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MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER

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MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR

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**DOCTORAL
STUDIES**

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
PhD, Economics, expected completion June 2027
DISSERTATION: "Essays on the Economics of Education"

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Parag Pathak
MIT Department of Economics
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Professor Esther Dufo
MIT Department of Economics,
University of Zurich
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Professor Nikhil Agarwal
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**PRIOR
EDUCATION**

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
S.B. in Mathematical Economics

2021

CITIZENSHIP

USA

GENDER Non-binary

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Education, Labor
Secondary Fields: IO, Development

**TEACHING
EXPERIENCE**

Kaufman Teaching Certificate, MIT Teaching + Learning Lab
14.19 Market Design (undergraduate)

2025

2023

Teaching Assistant to Professor Parag Pathak (rating 6.6/7)

14.02 Principles of Macroeconomics (undergraduate)

2021

Teaching Assistant to Professor Ricardo Caballero (rating 6.5/7)

	14.27 Economics and E-Commerce (undergraduate)	2019
	Teaching Assistant to Professor Sara Fisher Ellison (rating 5.8/7)	
RELEVANT POSITIONS	Research Associate, Blueprint Labs, MIT	2022–present
	Research Assistant, MIT	2022
	Professor Parag Pathak	
	Research Assistant, MIT and Harvard	2020
	Professors Benjamin Olken and Gabriel Kreindler	
	Research Assistant, MIT	2018–2021
	Professors Ernst Berndt and Rena Conti	
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS	Jerry A. Hausman Dissertation Fellowship, MIT Economics	2025–2026
	NBER Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Global Math Talent	2025–2026
	NSF Graduate Research Fellowship	2021–2026
	Phi Beta Kappa, MIT	2021
	Burchard Scholar, MIT	2020
	Research Grants	
	George and Obie Shultz Fund	\$64,500 2023–2026
	Carina Initiatives	\$4,300,000 2025, 2026
	Founders Pledge	£310,000 2024
	Agency Fund	\$600,000 2023, 2024
	J-PAL Science for Progress Initiative	\$72,000 2023
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES	Referee	
	Econometrica, Review of Economics and Statistics	
	Service	
	Graduate Representative, MIT Committee on Undergraduate Admissions and Financial Aid	2025–present
	Graduate Resident Advisor, MIT Division of Student Life	2022–present
	Graduate Representative, MIT GRA Training Committee	2023
	Labor Coffee Organizer, MIT Department of Economics	2022–2023
	Educational Counselor (Admissions Interviewer), MIT Alumni Association	2021–2024
	Undergraduate Representative, MIT Committee on the Undergraduate Program	2020–2021
RESEARCH PAPERS	“The Winner’s Curse in Test-Blind Admissions” (Job Market Paper) (with Nagisa Tadjfar and Kartik Vira) High-stakes final exams play two roles in university admissions: they give students an incentive to exert effort, and they give universities information with which to screen applicants, shaping the equilibrium match. We study these forces using the staggered rollout of unconditional offers in the UK, which let some students matriculate without requirements on their age-18 exams (A-levels). Students who accept an unconditional offer score 0.14 SD below those who decline one, conditional on observables. However, using a two-way fixed	

effects specification, we find that exposure to unconditional offers has precisely zero impact on students' age-18 exam performance, indicating that the observed gap is driven by private information. Exposure to unconditional offers increases university matriculation by 1.1 percentage points, mostly at middle-tercile universities. A structural model that incorporates the value students place on certainty of admission shows that, in equilibrium, recipients' gains come at the expense of non-recipients. Relative to a ban, unconditional offers lower total student welfare by 0.7%, hurting the three highest-achieving quartiles of students. Post-qualification admissions, under which students apply after receiving their scores, raise welfare by 12.5% through better sorting. Our results highlight how the distributional effects of admissions policies depend on student information, informing current policy debates in the UK.

“Identifying and Nurturing Math Talent: Evidence from Tamil Nadu”

(with Esther Duflo, Glenn Ellison, Sara Fisher Ellison, and Harini Kannan)

This paper presents evidence from a randomized controlled trial designed to test how to best identify and support gifted students from disadvantaged backgrounds. To do so, we offered access to an advanced online prealgebra course and an internet-enabled tablet to 7th-grade public-school students from Tamil Nadu, whom we identified as having high potential using several alternative strategies. Our primary finding is that we were able to successfully identify students who succeeded in challenging coursework originally designed as enrichment material for students with much stronger math preparation. We randomly assigned identification methods, which allowed us to investigate their relative effectiveness. We find that the combination of existing administrative scores and engagement with an extract of the textbook distributed as a physical booklet best predicts engagement and success with the course material. We additionally cross-randomized treatments to evaluate program design (including group and individual tutoring, incentives for students, access to computer labs), and find that the simplest-to-scale version without tutoring led to the highest engagement.

Presented by coauthor at NBER Economics of Talent Meeting (Fall 2025) and NBER Economics of Education Meeting (Spring 2026).

“A Practitioner’s Guide to Estimating School Effects in Centralized Assignment Systems”

Centralized school assignment with lottery tie-breaking generates quasi-experiments that identify school effects, but existing methods require applicants' rank-order lists and lottery numbers, data that is not always available. I characterize which data from a match identify a propensity score under which offers are ignorable. When each school draws its own lottery, offers among applicants who reach a school are randomly assigned, so comparing applicants offered and rejected there requires only waitlists. Under a single lottery, this comparison is biased, and the order of each applicant's rejections is also needed. Rank-order lists identify the score without lottery numbers, while the assignment and published aggregates do not in general. I show how to compute each score in finite markets, how waitlist order reveals which schools share a lottery, and how

to handle priorities and screened schools. In simulations, all valid designs recover the true effect, and richer data yields more precise estimates.

**RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS**

“From Cubs to Bears: The Evolution of Charter Effectiveness in Chicago”

This paper estimates how the effectiveness of Chicago charter schools has changed between 2009 and 2025. Using random variation from admissions lotteries, I validate earlier research showing high returns to attending Chicago charter schools. I also show effectiveness decreased during the 2010s, but has rebounded in recent years. I explore determinants of these changes, including teacher qualifications, teacher turnover, leadership changes, curricular changes, and policy changes.

“School-House Shocks: The Effect of Neighborhood-based School Assignment Policies on Intracity Migration”

Affirmative action policies based on geographic characteristics are potentially manipulable by families who move in response to the policy, undermining policy goals and hurting families who the policy is intended to help. I test whether these channels have significant impacts in Chicago, where admissions to selective high schools depend on the demographics of a student’s neighborhood. Using data from Chicago Public Schools and the Cook County Assessor’s office, I find no effects of marginal tier assignment on short-term migration of families or long-term housing prices.

PRIOR WORK

“A Rising Tide for All or Wave for One? The Effect of Charter School Competition on District Achievement,” *MIT Undergraduate Journal of Economics*, Vol. 20, 2021.

“Evaluating Strategic Play: Manipulations with Symmetric Information in the Boston Mechanism,” Undergraduate thesis, MIT, 2021.

“The Surprising Hybrid Pedigree of Measures of Diversity and Economic Concentration” (with Ernst Berndt and Rena Conti), *NBER Working Paper* No. 26512, 2019.