce the equilibrium effort level of the police (as is required to keep the criminals indifferent), while the equilibrium crime rate will remain constant (as the crime rate required to keep the police indifferent has not changed).\(^{41}\)

Another interesting feature of inspection games is that making the defender’s signal more precise (in the sense of Blackwell, 1951) does not necessarily reduce the equilibrium attack probability or increase the defender’s equilibrium expected payoff.\(^{42}\) This effect can arise when there are three or more possible realizations of the defender’s signal. To see the intuition, first suppose that the defender can only get signal \( s = D \) or \( s = H \), where \( s = H \) is more indicative of \( a_1 = H \), and in equilibrium signal \( s = H \) is sufficiently informative that

\(^{41}\)Of course, this extreme result requires that the equilibrium elasticity of law enforcement effort with respect to the crime rate is infinite. In a more realistic model where this elasticity is finite (as in the inspection game variant considered in the next subsection), an increase in the fine for criminal activity would decrease both law enforcement effort and the crime rate.

The literature on deterrence/inspection games in law and economics and related areas has remained active since Tsebelis’s paper. A key theme of the recent literature is the importance of random inspections. See, e.g., Lazear (2006), Eeckhout, Persico, and Todd (2010), Ortner and Chassang (2018), Dilme and Garrett (2019), Varas, Marinovic, and Skrzypacz (2020), Pei and Strulovici (2021), Kapon (2022), and Ball and Knoepfle (2023).

\(^{42}\)This observation is due to Baliga, Bueno de Mesquita, and Wolitzky (2020), although a related point was made by Cremér (1995) in the context of a principal-agent model with renegotiation.
the defender retaliates following signal $s = H$ given the equilibrium attack probability $p$. Now suppose that the defender’s information structure becomes more refined in the Blackwell sense, so that when signal $s = H$ arose under the original information structure, now one of two signals arise: either $s = H_L$, indicating a “probable attack,” or $s = H_H$, indicating a “certain attack.” If the attack probability remains fixed at $p$, the defender may now stop retaliating following signal $s = H_L$, because his posterior belief that $a_1 = H$ following signal $s = H_L$ under the new information structure is lower than his posterior following signal $s = H$ under the original information structure. But this change in the defender’s strategy would make $a_1 = H$ uniquely optimal for the attacker, which is inconsistent with equilibrium, so the attacker’s equilibrium attack probability must increase to the point where the defender is willing to retaliate following signal $s = H_L$ as well as $s = H_H$.

5.2 Multiple Possible Attackers and Imperfect Attribution

Classical deterrence theory along the lines just described was developed in the context of bilateral interactions, with the US and the USSR in the Cold War being the canonical example. In today’s more multi-polar world—as well as in more mundane problems arising in areas like pollution control or law and economics—another important aspect of deterrence is the presence of multiple possible aggressors and imperfect attribution of attacks, so that the defender’s information may not definitely determine which attacker is responsible for a given attack, as well as whether or not an attack actually occurred. In the context of international relations, imperfect attribution is especially important in cyberwarfare, where examples of false alarms, detection failure, and misidentification of the perpetrator of an attack abound. Thus, whereas so far this chapter has focused on misperceptions of whether or not a single adversary took an aggressive action, we now consider a second important type of misperception: which adversary is more likely to have acted aggressively.

Baliga, Bueno de Mesquita, and Wolitzky (2020) develop a simple model of deterrence with imperfect attribution, which builds on the standard deterrence/inspection game described above. Consider a situation with $n$ possible attackers and one defender. One of the

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43 The follows because the defender’s posterior following $s = H$ “splits” into a lower posterior following $s = H_L$ and a higher posterior following $s = H_H$. 

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attackers may randomly get a chance to launch an attack (for example, by identifying a weakness in the defender’s computer network), and the defender then receives a signal that probabilistically indicates whether an attack occurred, and if so which attacker is responsible. To make the model more tractable and to generate more realistic comparative statics, assume that the benefit $x$ from attacking without facing retaliation is stochastic and varies across attackers, with the realization of this variable for each attacker being her private information. Similarly, let us assume that the loss $l$ from failing to retaliate against each attacker is stochastic and heterogeneous across attackers, and is the private information of the defender. These random payoffs “purify” the mixed equilibrium in the standard deterrence game, leading to an equilibrium where each attacker $i$ attacks if and only if his attack benefit $x_i$ exceeds an (attacker-specific) threshold $x_i^*$, while the defender retaliates against attacker $i$ after a given signal realizations if and only if her loss from failing to retaliate $l_i$ is exceeds a threshold $l_i^*$. We also observe that an attacker with a sufficiently high value of $x_i$ will always attack in equilibrium, so the probability that an attacker has a high value of $x_i$ plays a similar role to the level of mistrust of this attacker, in the terminology of the previous sections.

A key feature of this model is that although there are no direct payoff externalities among the attackers (who each care only about whether they strike the defender, and whether they face retaliation), the model features a kind of endogenous strategic complementarity among the attackers, which works through the defender’s Bayesian updating problem of attributing responsibility for a given attack. To see the idea, suppose that the distribution of attack benefits $x_i$ for one attacker $i$—say, $i =$Russia—shifts up, so that Russia attacks with higher probability in equilibrium. This implies that, after each signal, the defender believes that Russia is guilty (responsible for the attack) with higher probability, and correspondingly believes that each other potential attacker is guilty with lower probability. This in turn implies that the defender’s retaliation threshold increases for each potential attacker other than Russia. Finally, this sequence of reasoning implies that the other attackers increase their equilibrium attack probabilities as well. In sum, due to the defender’s finite supply of

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44 Baliga, Bueno de Mesquita, and Wolitzky use a slightly different, but equivalent, payoff parameterization. 45 Except after a “business as usual” or null signal, which indicates that no attack is likely to have occurred. The strategic complementarity logic holds as long as the defender never retaliates following the null signal.
“suspicion” following each attack, when one attacker becomes more aggressive, this uses up some of the defender’s suspicion, and causes the other attackers to also become less suspect and therefore more aggressive.\textsuperscript{46}

The model can be used to understand the impact of changes on the defender’s signal technology on the profile of equilibrium attack probabilities. There are some surprising effects here, as well as some expected ones. As noted above, improving the defender’s information in the Blackwell sense need not reduce the equilibrium frequency of attacks or increase the defender’s equilibrium payoff.\textsuperscript{47} Another finding is that, in a certain sense, it is better for the defender to fail to detect an attack at all, rather than detecting the attack but attributing it to the wrong attacker. The intuition is that failing to detect attacks by Attacker 1 or misattributing to Attacker 2 both reduce retaliation against Attacker 1, and hence make him more aggressive; but the latter type of mistake also makes the defender more hesitant to retaliate against Attacker 2 when the signal points to her (because these signals may result from misattributed attacks by Attacker 1), and hence makes Attacker 2 more aggressive as well. This result therefore highlight the subtle effects of misperceptions on the likelihood of the onset of conflict in a Bayesian framework, especially in settings with multiple potential aggressors.

5.3 Continuous Claims and Salami Tactics

In the basic deterrence model, the attacker makes a binary choice between attacking ($H$) and not attacking ($D$). In many scenarios, the first-mover in a conflict can also choose from among a range of possible \textit{claims}, of different levels of aggressiveness, while the second mover then observes a signal of the claim and then has to decide whether to acquiesce to the claim (that is, \textit{accept}, which corresponds to the dovish action $D$ in the deterrence game), or to

\textsuperscript{46}This logic is somewhat akin to the law and economics literature on “crime waves,” where crime is modeled as a game of strategic complements among potential criminals, because high crime rates overwhelm the police (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996). However, a key theme of this literature is that strategic complements can lead to multiple equilibria, which may explain the high variance of crime rates across time and space. In contrast, in the imperfect attribution model, there is always a unique equilibrium. Intuitively, this is because, by Bayes’ rule, the defender’s posterior beliefs (and hence the retaliation probabilities) are determined by the ratio of the equilibrium attack probabilities rather than their levels, so there cannot exist multiple equilibria with different frequencies of attacks.

\textsuperscript{47}This can happen even with a single potential attacker.
initiate a costly conflict (that is, *reject* the claim, corresponding to the hawkish action $H$ in the deterrence game). For example, the first-mover might choose how much territory to occupy or how many arms to acquire, and the second-mover might misperceive exactly how much territory was occupied or how many arms were acquired before deciding whether to acquiesce or contest the occupation or arming. In addition to being more realistic, allowing a range of possible claims can capture the possibility of *salami tactics* (Schelling, 1966), where deterrence is hindered by the second-mover’s inability to clearly and credibly indicate what signals will trigger conflict; this allows the first-mover to gradually claim more and more resources (“slicing the salami”).\(^4\) One prominent recent example comes from Chinese naval activities in the South China Sea, which are viewed by several experts as instances of using the country’s first-mover status in their neighborhood and uncertainty/ambiguity about their exact actions in order to gain a strategic advantage (e.g., Kaplan, 2014; Coy, 2021).

As this discussion indicates, a deterrence game with a range of possible claims may alternatively be viewed as a game of *ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers*. In this game, the first-mover (who we will call the *claimant*) chooses a claim $a \in [-M, M]$ (where $M$ can be any number greater than 1), and the second-mover (who we will call the *responder*) observes a noisy signal $s$ of the claim $a$ before accepting or rejecting the claim. The size of the total available economic surplus (“the pie”) is normalized to 1, so that if the responder accepts a claim of $a$, payoffs are $a$ for the claimant and $1 - a$ for the responder; if instead the claimant rejects, each player’s payoff is 0. This game is studied by Wolitzky (2023).\(^5\) The assumption that $M > 1$ implies that the claimant can demand “more than the entire pie”: that is, he can claim so many resources that the responder is better-off contesting the claim rather than accepting it.

A couple remarks on the model are in order. First, if the responder’s signal $s$ is perfectly informative, the game reduces to the standard ultimatum bargaining game, where in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium the claimant demands $a = 1$ and the responder accepts.

\(^4\)A different perspective on salami tactics is provided by Powell (1996), who models such situations as wars of attrition with incomplete information.

\(^5\)Ravid (2020) and Denti, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2022) develop related models of unobserved-offers bargaining, where the responder endogenously acquires a signal of the claim at some cost.
In this situation, the assumption that the claimant can demand more than the entire pie is irrelevant, since the responder would reject these demands. However, once the claim is observed with noise, this assumption will preclude the possibility of an equilibrium where conflict is entirely absent (i.e., where the responder accepts the claim with probability 1). Intuitively, if the responder accepts with probability 1, then she must accept with probability 1 after every signal realization, in which case the claimant will make the greatest possible claim (since the claim is always accepted). But if this claim is greater than 1, the responder would be better-off rejecting.

More precisely, under some standard assumptions on the distribution of $F$—including, crucially, the assumption that $F$ has a non-moving support—in every Nash equilibrium of the imperfectly-observed offers bargaining game, either the claim is rejected with probability 1, or the claimant demands the entire pie ($a = 1$) with probability 1, and the responder accepts after some signal realizations but rejects after others.\textsuperscript{50} Costly conflict thus occurs with positive probability, even though the pie is perfectly divisible and there is no uncertainty about the parties’ preferences.\textsuperscript{51} The key friction in the model is that the claimant cannot demand slightly less than the entire pie (by taking action $a = .99$, say) while credibly communicating this reduced claim to the responder. If the claim were perfectly observable then the responder would always accept when $a = .99$—leaving both parties better off—but since the responder’s signal is noisy, conflict risk is only slightly lower when $a = .99$ rather than 1, so that the claimant is better off claiming $a = 1$ and incurring a slightly higher conflict risk.

The friction that generates conflict in bargaining with imperfectly-observed claims is somewhat akin to the mixed-strategy nature of the equilibrium in the basic deterrence game. In the deterrence game, if the attacker could take the dovish action $D$ and could credibly reveal this action to the defender, the resulting outcome of $(D, D)$ would be preferred by both players to the mixed equilibrium outcome. Thus, misperception of the first-mover’s action

\textsuperscript{50}In addition to full support, the required assumptions are that the conditional signal distribution is smooth, satisfies the strict monotone likelihood ratio property in $s$ and $a$, and is log-concave in $a$. These assumptions imply that there is no equilibrium where the claimant mixes. Note that there is also always a trivial equilibrium where the claim is always rejected, by the same logic as in Bagwell (1995).

\textsuperscript{51}Imperfect observation of claims thus seems distinct from the other “rationalist explanations of war” proposed by Fearon (1995).
is the root cause of conflict in both the basic deterrence game and the richer imperfectly-observed-offers bargaining game. The bargaining game also displays some natural comparative statics that can be useful for interpreting various conflict episodes. For instance, noisier observations of claims is associated with greater conflict risk. In addition, in an extension of the model where rejecting a claim leads to temporary rather than permanent conflict, conflict risk persists even as the time between successive claims goes to zero.52

Given that the attacker in a deterrence game or the claimant in an imperfectly-observed-claims bargaining game is better-off if she can reveal her action to the other party, a natural critique of these models is that in practice parties should be able to avoid conflict by revealing this information. However, in reality adversaries often do choose to conceal the extent of their aggressive actions, such as the size of the weapons stockpiles they have acquired. There are likely several reasons for this. One obvious reason is that revealing one’s weapons makes one vulnerable if conflict does break out. This mechanism is investigated by Coe and Vaynman (2020), who argue that it is a key reason why arms control failed to prevent the Iraq War. Another reason is that, just as the level of arming itself is imperfectly observed, so may the extent to which a country is complying with an arms control agreement. In other words, enriching a deterrence or bargaining model by letting the aggressor reveal his action might just push the scope for misperception from the action itself to the extent to which the aggressor has actually fully revealed it.

5.4 Dynamic Deterrence with Misperceptions

Given that one-shot sequential bargaining with imperfectly-perceived claims results in a positive probability of inefficient conflict, it is natural to ask whether repeated bargaining—which is a more realistic model of a long-run relationship between two adversaries—can lead to a more efficient outcome. In a similar context, Schelling (1966) argued informally that “tripwire” or “plate glass window” strategies could play an important role in deterring aggressive claims and averting conflict. Intuitively, if there is some critical threshold \( s^* \) such

\[ ^{52} \text{This result contrasts with the well-known “Coase conjecture,” which implies that agreement occurs almost immediately in bargaining with one-sided incomplete information as the time between offers vanishes. The Coase conjecture suggests that one-sided private information is not a likely cause of persistent disagreement or conflict.} \]
that the responder is expected to accept if and only if the perceived claim $s$ is below $s^*$, the aggressor can be incentivized to moderate his claim, and the responder can be incentivized to reject claims above $s^*$, for fear of triggering a shift to a more conflictual equilibrium regime. In Schelling’s words (1966, p. 56),

“Our deterrence rests on Soviet expectations. This, I suppose, is the ultimate reason why we have to defend California—aside from whether or not Easterners want to. There is no way to let California go to the Soviets and make them believe nevertheless that Oregon and Washington, Florida and Maine, and eventually Chevy Chase and Cambridge cannot be had under the same principle.”

In an extension of the bargaining model described in the previous subsection, Wolitzky (2023) shows that such a “tripwire” strategy can succeed, provided that three conditions are satisfied. First, it must be possible to choose the cutoff signal $s^*$ so that the signal $s$ is unlikely to exceed $s^*$ along the equilibrium path, but so that $s$ becomes much more likely to exceed $s^*$ if the aggressor marginally increases his claim. This can be done provided that extreme signal realizations are sufficiently informative about the claim.$^{53}$ Second, the signal $s$ must be publicly observed, so that both players’ play can shift to a bad equilibrium if the responder accepts following a signal above $s^*$. For example, in Schelling’s parable, it is essential that the Soviets understand the Americans’ signals of their actions, so that they can see whether or not the Americans are upholding their deterrence strategy. Third, the players must be sufficiently patient, so that the threat of shifting to a bad equilibrium if $s$ exceeds $s^*$ is strong enough to deter aggressive claims even when the equilibrium probability that $s > s^*$ is small. Under these conditions, any division of the pie can be sustained in equilibrium with a minimal risk of conflict: formally, for any numbers $x \in (0, 1)$ and $\eta > 0$, there exists a threshold discount factor $\tilde{\delta} < 1$ such that, for every $\delta > \tilde{\delta}$, there exists a sequential equilibrium of the repeated imperfectly-observed-claims bargaining game with discount $\delta$ where the players’ expected per-period payoffs are within a distance $\eta$ of the pair

$^{53}$For example, this is the case if $x = s + \varepsilon$, where $\varepsilon$ is an independent normal random variable of fixed variance. In general, what is required is that if the density of the signal $s$ conditional on the claim $a$ is given by $f(s|a)$, then $\lim_{s \to +\infty} f_a(s|a) / f(s|a) = \infty$. The relevant limit is the one as $s \to +\infty$ rather than $-\infty$ because higher signals are assumed to be more informative of aggressive claims, and the relevant signals are the ones that most strongly indicate an aggressive claim.
This result is a variant of the folk theorem for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, 1994).

The situation is very different if the signal is observed only by the responder and there is room for misunderstanding. This would be the case, for example, if the Soviets do not understand the Americans’ signals and the Americans do not recognize this. In this case, the claimant cannot tell when the responder’s signal exceeds $s^*$, so the responder is tempted to accept the claim even after unfavorable signal realizations (as she understands that, in equilibrium, these signal realizations are due to “bad luck” rather than truly aggressive claims). However, such behavior by the responder undermines deterrence. More precisely, it can be shown that when the signal is observed only by the responder, there is no equilibrium within a large class of strategies where the responder obtains any positive surplus. This finding is in the spirit of earlier impossibility results for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring (e.g., Matsushima, 1991). The contrast between the prospects of dynamic deterrence with public and private signals is another example where misperceptions need not lead to conflict as long as their occurrence is commonly understood by both parties, while private misperceptions that cause misunderstandings inevitably do lead to conflict.

6 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed, extended, and applied some canonical models of imperfect information and conflict dynamics. We argue that “3Ms”—mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding—are critical for understanding conflict dynamics. Mistrust—incomplete information regarding an adversary’s preferences or capabilities—can lead to conflict in settings with a first-mover advantage, such as the classic security dilemma, where each party takes an aggressive action out of fear that the other party is doing the same. Misperceptions—imperfect observation of an adversary’s action—can amplify mistrust and thus increase conflict risk in dynamic interactions. Finally, misunderstanding—uncertainty about an adversary’s observations or perceptions—is essential for understanding more complex and realistic conflict dynamics, including conflict spirals, traps, and cycles.

Of the “3Ms,” mistrust has been the main emphasis of the conflict literature. Misper-
ceptions have played an important role in discussions of the causes of several major wars, but have been less often incorporated into formal models of conflict. Misunderstanding as a major determinant of the dynamics of conflict has been largely ignored this literature. This chapter has stressed the central roles of misperception and misunderstanding in the onset, continuation, and cessation of conflict. We have also shown how the same forces determine conflict risk and dynamics in deterrence (or inspection) games.

Our main aim in this chapter has been theoretical—clarifying the distinct and complementary roles of mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding in driving conflict onset and dynamics. Nevertheless, we hope that a better appreciation of these forces will also be of use for more historical and empirical research in this area. Although there are already some empirical studies suggesting that mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding can be important factors in conflict, much work remains to be done. From a theoretical viewpoint, we believe that further work on conflict dynamics in the presence of misperceptions and misunderstandings can generate sharper predictions about the form, severity, and dynamics of war and other conflicts. One important avenue here is to extend these insights from the simple models considered in this chapter to richer settings within the broader political economy area, such as conflict and cooperation between ethnic groups, political parties, or interest groups.

Another important direction for future research is theoretical, historical, or empirical work elucidating different kinds of misperception and misunderstanding and their implications. In this chapter, we have focused on the simplest kind of misunderstanding, where each party is completely unaware of any misperception by the other party. Alternative, richer forms of misunderstanding (i.e., divergent higher-order beliefs) can result from, for example, miscommunication or differing interpretations of history. Another important area is to incorporate within-group heterogeneity into the theory of conflict (e.g., different attitudes towards war resulting from preference heterogeneity or from the consequences of conflict for other outcomes, such as redistribution). Finally, another set of important questions concern how international organizations and other third-party mediators can help ameliorate the effects of misperception and misunderstanding.
Appendix: Omitted Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 2

We consider each one of the five cases intern. The text establishes that equilibria must take one of four forms (recalling that player 2 always takes \( D \) when \( s = D \)): peaceful (player 1 takes \( D \), player 2 takes \( D \) when \( s = H \)), escalatory (player 1 takes \( D \), player 2 takes \( H \) when \( s = H \)), conflictual (player 1 takes \( H \), player 2 takes \( H \) when \( s = H \)), or mixed.

Case 1: \( \mu_0^2 \leq \min \{ \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}}, \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{sim}} \} \) and \( \mu_1^1 < \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \). When \( \mu_0^2 \leq \min \{ \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}}, \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{sim}} \} \) and player 2 always takes \( D \) when \( s = D \), player 1’s unique optimal action is \( D \), regardless of player 2’s behavior when \( s = H \). When \( \mu_1^1 < \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \) and player 1 always takes \( D \), player 2’s unique optimal action after either signal is \( D \).

Case 2: \( \mu_0^2 \in (\mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}}, \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{sim}}) \) and \( \mu_1^1 < \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \). The text establishes that there is no pure equilibrium in this case. It is straightforward to check that the equilibrium mixing probabilities are unique.

Case 3: \( \mu_0^2 < \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{seq}} \) and \( \mu_1^1 > \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \). When \( \mu_1^1 > \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \), player 2’s unique optimal strategy is escalatory, regardless of player 1’s strategy. When \( \mu_0^2 < \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{seq}} \) and player 2 takes his escalatory strategy, player 1’s unique optimal action is \( D \).

Case 4: \( \mu_0^2 > \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{seq}} \) and \( \max \{ \mu_0^2, \mu_1^1 \} < \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \). In this case, it is straightforward to check that both the peaceful and conflictual equilibria exist.

Case 5: \( \mu_0^2 > \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{seq}} \) and \( \max \{ \mu_0^2, \mu_1^1 \} > \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \). There are two cases to consider. First, if \( \mu_0^2 > \max \{ \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}}, \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{sim}} \} \) then player 1’s unique optimal action is \( H \), regardless of player 2’s strategy. When player 1 always takes \( H \), player 2’s unique optimal strategy is escalatory. Second, if \( \mu_1^1 > \mu_{\text{sim}}^{\text{seq}} \) then player 2’s unique optimal strategy is escalatory, regardless of player 1’s strategy. When \( \mu_0^2 > \mu_{\text{seq}}^{\text{seq}} \) and player 2 takes his escalatory strategy, player 1’s unique optimal action is \( D \).

A.2 Proof of Proposition 3

Since bad players always take \( H \), we need only consider normal players’ strategies. We first note that if the second-mover observes \( s_t = D \) in any period \( t \), she learns with certainty that
her opponent is normal (since \( s_t = D \) can result only if \( a^1_t = D \), and \( a^1_t = D \) can be played only if the period-\( t \) first-mover is normal). This player’s belief that her opponent is bad is then 0 in every future period. Since this belief is less than \( \min \{ \mu_{\text{sim}}, \mu_{\text{seq}} \} \), this player takes \( D \) in every future period where she is the first-mover, as the opponent must take \( D \) following the \( D \) signal when he is normal. This behavior eventually generates another \( D \) signal, at which point it becomes common knowledge that both players are normal, and hence they both take \( D \) in every future period. It thus remains only to determine the normal players’ strategies at histories where the signal has equalled \( H \) in every period, and to show that these strategies eventually lead to a \( D \) signal arising with probability 1. Let \( E_T \) denote this event: \( E_T = \{ s_t = H \ \forall t \leq T - 1 \} \).

We argue by induction that for every period \( T < 2n^* \), conditional on the event \( E_T \), it is common knowledge that the first-mover believes that the second-mover is bad with probability \( \mu_{[T/2]} \), while the second-mover believes that the first-mover is bad with probability \( \mu_{[T/2]-1} \) (with the convention \( \mu_{-1} = \mu_0 \)), and moreover that the first-mover takes \( a^1_t = D \) in any sequential equilibrium.\(^{54}\) It is established in the text that this holds for the first period \((T = 1)\), since each player’s belief is given by the prior, \( \mu_0 \), which satisfies \( \mu_0 < \mu_{\text{seq}} \) by assumption. Subsequently, if \( T < 2n^* \) is even, the first-mover (player 2) has observed \( T/2 = [T/2] \) periods \( t \) where \( s_t = H \) and the strategy of the normal type of player 1 prescribed \( a^1_t = D \), so the first-mover’s belief is \( \mu_{[T/2]} \). Similarly, the second-mover (player 1) has observed \( [T/2] - 1 \) such periods, so her belief is \( \mu_{[T/2]-1} \). Moreover, since by construction \( \mu_{T/2} < \mu_{\text{seq}} \) for all \( T < 2n^* \), the first-mover’s belief \( \mu_{T/2} \) is below \( \mu_{\text{seq}} \). Hence, either \( \mu_{T/2} \leq \mu_{\text{sim}} \) (in which case the first-mover takes \( D \) regardless of the second-mover’s strategy) or \( \mu_{T/2} > \mu_{\text{sim}} \) (in which case the unique equilibrium is escalatory as in Case 3 of Proposition 2, noting that \( \mu_{T/2} \) is also the second-mover’s belief following signal \( s_T = D \)). In either case, the first-mover takes \( D \). If instead \( T < 2n^* \) is odd, the first-mover (player 1) has observed \( (T - 1)/2 = [T/2] \) periods \( t \) where \( s_t = H \), while the second-mover (player 2) has observed \( [T/2] - 1 \) such periods, which by the same argument implies that the first-mover takes \( D \). This completes the inductive argument, and thus the description of the normal players’ strategies in periods \( T < 2n^* \) conditional on the event \( E_T \).

\(^{54}\)Here \( \lfloor \cdot \rfloor \) denotes the round-down function.
Now, at period $T = 2n^*$, conditional on the event $E_T$ the first-mover (player 2, since $T$ is even) has belief $\mu_{n^*} > \mu^{\text{seq}} > \mu^{\text{sim}}$. Hence, as in Case 5 of Proposition 2, player 2 takes $a_T^1 = H$. Moreover, player 2 continues to take $H$ whenever he is the first-mover, so long as the signal $s_t$ always equals $H$ when he is the second-mover, because such observations can only increase his belief that player 1 is bad. Thus, conditional on the event $E_T$, player 2’s play starting in period $T$ is the identical whether he is the normal type or the bad type. This implies that player 1’s belief remains fixed at $\mu_{n^*-1} < \mu^{\text{seq}}$, and therefore player 1 continues to take $D$ in all periods $t$ where she is the first-mover, so long as the signal $s_t$ always equals $H$ (as in Case 3 of Proposition 2). Almost surely, this behavior eventually leads to the signal taking value $D$, at which point the players’ continuation strategies are determined as above, and eventually lead to coordination on $(D, D)$ with probability 1.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 4

Consider an arbitrary sequential equilibrium, and consider the event that both players are normal. Since $\mu_0 < \mu^{\text{seq}}$, player 1 takes $a_1^1 = D$ in period 1. With probability $1 - \pi$, we have $s_1 = D$, in which case player 2 takes $a_2^1 = D$ in period 2. With probability $\pi$, we have $s_1 = H$, in which case player 2’s belief that player 1 is bad equals $\rho_1$. Since $\rho_1 > \rho_2$ and we assume that $\rho_2 > \mu^{\text{seq}} > \mu^{\text{sim}}$, we have $\rho_1 > \mu^{\text{seq}} > \mu^{\text{sim}}$, so player 2 takes $a_2^1 = H$ in period 1 following $s_1 = H$ (as in Case 5 of Proposition 2). Hence, if $s_1 = D$ then $s_2 = H$, and in this event player 1’s belief that player 2 is bad equals $\rho_2$ (as explained in the text). Since $\rho_2 > \mu^{\text{seq}} > \mu^{\text{sim}}$, player 1 then takes $a_3^1 = H$ in period 3, and subsequently, with probability 1, $s_t = H$ and $(a_t^1, a_t^2) = (H, H)$ in every period, since each player’s belief that the opponent is bad remains constant in periods where the opponent is known to take $H$ regardless of their type. In total, whenever a misperception occurs in the first period, the first-mover takes $H$ in every subsequent period. Moreover, if in addition $\rho_2 > \mu^{\text{sim}}$, in this event the second-mover also takes $H$ in every period other than first.

References


