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DOCTORAL STUDIES Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
 PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2027
 DISSERTATION: "Essays on Economics of Information"

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Drew Fudenberg
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PRIOR EDUCATION The University of Hong Kong 2017-21
 Bachelor of Science in Quantitative Finance

CITIZENSHIP China **GENDER:** Male

LANGUAGES English (fluent), Chinese (native)

FIELDS Primary Fields: Theory
 Secondary Fields: Organizational Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE 14.282 Introduction to Organizational Economics; 14.283/4 2023-26
 Advanced Topics in Organizational Economics I/II (PhD)
 Teaching Assistant to Professors Robert Gibbons, Charles Angelucci and Namrata Kala
 Course evaluations: 7.0/7 in all four course offerings

	14.122 Microeconomic Theory II (PhD core)	2023
	Teaching Assistant to Professor Drew Fudenberg	
	Course evaluation: 6.1/7	
	14.147 Topics in Game Theory (PhD)	2023
	Teaching Assistant to Professor Drew Fudenberg	
	Course evaluation: 7.0/7	
	14.26 Organizational Economics (Undergraduate)	2024
	Teaching Assistant to Professor Robert Gibbons	
	Course evaluation: 6.0/7	
RELEVANT POSITIONS	Research Assistant to Professor Drew Fudenberg	2024-26
	Research Assistant to Professor Ian Ball	2021-24
	Research Assistant to Professor Robert Gibbons	2024
	Research Assistant to Professor Charles Angelucci	2023
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS	Gregory K. Palm (1970) Fellow, MIT	2022-23
	Heising-Simons MIT Presidential Fellowship	2021-22
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES	<u>Referee</u> American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics <u>Presentations</u> 2026: ACM EC'26 (Rome) 2025: SAET 2025 (Ischia), Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory 2023: Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, Econometric Society Asian School in Economic Theory (Keio)	
JOB MARKET PAPER	“When Is Mediated Communication Possible?” (with Anna Merotto) We study when players can truthfully share private information through a mediator. Our analysis focuses on symmetric linear-quadratic games with strategic complements and independent private values. We characterize when mediated communication is informative, meaning that it can induce an outcome different from the unique Bayes-Nash outcome without communication. A sharp dichotomy emerges. When types that prefer higher own actions benefit less from higher opponent actions, informative communication is impossible regardless of the type distribution. By contrast, when those types benefit more from higher opponent actions, informative communication is possible if and only if the relevant extreme type lies sufficiently far from the mean. In a linear-demand Bertrand oligopoly, private costs rule out informative communication, whereas it may arise under private demand. Finally, informative communication weakly benefits every type, but whenever information sharing can raise aggregate welfare, the maximum aggregate payoff under communication is strictly below the maximum over Bayes correlated equilibria.	

RESEARCH PAPERS

“The Bounds of Mediated Communication” (with Roberto Corrao)

Revise and Resubmit, Econometrica

Extended Abstract in the Proceedings of EC'23 (“Mediated Communication with Transparent Motives”)

We study sender-receiver games with transparent motives, where an uninformed, sender-aligned mediator commits to a communication mechanism but cannot verify the sender's report. We compare mediated communication with cheap talk and Bayesian persuasion. A belief-value distribution is implementable by mediation exactly when it satisfies Bayes plausibility, receiver obedience, and zero covariance between posterior beliefs and sender values. This formulation separates the roles of commitment and verifiability. We show that mediation attains the persuasion value only when cheap talk also does; thus, whenever persuasion strictly outperforms cheap talk, unverifiable reports create a strict loss. We characterize when mediation strictly improves on cheap talk: the sender's value must exhibit countervailing effects along some direction in belief space. In finite-action, binary-state environments, this characterization yields a tractable description of optimal mediation. Applications cover platforms, lobbying, acceptance games, and a reinterpretation of the model as matching with externalities, where we study the efficiency-fairness tradeoff.

“Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure” (with Drew Fudenberg and Harry Pei)

Revise and Resubmit, Theoretical Economics

Extended Abstract in the Proceedings of EC'26

A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments they can perform (i.e., their *type*). We show that the sender cannot attain their commitment payoff in any equilibrium if (i) the receiver is sufficiently uncertain about their type and (ii) the sender could benefit from selective disclosure after conducting their full-commitment optimal experiment. Otherwise, there can be equilibria where the sender obtains their commitment payoff.

“Flexible Demand Manipulation” (with Andrew Koh)

Extended Abstract in the Proceedings of EC'26

We develop a simple framework to analyze how targeted persuasive advertising shapes market power and welfare. A designer flexibly manipulates the demand curve by influencing individual valuations at a cost. A monopolist prices against this manipulated demand curve. We fully characterize the form of optimal advertising plans under ex ante and ex post welfare measures. Flexibility per se is powerful, and can substantially harm or benefit consumers vis-a-vis uniform

advertising. We discuss implications for regulation, intermediation, and the joint design of manipulation and information.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Discriminatory Mediated Communication” (with Roberto Corrao and Chanjoo Lee)

We study how targeting and commitment jointly shape communication outcomes. An informed seller communicates with consumers who differ in tastes and outside options, either directly or through an uninformed mediator. Without commitment, allowing the seller to tailor private cheap-talk messages across consumers adds no value over public cheap talk. With a committed mediator, however, targeting is strictly valuable under smooth full-support heterogeneity. Commitment allows the mediator to link targeted messages across consumers to the seller's report, so a misreport that raises sales to some consumers can lower sales to others. In symmetric environments, targeted mediation can attain the seller's maximum payoff from committing to an arbitrary information structure for consumers. These results show the strong complementarity between targeting and mediated communication.