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DOCTORAL STUDIES Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
 PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2026
 DISSERTATION: "Essays in Macroeconomics"

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Daron Acemoglu
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Professor Martin Beraja
 Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley
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PRIOR EDUCATION Yale University 2020
 B.A. in Mathematics, Economics (with Distinction)

CITIZENSHIP United States **GENDER:** Male

FIELDS Primary Fields: Macroeconomics, Labor Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE 14.582 International Economics (Graduate) 2024
 Teaching Assistant to Professor Jose Vasquez and Professor Fadi Hassan

14.33 Research and Communication in Economics 2023
 Teaching Assistant to Professor James Poterba

14.78 Shaping the Future of Technology 2023

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|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| | Teaching Assistant to Professor Daron Acemoglu and Professor Simon Johnson | |
| | 14.03 Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy Teaching Assistant to Professor Tobias Salz | 2023 |
| | 14.33 Research and Communications in Economics Teaching Assistant to Professor Dave Donaldson | 2022 |
| RELEVANT POSITIONS | Research Fellow at Vienna University of Economics, Institute for Economics of Inequality | 2024 - present |
| | Research Assistant to Professor David Autor | 2021-2022 |
| | Research Assistant to Professor Michael Peters | 2018-2019 |
| FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS | Jerry A. Hausman Graduate Dissertation Fellow (2024-2025) George and Obie Shultz Fund (2024) National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program: Honorable Mention (2022) National College Fed Challenge: 1st Place (2018) | |
| PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES | IRS Joint Statistical Research Program and U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Tax Analysis Seminar [scheduled October 2025], NBER Behavioral Macroeconomics Research Bootcamp [2024], Princeton Initiative: Macro, Money, and Finance [2022] | |
| RESEARCH PAPERS | Monopsony with Dynamic Wage Contracts (Job Market Paper) (with Ishaana Talesara) | |

Monopsony power is often measured by interpreting firm wage and labor responses to shocks through static models. But when workers face frictions to changing jobs, employment adjusts gradually, and workers respond to changes in the total value of a job—not just the current wage. We develop a general equilibrium dynamic monopsony model where firms contract with risk-averse workers over idiosyncratic shocks. This allows us to model the shock-identified labor supply elasticity that is often estimated empirically and understand its implications for the extent of monopsony power. The shock-identified labor supply elasticity depends on the persistence of the shock, worker risk aversion, and the horizon over which it is estimated. These forces induce a wedge between the inverse shock-identified labor supply elasticity and the wage markdown. We estimate the model using U.S. Census employer-employee matched data. The small and persistent wage response to temporary shocks is consistent with firms insuring risk-averse workers. Search frictions explain why employment continues to rise even after wages have started to fall. We find the average worker's wage is marked down 8.3%. By contrast, the

static model approach of inverting the shock-identified labor supply elasticity implies a markdown estimate as wide as 26%. Lastly, we show that firm employment dynamics are not efficient: insurance distorts the job ladder, preventing productivity-improving job transitions from occurring.

Worker Beliefs about Layoff Risk

(with Lukas Lehner and Ishaana Talesara)

Job loss is one of the most costly economic risks workers face, but a firm's layoff risk is difficult to observe. We document substantial, persistent variation in firm layoff rates, creating scope for workers to change their job loss risk through firm choice. We exploit linked survey, experimental, and administrative data from Austria to examine how unemployed workers perceive and respond to information about firm-level layoff risk. Workers believe that past layoffs are predictive of future risk and prefer jobs at firms with lower historical layoff rates but have significant misperceptions about which firms are safer. Providing workers with information about firm layoff histories causes them to redirect their search toward historically safer employers. Using a search and matching model, we show that imperfect information distorts equilibrium outcomes: it reverses the compensating differential for layoff risk and raises the average layoff rate by allocating more workers to high-risk firms.

The Tipped Minimum Wage (with Ishaana Talesara)

[results under IRS review for distribution: scheduled October 2025] Labor market policy can regulate total pay (like the minimum wage) or specifically target a form of pay (like the tipped minimum wage). The tipped minimum wage has been the subject of considerable policy debate despite limited evidence on how it will affect workers and firms. In this project, we compare the tipped minimum wage to the minimum wage. Using IRS W-2 and firm tax data, we present new facts about the prevalence of tips in the US. We use state-level temporal variation in the tipped and standard minimum wages to study the effect of the policy on base wages, tips, the composition of earnings, and overall earnings. We also estimate effects on employment and revenue. Our findings contribute directly to the ongoing policy debate surrounding the tipped minimum wage and offer broader insights into the determinants of firms' compensation strategies. We present a monopsony model where firms choose wages and tips to rationalize the results.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

The Labor Market Consequences of Moving Home

(with Nathan Lazarus and Ishaana Talesara)

(approved U.S. Census Project)