Identification using Revealed Preferences in Linearly Separable Models*

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Abstract

Revealed preference arguments are commonly used when identifying models of both single-agent decisions and non-cooperative games. We develop general identification results for a large class of models that have a linearly separable payoff structure. Our model allows for both discrete and continuous choice sets. It incorporates widely studied models such as discrete and hedonic choice models, auctions, school choice mechanisms, oligopoly pricing and trading games. We characterize the identified set and show that point identification can be achieved either if the choice set is sufficiently rich or if a variable that shifts preferences is available. Our identification results also suggest an estimation approach. Finally, we implement this approach to estimate values in a combinatorial procurement auction for school lunches in Chile.

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1 Introduction

Revealed preference arguments are central to estimating the distribution of agents’ payoffs. These arguments yield restrictions on preferences or payoffs based on an observed action (or choice). The typical argument assumes optimal behavior to derive implications of the requirement that any alternative action that an agent could have taken must yield a lower payoff. The consequences of the chosen and alternative action – in terms of realized allocations – are then used to identify or bound the payoffs from various allocations.

Such arguments have been applied to study a seemingly disparate set of models. The most immediate application is to consumer choice (e.g., McFadden, 1973; Rosen, 1974). However, arguments that are similar in spirit have been applied for other single-agent choice settings and a class of non-cooperative games. Single-agent examples include hedonic demand models (e.g., Rosen, 1974; Bajari and Benkard, 2005) and monopoly pricing. Examples of non-cooperative games include games with incomplete information such as auctions (Guerre et al., 2000), school choice (Agarwal and Somaini, 2018), and trading or bargaining games (Larsen and Zhang, 2018); and games with full information such as oligopoly price setting where the objective is to identify marginal costs (Berry et al., 1995; Berry and Haile, 2014). A common question is whether (the distribution of) agents’ payoff types is identified from the available data.

Our starting point is the observation that several models in the literature share a common structure. An agent can take an action $a \in A$. The consequence of the action is described by an expected outcome $x \in X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J$ and an expected transfer $t \in \mathbb{R}$. Payoffs take a linear form and the agent maximizes

$$V(a; v) = v \cdot x_A(a) - t_A(a),$$

where $v \in \mathbb{R}^J$ is the agent’s preference type, and $x_A(\cdot)$ and $t_A(\cdot)$ are functions that map actions to outcomes and transfers respectively. We assume that the analyst knows (or can identify) $x_A(a)$ and $t_A(a)$ and observes each agent’s choices. An important requirement for conducting counterfactual analysis is that the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable $v$ given observables $z$, denoted with $F_{V|Z}(v; z)$, is identified. In addition to this distribution, some cases also yield identification of the payoff type for each agent in the

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1 We abstract away from the endogeneity of prices which is the focus of an important literature on identifying market demand (Berry et al., 1995; Berry and Haile, 2014). We focus on cases where endogeneity can be perfectly controlled for by other means or where consumer-level price variation that is orthogonal to preferences is available (e.g. Tebaldi et al., 2019).
This paper studies the identification of models with this linearly separable structure. Our framework and results allow for both discrete and continuous choice sets $\mathcal{X}$ or a mixture of the two, and can incorporate both single-agent decision settings as well as a large class of non-cooperative games with independent private information. As we formally demonstrate in section 3, the hedonic demand model of Rosen (1974) and Bajari and Benkard (2005) maps to the model above if $a$ is the good chosen, $x_a(a)$ denotes the characteristics of the good, $v$ denotes the vector of consumer preferences for the characteristics and $t_a(a)$ denotes the pricing function. In the class of incomplete information non-cooperative games with independent and private types, $x_a(a)$ and $t_a(a)$ are expected outcomes and transfers, integrating over the strategies of other agents. For example, in the first-price auction studied in Guerre et al. (2000), $a$ denotes the bid, $x_a(a)$ denotes the probability of winning and $t_a(a)$ denotes the expected payment.

The main results characterize the identified set of distributions $F_{V|Z}(v|z)$ and derive conditions under which it is point identified. Point identification can be achieved in two cases. The base case is if the choice set is $\mathcal{X}$ is sufficiently “rich” so that each choice is optimal only for a unique payoff type. This result implies identification in the hedonic price model as well as the first-price independent private value auctions. It also implies identification of marginal costs in oligopoly models if the demand function is known.

In the complementary case, where each choice is optimal for a set of payoff types, we show conditions under which variation in the observable $z$ can be used to “trace out” the distribution of $v$. In this case, we require that $z$ acts as a payoff shifter as in Lewbel (2000), although we can allow for a more general non-linear form by applying arguments similar to those in Allen and Rehbeck (2017). Our results imply identification in discrete choice models, bargaining models with discrete offers (Larsen and Zhang, 2018), and school choice models with or without strategic manipulation (Agarwal and Somaini, 2018).

These results therefore unify the analysis of identification in a large class of models, which have thus far been obtained using arguments customized for each model. While we do not aim to extend the analysis of identification in these models, we hope that the relatively sparse structure required for our results will be useful for new models. For instance, our model allows for a combination of discrete and continuous choices, which might be useful in some contexts – e.g., Aspelund and Russo (2023), which analyzes a scoring auction with multi-dimensional bids that include discrete and continuous components. We hope that our general results and this shared structure will yield more immediate results for other models.
where identification results do not currently exist.

Our characterization of the identified set also suggests an estimation approach that is portable across contexts. In a first step, an analyst can use the revealed preference restrictions that we derive to bound the payoff type of each agent in the dataset based on the agent’s action. These restrictions yield a convex set to which the agent’s payoff type belongs. The second step then estimates the distribution of payoffs using an estimator of choice and further restrictions (if any).

As an illustrative application, we empirically analyze the procurement for public school lunches in Chile that is based on a combinatorial auction. This auction was analyzed in Kim et al. (2014), henceforth KOW. Our study uses the same dataset. It is well-known that the extreme high dimensionality of the choice set in a combinatorial auction presents several technical challenges. We show how our reformulation of the problem suggests an alternative solution to this dimensionality problem than the one taken in KOW.

Related Literature

A large literature that is not easily summarized applies revealed preference arguments to show identification of various models. We point the reader to several surveys for identification results pertaining to these models; for example, see Berry and Haile (2016) for demand models; Athey and Haile (2007) for auction models; and Agarwal and Somaini (2020) for school choice.

Our paper shares its focus on general revealed preference arguments with Pakes (2010), which also starts with revealed preference inequalities. The models and approaches are non-nested – Pakes (2010) allows for expectational errors in agents’ beliefs but places stronger functional form restrictions on the estimand, which is the expectation of \( v \) and \( z \). We study the identification of the conditional distribution given by \( F_{V|Z} \). In this sense, our estimand is similar to that in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), although we pursue a non-parametric approach and consider conditions for obtaining point identification.

The illustrative application that we study is related to a small but growing literature on the analysis of combinatorial auctions. Papers that use bid data to estimate complementarities or substitutabilities between multiple objects that are auctioned off simultaneously include Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2007), Gentry et al. (2014) and Xiao and Yuan (2020).

Overview

Section 2 describes the notation of our model for single-agent problems and non-cooperative games, and maps the leading examples to our notation. Section 4 presents the main results
on identification and applies it to the examples. Section 5 presents the application to combinatorial auctions. Section 6 concludes. Proofs and lemmas not contained in the main text are in the Appendix.

2 Model

2.1 Notation and Agent Decisions

Consider an agent indexed by $i$ who picks an action $a$ from a set $\mathcal{A}$. Each action results in an outcome described by $x \in \mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J$ and an (expected) payment $t \in \mathbb{R}$. Let $x_A : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ and $t_A : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be the functions mapping actions to outcomes and transfers respectively. We do not restrict the cardinality of $\mathcal{X}$ or of $\mathcal{A}$. By assuming that all agents face the same choice sets, our analysis effectively conditions on the value of $(x_A, t_A)$ faced by an agent.

Agent $i$’s preference type is denoted $v_i \in \mathbb{R}^J$. Her (expected) utility from choosing $a \in \mathcal{A}$ is given by the linear form

$$v_i \cdot x_A(a) - t_A(a).$$

We assume that each agent chooses $a \in \mathcal{A}$ to maximize this indirect utility.\footnote{This formulation embeds scale and location normalizations because the expected utility is equal to $-t_A(a)$ if $x_A(a) = 0$.}

Optimality implies that an agent with preference type $v$ picks action $a$ only if for all $a' \in \mathcal{A},$

$$v \cdot x_A(a) - t_A(a) \geq v \cdot x_A(a') - t_A(a').$$

Thus, if $a$ and $a'$ are such that $x_A(a) = x_A(a')$ and $t_A(a) < t_A(a')$, then no agent picks $a'$. Define $t_X(x)$ to be cost of choosing the outcome $x \in \mathcal{X}$:

$$t_X(x) = \inf \{t_A(a), a \in \mathcal{A} : x_A(a) = x\}.$$

Observe that it is dominated to choose an action $a \in \mathcal{A}$ if $(x_A(a), t_A(a))$ is not in the graph of $t_X(x)$.

We introduce two definitions that will be useful in the analysis. First, define the convex hull $t(\cdot) = \text{conv} t_X(\cdot)$ of the function $t_X(\cdot)$ to be the greatest convex function majorized by...
the function (Rockafellar, 1970, page 36):

\[ t(x) = \inf \{ t | (x, t) \in \text{conv epi} t_X(\cdot) \}, \]

where \( \text{conv epi} t(\cdot) \) is the convex hull of the epi-graph of \( t(\cdot) \). By definition, the convex hull of a function on \( \mathcal{X} \) is a convex function with domain \( \bar{\mathcal{X}} \) given by the convex hull of \( \mathcal{X} \).

Second, define the subdifferential \( \partial t(x) \) of a convex function \( t : \bar{\mathcal{X}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) evaluated at \( x \) to be the set of all subgradients \( v \in \mathbb{R}^J \) such that for all \( x' \in \mathcal{X} \), \( t(x') \geq t(x) + v \cdot (x' - x) \). The subdifferential of a convex function is a non-empty convex set at every point in the interior of its domain. Further, if \( t \) is differentiable at \( x \), then the subdifferential is a singleton containing only the gradient of \( t \) evaluated at \( x \), \( \nabla t(x) \).

Figure 1 illustrates the function \( t_X(\cdot) \), its convex hull \( t(\cdot) \), and subgradients of \( t(\cdot) \) at certain points. The horizontal axis denotes the potentially high-dimensional outcome space \( \mathcal{X} \). The solid curve represents \( t_X(\cdot) \) and the dashed curve represents the parts where \( t(\cdot) \) differs from \( t_X(\cdot) \). Specific pairs of \( x \) and \( t \) are labeled \( A \) through \( F \), with co-ordinates \( (x_A, t_A), \ldots, (x_F, t_F) \).

Figure 1: Outcomes, Convex Hulls and Subgradients

Notes: The solid curve is the graph of \( t_X(x) \) and the dashed curve is the graph of \( t(x) \) for points where \( t(x) < t_X(x) \). The points labeled \( A \) through \( F \) represent outcomes. When an outcome is represented by a solid circle, it belongs to the graph of \( t_X(x) \) and results from an action \( a \in \mathcal{A} \). An outcome represented by a hollow circle does not belong to the graph of \( t_X(x) \), but is in the graph of \( t(x) \). Such a point does not yield from an action \( a \in \mathcal{A} \).

\(^3\)The epi-graph of a function \( f \) is the set of points \( (x, y) \) such that \( y \geq f(x) \).
Since $t_X(\cdot)$ and $t(\cdot)$ are differentiable at $x_A$, the only element of the subdifferential is the slope of the dotted line through $A$. In contrast, these functions are not differentiable at $C$. The subdifferentials of $t(\cdot)$ consists of the slopes of all lines that are everywhere below the dashed and solid lines.

Finally, note that half-open interval $[x_D, x_E)$ does not belong to $X$, but belongs to the domain of the function $t(\cdot)$. An agent can achieve this expected outcome by randomizing between the appropriate actions $a \in A$.

### 2.2 Non-Cooperative Games

Although we began with the single-agent case, our framework also allows analysis of games that satisfy the following structure on payoffs and information. Let $a_{-i}$ and $v_{-i}$ respectively denote the actions and values of agents other than $i$. Let $\bar{x}_i(a_i, a_{-i})$ be the outcome and $\bar{t}_i(a_i, a_{-i})$ be the transfer for agent $i$ as a function of the action profile $(a_i, a_{-i})$. If the outcome is random conditional on the action profile, then interpret $\bar{x}_i(a_i, a_{-i})$ and $\bar{t}_i(a_i, a_{-i})$ be the corresponding expected values.

Assume that agent $i$’s payoff playing $a_i$ when the other agents play $a_{-i}$ is given by

$$v_i \cdot \bar{x}_i(a_i, a_{-i}) - \bar{t}_i(a_i, a_{-i}).$$

Let $\mathcal{J}_i$ denote agent $i$’s information set, with $v_i \in \mathcal{J}_i$. The expected utility from playing $a_i$ is given by

$$v_i \cdot \mathbb{E}[\bar{x}_i(a_i, a_{-i})|a_i; \mathcal{J}_i] - \mathbb{E}[\bar{t}_i(a_i, a_{-i})|a_i; \mathcal{J}_i],$$

where expectations are taken with respect to the distribution of actions $a_{-i}$ of the other players given the information set $\mathcal{J}_i$. Uncertainty in this model can arise either because $i$ expects its opponents to play a mixed strategy, because the types $v_{-i}$ are private information from the perspective of agent $i$, or both.

This model fits our framework if each agent is best responding to the distribution of actions played by others. Specifically, set

$$x_A(a_i; \mathcal{J}_i) = \mathbb{E}[\bar{x}_i(a_i, a_{-i})|a_i; \mathcal{J}_i]$$

$$t_A(a_i; \mathcal{J}_i) = \mathbb{E}[\bar{t}_i(a_i, a_{-i})|a_i; \mathcal{J}_i].$$

When analyzing games, we will assume that the two functions above are known to the analyst.
A sufficient condition is that the outcome and the distribution of actions \( a_{-i} \) that agent \( i \) expects, \( a_{-i}|J_i \), is known or can be identified.

For example, consider the case in which agents' types are private information, each drawn independently from a distribution with CDF \( F_V \). In this case, if the strategy profile \( \sigma^* (v) \) constitutes a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, then

\[
x_A (a_i) = \int \tilde{x}_i (a_i, \sigma^*_i (v_{-i})) \, dF_{V_{-i}} \tag{1}
\]
\[
t_A (a_i) = \int \tilde{t}_i (a_i, \sigma^*_i (v_{-i})) \, dF_{V_{-i}} , \tag{2}
\]

where the conditioning on the information set is dropped because it is irrelevant. Since play is described by a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, agents have correct beliefs about the distribution of \( a_{-i} \). The distribution of \( a_{-i} \) that each agent expects is identified from observation of the actions of all agents in independent and identically distributed instances of the game.

### 2.3 Regularity

We will make the following assumption to ensure that the optimization problem faced by each agent and their resulting choices are well-behaved:

**Assumption 1.** (i) The function \( t_X : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) is lower semi-continuous.

(ii) The set \( \mathcal{X} \) is compact.

(iii) The random variable \( X = X^* (V) \), where \( X^* (\cdot) \) is measurable with respect to \( V \) and

\[
X^* (v) \in \arg \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} v \cdot x - t_X (x) .
\]

Parts (i) and (ii) above imply, by the extreme value theorem, that the solution to the problem \( \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} v \cdot x - t_X (x) \) for each \( v \in \mathbb{R}^J \) is attained for some element of \( \mathcal{X} \). Compactness of \( \mathcal{X} \) is either commonly satisfied or a weak restriction in the examples discussed above. For instance, in first-price auctions, \( \mathcal{X} \) is the unit interval; in the hedonic demand models, it restricts the characteristic space to be compact. Part (iii) assumes optimal behavior as well as a weak technical restriction regarding the measurability of the map from types to outcomes. Specifically, when \( \arg \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} v \cdot x - t_X (x) \) is a set, then the agent is indifferent

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4 Theorem 18.19 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) implies that a measurable selector satisfying part (iii) exists if \( \mathcal{X} \) is compact and \( t_X (\cdot) \) is continuous. This is the case because the maximand is a Caratheodory function: it is the difference between a bilinear function and a continuous function \( t_X (\cdot) \) of the argument \( x \).
between multiple outcomes \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) and part (iii) requires that the random variable \( X \) is generated from a measurable selector.

### 2.4 Observables

We follow the convention that upper-case letters denote random variables while lower case letters indicate specific values of the corresponding random variable.

Consider a dataset in which the analyst has access to a large sample of observations indexed by \( i \) from conditionally independent choices given a set of covariates \( Z \). The analyst observes \( Z \) and the chosen outcome \( X = X^* (V) \).

In addition, we assume that the analyst knows or observes the feasible outcomes \( \mathcal{X} \) and the function \( t_X (\cdot) \). Therefore, we assume that \( \mathcal{X} \) and \( t_X (\cdot) \) are either identified from the data or known from institutional details.

As discussed above, these outcomes and payoffs are generated by choosing actions \( a \in \mathcal{A} \) with corresponding outcomes and transfers. Therefore, an alternative to observing \( X_i \) and having knowledge of \( t_X (\cdot) \) is that the actions \( A_i \) are observed and the functions \( x_A (\cdot) \) and \( t_A (\cdot) \) are known. The rest of the analysis treats \( X \) and \( t_X (\cdot) \) as observable although all of our conclusions carry over to the alternative case by setting \( X = x_A (A) \).

We can also allow for \( \mathcal{X} \) and the function \( t_X (x) \) to vary as long as the sample includes many observations for a given pair \( (\mathcal{X}, t_X (\cdot)) \). We omit variation in this object for notational simplicity because our analysis will be conditional on a fixed value.

In what follows, the conditioning on specific values of \( Z \) will be dropped from the notation except when we explicitly put together choices of agents with different values of the observables.

### 2.5 Identification

We follow the standard definitions of identification and falsifiability in the literature (e.g., Athey and Haile, 2002; Matzkin, 2007). That is, a model is identified if the joint distribution of the model’s primitives is uniquely determined by the joint distribution of observables. In our case, a model \((\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})\) is defined by a collection \( \mathcal{F} \) of joint distributions of \( V \) and \( Z \), \( F_{V,Z} \), and a collection \( \mathcal{S} \) of maps \( \phi : \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathcal{H} \), where \( \mathcal{H} \) is the set of all joint distributions of \( X \) and \( Z \), \( F_{X,Z} \). We assume that the model is correctly specified. That is, the true value of \((F_{V,Z}, \phi)\) that generates the data belongs to \((\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})\).
Our analysis will focus on identifying various features of the model, such as the joint distribution $F_{V,Z}$:

**Definition 1.** A feature $\psi : (\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}) \to \Omega$ is **identified** given the model $(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$ if and only if for any two pairs $(F_{V,Z}, \phi)$ and $(\tilde{F}_{V,Z}, \tilde{\phi})$ in $(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$, $\phi(F_{V,Z}) = \tilde{\phi}(\tilde{F}_{V,Z})$ implies that $\psi(F_{V,Z}, \phi) = \psi(\tilde{F}_{V,Z}, \tilde{\phi})$.

In addition to identification, some of our results will analyze whether the implications of a model are refutable:

**Definition 2.** A model $(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$ is **falsifiable** if and only if $\bigcup_{\phi \in \mathcal{S}} F_{V,Z} \in \mathcal{F} \phi(F_{V,Z}) \subsetneq \mathbb{H}$.

Just as identification of a model in necessary but not sufficient for the existence of a consistent estimator, falsifiability is necessary but not sufficient for the existence of a valid statistical test (Berry and Haile, 2018). Both estimation and inference require additional statistical analysis. We leave such analyses for future research.

### 3 Examples

#### 3.1 Single-Agent Problems

**Example 1. Hedonic Demand Models.** Consider the hedonic demand model in which consumer $i$’s indirect utility from purchasing good $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ is given by

$$\sum_j x_{kj} \beta_{ij} - p(x_k),$$

where $p(\cdot)$ is the pricing function, $x_{kj}$ denotes the $j$–th characteristic of product $k$, and $\beta_{ij}$ denotes the random co-efficients. This model fits our framework with $v_i = (\beta_{i1}, \ldots, \beta_{iJ})$ and $t(\cdot) = p(\cdot)$.

This model is the hedonic demand model proposed in Gorman (1980) and Lancaster (1966) with the additional restriction that preferences are linear in characteristics and prices. Rosen (1974) proposed estimating such models by first estimating $p(\cdot)$ and then using data on purchases to recover the marginal willingness to pay for $x_{kj}$, $\beta_{ij}$, between $x_{kj}$. Bajari and Benkard (2005) incorporate price endogeneity into this framework by including an unobserved quality index $\xi_k \in \mathbb{R}$ into $x_k$ and show how to identify the pricing function and the unobserved quality of each good in a first step. Our analysis takes this first step as given and applies to the identification of the marginal willingness to pay.
Example 2. Multinomial Choice with Exogenous Characteristics. Consider a discrete choice model (see McFadden, 1973; Train, 2009). An outcome $x \in X = \{ x \in \{0, 1\}^J : \sum_j x_j \leq 1 \}$ denotes which option is chosen by a consumer. Let $t(x)$ denote the price of option $x$ and let $v_i$ denote the vector of utilities for the other attributes. The consumer’s utility from picking any given $x \in X$ is given by the form assumed in our model:

$$v_i \cdot x - t(x).$$

A large literature (e.g., Berry et al., 1995) focuses on solving the price endogeneity problem. This problem is particularly relevant for the consumer choice context when certain product attributes are unobserved. We do not address endogeneity of this form in our analysis, assuming that the researcher is able to find a solution in a prior step or it is reasonable that endogeneity is not a concern. Thus, our results are relevant to choices in which unobserved product attributes can be controlled for by other means or if there is consumer-level price variation within the market (e.g., Tebaldi et al., 2019).

3.2 Mechanisms and Trading Games

Example 3. Single Unit, Independent Private Value (IPV) Auctions. Our model embeds standard IPV auctions that award the object to the highest bidder. In our notation, the action $a \in \mathbb{R}$ corresponds to a bid, $v_i$ is agent $i$’s value for the object, $x_A(a) \in [0, 1]$ denotes the probability of winning with a bid $a$, and $t_A(a)$ denotes the expected payment. We can accommodate both first-price and all-pay auctions, amongst others. For example, in the first-price auction analyzed by Guerre et al. (2000), each agent chooses a bid $a$ to maximize $(v - a)H(a)$, where $H(a)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the highest bid of the remaining bidders. In a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, bidders have consistent beliefs about the bid distribution of opposing bidders and data from many independent and identical auctions identifies $H(a)$. The bid $a$ parametrizes $x_A(a) = H(a)$ and $t_A(a) = aH(a)$.

We assume that all bids are observed. The identification of these auctions under weaker assumptions and fewer data requirements has been analyzed in Athey and Haile (2002).

Example 4. Mechanisms with Private Information, Independent Types, and Quasi-linear Utilities. Our model can incorporate mechanisms more general than single-unit IPV auctions. Consider a mechanism described by the allocation rule $\tilde{x}_i(a_i, a_{-i})$ and transfer function $\tilde{t}_i(a_i, a_{-i})$, where the set of actions $A$ coincides with the set of messages an agent can send. In incentive-compatible direct mechanisms, agents will truthfully reveal their
types and the distribution of \( a_{-i} \) will coincide with the distribution of valuations. In indirect mechanisms, revealed preference arguments link valuations and messages. Moreover, the resulting allocation may involve ironing or pooling types. Pooling is particularly important if the space of messages is discrete, for example if there are minimum bid increments. An example with discrete messages includes scoring auctions in which bids may include binary services in addition to a continuous monetary amount (see Aspelund and Russo, 2023, for example). Our approach will allow for both cases.

**Oligopoly Pricing.** The identification of marginal costs in canonical models (e.g., Berry et al., 1995) is based on first identifying demand using cost shifters (see Berry and Haile, 2014), then assuming a Nash Equilibrium in simultaneous move price setting game. To map this exercise to our notation, let \( a_i \) be the price chosen by firm \( i \), \( v_i \) be the negative of the firm’s marginal cost, \( x_i (a_i, a_{-i}) \) be the quantity sold by firm \( i \), and \( t_i (a_i, a_{-i}) \) be the negative of the firm’s revenue. Therefore, \( x_A (a_i; J_i) \) and \( t_A (a_i; J_i) \) are the expected quantities and the negative of expected revenues, respectively. Profit maximization implies that the firm maximizes

\[
v_i \cdot x_A (a_i; J_i) - t_A (a_i; J_i).
\]

We can allow for information sets that may or may not include the prices set by other firms by varying \( J_i \).

Instead of a price setting game, it is also straightforward to fit a quantity setting game into our model by interpreting \( a \) as quantities and setting \( x_i (a_i; J_i) = a_i \). The function \( t_i (a_i; J_i) \) still denotes the expected negative revenue.

**Example 5. School Choice.** Agarwal and Somaini (2018) consider a school assignment mechanism in which agents can submit rank order lists indexed by \( a \). Assume that preferences are private information and each student knows the distribution from which the preferences of other students are drawn. In equilibrium, a student submitting the list \( a \) is assigned to one of \( J \) schools with probability vector \( x_A (a) \in \Delta^J \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J \), where \( x_A (a) \) is derived as in section 2.2. Let \( d_i = (d_{i1}, \ldots, d_{iJ}) \) be the vector of distances of each school from student \( i \), and let \( v_i \) denote the vector of indirect utilities from assignment into each school, net of distance. If preferences are linear in distance, then the expected utility from submitting list \( a \) is given by

\[
(v_i - d_i) \cdot x_A (a).
\]

This model fits our framework by setting \( t_A (a; J_i) = d_i \cdot x_A (a) \).

\footnote{We fix the priority type of the student and drop it from the notation for simplicity.}
Example 6. Trading Games. Larsen and Zhang (2018) consider a trading game in which an agent can take a sequence of actions \( a = (a_1, \ldots, a_M) \). Following this sequence, the agent has a probability \( x_A (a) \in [0, 1] \) of engaging in a transaction and paying an expected (possibly negative) transfer \( t_A (a) \). The value of the trade for agent \( i \) is given by \( v_i \in [v_i, \overline{v}_i] \subseteq \mathbb{R} \). Therefore, the expected utility from the action \( a \) sequence is

\[
v_i \cdot x_A (a) - t_A (a),
\]

where the actions of other agents are integrated over as in section 2.2. This trading game is a one-dimensional special case of our model.

4 Revealed Preferences

4.1 Rationalizable Actions

Our first result derives a testable implication of the model and characterizes the consequences \( x \) that are optimal for some \( v \in \mathbb{R}^J \).

Proposition 1. (i) The outcome \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) is optimal for type \( v \in \mathbb{R}^J \) if and only if \( t_X (x) = t (x) \) and \( v \in \partial t (x) \). (ii) If \( t_X (\cdot) \) is convex and lower-semicontinuous, then for every \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) there exists \( v \in \mathbb{R}^J \) such that \( x \) is an optimal choice.

**Proof.** Part (i). If: Let \( v \in \partial t (x) \) and \( t_X (x) = t (x) \). Since \( v \in \partial t (x) \), for all \( x' \) in the convex hull of \( \mathcal{X} \), \( v \cdot (x' - x) \leq t (x') - t (x) \). Observe that \( t_X (x) = t (x) \) and \( t (x') \leq t_X (x') \) for all \( x' \in \mathcal{X} \). Therefore, we have that \( v \cdot (x' - x) \leq t_X (x') - t_X (x) \) as required.

Only if: Suppose that \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) is optimal for \( v \). Towards a contradiction suppose that \( t (x) < t_X (x) \). Since \( t (\cdot) \) is the convex hull of \( t_X (\cdot) \), there exist \( x_j \in \mathcal{X} \) and weights \( \alpha_j \geq 0 \) such that \( \sum \alpha_j = 1 \), \( \sum_j \alpha_j x_j = x \) and \( \sum_j \alpha_j t_X (x_j) = t (x) \). Therefore,

\[
v \cdot x - t_X (x) < \sum_j \alpha_j (v \cdot x_j - t_X (x_j)).
\]

Hence, it must be that there exists \( x_j \) such that \( v \cdot x - t_X (x) < v \cdot x_j - t_X (x_j) \). This contradicts the assumption that \( x \) is optimal. Thus, \( t_X (x) \geq t (x) \), and by definition of \( t (\cdot) \), \( t (x) \leq t_X (x) \). Therefore, \( t_X (x) = t (x) \).

To show that \( v \in \partial t (x) \), assume towards another contradiction that \( v \notin \partial t (x) \). That is, assume there exists \( x' \) in the convex hull of \( \mathcal{X} \) such that \( v \cdot x - t (x) < v \cdot x' - t (x') \). Hence, there
exist \( x_j \in \mathcal{X} \) and weights \( \alpha_j \geq 0 \) such that \( \sum \alpha_j = 1 \) and \( \sum_j \alpha_j (v \cdot x_j - t_{\mathcal{X}}(x_j)) = v \cdot x' - t(x') \). Since \( t_{\mathcal{X}}(x) = t(x) \), it must be that there exists \( x_j \) such that \( v \cdot x - t_{\mathcal{X}}(x) < v \cdot x_j - t_{\mathcal{X}}(x_j) \). This contradicts the assumption that \( x \) is optimal.

Part (ii). Under the maintained assumptions, \( t_{\mathcal{X}}(x) = t(x) \) for all \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) and \( \partial t_{\mathcal{X}}(x) = \partial t(x) \). Moreover, \( t(x) \) is continuous, implying that \( \partial t(x) \) is non-empty. Part (i) implies the result.

Part (i) shows that linearity of payoffs in the model has testable implications. Specifically, outcomes \( x \) that result in payments larger than \( t(x) \) are dominated. Figure 1 presents an illustration. Consider the point \( A \) and an agent with type \( v_A \) given by the slope of the tangent through \( A \). Lines parallel to this tangent are the indifference curves for an agent with type \( v_A \), with utility increasing as \( t \) decreases. Therefore, the unique optimizer for this agent is \( x_A \). In contrast, points in the neighborhood of \( x_B \) are not an optimal choice. An agent would rather pick either \( x_C \) or an outcome close to \( x_A \). The outcome \( x_C \) is also optimal, but for more than one type. The slopes of the two dotted lines touching \( C \), and convex combinations of them, are the types for which \( C \) is optimal.

That said, part (ii) shows that if the cost function \( t_{\mathcal{X}}(\cdot) \) is convex and smooth, then essentially any choice can be rationalized. Convexity implies that \( t_{\mathcal{X}}(x) = t(x) \) for all \( x \in \mathcal{X} \), ruling out points like \( B \) in Figure 1. Lower semi-continuity rules out points like \( D \) and \( F \) in the graph of \( t_{\mathcal{X}}(\cdot) \), illustrated in Figure 1. The outcome \( x_D \not\in \mathcal{X} \) and therefore it does not belong to the domain of \( t_{\mathcal{X}}(\cdot) \) although it belongs to the domain of \( t(\cdot) \). The outcome \( x_F \) is not optimal for any type because an agent can achieve an arbitrarily close outcome to \( x_F \) while discretely reducing the payment. Proposition 1 implies that \( x_F \) is not optimal because \( \partial t(x) \) is not well-defined at this point. Together, convexity and lower semi-continuity imply that all solutions to the problem \( \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} v \cdot x - t_{\mathcal{X}}(x) \) also solve the problem \( \max_{x \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}} v \cdot x - t(x) \).

The assumptions of convexity and semi-continuity are commonly imposed in the literature on identification. In first-price auctions (example 3), it is often assumed that \( b + \frac{G(b)}{\partial G(b)/\partial G(b)} \), where \( b \) is a bid and \( G(b) \) is the cumulative distribution function of the highest competitor bid, is increasing (see Assumption C2 in Guerre et al., 2000, for example). This assumption is identical to assuming that \( t(x) \) is convex if it is twice differentiable. To see this, note that the first-derivative of \( t(x) = xG^{-1}(x) \) is equal to

\[
\nabla t(x) = G^{-1}(x) + \frac{x}{\partial G(G^{-1}(x))} / \partial b
\]

and substitute \( x = G(b) \). Similarly, in the hedonic demand model, if the price function,
were non-convex, then certain choices would be sub-optimal under the linear random co-efficients structure.

### 4.2 Identification with Rich Choice Environments

Our first identification result considers the case when \( t(x) \) is differentiable. It is a corollary of Proposition 1, applied for each fixed value of \( Z = z \).

**Corollary 1.** Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied and agent \( i \) chooses outcome \( x_i \). If \( t(\cdot) \) is differentiable at \( x_i \), then \( v_i \) is identified. In particular, if \( t(\cdot) \) is differentiable for all \( x \in X \), then \( F_{V,Z} \) is identified.

The result shows that choosing \( x \in X \) uniquely determines the type of all agents making that choice. For this reason, we label such a choice environment as “rich.”

Two special cases of this result are identification of the hedonic choice models and first-price auctions. To see this, recall our calculation of the derivative of \( t(x) = xG^{-1}(x) \) in first-price auctions (example 3). This derivative, calculated at \( x = G(b) \), is precisely the virtual valuation of a bidder bidding \( b \).

In the higher-dimensional case of hedonic demand models, the marginal cost of increasing \( x_j \) is \( \partial t(x) / \partial x_j \). Therefore, if consumer \( i \) chooses a product or a consumption bundle described by \( x_i \), then optimality implies that \( \nabla t(x_i) \) is equal to the vector of marginal willingness to pay for each of the components, \( v_i \).

### 4.3 Partial Identification with Coarse Choice Sets

The complementary case is when \( t(x) \) is not differentiable. This case is particularly relevant when \( X \) is not a connected subset of \( \mathbb{R}^J \), for example, when the choice set is discrete. For any fixed value of the characteristic \( z \), we observe the distribution of \( X \) that agents with that characteristic choose. Because the set \( \partial t(x) \) is not a singleton, without any further restrictions, the identified set may not be a singleton.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied and agent \( i \) chooses outcome \( x_i \in X \). The identified set of \( F_{V,Z} \) is given by

\[
F_I = \left\{ F_{V,Z} : \text{ for all } z \text{ and } x \in X, \ p_x(z) = \int 1\{v \in \partial t(x)\} dF_{V|Z=z} \right\}.
\]
The result follows because \( p_x (z) = P (v \in \partial t (x) | z) = \int 1 \{ v \in \partial t (x) \} dF_{V|Z=z} \). The first equality is a consequence of Proposition 1, and the second is definitional. Observe that the identified set is convex. This is the case because the restrictions on \( F_{V|Z} \) are linear.

A one-dimensional version of this result for trading models is given in Larsen and Zhang (2018). Specifically, consider an agent, indexed by \( i \), who picks actions that result in a probability of trade equal to \( x_i \). Assume that the agent can also pick actions that instead yield either \( x_i + \Delta_1 \) or \( x_i - \Delta_2 \) for some \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0 \). Since \( x_i \) is optimal, it must be that

\[
\frac{t (x_i) - t (x_i - \Delta_1)}{x_i - (x_i - \Delta_1)} \leq v_i \leq \frac{t (x_i) - t (x_i + \Delta_2)}{x_i - (x_i + \Delta_2)}.
\]

Convexity of \( t (\cdot) \) implies that the local deviations considered above are both necessary and sufficient for optimality.

Our result extends naturally to a higher-dimensional version of this problem. It also applies to other scenarios. As an example, consider a hedonic demand model with a discrete product set. In this context, our result identifies the set to which the vector representing consumers’ willingness to pay for specific product characteristics belongs.

Moreover, the argument suggests a two-step estimation strategy. The first step recovers the subgradients \( \partial t (x) \), which may or may not be points. Computing the subgradients may first require estimating the function \( t (x) \) in some contexts. The second step estimates the CDF \( F_{V|Z} \). A common example is auctions, a case that we further develop in our application in Section 5.

### 4.4 Identification with Preference Shifters

We now show that even with coarse choice sets, variation in an observable shifter of preference, denoted \( z \), can be used to point identify the model. We start with the case when \( z \) is a special regressor (Lewbel, 2000), that is, \( v = u + z \), with \( u \perp z \). Then, we generalize this result to the case when \( v = u + g(z) \), where \( g (\cdot) \) is a non-linear function.

The rest of this section makes the following assumption on the distribution of \( u \):

**Assumption 2.** (i) The random variable \( u \) is independent of \( z \) and admits a density \( f_U (u) \).

(ii) There exists a constant \( k > 0 \) such that \( \exp (k |u|) f_U (u) \) is Lebesgue integrable.

Aspelund and Russo (2023) is a recent example that analyzes a scoring auction using this estimation procedure in a context that does not squarely fit into prior models.
This assumption requires that the tails of \( u \) decline sufficiently rapidly. It is satisfied by most commonly used parametric forms, including multivariate normals and extreme-value distributions as well as finite mixtures of these distributions. With this assumption, we have the following result:

**Theorem 1.** Suppose that \( v = u + z \) and Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. If there exists \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) such that (i) \( \partial t (x) \) has strictly positive Lebesgue measure, (ii) \( \partial t (x) \) is contained in a translated (closed) salient cone,\(^7\) and (iii) \( z \) has full support on \( \mathbb{R}^J \), then \( f_U (\cdot) \) is identified.

We discuss the conditions of the result before presenting the proof. Part (i) is a formalization of the case that the choice set is not "rich," which is the focus of this subsection.\(^8\) It requires that the choice of \( x \) does not pin down \( v \) in a measure-zero set. If \( x \) belongs to the real line, then the condition is equivalent to stating that \( t (\cdot) \) is not differentiable at \( x \). In higher dimensions, the requirement is equivalent to stating that the subdifferential \( \partial t (x) \) does not belong to a linear subspace of \( \mathbb{R}^J \).\(^9\) Part (ii) of the hypotheses requires that the choice of \( x \) is informative about every dimension of payoffs. If this condition is not satisfied, then \( \partial t (x) \) would contain a linear subspace. Part (iii) requires that \( z \) has sufficient variation in order to trace the tails of the distribution of \( u \). This condition is similar to those used in other arguments that rely on special regressors. Finally, note that it is sufficient for requirements (i) and (ii) to be satisfied for some \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) in order to achieve identification.

**Proof.** Let \( \mathcal{F}_k \subseteq L^1 (\mathbb{R}^J) \) be the space of functions that satisfy the integrability condition in Assumption 2 for a given value of \( k \). Fix \( k > 0 \) such that \( f_U \in \mathcal{F}_k \) for the true \( f_U \). Define the operator \( A : \mathcal{F}_k \to L^\infty (\mathbb{R}^J) \) as

\[
A [f] (z) = \int 1 \{ u + z \in \partial t (x) \} f(u) du.
\]

Note that \( A [f_U] (z) = p_x (z) \) for the true value of \( f_U \). We will show that \( A [f] = 0 \) a.e. implies that \( f = 0 \) a.e. if \( f \in \mathcal{F}_k \). This statement implies that \( f_U \) is identified because if \( A [f_U] (z) = p_x (z) \) for two candidate functions \( f_U \), then linearity of the map \( A \) implies that the two functions have to be identical.

---

\(^7\)The set \( C \) is a translated salient cone if it is equal to \( C' + \{ z_0 \} \) for some \( z_0 \in \mathbb{R}^J \) and \( C' \) is a salient cone. The set \( C' \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J \) is a salient cone if \( C' = \{ v \in \mathbb{R}^J : Av \geq 0 \} \) and \( C' \cap -C \subseteq \{ 0 \} \).

\(^8\)There is a knife-edge case in which \( \partial t (x) \) is a non-singleton set with zero Lebesgue measure that our results do not cover.

\(^9\)If this were the case, then the result could be applied restricting attention to this linear subspace. Therefore, the conclusion that \( f_U (\cdot) \) is identified would hold.
Towards a contradiction, suppose \( A[f] = 0 \) and \( f \) is nonzero on a set with positive Lebesgue measure. It is without loss to assume that \( \partial t(x) \) is contained in a salient cone because if it is contained in \( C + \{ z_0 \} \) where \( C \) is a salient cone, then we can re-define the operator above by replacing the argument of \( A[f] \) with \( z' = z - z_0 \). Since \( \partial t(x) \) is contained in a salient cone, Lemma 2 implies that there exists a simplicial cone \( C \supseteq \partial t(x) \). Let \( \mathcal{N}(C) \) be the normal cone to \( C \). By the definition of \( \mathcal{F}_k \), there exists \( \lambda \in \text{int} \mathcal{N}(C) \) sufficiently small so that \( \exp (2\pi u \cdot \lambda) f(u) \) is integrable for all \( f \in \mathcal{F}_k \). Fix one such value of \( \lambda \). Rewrite

\[
A[f](z) = \int 1\{u + z \in \partial t(x)\} f(u) \, du \\
= \int 1\{u \in \partial t(x)\} f(u - z) \, du \\
= \exp (2\pi z \cdot \lambda) \int 1\{u \in \partial t(x)\} \exp (-2\pi u \cdot \lambda) \exp (2\pi (u - z) \cdot \lambda) f(u - z) \, du.
\]

Since \( \exp (2\pi z \cdot \lambda) > 0 \) a.e., \( A[f] = 0 \) a.e. \( \iff \hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(\xi) \cdot \hat{f}_\lambda(\xi) = 0 \), where \( \hat{f}_\lambda \) is the conjugate of the Fourier transform of \( f_\lambda(u) = \exp (2\pi u \cdot \lambda) f(u) \) and \( \hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda} \) is the Fourier transform of \( \chi_{\partial t(x),\lambda} = 1\{u \in \partial t(x)\} \exp (-2\pi u \cdot \lambda) \). Since \( \hat{f}_\lambda(\xi) \) is continuous, the set of values \( \xi \) where \( \hat{f}_\lambda(\xi) \neq 0 \) is open. Further, since \( \|f_\lambda\|_1 > 0 \), the support of \( \hat{f}_\lambda(\xi) \) is non-empty. Therefore, there is a non-empty open set \( \Xi \), such that \( \hat{f}_\lambda(\xi) \neq 0 \) for all \( \xi \in \Xi \). Because \( \hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(\xi) \cdot \hat{f}_\lambda(\xi) = 0 \), it must be that for all \( \xi \in \Xi \), \( \hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(\xi) = 0 \). However, this conclusion contradicts Lemma 1 below, which shows that \( \hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda} \) is not zero on any open set \( \Xi \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J \).

\[\square\]

The proof technique is based on Fourier deconvolution methods. Under Assumption 2, the distribution of \( v \) is obtained using a convolution of the distributions of \( u \) and \( z \). The choice of a specific \( x \) restricts the set of \( v \) to \( \partial t(x) \). Therefore, by observing \( p_x(z) \) for various values of \( z \), we obtain information about the distribution of \( u \) because \( p_x(z) = \int 1\{u + z \in \partial t(x)\} f(u) \, du \).

The result below states the key technical result in the argument, which is based on finding a vector \( \lambda \) such that \( \lambda \cdot v > 0 \) for all \( v \in \partial t(x) \) and then working with the Fourier transform of the function \( \chi_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(u) = 1\{u \in \partial t(x)\} \exp (-2\pi u \cdot \lambda) \):

**Lemma 1.** Suppose \( \partial t(x) \) has strictly positive Lebesgue measure and \( \partial t(x) \) is contained in a (closed) salient cone. Then, there exists \( \lambda \in \text{int} \mathcal{N}(\partial t(x)) \), with \( |\lambda| \) arbitrarily small, such that

\[
\hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(\xi) = \int 1\{u \in \partial t(x)\} \exp (-2\pi u \cdot (i\xi + \lambda)) \, du
\]

is not zero on any open set \( \Xi \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J \).
The formal proof is presented in Appendix A. The argument has three parts. First, we show that \( \hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(\xi) \), when viewed as a function with complex domain, is holomorphic in a neighborhood of \( \mathbb{R}^J \). This result is obtained by verifying the conditions necessary for differentiating under the integral sign when dealing with functions that have complex domain (Theorem 13.8.6(iii) in Dieudonné, 1976). Second, we apply Theorem 5 in Shabat (1992) which implies that if \( \hat{\chi}_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(\xi) \) is zero on an open subset of \( \mathbb{R}^J \) then it is zero everywhere. Third, we observe that this second conclusion contradicts the fact that \( \chi_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(u) \) is, up to scale, a density function.

The technical arguments are a significant generalization of Theorem A.2 in Agarwal and Somaini (2018). This previous result, which is special to a school choice model, dealt the case in which \( \partial t(x) \) is a convex cone. When \( \partial t(x) \) is a convex cone, the Fourier transform of \( \chi_{\partial t(x),\lambda}(u) \) can be computed in closed form, circumventing the need for more general arguments.

A limitation of Theorem 1 is that it requires a linearly separable regressor \( z \) that is independent of \( u \). Our next result applies relaxes this requirement by considering the model

\[
v = u + g(z),
\]

where \( g : \mathbb{R}^{d_z} \to \mathbb{R}^J \) with \( d_z \geq J \). We use an argument inspired by Allen and Rehbeck (2017) to show that the function \( g(\cdot) \) is identified under the following additional restrictions:

**Assumption 3.**

(i) \( J \geq 2 \) and the function \( g(z) \) is given by \( (g_1(z_1), \ldots, g_J(z_J)) \). Moreover, each \( g_j(\cdot) \) is differentiable at each point.

(ii) For any \( l, k \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \), the partial derivatives of each \( \mathbb{E}[X_l|z] \) with respect to \( z_k \) exist, are continuous, and are non-zero for all \( z \).

(iii) The support of \( Z \) is rectangular.

(iv) The expectation of \( U \) exists.

The main restrictions are in parts (i) and (ii). Part (i) assumes that each of the regressors \( z_j \) is component-specific and that there are at least two components. We will discuss the need for at least two components after presenting our main result. Extensions that allow for additional regressors, some of which are common, can be accommodated by following arguments in Allen and Rehbeck (2017). Part (ii) assumes that the expected value of the optimal \( x \) is smooth and the partial derivatives are non-zero. This assumption would be
violated if a component of \( g \) were not globally either a strict complement or substitute with a component of \( X \). Since this quantity in observed in the data, this assumption is falsifiable.\(^{10}\)

Parts (iii) and (iv) are technical regularity assumptions. Part (iii) allows us to move from knowing the derivatives of \( g \) to determining the function up to a location. Part (iv) is a weak condition that is implied, for example, by Assumption 2(ii).

**Proposition 3.** Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied and \( u \perp z \). Then, \( g \) is identified on its support up to the location and scale normalizations \( g(z_0) = 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial}{\partial z_j} g_j(z_0) \in \{-1,1\} \) for some \( j \), respectively.

**Proof.** Define \( v^*(g) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} x \cdot (u + g) - t(x) \right] g \). This expectation exists because

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} x \cdot (u + g) - t(x) \right] g = \mathbb{E} \left[ X^*(u + g) \cdot (u + g) - t(X^*(u + g)) \right] g
\leq \mathbb{E} \left[ |X^*(u + g)| \cdot |u + g| + |t(X^*(u + g))| \right] g,
\]

which is finite since \( X^* \) belongs to compact-valued set, \( u \) is independent of \( g \) and has finite expectation, and \( t(\cdot) \) is a continuous function. Since \( X^*(v) \) is measurable, we have that

\[
v^*(g) = \max_{X: \mathbb{R}^J \rightarrow \mathcal{X}} \int [X(u) \cdot (u + g) - t(X(u))] f_U(u) \, du.
\]

The equality follows from setting \( X(u) = X^*(u + g) \in \arg \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} x \cdot (u + g) - t(x) \) to show a weak inequality in one direction, and the definition of \( v^*(g) \) for the other. Re-writing, we get that

\[
v^*(g) = \max_{X: \mathbb{R}^J \rightarrow \mathcal{X}} \left[ g \cdot \int X(u) f_U(u) \, du + \int [X(u) \cdot u - t(X(u))] f_U(u) \, du \right].
\]

Observe that the maximand is linear in \( g \), and therefore equidifferentiable with respect to each \( g_j \). Moreover, the partial derivative of the maximand with respect to each \( g_j \) is uniformly bounded because \( \mathcal{X} \) is compact. Therefore, by the generalized envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002) (see Theorem 3),

\[
\nabla v^*(g) = \int X^*(u + g) f_U(u) \, du = \mathbb{E} \left[ X^*(u + g(z)) \right] g(z) = g.
\]

\(^{10}\)This assumption substitutes for the non-testable assumption in Allen and Rehbeck (2017) that the second-order cross partials of \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} x \cdot (u + g(z)) - t(x) \right] \) are non-zero.
Differentiating, we get that
\[ \frac{\partial \mathbb{E} [X_k | z]}{\partial z_l} = \frac{\partial \mathbb{E} [X_k^* (u + g(z)) | z]}{\partial z_l} = \frac{\partial g_l(z_l)}{\partial z_l} \frac{\partial g_l(z_l)}{\partial z_k}, \]
where the derivatives exist by Assumption 3(iii). Therefore, for any value of \( g \) and \( z \), and any pair \( k \) and \( l \), we can identify
\[ \frac{\partial g_l(z_l)}{\partial z_l} \frac{\partial g_k(z_k)}{\partial z_k}. \] (3)

The rest of the proof uses the arguments in Corollary S.5.1 in Allen and Rehbeck (2017). First, we identify \( \frac{\partial}{\partial z_j} g_j(z_0) \) up to scale. Optimality and independence of \( u \) and \( z \) implies that
\[ (\mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z)) | z] - \mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z')) | z']) \cdot (g(z) - g(z')) \geq (\mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z)) | z] \cdot u - \mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z')) \cdot u | z']) - (\mathbb{E} [t (X (u + g(z))) | z] - \mathbb{E} [t (X^* (u + g(z')))] | z')). \]
An identical expression holds in which the left hand side switches the roles of \( z \) and \( z' \). Adding these two inequalities, we get that
\[ (\mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z)) | z] - \mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z')) | z']) \cdot (g(z) - g(z')) \geq 0. \]
If \( \mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z)) | z] \neq \mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z')) | z'] \), then it must be that \( g(z) \neq g(z') \) and
\[ (\mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z)) | z] - \mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z')) | z']) \cdot (g(z) - g(z')) > 0. \] (4)

Now, consider a small change in the \( j \)-th component starting from \( z_0 \). We know that
\[ (\mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z_0)) | z_0] - \mathbb{E} [X^* (u + g(z_0 + \Delta_j)) | z_0 + \Delta_j]) \cdot (g(z_0) - g(z_0 + \Delta_j)) > 0, \]
where \( \Delta_j \) is the \( j \)-th standard basis vector multiplied by a small \( \Delta > 0 \). Because regressors are dimension-specific, we have that the sign of \( g_l(z_{0,j}) - g_l(z_{0,j} + \Delta) \) is identified for all \( \Delta > 0 \). Taking the limit of this difference divided by \( \Delta \) as \( \Delta \to 0 \) implies that the sign of \( \frac{\partial g_l(z_{0,j})}{\partial z_j} \) is identified for all \( j \). The scale normalization implies that the partial derivatives of \( g \) are known at \( z_0 \).

Identification of \( \frac{\partial g_l(z_{0,j})}{\partial z_j} \) and the ratios in equation (3) implies that for all \( l \), \( \frac{\partial g(z)}{\partial z_l} \) is identified for all \( z \) in its support. To show that this is sufficient to identify \( g(z) \) up to scale and location, assume that there are two functions \( g(z) \) and \( \tilde{g}(z) \) that have the same partial derivatives
and let $\delta(z) = g(z) - \tilde{g}(z)$. Since $\nabla \delta(z) = \nabla g(z) - \nabla \tilde{g}(z) = 0$ and the support of $z$ is rectangular, we have that $\delta$ is the constant function. The location normalization implies that $g$ is identified.

The main observation is an envelope theorem argument to show that the gradient of $v^*(g)$ is equal to the expected value of $X$, which is observed. This argument is akin to Roy’s identity from consumer theory. The second derivatives then can be identified and can be used to learn about the derivatives of $g$.

There are two differences from Allen and Rehbeck (2017) that are worth noting. First, they study a more general model choice structure than ours but focus on the identification of $g(z)$ while treating the distribution of $u$ as a nuisance parameter. We identify this distribution. Second, we shorten their proof substantially by side-stepping the “representative agent’s problem” they define.\footnote{We found this direct proof to be simpler than applying the general conditions of Theorems 1 and 2 in Allen and Rehbeck (2017). A cost of our approach is that we forego the appealing interpretation of the observed quantity $E[X|z]$ as the solution to the representative agent’s problem.}

Theorems 1 and 3 immediately imply the following result:

**Corollary 2.** Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 are satisfied. If $v = u + g(z)$ and $g(z)$ has full support on $\mathbb{R}^l$, then $f_{v|Z}(v|z)$ is identified.

## 5 Application: Combinatorial Auctions

### 5.1 Empirical Setting

In our empirical application, we analyze the combinatorial auction used to procure school lunches in Chile. The National Board for School Aid and Scholarships (JUNAEB) contracts with private catering companies to prepare meals and deliver them to schools in the 90 territorial units (TUs). The typical contract has a three-year duration and covers one or multiple TUs. Epstein et al. (2002) and Kim et al. (2014) provide additional institutional details; we continue to abbreviate the latter as KOW.

Each year, JUNAEB uses a combinatorial auction to procure meals for about a third of the TUs. A bid consists of a list of TUs, i.e., a package, and a per-meal quote. Bidders have to meet some technical and financial requirements to qualify for the auction. Depending on their qualifications, bidders may face restrictions on the packages they can bid, such as a maximum...
Table 1: Auction Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Auction environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total meals allocated (millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># TUs allocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># bidders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># bids submitted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Awarded allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payment (pesos per meal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># winning bidders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In these tables and elsewhere, the number of meals refers to the total number of meals served per year. Winning bidders are allocated three-year contracts.

number of TUs or a maximum number of meals. The number of bids a single bidder can submit is limited to 10,000. JUNAEB determines the contract allocation by solving a linear program that minimizes the total cost and ensures contracts for all TUs.

We use the same dataset as in KOW. The primary dataset contains all the bids submitted to the auctions. Two supplementary datasets contain TU-specific geographical and demographic information and bidder-specific financial and technical ratings. The information in these two datasets allows us to construct all the relevant restrictions to the cost-minimization problem.

We focus on the 2003 auction, allowing us to compare our results to KOW.

Table 1 describes the auction environment and the outcome. JUNAEB allocated 32 TUs, totaling about 81 million meals. There were twenty bidders, which together bid on over 43,000 packages. Nine of the bidders were included in the final allocation of 32 TUs. The average price bid was 423 pesos per meal. At the end of 2003, the exchange rate was 599 Chilean pesos per U.S. dollar (OECD, 2016). The average price bid in U.S. dollars was therefore 71 cents per meal.

Table 2 describes the bids in greater detail. Panel A shows that there is significant heterogeneity in the total number of meals across TUs, with the 25th percentile of TUs serving just over 2 million meals and the 75th percentile serving over 3 million meals. The number of package bids containing a TU also varies substantially, although each TU receives at least one bid from each bidder. Panel B shows that bidders face varying restrictions on the maximum number of meals they are allowed to bid and the maximum number of TUs they may be allocated. There is also significant heterogeneity in the number of packages that a bidder may bid on. However, the number of packages on which a bidder does place a bid is much
Table 2: TUs, Bidders, and Bids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>25th percentile</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>75th percentile</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: TUs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meals (millions)</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># bidders on TU</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># bids on packages</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>4,219</td>
<td>7,204</td>
<td>9,370</td>
<td>11,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>containing TU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B: Bidders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max meals allowed (millions)</td>
<td>25.92</td>
<td>35.11</td>
<td>37.77</td>
<td>38.77</td>
<td>50.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max TUs allowed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># TUs bid on</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># packages bid on</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>3,679</td>
<td>9,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># feasible packages</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>10,906</td>
<td>31,353</td>
<td>31,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel C: Bids</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price (pesos per meal)</td>
<td>299.59</td>
<td>401.92</td>
<td>421.41</td>
<td>440.35</td>
<td>690.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># TUs in package</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The unit of observation is the TU in Panel A, the firm in Panel B, and the bid (i.e., the firm-package pair) in Panel C.
lower than the number of feasible packages. Finally, panel C shows that the bid price per meal exhibits significant heterogeneity across firm-package pairs.

### 5.2 Empirical Model

#### 5.2.1 Setup

*Bidder and Packages:* Our empirical setting is a special case of Example 4, Mechanisms with Private Information and Independent Types and Quasi-linear Utilities. Each TU, indexed by \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \), must be allocated to one of the firms in the auction, indexed by \( i \in \{1, \ldots, I\} \). Let \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \) index subsets of TUs, or packages, where \( J = 2^K - 1 \) is the number of possible nonempty packages. For each firm \( i \), the outcome space \( \mathcal{X} \) is the space of vectors \( x_i = \{x_{ij}\}_j \), where \( x_{ij} \) denotes firm \( i \)'s probability of being allocated package \( j \). Denote firm \( i \)'s action with \( a_i \in \mathcal{A}_i = \mathbb{R}_+^J \), a vector of bids indicating a price for each package. A firm may choose to bid only on a subset of packages. If a firm does not bid on a particular package, we adopt the convention that the bid on that package is infinite. Package bidding allows firms to express complementarities or substitutabilities in costs of supplying multiple geographical units.

*Costs:* Let \( c_{ij} \) denote firm \( i \)'s cost of supplying package \( j \), which we collect into the vector \( c_i = \{c_{ij}\}_j \). In the notation of section 2.1, bidder \( i \)'s valuation vector is \( v_i = -c_i \). We assume independent private valuations conditional on observables \( z_i \):

**Assumption 4.** The cost vector of each bidder \( i \), denoted \( c_i \), is independent of the costs of the other bidders and is distributed according to \( F_{C|z_i} \). Each bidder’s valuation is private information. Bidder characteristics \( z_i \) and conditional cost distributions \( F_{C|z_i} \) are common knowledge.

*Types:* We want to estimate the conditional valuation distribution \( F_{C|z_i} \), but the high-dimensional nature of this problem makes estimation challenging. The spaces of outcomes, actions, and valuations all have dimension equal to the number of possible packages, \( J = 2^K - 1 \), which grows exponentially in the number of TUs, \( K \). This curse of dimensionality makes calculating \( \partial t(\cdot) \) challenging.

We reduce the dimensionality of the problem by assuming that firms’ cost vectors \( c_i \in \mathbb{R}^J \) (and therefore their valuation vectors) are a linear function of lower-dimensional types \( \gamma_i \in \mathbb{R}^L \):
**Assumption 5.** Costs satisfy $c_i = M \gamma_i$ for all firms $i$, where $M$ is a known $J \times L$ matrix with $L \ll J$.

Our objective is therefore to estimate the distribution of types $F_{i|z_i}$ given each bidder $i$'s observables $z_i$.

This approach contrasts with that in KOW, which solves the dimensionality problem by assuming that the markups that a firm bids, which are endogenous, are a low-dimensional function of package characteristics. Instead, we directly place restrictions on the distribution of firm costs as opposed to markups. These restrictions will allow us to ease the computation of types consistent with optimal bidding. As we will see below, these restrictions will reduce dimensionality when computing $\partial t (\cdot)$.

### 5.2.2 Mechanism and Equilibrium

**Mechanism:** In the notation of section 2.2, the Chilean combinatorial auction can be represented by an allocation rule $\tilde{x}_i (a_i, a_{-i})$ and a transfer function $\tilde{t}_i (a_i, a_{-i})$ for each firm $i$. Winning firms are paid the amount of their winning bids: $\tilde{t}_i (a_i, a_{-i}) = -a_i \cdot \tilde{x}_i (a_i, a_{-i})$.

The winning allocation is determined by finding the lowest total price at which all TUs can be served. This problem, known as the winner determination problem, can be written as an integer program. Stack the allocation rules for each firm into the function $\tilde{x}$:

$$\tilde{x}_i (a_1, \ldots, a_I) \in \arg\min_x \sum_i \sum_j x_{ij} a_{ij}$$

s.t. $x \in \tilde{X}$,

where $x = \{x_{ij}\}_{i,j}$ and $\tilde{X} \subseteq X^I$ is a set of allowable allocations. The constraints on $\tilde{X}$ imposed by JUNAEB are (i) each TU $k$ must be served – for each $k$, $\sum_i \sum_{j,k \in j} x_{ij} \geq 1$; (ii) no firm wins more than one package – for each $i$, $\sum_j x_{ij} \leq 1$; and (iii) a set of constraints on each firm indicating limits on their market share.\(^{12}\) These constraints, including the third set, are linear in $x_{ij}$. Generically, ties in the winner determination problem happen with probability zero.

**Equilibrium:** Before submitting her bid, a bidder observes her own type and characteristics, as well as her competitors’ characteristics. A (mixed) strategy is a function $\sigma_i (\cdot; z_i, z_{-i})$:

\(^{12}\)The full set of feasibility constraints is presented in appendix B.1.
the domain is the bidder’s type $\gamma_i$ and the range is a distribution over bid vectors. Let $F_{A_{-i}|z_i,z_{-i}}(a_{-i})$ denote the distribution of firm $i$’s opponents’ bids conditional on observables. A change of variables in equation (1) yields firm $i$’s expected outcome function

$$x_A(a_i) = \int \bar{x}_i(a_i, a_{-i}) dF_{A_{-i}|z_i,z_{-i}}(a_{-i})$$

(6)

and (pay-as-bid) expected payment function

$$t_A(a_i) = -a_i \cdot x_A(a_i).$$

(7)

**Assumption 6.** *Bidder strategies follow a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.*

The strategy profile $(\sigma^*_1, \ldots, \sigma^*_I)$ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each firm $i$ and bid vector $a_i$ with $\sigma^*_{i,a_i} > 0$,

$$a_i \in \text{argmax}_{a \in A} -c_i \cdot x_A(a_i) - t_A(a_i)$$

$$= \text{argmax}_{a \in A} (-c_i + a) \cdot x_A(a)$$

$$= \text{argmax}_{a \in A} (a - M\gamma_i) \cdot x_A(a)$$

(8)

As described in section 3.2, this setup bears close resemblance to GPV in the case of a single-unit auction.

### 5.2.3 Revealed Preference Type Bounds

The optimality condition (8) forms the basis for our estimation strategy. Given that bidder $i$ submits $a_i$, define the **type bounds** $G_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^L$, the set of types $\gamma_i$ for which $a_i \in \text{argmax}_{a \in A} (a - M\gamma_i) \cdot x_A(a)$. Then, under Assumption 5, $-c_i$ is in the subdifferential $\partial t(x)$ if and only if $\gamma_i \in G_i$. That is, $G_i$ is the lower-dimensional analogue in type space to the subdifferential.

Equivalently, $G_i$ is the set of types such that for all deviating bid vectors $a'_i$,

$$M\gamma_i \cdot [x_A(a_i) - x_A(a'_i)] \leq a_i \cdot x_A(a_i) - a'_i \cdot x_A(a'_i).$$

(9)

For each deviation $a'_i$, the revealed preference inequality (9) specifies a halfspace in the domain of types. The type bounds $G_i$ are the intersection of these halfspaces for all possible deviations, forming a convex polyhedral set.
For each firm $i$, the empirical objects we target are: (i) the distribution $F_{A−i|z_i,z−i}$ of opponents’ bids, (ii) the type bounds $G_i$, and (iii) the conditional valuation distribution $F_{Γ_i|z_i}$. The estimated bid distribution is used to evaluate the allocation function $x_A(\cdot)$ via simulation of equation (6). The type bounds are obtained from the revealed preference inequality (9). These bounds are inputs to estimation of the conditional type distribution, our ultimate object of interest. We now describe our parameterizations of the bid and type distributions; the latter parameterization is only required for a subset of our empirical results.

5.2.4 Bid Distribution

Firm bids depend on two package characteristics. A package’s volume is its annual number of meals to be supplied, in millions. Abusing notation, we also use $q_k$ to denote the volume of constituent TU $k$, so that $q_j = \sum_{k \in j} q_k$. Our density measure captures the geographic concentration of TUs within a package and takes values in the unit interval. We discretize these variables into volume and density bins $\{Q_0, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{L\text{volume}}\}$ and $\{D_0, D_1, \ldots, D_{L\text{density}}\}$, respectively.

Assume that the distribution of $F_{A−i|z_i,z−i}$ of firm $i$’s per-meal equilibrium bids (from the perspective of $i$’s competitors) is given by

$$
\frac{d_{ij}}{q_j} = \sum_{k \in j} \frac{q_k}{q_j} \tilde{β}^\text{TU}_{ik} + \sum_{l=1}^{L\text{volume}} 1\{q_j \in Q_l\} \beta^\text{volume}_{l,\text{size}_i} + \sum_{l=1}^{L\text{density}} 1\{d_j \in D_l\} \beta^\text{density}_{l,\text{size}_i} + ε_{ij},
$$

where size$_i$ is a firm-specific categorical variable taking values “small” and “large.” The first right-hand side term is a TU volume-weighted sum of base prices $\tilde{β}^\text{TU}_{ik}$ charged for each constituent TU $k$. The base prices are distributed as

$$
\tilde{β}^\text{TU}_{ik} = β^\text{TU}_k + β^\text{incumb}_{incumb,ik} + ω_{ik},
$$

where incumb$_{ik}$ is an indicator for whether firm $i$ is the incumbent supplier in TU $k$.

---

13 We define the density of package $j$ as $d_j = \sum_{r} \left( \frac{\sum_{k \in j \cap r} q_k}{q_j} \right)^2$, where the TUs have been partitioned into regions indexed by $r \in \{1, \ldots, R\}$. This density measure can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected meals from package $j$ will come from the same region. Packages with higher densities have TUs which are more geographically concentrated. Notice that by definition, single-TU packages are contained in a single region, and thus have densities of one. The opposite extreme is a geographically diffuse package with many TUs, each in its own region and with roughly the same number of meals; this package has a low density.

14 The third set of allocation constraints in the winner determination problem includes constraints on how many TUs each firm is allowed to win. No firm is allowed to win more than 8 TUs. We call a firm small if
The base prices depend on (across-firm) means \( (\beta_k^{\text{TU}})_k \) and an incumbency shifter \( \beta_{\text{incumb}} \), as well as a normally distributed shock \( \omega_i = (\omega_{i1}, \ldots, \omega_{iK}) \sim N(0, \Sigma_\omega) \). The next two terms are bid adjustments due to volume and density, where the smallest volume bin and largest density bin are omitted. The bid adjustment amounts \( \beta^{\text{volume}}_{l,\text{size}} = \{ \beta_{l,\text{size}}^{\text{volume}} \} \) and \( \beta^{\text{density}}_{l,\text{size}} = \{ \beta_{l,\text{size}}^{\text{density}} \} \) are different for small and large firms. The final term is an idiosyncratic error \( \epsilon_{ij} \); it is normally distributed with mean zero and variance \( \sigma^2_{\epsilon,|j|} \) depending on the number of TUs in the package.\(^{15}\)

5.2.5 Type Distribution

Combinatorial auctions attempt to take advantage of cost complementarities across units. By allowing package bidding, they seek to mitigate the exposure problem present in simultaneous or sequential single-unit auctions.\(^{16}\) The effectiveness of package bidding depends on the magnitude of and across-firm heterogeneity in these complementarities, as well as on the degree of pass-through from cost complementarities to bid discounts.

We allow for complementarities in costs for supplying package \( j \) to depend on the volume \( q_j \) and the density \( d_j \) of the package. The map \( M \) from types to costs is specified as follows: firm \( i \)'s per-meal cost of supplying package \( j \) is

\[
\frac{c_{ij}}{q_j} = \sum_{k \in j} \frac{q_k}{q_j} \gamma_{ik}^{\text{TU}} + \sum_{l=1}^{L_{\text{volume}}} 1 \{ q_j \in Q_l \} \gamma_{il}^{\text{volume}} + \sum_{l=1}^{L_{\text{density}}} 1 \{ d_j \in D_l \} \gamma_{il}^{\text{density}} \tag{12}
\]

This cost is the sum of (i) the TU volume-weighted average of the costs \( \gamma_{ik}^{\text{TU}} \) of supplying each TU \( k \) in the package, (ii) cost complementarities or substitutabilities due to economies or diseconomies of scale, and (iii) the same due to economies or diseconomies of density. Equation (12) above parallels equation (10), which parameterizes the distribution of firm \( i \)'s bid on package \( j \).

Firm \( i \)'s type is therefore \( \gamma_i = ( (\gamma_{il}^{\text{volume}})_l, (\gamma_{il}^{\text{density}})_l, (\gamma_{ik}^{\text{TU}})_k ) \in \mathbb{R}^L \).

For a subset of results, we will parametrize the conditional type distribution \( F_{\Gamma_i|z_i} \) as a

\(^{15}\)Our bid distribution parameterization largely parallels that of KOW. We define package density differently and allow the variance-covariance matrix \( \Sigma_\omega \) to be unrestricted.

\(^{16}\)As an extreme example, suppose a firm views TUs A and B as perfect complements: its cost of supplying the two-unit package is 400 pesos per meal, while its cost of supplying either of the single-unit packages is infinite. Without package bidding, the firm always faces the risk of being allocated only one of the TUs, a prospect that it finds infinitely undesirable. With package bidding, the firm can choose to bid on the two-unit package but not the single-unit packages, so that it will never be allocated only a single TU.
function of firm size and incumbency. Conditional on these observables, the type distribution is multivariate normal with variance-covariance matrix $\Sigma_\nu$. The mean values of the volume and density components are $\mu_{\text{size},i}^{\text{volume}}$ and $\mu_{\text{size},i}^{\text{density}}$ respectively, again potentially differing by firm size. Mean TU costs are given by $\mu^{\text{TU}} + \mu^{\text{incumb}}_{\text{incumb},i}$, the sum of a common mean vector and an incumbency shifter.

5.3 Estimation Procedure and Results

The estimation procedure mimics the identification approach. First, we construct the outcome function $x_A(a_i)$ and the expected payment function $t_A(a_i)$ by estimating the bid distribution $F_{A|i,z_i, z_{-i}}$. Next, we estimate the type bounds $G_i$ using the revealed preference inequality (9). Finally, we estimate the conditional type distribution $F_{\Gamma_i|z_i}$.

5.3.1 Bid Distribution

We estimate the bid distribution parameters $\theta_a \equiv (\theta_{a,1}, \theta_{a,2})$ in two stages. First, we estimate $\theta_{a,1} = (\beta^{\text{volume}}, \beta^{\text{density}}, (\sigma^2_{\epsilon, n})_n)$ and TU base prices $(\hat{\beta}_{ik})_{ik}$ from equation (10) using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). Second, we estimate $\theta_{a,2} = ((\beta^{\text{TU}}_k)_k, \beta^{\text{incumb}}, \Sigma_\omega)$ from equation (11) again using FGLS, taking the first-stage $(\hat{\beta}_{ik})_{ik}$ estimates as data.

Across all firms and all TUs, the mean TU base price is about 464 pesos per meal, though this masks considerable variation, particularly across TUs. Figure 2 plots the distribution of TU base prices. The mean base price for TU $k$, denoted $\beta^{\text{TU}}_k$ in equation (11), ranges from 356 to 607 pesos per meal. Within a TU, firms’ base prices are correlated. However, we estimate that the incumbent firm in a TU submits bids for that TU that are 17.62 pesos per meal lower on average than those of its non-incumbent competitors, suggesting a potential incumbency cost advantage.

We find evidence of significant downward bid adjustments due to volume and density. Bid adjustments become more negative as package volume and density increase. We estimate that the prices bid on the largest (highest-volume) packages we observe are, on average, 25.7 to 29.3 pesos lower than those on the smallest packages. Likewise, we estimate that average bids on low-density packages are 1.1 to 5.6 pesos higher than those on high-density ones. Figure 3 shows the estimated bid adjustment functions for small and large firms. Small firms offer smaller discounts for package volume than large firms do. However, the pattern is reversed for density: it is small firms that offer the greater discounts for package density.
Figure 2: Distribution of Firms’ TU Base Prices

Note: The blue boxplots show the distribution of non-incumbent firms’ base prices charged for each TU, denoted $\beta_{ik}^{TU}$ in equation (10). Boxes show the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile. Lower whiskers extend to the lowest observed data point that is within a distance of 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR) from the 25th percentile. Likewise, upper whiskers extend to the highest observed data point within 1.5 times the IQR from the 75th percentile. Blue dots indicate outliers. Each orange dot indicates the base price charged by the incumbent firm serving that TU.
Figure 3: Estimated Bid Adjustment Functions

(a) Volume

(b) Density

Note: Figures show estimated bid adjustments due to economies of volume and density, with 95 percent confidence intervals shaded. The lowest volume bin and the highest density bin are omitted base categories, so bid adjustments are in comparison to low-volume, high-density packages.

The estimated bid distribution fits the data well; we compare it to the observed bid distribution in figure B.1.

5.3.2 Outcome and Payment Functions

Given bid distribution parameter estimates $\hat{\theta}_a$, we estimate the outcome function $x_A(\cdot)$ and payment function $t_A(\cdot)$ via simulation of equations (6) and (7), respectively. For each firm $i$, we use $S_a = 1,000$ competitor bids $a_{-i}$ from the distribution $F_{A_{-i}|z_i,z_{-i}}(\cdot; \hat{\theta}_a)$.

Firms vary substantially in their probabilities of being included in the final allocation. Two firms are estimated to win with zero probability at their submitted bids, while the win probabilities of another four firms are estimated to be greater than 95 percent. As expected, firms’ expected revenues $-t_A(a_i)$ increase in their win probabilities, as seen in figure 4. Firms who submit lower average bids tend to have a greater probability of winning a package. Although not shown, win probabilities are, perhaps surprisingly, not very correlated with the number of bids submitted.

5.3.3 Type Bounds

Next, for each firm $i$, we estimate the set of types $G_i$ that satisfy the revealed preference inequality (9). There are two challenges in this exercise.
Figure 4: Bidders’ Average Prices, Win Probabilities, and Expected Revenues

(a) Win Probability vs. Average Price Bid

(b) Win Probability vs. Expected Revenue

Note: Each circle represents a bidder. The marker size is proportional to the number of bids submitted by that firm. The horizontal axis indicates the firm’s probability of winning any package—that is, the sum of the elements of $x_a(a_i)$, the expected allocation vector. In the left panel, the vertical axis indicates the firm’s average per-meal price bid. In the right panel, the vertical axis indicates the firm’s expected revenue, $t_a(a_i)$. These figures omit two firms which are estimated to have zero win probability.

First, there are a large number of potential deviations and it is computationally costly to check all of them. Simulating the expected allocation function $x_A(\cdot)$ requires repeated solutions of the winner determination problem at each of the deviating bid vectors and each of the $S_a = 1,000$ draws from the estimated bid distribution. Checking many deviations also results in a complex description of the set $G_i$.\footnote{As the number of halfspaces grows, polyhedral operations like checking set membership (i.e., checking whether a given type vector lies in $G_i$), projection onto subspaces, and elimination of dimensions become more difficult.}

The second challenge is that the expected allocation function $x_A(\cdot)$ is estimated with simulation error. Considering larger deviations – to bid vectors farther away from the observed $a_i$ – allows the differences $x_A(a_i) - x_A(a'_i)$ and $a_i \cdot x_A(a_i) - a'_i \cdot x_A(a'_i)$ in inequality (9) to be estimated more precisely, decreasing the variance but at the cost of a larger than necessary set $G_i$.

To address these challenges, we estimate $G_i$ by checking the inequality in equation (9) for a subset of deviations $a'_i \in \tilde{A}_i \subset A_i$. Observe that this results in a larger set of types that contains the true set $G_i$. We consider two types of deviating bid vectors $a'_i$. In each deviation, we change the firm’s bid on a single package $j$ and hold constant its bids on other packages, $a'_{i,-j} = a_{i,-j}$. The two types of deviations are:

1. \textbf{Downward deviations:} For each package $j$ in a subset $\tilde{J}_i$ of possible packages,
decrease the bid on package j by 50 pesos per meal.

2. **Grid deviations:** For each single-unit package j (including j that we do not observe the firm bidding on in the data), deviate to bidding 300, 350, 400, 450, and 500 pesos per meal on j. This grid of per-meal bids roughly spans the range of observed prices bid.

We impose two additional constraints on the sets $G_i$: (i) costs are below bids ($M \gamma_i \leq a_i$) and (ii) TU costs are nonnegative ($\gamma_i^{TU} \geq 0$). These inequalities don’t require simulating the allocation function $x_A(\cdot)$ so they are easier to compute.

The revealed preference inequalities and the two additional constraints yield a convex polyhedral set, which is in most cases bounded. Each downward deviation implies a lower bound on some linear combination of type dimensions: if firm $i$ did not find it optimal to decrease its bid on package $j$ by 50 pesos per meal, then its cost of supplying $j$ must be at least something. Constraint (i) generates upper bounds on linear combinations of type dimensions. The grid deviations and constraint (ii) ensure that TU costs are bounded even if there are TUs that firm $i$ does not bid on in the data. The downward deviation packages $\tilde{J}_i$ are chosen to generate independent variation in each of the type dimensions: volume economies, density economies, and TU costs. We describe the construction of this set in appendix B.3.

Figure 5 shows type bound estimates for an example firm. There are four volume economies (the lowest volume bin is omitted), two density economies (the highest density bin is omitted), and 32 TU costs. Each black whisker in figure 5 plots a projection of the polyhedral set $G_i$ onto a single dimension. This example firm is not allowed to win any packages involving volume bins 3 and 4 or density bin 2, so we are unable to bound its realizations of those dimensions. The estimated bounds suggest that this firm has economies of volume, though we cannot rule out very small diseconomies of volume. Likewise, this firm exhibits either small economies or small diseconomies of density. Its TU costs are often but not always bounded from above by both its prices bid on single-unit packages and the TU base prices it bids.

---

18In principle, we could also obtain upper bounds from the revealed preference inequalities implied by upward deviations (increasing per-meal bids on packages in $\tilde{J}_i$). However, computing these requires simulating $x_A(\cdot)$ and the resulting upper bounds are not that informative conditional on the bid upper bounds. As a result, we do not include upward deviations in $\tilde{A}_i$.

19Higher values for the type dimensions $\gamma_{il}^{volume}$ and $\gamma_{il}^{density}$ increase the per-meal package cost in equation (12). Hence, a more negative value for $\gamma_{il}^{volume}$ indicates a larger economy of volume, while a more positive value indicates a larger **diseconomy** of volume.

20This does not contradict package costs being weakly below package bids because the cost of a single-unit package may also be a function of volume and/or density economies. For example, TU 401 has enough meals
Figure 5: Example Firm Type Estimates

Note: This figure plots type estimates for an example firm $i$. For each of the TU costs $\gamma_{ik}$, the blue dot indicates firm $i$’s bid on the single-unit package containing only TU $k$. The orange dot indicates firm $i$’s base price bid on TU $k$, denoted $\tilde{\beta}_{ik}$. Each black whisker is the projection of the type bounds $G_i$ onto a single dimension. The left green violin plots show the marginals of the proposal distribution $G_i$. The right purple violin plots show the marginals of the estimated type distribution $F_{\Gamma_i | z_i} \left( \cdot | \hat{\theta}_i \right)$. Both the proposal distribution and the estimated distribution are conditional on the type bounds $G_i$. 
5.3.4 Type Distribution

Finally, we estimate the parameters $\theta_\gamma = (\mu^\text{volume}, \mu^\text{density}, (\mu_k^\text{TU})_k, \mu^\text{incumb}, \Sigma_\nu)$ of the conditional type distribution $F_{\Gamma | z_i}$. The likelihood of $\theta_\gamma$ given firm $i$’s type bounds $G_i$ is

$$L(\theta_\gamma | G_i) = \int 1\{\gamma_i \in G_i\} dF_{\Gamma | z_i}(\gamma_i; \theta_\gamma).$$

(13)

We will simulate this likelihood because it need not yield a closed form solution. In principle, it suffices to count how many draws from $F_{\Gamma | z_i}(\cdot | \theta_\gamma)$ lie in the set $G_i$, though a precise estimate of a small likelihood – if $F_{\Gamma | z_i}(\cdot | \theta_\gamma)$ puts little mass on $G_i$ – may require a large number of draws. We instead evaluate the likelihood at each candidate $\theta_\gamma$ using importance sampling (Ackerberg, 2009), using draws from a proposal distribution $G_i$ which we reweight by their likelihood ratios:

$$L(\theta_\gamma | G_i) = \int 1\{x \in G_i\} \frac{f_{\Gamma | z_i}(x; \theta_\gamma)}{g_i(x)} dG_i(x) \approx \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} 1\{x_s \in G_i\} \frac{f_{\Gamma | z_i}(x_s; \theta_\gamma)}{g_i(x_s)},$$

(14)

where $\{x_s\}_1^S$ denotes $S$ simulated draws from the proposal distribution $G_i$. In practice, drawing from the unconditional proposal distribution is computationally burdensome because the high-dimensional nature of this problem implies that obtaining a draw $x_s \in G_i$ has low probability. To solve this issue, we take advantage of the fact that the bounds $G_i$ have been previously computed and draw $x_s$ from a set that is either equal to or slightly larger than $G_i$. Finally, we estimate $\theta_\gamma$ using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with the simulated version of $L(\theta_\gamma | G_i)$.\textsuperscript{21} We describe our importance sampling and Metropolis-Hastings procedures in greater detail in appendix B.4.

The green violin plots in figure 5 show, for the same example firm $i$ as above, the marginals of the proposal distribution $G_i$.\textsuperscript{22} The purple violin plots show the marginals of the estimated
type distribution \( F_{\Gamma|i|z_i} (\cdot | \hat{\theta}_i) \). Both distributions are shown conditional on the example firm’s bids – that is, conditional on \( \mathcal{G}_i \).\(^{23}\)

For this example firm, our estimated type bounds do not rule out economies of volume of up to 118 pesos per meal, but nor do they indicate that such large volume economies (i.e., such negative values for the volume economy dimensions) are likely. Recall that the type bound estimates (black whiskers) plotted in figure 5 are one-dimensional projections of the polyhedral set \( \mathcal{G}_i \). Thus, figure 5 shows that there exists a vector of the other type dimensions at which we can rationalize volume economies of 118 pesos per meal. However, the proposal distribution draws place little mass in this region. Since we use a conditional proposal distribution that is uniform on \( \mathcal{G}_i \), this indicates that \( \mathcal{G}_i \) also has little volume in that region. The estimated type distribution places even less mass in that area; it also has little mass on values of the TU costs above the firm’s per-meal prices bid.\(^{24}\)

### 5.4 Markups and Efficiency

#### 5.4.1 CA Markups

Our first set of markup estimates uses only the estimates of the type bounds \( \mathcal{G}_i \) and does not require the additional parameterization of the type distribution. For each bid \( a_{ij} \) submitted by firm \( i \) on package \( j \), we compute the minimum and maximum markups

\[
\frac{a_{ij} - c_{ij}}{a_{ij}} = \frac{a_{ij} - M_j \gamma_i}{a_{ij}}
\]

that are consistent with the type bounds \( \mathcal{G}_i \). The distributions of these lower and upper bounds across bids are shown in blue and orange, respectively, in Figure 6. We bound the aggregate markup on awarded bids from below by 0.5 percent of the total payment to winning bidders and from above by 31.6 percent.

Second, we compute expected markups using the estimated type distribution \( F_{\Gamma|i|z_i} (\cdot | \hat{\theta}_i) \) conditional on the type bounds \( \mathcal{G}_i \). That is, for each bid \( a_{ij} \), we compute

\[
E \left[ \frac{a_{ij} - M_j \gamma_i}{a_{ij}} \bigg| \gamma_i \in \mathcal{G}_i, z_i; \hat{\theta}_i \right].
\]

Details on this procedure are provided in appendix B.5. Figure 6 plots the distribution of these expected markups across firm-package pairs in green. The expected aggregate markup on awarded bids is 5.2 percent. This point estimate is similar to that of KOW, which estimates an aggregate markup of 4.8 percent on awarded bids.

\( 23 \) We drop the firm’s three infeasible dimensions from the proposal distribution, as we describe in appendix B.4.

\( 24 \) We are able to estimate the joint distribution of firm \( i \)’s feasible and infeasible type dimensions because estimation of \( \theta_i \) pools information from across firms. However, conditioning on the bounds \( \mathcal{G}_i \) is not further informative about the firm’s values of those infeasible dimensions.
**Figure 6: Distribution of Estimated Bid Markups**

Note: Each histogram observation is a bid that a firm \( i \) submits on a package \( j \). The blue and orange histograms show the distribution of lower and upper bounds, respectively, on bid markups. The green histogram shows the distribution of mean markups. The blue, orange, and green vertical lines respectively indicate the lower bound, upper bound, and mean markups for the awarded allocation.

Finally, we report estimates of costs and markups separately for each awarded bid in table B.6.

### 5.4.2 Efficient Benchmark

Next, we compare the combinatorial auction to a first-best benchmark by simulating counterfactual outcomes under the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism.\(^{25}\) The VCG allocation

\(^{25}\)In the counterfactual analysis, following KOW, we exclude two firms who submit exceptionally low bids, resulting in high estimated win probabilities and markups. KOW states that “Despite their competitive prices, these firms did not win any units [in the observed auction] and were disqualified from the allocation process because of quality considerations.” We do include these two low-quality firms in the estimation of the bid and type distributions under the assumption that their competitors did not know they would be disqualified at the time of bidding.
\[ \tilde{x}_i (c_i, c_{-i}) = \left\{ x^*_i \right\}_j \] minimizes the total allocation cost, solving

\[
x^* \in \arg\min_x \sum_i \sum_j x_{ij} c_{ij}
\]

s.t. \( x \in \mathcal{X} \)

where \( x = \{ x_{ij} \}_{i,j} \) and \( \mathcal{X} \subseteq \prod_i \mathcal{X}_i \) is the same set of allowable allocations imposed in the combinatorial auction (CA). The CA minimizes total payments (the sum of winning bids), while the VCG mechanism minimizes total allocation cost, but both are subject to the allocation constraints imposed in Chile. Under the VCG mechanism, each winning bidder is paid the amount of the (positive) externality generated by its participation in the mechanism:

\[
\tilde{t}_i (c_i, c_{-i}) = \left( \min_x \sum_{i' \neq i} \sum_j x_{i'j} c_{i'j} \right) - \left( \sum_{i' \neq i} \sum_j x^*_{i'j} c_{i'j} \right).
\]

This is the difference between (i) the minimal allocation cost achievable in firm \( i \)'s absence and (ii) the minimal allocation allocation cost when \( i \) is included.

For computational tractability, we restrict the set of firm-package pairs that we consider.\(^{26}\) We consider feasible packages for a firm that fall into one of four categories: (i) all packages bid by at least one firm in the observed auction, (ii) all single-TU and two-TU packages, (iii) all packages that contain all TUs in a region, and (iv) all packages containing eight TUs from a single region. These restrictions imply that the cost of this approximate VCG allocation that we simulate is an upper bound on the true minimum cost. However, we expect the approximation error to be small because if complementarities amongst other packages not included in this set were substantial, then at least one firm should have bid the package in the observed auction and the package would be included in set (i).

We estimate economically large efficiency gains in moving from the observed CA to the VCG mechanism. The CA allocation cost is estimated to be about 12.2 percent higher than the (approximate) first-best VCG allocation cost. The VCG mechanism also results in higher producer surplus, defined as payments to firms less allocation costs. Although total payments to firms are lower under VCG, this is more than offset by the lower cost of supplying the packages. Table 3 reports summary statistics of simulated allocation costs, producer surpluses, and payments to firms under the observed combinatorial auction and counterfactual VCG mechanism.

To investigate the source of the efficiency gains, we then recompute allocation costs under each auction design under alternative cost economies, holding fixed the simulated VCG allocation.

\(^{26}\)Without any restrictions other than the maximum allowable number of TUs that can be allocated to a firm (eight), there are 100,716,104 possible firm-package pairs.
Table 3: Combinatorial Auction vs. VCG Mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>p5</th>
<th>p95</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel A: Combinatorial auction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>389.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>385.4</td>
<td>393.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Producer surplus</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Payment</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>341.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>327.3</td>
<td>353.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer surplus</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment</td>
<td>382.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>372.0</td>
<td>390.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel C: Difference (CA - VCG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer surplus</td>
<td>-18.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>-32.6</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents summary statistics of simulated CA and VCG outcomes under the estimated type distributions $F_{\gamma_{|z_i}}(\cdot|\hat{\theta}^{MH})$, conditioning on the cost bounds $G_i$. All values are in pesos per meal.

draws. We report the results in table 4. In each panel, the first row shows the same baseline allocation cost as in table 3.27

Perhaps the most important source of VCG efficiency gains is the ability to allocate packages with the greatest firm-specific cost complementarities. Shutting down heterogeneity in economies of volume and density barely changes the CA allocation cost but increases the VCG allocation cost by almost 9 percent. The VCG efficiency gain over the CA is reduced from 12.2 percent to 4.9 percent. These alternative allocation costs are computed by setting each firm’s volume and density cost parameters to the across-firm and across-draw averages of each parameter (see table 4, second row). Eliminating economies of volume and density altogether mechanically increases allocation costs under both mechanisms, but only further reduces the VCG efficiency gain from 4.9 percent to 4.4 percent (see table 4, third row). Thus, the VCG mechanism exploits firm-specific heterogeneity in economies better than the combinatorial auction.

27Our estimates of the efficiency gains from the VCG allocation are larger than those obtained by KOW, which finds that the combinatorial auction and the VCG auction yield very similar overall costs. A potential reason for the difference is that KOW directly parametrize markups instead of costs. This approach reduces the heterogeneity in markups relative to our model. If we project our estimated markups on the same set of characteristics used in KOW and volume, and recompute the VCG allocation assuming that only packages that a bidder placed a bid on in the combinatorial auction is considered, then the VCG allocation yields a mean cost of 372.2 pesos per meal. Thus, some of the difference between our estimates and those in KOW that arise from the decision to estimate markups versus directly targeting the distribution of costs.
Table 4: CA and VCG Allocation Costs Under Alternative Cost Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>p5</th>
<th>p95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: Combinatorial auction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>389.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>385.4</td>
<td>393.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common economies</td>
<td>390.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>384.9</td>
<td>396.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero economies</td>
<td>406.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>400.4</td>
<td>411.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B: VCG mechanism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>341.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>327.3</td>
<td>353.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common economies</td>
<td>371.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>362.2</td>
<td>381.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero economies</td>
<td>388.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>379.0</td>
<td>397.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel C: Difference (CA - VCG)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>47.6</td>
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<td>Common economies</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero economies</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this table, we fix the simulated VCG allocation draws obtained under the estimated type distributions $F_{\gamma_iZ_i} \left( . | \hat{\theta}^{MH} \right)$. In each row in Panels A and B, we compute summary statistics for the CA or VCG allocation cost under alternative cost economies. The baseline case shows the same allocation cost as in table 3. To compute allocation costs under common cost economies, we set the volume and density cost parameters to their across-firm and across-draw averages. To compute allocation costs under zero cost economies, we set the volume and density cost parameters to be zero. All costs are in pesos per meal.
In theory, through package bidding, these firm-specific cost complementarities can also show up in the CA. In practice, the pass-through of these complementarities from package costs to package bids is somewhat limited. This occurs in part because a firm’s bid on a given package \( j \) competes with not only its competitors’ bids, but also its own bid on other packages \( j' \). As in the multi-product firm’s pricing problem, the multi-package bidder internalizes the potential for “business stealing” by one of its bids from each of its other bids.

6 Conclusion

A large literature studies the identification of specific econometric models of behavior (see Matzkin, 2007 and the ensuing literature). Ensuring identification is essential in empirical analysis because it is a presumption for the validity of many statistical procedures (Newey, 1994, for example). This paper develops a unified revealed-preference approach for identification in a class of models with a linear payoff structure. The approach is valid in a number of single-agent environments as well as in non-cooperative games; and allows for both continuous and discrete actions, or a combination of the two. We characterize the identified set of models, show how to achieve point identification with excluded shifters, and use our results to suggest an estimation approach.

A number of important examples are a special case of our results. These include single-agent models where revealed preferences are used to identify preferences, for example, in multinomial choice models (McFadden, 1974, 1981); and reports made to strategy-proof mechanisms such school choice (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2017) and second-price auctions. We also cover identification in games when the empirical strategy is based on implications of mutual best-responses in both private information settings (e.g., Guerre et al., 2000) as well as full-information cases (e.g., Berry et al., 1995).

These results also apply to cases beyond previously studied settings. As a case in point, our results apply immediately to recent extensions of scoring auctions studied in Asker and Cantillon (2008), including non-linear multi-dimensional scoring auctions as in Hanazono et al. (2022) and scoring rules that combine discrete actions with continuous bids as in Aspelund and Russo (2023). These extensions are useful in a number of settings such as the decision of whether or not to provide add-on service, which is a common feature of a number of auction settings.

Our results also suggest an estimation approach, which we illustrate by revisiting the combinatorial procurement auction for Chilean school lunches studied in Epstein et al. (2002) and
KOW. Instead of directly parameterizing bidder markups, our approach targets the distribution of bidder costs and synergies during estimation. This provides an alternative approach in a combinatorial auction setting. We estimate that in the 2003 combinatorial auction, the aggregate markup on awarded bids was 5.2 percent. However, a more efficient allocation was possible. We find that the allocation cost under the status-quo combinatorial auction was 12.2 percent higher than it would have been under the first-best Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. In theory, package bidding in combinatorial auctions allow bidders to express across-unit cost complementarities. In practice, in Chile, we find that the pass-through of these complementarities from package costs to package bids is limited. The VCG mechanism’s economically large efficiency gains arise from its ability to take full advantage of across-firm heterogeneity in economies of volume and density.

There are a number of issues that are left for future work. First, a strong restriction in our framework is that payoffs are linear in the outcome space, \((x, t)\), which consists of an expected allocation and an expected transfer. Linear separability in outcomes and transfer rules out risk aversion. Relaxing this functional form is important. Second, this paper focuses its contributions on identification and largely applies prior methods during estimation. Specifically, we simplified estimation by restricting the dimension of heterogeneity in costs and by parametrizing the cost distribution. Relaxing these assumptions during estimation is also left for future work. Finally, we abstract away from issues such as endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity, which are useful dimensions in which to extend our approach.

References


OECD, “Main Economic Indicators - complete database,” 2016.


Appendix

A Lemmata

Lemma 2. Let $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J$ be a closed, salient cone. Then it is contained in a simplicial cone $T$.

Proof. Let $S^*$ denote the dual cone of $S$:

$$S^* = \{ y : x \cdot y \geq 0 \text{ for all } x \in S \}$$

This proof relies on dual cone properties from Exercise 2.31 in Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004. Since $S$ is closed and salient, the interior of $S^*$ is nonempty, hence has volume in $\mathbb{R}^J$. Then we can take $J$ linearly independent vectors $\{a_1, \ldots, a_J\} \subseteq S^*$, which generate a simplicial cone $T^* \subseteq S^*$. This in turn implies that $S^{**} \subseteq T^{**}$, where $S^{**} = S$ because $S$ is closed. To complete the proof, we need to show that $T := T^{**}$ is also simplicial. Let $A$ be the $J \times J$ invertible matrix with columns $\{a_1, \ldots, a_J\}$, so that

$$T^* = \{ y : y = Av \text{ for some } v \geq 0 \}$$

Then its dual cone is

$$T = \{ x : x \cdot y \geq 0 \text{ for all } y \in T^* \}$$

$$= \{ x : x \cdot (Av) \geq 0 \text{ for all } v \geq 0 \}$$

$$= \{ x : x^T A \geq 0 \}$$

$$= \{ x : A^T x = u \geq 0 \}$$

$$= \{ x : x = (A^T)^{-1} u \text{ for some } u \geq 0 \}$$

This shows that $T$ is generated by the $J$ linearly independent columns of $(A^T)^{-1}$, hence is simplicial.

Lemma 3. Let $C$ be a subset of $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J$ with strictly positive Lebesgue measure. Assume that $C \subseteq \bar{C} + \{x\}$, where $\bar{C}$ is a simplicial cone and $+$ denotes Minkowski summation. Then, there exists $\lambda \in \text{int } \mathcal{N}(\bar{C})$, such that

$$\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi) = \int_C \exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i\xi + \lambda)) \, dv$$
is not zero on any open set $\Xi \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J$. Moreover, $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)$ is not zero on any open set $\Xi \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J$ for any $\tilde{\lambda} = \alpha \lambda$ for $\alpha \in (0, 1)$.

Proof. We first introduce some notation. First, define the matrix $A_C = \begin{bmatrix} a_1 & \cdots & a_J \end{bmatrix}$ so that $v \in \tilde{C}$ if and only if $v = A_C u$ for some $u \geq 0$. By definition, $A_C$ is invertible because $\tilde{C}$ is simplicial. It is without loss of generality to assume that $|\det (A_C)| = 1$. Second, let $\mathcal{N}(\tilde{C})$ be the dual cone to $\tilde{C}$. Note that int $\mathcal{N}(\tilde{C})$ is non-empty because $\tilde{C}$ is simplicial. Fix a $\lambda \in \text{int} \mathcal{N}(\tilde{C})$ for the remainder of this proof.

Towards a contradiction, assume that $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)$ is zero on an open set $\Xi \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J$. We will show below that $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)$ when viewed as a function on $\Xi$ is holomorphic. Under this hypothesis, Theorem 5 in Shabat (1992) implies that $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi) = 0$ for all $\xi \in \mathbb{R}^J$. However, this contradicts the fact that $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)$ is, up to scale, the characteristic function of a random variable with density $1 \{v \in C\} \exp \left(-2\pi \langle v, \lambda \rangle\right)$. This density, and therefore $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)$, is non-zero because $C$ has strictly positive Lebesgue measure.

The second part follows immediately because if $\lambda \in \text{int} \mathcal{N}(\tilde{C})$ then so is $\tilde{\lambda} = \alpha \lambda$ for any $\alpha \in (0, 1)$.

Hence, it only remains to show that $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)$ is holomorphic in $\Xi$. To do this, we first use the differentiation under the integral sign theorem for complex variables (Theorem 13.8.6(iii) in Dieudonné, 1976) to show that $\frac{\partial \hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)}{\partial \xi_k}$ exists on $\Xi$ and is equal to

$$
\frac{\partial \hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda}(\xi)}{\partial \xi_k} = \int 1 \{v \in C\} i v_k \exp \left(-2\pi v \cdot (i \xi + \lambda)\right) dv.
$$

Fix $\xi_{-k} = (\xi_1, \ldots, \xi_{k-1}, \xi_{k+1}, \ldots, \xi_J)$ and define the function $f_C(v, \xi_k; \xi_{-k}) = 1 \{v \in C\} \exp \left(-2\pi v \cdot (i \xi + \lambda)\right)$.

To apply the result, we need to show that $f_C(v, \xi_k; \xi_{-k})$ is (i) analytic in $\xi_k$ for almost all $v$, (ii) measurable in $v$ for each $\xi$, and (iii) there exists an integrable function $g(v)$ such that for almost all $\xi$, $|f_C(v, \xi_k; \xi_{-k})| \leq g(v)$. Requirement (i) follows from the definition of $f_C(\cdot)$.

Measurability is immediate given the definition of $f_C(v, \xi_k; \xi_{-k})$.

To show (iii) we will use the fact that $|f_{\tilde{C}+\{x\}}(v, \xi_k; \xi_{-k})| \geq |f_C(v, \xi_k; \xi_{-k})|$ for all $v$ and show that $|f_{\tilde{C}+\{x\}}(v)| \leq g(v) = 1 \{v - x \in \tilde{C}\} \exp \left(-2\pi v \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right)$ for all $\xi \in \Xi$, where $g(v)$ is integrable. To this end, we first bound $|f_{\tilde{C}+\{x\}}(v)|$ as follows:
\[ |f_{C \setminus \{x\}} (v)| = |1 \{v - x \in \bar{C}\} \exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i\xi + \lambda))| \]
\[ = 1 \{v - x \in \bar{C}\} |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i (y + iz) + \lambda))| \]
\[ = 1 \{v - x \in \bar{C}\} |\exp \left(-2\pi v \cdot \left(\frac{\lambda}{2} + \left(\frac{\lambda}{2} - z\right)\right)\right)| \]
\[ \leq 1 \{v - x \in \bar{C}\} |\exp \left(-2\pi v \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right)| \equiv g(v). \]

The first equality uses the definition \(\xi = y + iz\), The second equality follows the fact that 
\[ |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i (y + iz) + \lambda))| = |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot iy)| |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot (\lambda - z))| \]
\[ = |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot (\lambda - z))|. \]

The inequality uses the fact that \(\frac{\lambda}{2} - z \in \text{int } \mathcal{N}(\bar{C})\), implying that \(v \cdot \left(\frac{\lambda}{2} - z\right) > 0\). We now show that \(g(v)\) is integrable.

\[ \int g(v) \, dv = \int 1 \{v - x \in \bar{C}\} |\exp \left(-2\pi v \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right)| \, dv \]
\[ = \int 1 \{A_C^{-1} (v - x) \geq 0\} |\exp \left(-2\pi v \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right)| \, dv \]
\[ = \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} |\exp \left(-2\pi (A_C u + x) \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right)| \, du \]
\[ = \exp \left(-2\pi x \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right) \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} \exp \left(-2\pi A_C u \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right) \, du. \]

The first equality uses the definition of \(A_C\). The second substitutes \(u = A_C^{-1} (v - x)\), and uses the fact that \(|\det (A_C)| = 1\) and \(u \geq 0\). The third rewrites the integrands as the product of two terms and pulls out the constant \(|\exp \left(-2\pi x \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right)|\) from the integral sign.

Since \(\exp \left(-2\pi x \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right)\) is finite, we need to show that \(\int_{\mathbb{R}^d} \exp \left(-2\pi A_C u \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}\right) \, du\) is finite. Ob-
serve that $\frac{1}{2} \in \text{int } \mathcal{N} \left( \bar{C} \right)$. Re-write the integral as

\[
\int_{\mathbb{R}_+^j} \exp \left( -2\pi A_C^2 u \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2} \right) du
= \int_{\mathbb{R}_+^j} \exp \left( -2\pi \|u\| A_C^2 \frac{u}{\|u\|} \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2} \right) du
= \int_{S_{+}^{j-1}} \int_0^\infty r^{j-1} \exp \left( -2\pi r A_C^2 u' \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2} \right) dr d\sigma (u')
= \int_{S_{+}^{j-1}} \frac{1}{(2\pi A_C^2 u' \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2})^j} \int_0^\infty s^{j-1} \exp (-s) ds d\sigma (u')
= \int_{S_{+}^{j-1}} \frac{1}{(2\pi A_C^2 u' \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2})^j} \Gamma (J) d\sigma (u'),
\]

where $\sigma (u')$ is the proper surface measure of the sphere $S^{j-1}$, $S_{+}^{j-1} = S^{j-1} \cap \mathbb{R}_+^j$, $u' = \frac{u}{\|u\|}$, and $\Gamma (\cdot)$ is the Gamma function. The first equality is trivial, the second from a change of variables $u' = \frac{u}{\|u\|}$ and $r = \|u\|$, the third from a change of variables $s = -2\pi r A_C^2 u' \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2}$ and the last from the definition of the Gamma function.

Because $\frac{1}{2} \in \text{int } \mathcal{N} \left( \bar{C} \right)$, we have that $(A_C u' \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2})$ is strictly positive, with a strictly positive minimum $\kappa > 0$. Hence, we have that

\[
\int_{S_{+}^{j-1}} \frac{1}{(2\pi A_C^2 u' \cdot \frac{\lambda}{2})^j} \Gamma (J) d\sigma (u') < (2\pi \kappa)^{-J} \Gamma (J) \int_{S_{+}^{j-1}} 1 d\sigma (u').
\]

Since $\sigma \left( S^{j-1} \right)$ is finite, we have that the right hand side is finite.

Finally, Osgood’s Lemma implies that $\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda} (\xi)$ is holomorphic if it is continuous in $\xi$. For any $h \in \mathbb{C}^J$,

\[
|\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda} (\xi + h) - \hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda} (\xi)| \leq \int 1 \{ v \in C \} |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i (\xi + h) + \lambda)) - \exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i \xi + \lambda))| dv.
\]

Since $\xi \in \Xi_\lambda$, there exists $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for $h \in \mathbb{C}^J$ with $\|h\| < \varepsilon$, $\xi + h \in \Xi_\lambda$. As both $\xi + h$ and $\xi$ are in $\Xi_\lambda$, the integrand is dominated by $2g(v)_\lambda$, which is integrable. And $1 \{ v \in C \} |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i (\xi + h) + \lambda)) - \exp (-2\pi v \cdot (i \xi + \lambda))| = \exp (-2\pi v \cdot \lambda) |\exp (-2\pi v \cdot ih) - 1| \to 0$, as $h \to 0$. Therefore, by the dominated convergence theorem, $|\hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda} (\xi + h) - \hat{\chi}_{C,\lambda} (\xi)| \to 0$ as $h \to 0$. \qed
B Empirical Appendix

B.1 Combinatorial Auction Mechanism

In this section, we present the full winner determination problem, as presented in KOW’s appendix G. The decision variables $x_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ indicate whether firm $i$ is allocated package $j$. The combinatorial auction minimizes total payments (the sum of winning bids) by solving the integer program

$$\min_x \sum_i \sum_j x_{ij} q_{ij}$$

s.t. $\sum_i \sum_{j: k \in j} x_{ij} \geq 1$ for all $k$

$\sum_j x_{ij} \leq 1$ for all $i$

$\sum_j x_{ij} q_{ij} \leq \bar{q}_i$ for all $i$

$\sum_j x_{ij}|j| \leq \bar{n}_i$ for all $i$

$L_r \leq \sum_i \sum_{j: j \cap r \neq \emptyset} x_{ij} \leq \bar{I}_r$ for all $r$

$\sum_i \sum_j x_{ij} \geq L$

In words, the constraints are:

1. Each TU $k$ is assigned;
2. Each firm $i$ wins at most one package;
3. Each firm $i$ wins at most $\bar{q}_i$ total meals;
4. Each firm $i$ wins at most $\bar{n}_i$ total TUs;
5. Each region $r$ is served by between $L_r$ and $\bar{I}_r$ firms; and
6. At least $L$ total firms are included in the allocation.
In KOW, the authors write that the second constraint isn’t explicitly imposed in the actual auctions, though it turns out that this constraint is not binding in most years. We follow KOW in including this second constraint. We never observe $I$, the minimum number of firms that must win in a given auction, needed to check the final constraint; we drop this final constraint in our application.

### B.2 Bid Distribution

#### B.2.1 Bid Adjustment Functions

The bid adjustment functions $h_a^{\text{volume}}(\cdot; \beta^{\text{volume}}_{\text{size}_i})$ and $h_a^{\text{density}}(\cdot; \beta^{\text{density}}_{\text{size}_i})$ are step functions in the volume $q_j$ and density $d_j$, respectively, of the package $j$. The volume adjustment function is constant in each of nine equally spaced intervals $\{[0, 3], \ldots, [24, 27]\}$ that cover the range of package volumes observed in the data. The density adjustment function is constant in each of the intervals $\{[0, 0.5), [0.5, 1), [1, 1]\}$, with the third bin capturing the mass of packages whose constituent TUs lie entirely within one region.\(^{28}\) We normalize bid adjustments in the smallest volume bin and largest density bin to zero.

#### B.2.2 Parameter Estimates

In tables B.1, B.2, and B.3, we present estimates $\hat{\theta}_a$ of the bid distribution parameters. In figure B.1, we compare the observed distribution of per-meal prices bid to our estimated distribution.

### B.3 Type Bounds

As part of estimating the type bounds $\tilde{G}_i$, we rule out downward deviations to bid vectors $a'_i$ in which firm $i$ decreases its bid on a single package $j$ by 50 pesos per meal. The set of packages $\tilde{J}_i$ for which we consider these downward deviations is chosen to generate independent variation in each of the type dimensions. Specifically, for each of the type dimensions indexed by $l$, we start by choosing a set of packages $\tilde{J}_{il}$ to be maximally informative about that dimension:

---

\(^{28}\)Package volume is measured in millions of meals per year. We define package density in footnote 13; it takes values in the unit interval.
Table B.1: Estimates of Bid Adjustment Function Parameters $\beta_{\text{volume}}$ and $\beta_{\text{density}}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small firms</th>
<th>Large firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volume 1</strong></td>
<td>-12.899</td>
<td>-16.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.929)</td>
<td>(1.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volume 2</strong></td>
<td>-17.752</td>
<td>-22.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.934)</td>
<td>(1.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volume 3</strong></td>
<td>-20.429</td>
<td>-27.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.937)</td>
<td>(1.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volume 4</strong></td>
<td>-25.683</td>
<td>-29.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.234)</td>
<td>(1.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density 1</strong></td>
<td>3.919</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density 2</strong></td>
<td>5.629</td>
<td>1.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.*

Table B.2: Estimates of Standard Deviations $\sigma_\epsilon$ of Idiosyncratic Bid Shocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package size (# TUs)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B.3: Estimates of Means $\beta^{TU}$ and Standard Deviations $\sigma_\omega$ of TU Base Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$\sigma_\omega$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TU 401</td>
<td>500.949</td>
<td>14.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 402</td>
<td>440.899</td>
<td>12.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 403</td>
<td>515.466</td>
<td>13.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 404</td>
<td>606.711</td>
<td>33.822</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 405</td>
<td>580.172</td>
<td>33.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 501</td>
<td>501.379</td>
<td>30.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 502</td>
<td>421.620</td>
<td>19.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 503</td>
<td>430.904</td>
<td>17.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 504</td>
<td>417.353</td>
<td>21.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 505</td>
<td>433.111</td>
<td>11.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 506</td>
<td>445.616</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 507</td>
<td>450.197</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 508</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 510</td>
<td>416.788</td>
<td>9.913</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 511</td>
<td>433.948</td>
<td>29.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 901</td>
<td>510.563</td>
<td>25.836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 902</td>
<td>512.277</td>
<td>24.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 903</td>
<td>585.829</td>
<td>36.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 904</td>
<td>443.816</td>
<td>18.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 905</td>
<td>486.187</td>
<td>22.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 906</td>
<td>474.471</td>
<td>19.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 907</td>
<td>499.643</td>
<td>24.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 908</td>
<td>528.013</td>
<td>24.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 909</td>
<td>581.423</td>
<td>38.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1201</td>
<td>603.123</td>
<td>48.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1331</td>
<td>415.935</td>
<td>13.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1332</td>
<td>378.521</td>
<td>11.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1333</td>
<td>356.387</td>
<td>11.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1334</td>
<td>404.167</td>
<td>11.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1335</td>
<td>392.525</td>
<td>21.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1336</td>
<td>404.571</td>
<td>12.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1339</td>
<td>444.407</td>
<td>20.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency shifter</td>
<td>-17.621</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The variance-covariance matrix $\Sigma_\omega$ is unrestricted, but for clarity only the (square roots of the) diagonal elements are reported here.
Figure B.1: Observed and Estimated Bid Distributions

Note: The blue histogram shows prices bid by all firms on all packages on which they submitted bids in the data; an observation is a firm-package pair. To construct the orange histogram, for each firm-package pair, we simulate 1000 draws from the estimated bid distribution; each observation is a firm-package-draw triple. Each histogram is normalized to represent a discrete probability distribution.
• If \( l \) is a volume or density economy, then \( \tilde{J}_l \) is the set of 10 packages with the highest estimated win probabilities for firm \( i \) under its observed bids.

• If \( l \) is a TU cost, then \( \tilde{J}_l \) contains only the single-unit package with that TU. If we do not observe firm \( i \) bidding on the single-unit package for that TU, then the sole element of \( \tilde{J}_l \) is the next-smallest package \( i \) bids on, with ties broken in descending order of \( i \)'s estimated probability of winning that package.

Then, we take the union of these dimension-specific sets \( \tilde{J}_l \) and further restrict to packages that (i) firm \( i \) bids on in the data, (ii) firm \( i \) is allowed to win under the meal and TU constraints described in appendix B.1, and (iii) whose costs have a nonzero coefficient on dimension \( l \).

Note that not all firms are allowed to win packages involving all type dimensions. For example, some firms are restricted in the size of packages they can win (where size is measured both in number of meals and number of TUs). If firm \( i \) is not allowed to win any packages falling in the highest volume bin, then revealed preference can tell us nothing about the element of \( \gamma_{i}^{\text{volume}} \) corresponding to that volume bin.

### B.4 Type Distribution

#### B.4.1 Importance Sampling

In principle, it suffices to estimate the likelihood (13) at each candidate \( \theta_{\gamma} \) by counting how many draws from \( F_{\Gamma,|\gamma_{i}|} (\cdot | \theta_{\gamma}) \) lie in the set \( G_{i} \), though a precise estimate of a small likelihood — if \( F_{\Gamma,|\gamma_{i}|} (\cdot | \theta_{\gamma}) \) puts little mass on \( G_{i} \) — may require a large number of draws. We would ideally like to sample \( \gamma_{i} \) from \( F_{\Gamma,|\gamma_{i}|} (\cdot | \theta_{\gamma}) \) conditional on \( \gamma \) being in \( G_{i} \), but doing so in closed form is possible only in one dimension. Instead, we use importance sampling, taking draws from a proposal distribution \( \hat{G}_{i} \) and reweighting them by their likelihood ratios:

\[
L (\theta_{\gamma} | G_{i}) = \int 1 \{x \in G_{i}\} \frac{f_{\Gamma,|\gamma_{i}|} (x; \theta_{\gamma})}{g_{i}(x)} dG_{i}(x) \tag{16}
\]

We furthermore use draws from \( G_{i} \) conditional on the type bounds \( \hat{G}_{i} \); denote this conditional distribution by \( \hat{G}_{i} \). Inside the set \( G_{i} \), the unconditional and conditional distributions differ by the total mass that \( G_{i} \) puts on \( \hat{G}_{i} \):

\[
d\hat{G}_{i} (x) = \frac{1 \{x \in \hat{G}_{i}\}}{\int 1 \{y \in \hat{G}_{i}\} d\hat{G}_{i}(y)} dG_{i}(x) \tag{17}
\]
In particular, when \( x \in G_i \), then \( dG_i(x) = \int 1 \{ y \in G_i \} dG_i(y) \). As a result, the likelihood in equation (16) becomes

\[
L(\theta_\gamma | G_i) = \int 1 \{ x \in G_i \} \frac{f_{\Gamma_i|z_i}(x; \theta_\gamma)}{g_i(x)} \left[ \int 1 \{ y \in G_i \} dG_i(y) \right] d\tilde{G}_i(x)
\]

\[
= \left[ \int 1 \{ y \in G_i \} dG_i(y) \right] \times \int \frac{f_{\Gamma_i|z_i}(x; \theta_\gamma)}{g_i(x)} d\tilde{G}_i(x)
\]

\[
= : \left[ \int 1 \{ y \in G_i \} dG_i(y) \right] \times \tilde{L}(\theta_\gamma | \tilde{\Gamma}_i)
\]

where the second equality uses the fact that, by definition, \( 1 \{ x \in G_i \} \equiv 1 \) for \( x \) drawn from \( \tilde{G}_i \). Call \( \tilde{L}(\theta_\gamma | G_i) \) the quasi-likelihood, which differs from the true likelihood by the same factor \( \int 1 \{ y \in G_i \} g_i(y) dy \) as in equation (17). Since this factor does not depend on \( \theta_\gamma \), it suffices to use the quasi-likelihood in Metropolis-Hastings rather than the true likelihood. The quasi-likelihood is easy to compute, as it doesn’t require integrating out the mass that the unconditional proposal distribution puts on \( G_i \). We approximate the quasi-likelihood using \( S^\text{prop}_\gamma = 1,000 \) draws \( \gamma_i^{(s)} \) from \( \tilde{G}_i \), the version of the proposal distribution that conditions on the type bounds:

\[
\tilde{L}(\theta_\gamma | \tilde{\Gamma}_i) \approx \frac{1}{S^\text{prop}_\gamma} \sum_{s=1}^{S^\text{prop}_\gamma} \frac{f_{\Gamma_i|z_i}(\gamma_i^{(s)}; \theta_\gamma)}{g_i(\gamma_i^{(s)})}
\]

Appendix B.4.2 describes how we generate draws from the conditional proposal distribution.

Finally, this discussion has so far assumed that firm \( i \) is allowed to win at least one package involving each type dimension. If there are in fact some dimensions that are infeasible for \( i \), then \( G_i \) must always be completely unbounded in those dimensions, as no bids by the firm can ever be informative about its values for those dimensions. When evaluating the (quasi-)likelihood, we therefore drop infeasible dimensions from both the type bound \( G_i \) and the proposal distribution \( G_i \), and we integrate out over infeasible dimensions in \( F_{\Gamma_i|z_i} \). (This is easy because \( G_i \) is a product distribution and \( F_{\Gamma_i|z_i} \) is multivariate normal.)

### B.4.2 Proposal Distribution

**Constructing the Unconditional Distribution** The advantage of importance sampling is that fewer draws are required to precisely estimate the likelihood; the challenge is choosing the proposal distribution well. Its support must contain \( G_i \), and it ideally concentrates most of its mass there. Its density should be easy to evaluate. The variance of the resulting likelihood
ratios should be minimized, so that the effective sample size is maximized. The difficulty of designing the right proposal distribution increases with the dimension of the random vector. Let $G_i$ be a (firm-specific) product distribution on the $L$-dimensional box containing $G_i$. We use a product of uniform and exponential distributions, depending on whether the given dimension is bounded. For each dimension $l$, define

\[ \gamma_{il} = \inf \{ \gamma_{il} \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\} : (\gamma_{il}, \gamma_{i,-l}) \in G_i \text{ for some } \gamma_{i,-l} \in \mathbb{R}^{L-1} \} \]

\[ \bar{\gamma}_{il} = \sup \{ \gamma_{il} \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\} : (\gamma_{il}, \gamma_{i,-l}) \in G_i \text{ for some } \gamma_{i,-l} \in \mathbb{R}^{L-1} \} \]

\[ X_{il} = \begin{cases} -100, & l \text{ is a volume or density economy} \\ 300, & l \text{ is a TU cost} \end{cases} \]

\[ \bar{X}_{il} = \begin{cases} 100, & l \text{ is a volume or density economy} \\ 600, & l \text{ is a TU} \end{cases} \]

Then we define $G_{il}$, the proposal distribution for dimension $l$, as follows:

- If $\gamma_{il} > X_{il}$ and $\bar{\gamma}_{il} < \bar{X}_{il}$, then $G_{il}$ is uniform on $[\gamma_{il}, \bar{\gamma}_{il}]$.
- If $\gamma_{il} > X_{il}$ but not $\bar{\gamma}_{il} < \bar{X}_{il}$, then we take $G_{il}$ to be unbounded from above. Let $G_{il}$ be the shifted and re-scaled exponential distribution with minimum $\gamma_{il}$ and 75th percentile $\bar{X}_{il}$.
- If $\bar{\gamma}_{il} < \bar{X}_{il}$ but not $\gamma_{il} > X_{il}$, then we take $G_{il}$ to be unbounded from below. Let $G_{il}$ be the shifted, re-scaled, and flipped exponential distribution with maximum $\bar{\gamma}_{il}$ and 25th percentile $X_{il}$.
- If neither $\gamma_{il} > X_{il}$ nor $\bar{\gamma}_{il} < \bar{X}_{il}$, then we take $G_{il}$ to be unbounded in both directions. Let $G_{il}$ be the shifted and re-scaled Laplace (double exponential) distribution with 25th percentile $X_{il}$ and 75th percentile $\bar{X}_{il}$.

Ideally, we would like to sample uniformly from the smallest box in $\mathbb{R}^L$ containing $G_i$, which would amount to sampling uniformly and independently from each dimension. This is certainly not possible in dimension $l$ if $G_i$ is unbounded in that dimension—that is, if the outer bounds $\gamma_{il}$ and $\bar{\gamma}_{il}$ are not both finite. In this case, we want that dimension’s proposal distribution $G_{il}$ to have full support on the half or full real line, hence we set it to the exponential or double exponential. However, even if $\gamma_{il}$ and $\bar{\gamma}_{il}$ are both finite, these outer bounds might
Still be very uninformative, and it will be undesirable to sample uniformly from such a large interval. If we don’t have $x_{il} < \gamma_{il} < \bar{\gamma}_{il} < \bar{x}_{il}$, then we still use the exponential or double exponential for $G_{il}$.

**Sampling from the Conditional Distribution** We take proposal draws from $G_i$ conditional on $G_i$ using Gibbs sampling to draw one dimension at a time. Suppose we want to sample the $s$th new value for the $l$th cost parameter. Let $\gamma^{(s)}_{i,-l} = \left(\gamma_{i1}, \ldots, \gamma_{i,l-1}, \gamma_{i,l+1}, \ldots, \gamma_{in}\right)$ be the vector of current values for the other $L - 1$ dimensions. The set of values $\gamma_{il}$ such that $(\gamma_{il}, \gamma^{(s)}_{i,-l}) \in G_i$ is an interval, so we draw the new cost parameter $\gamma^{(s)}_{il}$ from $G_{il}$ truncated to this interval.

We start by sampling 10,000 proposal draws, discarding the first half as burn-in and thinning the remainder by keeping every fifth draw. We end up with $S^\text{prop}_{\gamma} = 1,000$ proposal draws which are used to estimate the likelihood.

**B.4.3 Metropolis-Hastings**

Before running Metropolis-Hastings, we first estimate $\theta_\gamma$ via maximum (quasi-)likelihood. We start the maximum likelihood estimation at the following parameters: $\mu^{\text{volume}} = 0$, $\mu^{\text{density}} = 0$, $\mu^{\text{TU}} = (400, \ldots, 400)$, $\mu^{\text{incumb}} = 0$, and $\Sigma = 50^2 I$. Let $\hat{\theta}^{ML}_{\gamma}$ denote the MLE point estimate, and let $\hat{H}^{ML}_{\gamma}$ be the Hessian of the log-(quasi-)likelihood evaluated at $\hat{\theta}^{ML}_{\gamma}$. We use $\hat{\theta}^{ML}_{\gamma}$ as the starting point for Metropolis-Hastings.

For the jump distribution, we use a multivariate normal centered at zero, with variance-covariance matrix proportional to the inverse of the negative of the Hessian, $(-\hat{H}^{ML}_{\gamma})^{-1}$. The scaling parameter is chosen to target a rejection rate of between 0.4 and 0.6; in practice, we multiply the inverse Hessian by 0.03$^2$. The inverse Hessian contains information about how large a step to take in each dimension and how correlated the dimensions are. If the posterior marginal distribution of a parameter is very concentrated, then the corresponding diagonal element of the Hessian will be large, so the step size in that dimension will be small. When the posterior marginal distribution is very diffuse, the step size under the jump distribution will be large.

We start with 1 million Metropolis-Hastings iterations; then, we discard the first half as burn-in and thin the remainder by keeping every fiftieth draw. The result is $S_{\theta_\gamma} = 10,000$ draws of $\theta_\gamma$. We report summary statistics for the sampled draws in tables B.4 and B.5.
Table B.4: Metropolis-Hastings Draws of Volume and Density Economy Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small firms</th>
<th></th>
<th>Large firms</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>95% confidence set</th>
<th>95% confidence set</th>
<th>95% confidence set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>LB</td>
<td>UB</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>LB</td>
<td>UB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume 4</td>
<td>-9.298</td>
<td>37.740</td>
<td>-215.879</td>
<td>148.431</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>18.891</td>
<td>-108.725</td>
<td>74.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density 2</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>6.126</td>
<td>-26.866</td>
<td>41.199</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6.387</td>
<td>-25.001</td>
<td>34.046</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* To construct the 95 percent confidence set, we compute the minimum and maximum values of each parameter among the 95 percent of Metropolis-Hastings draws (after burning and thinning) with the highest values of the likelihood.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tu</th>
<th>(\mu)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Set</th>
<th>(\sigma)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>LB</td>
<td>UB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 401</td>
<td>462.882</td>
<td>6.223</td>
<td>434.242</td>
<td>492.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 402</td>
<td>409.170</td>
<td>8.409</td>
<td>364.553</td>
<td>445.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 403</td>
<td>500.153</td>
<td>4.549</td>
<td>480.217</td>
<td>519.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 404</td>
<td>619.820</td>
<td>58.410</td>
<td>438.540</td>
<td>812.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 405</td>
<td>549.370</td>
<td>14.984</td>
<td>488.505</td>
<td>623.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 501</td>
<td>470.523</td>
<td>13.027</td>
<td>421.373</td>
<td>523.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 502</td>
<td>371.022</td>
<td>14.678</td>
<td>303.596</td>
<td>416.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 503</td>
<td>404.424</td>
<td>11.086</td>
<td>357.965</td>
<td>447.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 504</td>
<td>389.384</td>
<td>8.013</td>
<td>348.499</td>
<td>423.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 505</td>
<td>400.846</td>
<td>9.514</td>
<td>367.954</td>
<td>442.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 506</td>
<td>411.759</td>
<td>7.021</td>
<td>374.353</td>
<td>435.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 507</td>
<td>414.557</td>
<td>8.962</td>
<td>374.139</td>
<td>452.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 508</td>
<td>368.979</td>
<td>6.619</td>
<td>344.987</td>
<td>395.647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 509</td>
<td>385.638</td>
<td>18.056</td>
<td>311.150</td>
<td>455.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.124</td>
<td>369.086</td>
<td>429.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 901</td>
<td>466.919</td>
<td>11.248</td>
<td>416.666</td>
<td>512.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 902</td>
<td>480.806</td>
<td>13.166</td>
<td>427.306</td>
<td>539.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 903</td>
<td>521.769</td>
<td>23.808</td>
<td>439.945</td>
<td>630.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 904</td>
<td>416.109</td>
<td>5.616</td>
<td>394.391</td>
<td>448.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 905</td>
<td>433.060</td>
<td>12.728</td>
<td>382.972</td>
<td>482.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 906</td>
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<td>8.670</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10.842</td>
<td>429.383</td>
<td>517.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 908</td>
<td>516.200</td>
<td>19.083</td>
<td>400.057</td>
<td>591.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 909</td>
<td>503.912</td>
<td>19.666</td>
<td>416.887</td>
<td>584.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 1201</td>
<td>547.574</td>
<td>17.934</td>
<td>477.209</td>
<td>648.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 1331</td>
<td>370.662</td>
<td>14.950</td>
<td>312.350</td>
<td>429.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 1332</td>
<td>348.331</td>
<td>16.872</td>
<td>259.191</td>
<td>418.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 1333</td>
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<td>16.026</td>
<td>247.694</td>
<td>434.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 1334</td>
<td>386.891</td>
<td>28.422</td>
<td>260.902</td>
<td>483.792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu 1335</td>
<td>369.221</td>
<td>11.345</td>
<td>327.185</td>
<td>409.970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B.5: Metropolis-Hastings Draws of TU Cost Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>µ</th>
<th>95% confidence set</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>95% confidence set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>LB</td>
<td>UB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1336</td>
<td>365.385</td>
<td>8.698</td>
<td>326.605</td>
<td>406.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 1339</td>
<td>399.456</td>
<td>14.771</td>
<td>339.603</td>
<td>465.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>-9.196</td>
<td>8.353</td>
<td>-43.462</td>
<td>17.798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To construct the 95 percent confidence set, we compute the minimum and maximum values of each parameter among the 95 percent of Metropolis-Hastings draws (after burning and thinning) with the highest values of the likelihood.

B.4.4 Type Distribution Estimates

Across all firms and all TUs, the mean TU cost is 434 pesos per meal, compared to the mean TU base price of 464 pesos per meal discussed in section 5.3.1. The average markup from TU cost to TU base price is 7.7 percent of the TU base price. TUs on which firms bid higher base prices are also higher-cost to supply. Figure B.2 compares the two distributions separately for each TU.

B.5 Welfare Analysis

B.5.1 Sampling from the Conditional Type Distribution

For our welfare analysis, we need draws from the estimated type distribution $F_{\gamma|z_i}(\cdot | \hat{\theta}_\gamma)$ conditional on type bounds $G_i$ for each firm $i$. Obtaining these draws requires sampling from a multivariate normal distribution truncated to a polyhedron. While it is possible to sample from truncated univariate normals in closed form using inverse transform sampling, there is no equivalent procedure in higher dimensions. Furthermore, naive rejection sampling is computationally inefficient when the polyhedron’s volume is small relative to the dimension of the space: most of the sampled draws from the unconditional distribution are discarded,
Figure B.2: Distributions of Firms’ TU Base Prices and Costs

Note: These violin plots show the distributions of firms’ TU base prices $\tilde{\beta}_{ik}$ (left, in blue) and TU costs $\gamma_{ik}^{TU}$ (right, in orange). In each TU $k$’s violin plots, an observation is a firm $i$. Firm $i$’s cost of supplying each TU $k$ is computed from the mean of the estimated type distribution $F_{T_i|z_i}(\cdot|\hat{\theta}_i)$ conditional on the type bounds $G_i$. 
so the number of unconditional draws required in order to obtain each conditional draw is high.

Instead, we sample firm types $\gamma_i$ via Gibbs sampling, drawing one dimension at a time as in appendix B.4.2. We run the Gibbs sampler for 100,000 iterations, discarding the first half as burn-in and thinning the remainder by a factor of five. We end up with $S_\gamma = 10,000$ draws of each firm’s cost parameters, which we use for the parametric results in Section 5.4.

**B.5.2 Awarded Bid Cost and Markup Estimates**

We present estimates of package costs and markups for each of the winning bids in table B.6.
Table B.6: Awarded Bid Cost and Markup Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>TUs</th>
<th>Meals (millions)</th>
<th>Price bid (pesos per meal)</th>
<th>Cost (pesos per meal)</th>
<th>Markup (% of price bid)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LB</td>
<td>UB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>[401, 402, 901, 902, 903, 906, 908, 909]</td>
<td>21.17</td>
<td>462.98</td>
<td>415.80</td>
<td>462.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>[905, 1334]</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>386.07</td>
<td>270.69</td>
<td>386.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>[504, 505, 507]</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>391.58</td>
<td>-582.71</td>
<td>391.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>[403, 404, 502, 503, 904, 907, 1201, 1331]</td>
<td>20.91</td>
<td>405.64</td>
<td>304.40</td>
<td>404.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
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<td>9.48</td>
<td>340.05</td>
<td>338.56</td>
<td>339.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>[501]</td>
<td>1.64</td>
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<td>441.15</td>
<td>459.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>[506, 508, 510, 511]</td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>381.66</td>
<td>373.63</td>
<td>381.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>[1335, 1339]</td>
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<td>381.77</td>
<td>323.21</td>
<td>381.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>[405]</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>536.59</td>
<td>444.01</td>
<td>460.39</td>
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