

SIVAKORN SANGUANMOO

OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION

MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52-301
Cambridge, MA 02139
sanguanm@mit.edu
<https://sites.google.com/view/sivakorn-sanguanmoo/home>

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION

70 Pacific St., Apt 440C
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 608-628-8166

MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER

Professor Stephen Morris
semorris@mit.edu
617-253-5193

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR

Mrs. Shannon Robinson
shmay@mit.edu
617-324-5857

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2027
DISSERTATION: "Essays on Dynamic Economic Designs"

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Parag Pathak
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52-426
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-7458
ppathak@mit.edu

Professor Stephen Morris
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52-422
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-5193
semorris@mit.edu

Professor Alexander Wolitzky
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52-518
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-3644
wolitzky@mit.edu

PRIOR University of Wisconsin-Madison 2021
EDUCATION *B.S., Mathematics with honors; B.S. in Economics with honors* GPA: 4.0/4.0

CITIZENSHIP Thai **GENDER:** Male

LANGUAGES Thai, English

FIELDS Primary Field: Theory
Secondary Fields: Market Design, Industrial Organization

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Microeconomic Theory: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard (Graduate) Teaching Assistant to Professor Alexander Wolitzky (Rating: 7.0/7.0)	2026
	Microeconomic Theory: Consumer and Producer Theory (Graduate) Teaching Assistant to Professor Parag Pathak (Rating: 6.1/7.0, 6.3/7.0)	2024, 2025
	Market Design (Graduate) Teaching Assistant to Professor Nikhil Agarwal and Professor Parag Pathak (Rating: 6.8/7.0, 5.3/7.0)	2024, 2025
	Strategy and Information (Undergraduate) Teaching Assistant to Professor Ian Ball and Professor Muhamet Yildiz (Rating: 6.0/7.0)	2025
	Economic Applications of Game Theory (Undergraduate) Teaching Assistant to Professor Tomasz Sadzik (Rating: 6.0/7.0)	2023
	Market Design (Undergraduate) Teaching Assistant to Professor Parag Pathak (Rating: 5.9/7.0)	2023
	Mathematical Methods for Quantitative Finance (MITx) Teaching Assistant to Professor Paul Mende	2022
RELEVANT POSITIONS	Research Assistant for Professor Stephen Morris, MIT	2022
	Research Assistant for Professor Nikhil Agarwal, MIT	2022-2023
	Research Assistant for Professor Marzena Rostek, University of Wisconsin-Madison	2021
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS	Best Graduate TA award, MIT Economics, 2026	
	UK AI Security Institute ‘Alignment Project’ grant for ‘An Economic Framework for Alignment and Control’ (with D. Bergemann, A. Koh, S. Morris, & Z. Yang), 2026	
	MIT Presidential Fellowship, MIT Economics, 2021-2023	
	Honorable Mention, William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, 2017, 2018, 2019	
	Silver Medal, International Mathematical Olympiad, 2014, 2015, 2016	

**PROFESSIONAL
ACTIVITIES**

Referee

Econometrica, American Economic Review, American Economic Review: Insights

Seminar and Conference Presentations

Northwestern-Kellogg Summer School in Economic Theory, 2026

North American Summer Meeting, 2026

ASSA Annual Meeting ('Attention and Engagement on Platforms'), 2025

Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, 2023

AMS Fall Central Sectional Meeting ('Connecting Network Structure and Behavior of Biological Interaction Systems'), 2019

Supervision

Sitta Tantikul, MIT UROP, "Interview Design: Job Assessment versus Precision," 2026-present (co-supervised with Professor Glenn Ellison and Farrell Wu)

**RESEARCH
PAPERS**

**"Robustness and Simple Contracts in Sequential Screening"
(Job Market Paper) [\[link\]](#)**

Sellers often contract with buyers before buyers learn their valuations, but the contracts are simpler than Bayesian sequential screening predicts. We study a sequential-screening environment in which the seller knows demand but not how the buyer learns, and maximizes worst-case profit over all learning processes consistent with demand. Under natural conditions on cost and the shape of demand, the essentially unique robustly optimal mechanism is a single refund contract that the buyer always accepts. The value of sequential screening then comes from information about both learning and demand. We quantify this value and show that knowing how the buyer learns can raise both the seller's profit and total welfare.

"Attention Capture" (with Andrew Koh) [\[link\]](#)

Revise and Resubmit, *Journal of Political Economy*

We develop a unified analysis of how information captures attention. A decision maker (DM) faces a dynamic information structure and decides when to stop paying attention. We characterize the convex-order frontier and extreme points of feasible stopping times, as well as dynamic information structures which implement them. This delivers the form of optimal attention capture as a function of the designer and DM's relative time preferences. Intertemporal commitment is unnecessary: sequentially optimal information structures always exist by inducing stochastic interim beliefs. We further analyze optimal attention capture under noninstrumental value for information. Our results speak directly to the attention economy.

“Robust Technology Regulation” (with Andrew Koh) [\[link\]](#)

Extended abstract in *27th ACM conference on Economics and Computation*

We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated and how regulation should evolve with new information. An adaptive sandbox comprising a zero marginal tax up to an evolving quantity limit is (i) robust: it delivers optimal payoff guarantees when the agent’s learning process and/or preferences are chosen adversarially; (ii) dominant: it outperforms other robust and regular mechanisms across all agent learning processes and preferences; (iii) time-consistent: it is the only robust mechanism that can be implemented without commitment. Robustness is important: absent robust regulation, worst-case payoffs can be arbitrarily poor and are induced by weak but growing optimism that encourages excessive risk-taking. Our results offer optimality foundations for existing policy and speak directly to current debates around managing emerging technologies.

“Persuasion and Optimal Stopping” (with Andrew Koh and Weijie Zhong) [\[link\]](#)

Extended abstract in *27th ACM conference on Economics and Computation*

We develop a duality-based first-order approach to dynamic persuasion in optimal stopping problems with general action-, state-, and time-dependent preferences. A direct-communication reduction recasts the design problem as a semi-static program over joint distributions of stopping beliefs and times; strong duality and a near-necessary first-order condition then reduce it to a one-dimensional differential equation in a multiplier that prices the agent's continuation incentive, characterizing the optimum as a concavification of a multiplier-augmented payoff. We demonstrate the method in three applications: dynamic binary persuasion, where optimal policies combine suspense generation with action-targeting; a structural result by which the principal's time-risk preferences alone determine whether suspense is optimal; and dynamic linear persuasion, where the optimum is dynamic tail-censorship.

“Informational Puts” (with Andrew Koh and Kei Uzui) [\[link\]](#)

Extended abstract in *25th ACM conference on Economics and Computation*

We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but injects asymmetric and inconclusive public information if they lose faith. There is (i) no multiplicity gap: the largest (partially) implementable equilibrium can be implemented uniquely; and (ii) no commitment gap: the policy is sequentially optimal. Our results have sharp implications for the design of policy in coordination environments.

“Technology Speed Limits” (with Andrew Koh) [\[link\]](#)

We study optimal technology regulation when private learning occurs both through doing (scaling up the technology) and through waiting (as time passes). We show that an adaptive speed limit—a cap on the rate at which the technology can increase per unit time—delivers optimal worst-case guarantees over all learning processes and/or preferences, and is the only time-consistent mechanism that does so.

“Memory Correlated Equilibrium” (with Andrew Koh) [\[link\]](#)

We develop a framework for modeling random and correlated memory in games: a memory correlated equilibrium (MCE) comprises (i) a base extensive-form game; and (ii) a memory structure that delivers self-locating information. We define progressively stronger versions of MCE, show their existence, and develop a revelation principle that paves the way for memory design in games. We illustrate applications to cooperation, mechanisms, coordination, and hold-up problems, as well as discuss implications for the design of algorithms and artificial agents.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Multiple Signaling Channels in the College Admissions Problem” [\[link\]](#)

I model a multi-channel college admission policy in which students differ along both intrinsic qualities and test-taking abilities, while a college only values students' intrinsic qualities. Students signal their qualities to the college by choosing between a test and a portfolio track. Test scores depend on both quality and test-taking ability and have high precision, while portfolio scores depend only on quality and have low precision. I give tight conditions under which non-trivial equilibria exist. I then compare the multi-channel policy with a test-only (portfolio-only) policy that uses only test (portfolio) scores to sort students and show that the multi-channel policy always yields a weakly better expected quality of accepted students. Moreover, the welfare outcome of the portfolio-only policy is always strictly dominated by either the multi-channel or test-only policy.

“Implementable Dynamic Information Structures under Outside Learning”

I study which dynamic information structures can be implemented for an agent who also learns from an outside source. The designer refines the agent's outside filtration and may reveal in advance what the agent will learn from the outside source.