Not Learning from Others & Learning in the Household

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Matthew Ridley    Frank Schilbach

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Not Learning from Others
Motivation: Two ways we often learn new information

(1) Through personal efforts and experiences, e.g.:
   - Try out new restaurants
   - Experiment with a novel technology
   - Track performance of own investments

(2) Receiving information from others, e.g.:
   - Conversations with others
   - Observing their outcomes
   - Reading about their experiences

Efficient learning requires combining information from these sources.

This paper: Tests the standard assumption in economics that equivalent pieces of information are weighted equally regardless of source
Social learning experiments in India (BDL lab) and US/UK (Prolific)

- Research questions
  1. Do people respond similarly to equivalent info uncovered by themselves and others?
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  (1) Control condition: draw all signals on your own (‘Individual’ round)
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  (3) Informed treatment: directly inform participants of partner’s signals
  (4) Observe treatment: directly observe partner drawing signals
• **Social learning** → Provide evidence of a potentially powerful barrier to social learning
  - Field: Barriers to information seeking and diffusion
    Mobius et al. '15; Chandrasekhar et al. '18; Banerjee et al. '18; BenYishay and Mobarak, '19
  - Lab: People don’t account for correlation structure, underreact to others’ *actions*
    Enke and Zimmermann, 2019; Weizsäcker '10; Angrisani et al. '18

• **Learning from experience** → Role of taking some action to uncover information
  - Field: Beliefs and economic decisions powerfully shaped by personal experiences
    Malmendier and Nagel, '16; D’Acunto et al., '21
  - Reinforcement learning / Learning from experience vs. observation or description
    Nisbett and Ross, '80; Camerer and Ho, '99; Barron and Erev, '03; Hertwig et al., '04; Merlo and Schotter, '03; Simonsohn et al. '08; Miller and Maniadis '12

• **Ownership Effects** → Effect of ‘owning’ information
  - Owning a good increases people’s valuation for it and causes people to react more to information about it
    Knetsch '89; Kahneman et al., '90; Hartzmark et al., '21
Experimental task: guess number of red balls in urn of 20 balls

- Common prior: # red balls between 4 and 16 (equal prob)
- Each round: draw two sets of $n \in \{1, 5, 9\}$ balls (with replacement)
Aligned incentives: each person paid equally for same randomly chosen guess

- Randomly-matched partners
- Both paid for the same randomly chosen guess → incentives aligned
- Can calculate risk-neutral Bayesian guess ⇒ How we calculate this
Nature of task, complexity, and comprehension

- Key features of this design
  - Can create common prior + aligned incentives ⇒ no strategic motives
  - Can precisely vary each person’s info + calculate risk-neutral Bayesian’s guesses

- Broad design considerations for designing the task:
  - Simple enough to be well understood by sample with relatively low education
  - Yet sufficient complexity to allow some ‘wiggle room’

- Requires few assumptions
  - Participants do not need to be Bayesian
  - Do not assume that participants report mean/median of their belief distribution
  - Instead, simply test for equal sensitivity to “own” vs. “others” signals

- Clear prediction from standard model: equal sensitivity to own and others’ signals
Three experiments using this task across two settings

- **Two lab experiments with strangers** in Chennai, India
  - Experiment 1: establishes main findings
  - Experiment 2: addresses confounds and explores mechanisms

- Online experiment with strangers in US and UK
  - Experiment 3: external validity + further channels + simpler design

Will now walk you through core design used in Experiment 1

Experiments 2 and 3 are simpler
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- Experiments 2 and 3 are simpler
Randomly-matched pair plays five rounds, in randomized order

- Individual
- Discussion
- Discussion
- Informed of Partner’s Draws
- Informed of Partner’s Guess
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
<th>DISCUSSION</th>
<th>INFORMED OF PARTNER’S DRAWS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

FIRST SET OF DRAWS

INDIVIDUAL

Participant 1  Participant 2

n1 draws  n2 draws

Private guess  Private guess

DISCUSSION

INFORMED OF PARTNER’S DRAWS
**INDIVIDUAL**

**FIRST SET OF DRAWS**
- Participant 1: \(n_1\) draws
  - Private guess
- Participant 2: \(n_2\) draws
  - Private guess

**SECOND SET OF DRAWS**
- Participant 1: \(n_2\) draws
  - Private guess
- Participant 2: \(n_1\) draws
  - Private guess

**FINAL GUESSES**
- Participant 1: Private guess
- Participant 2: Private guess

**DISCUSSION**

**FIRST SET OF DRAWS**
- Participant 1: \(n_1\) draws
  - Private guess
- Participant 2: \(n_2\) draws
  - Private guess

**SECOND SET OF DRAWS**
- Participant 1: \(n_2\) draws
  - Private guess
- Participant 2: \(n_1\) draws
  - Private guess

**FINAL GUESSES**
- Participant 1: Private guess
- Participant 2: Private guess

**INFORMED OF PARTNER’S DRAWS**

**FIRST SET OF DRAWS**
- Participant 1: \(n_1\) draws
- Participant 2: \(n_2\) draws

**SECOND SET OF DRAWS**
- Participant 1: \(n_2\) draws
- Participant 2: \(n_1\) draws

**FINAL GUESSES**
- Participant 1: Private guess
- Participant 2: Private guess

**Unstructured, as much time as they want (usually ≈1-2 mins)**

**Asked to make joint guess**

**Participant 1 can learn Participant 2’s \(n_2\) draws;**
**Participant 2 can learn Participant 1’s \(n_1\) draws**
Individual vs. Discussion rounds:

Is info uncovered yourself weighted differently than info *potentially* learned via a discussion with your partner?
INDIVIDUAL

Participant 1  Participant 2
n1 draws     n2 draws
Private guess Private guess

n2 draws     n1 draws
Private guess Private guess

DISCUSSION

Participant 1  Participant 2
n1 draws     n2 draws
Private guess Private guess

Discussion and joint guess

PRIVATE GUESS

INFORMED OF PARTNER’S DRAWS

Participant 1  Participant 2
n1 draws     n2 draws
Private guess Private guess

Informed of partner’s n2 draws
Informed of partner’s n1 draws

Private guess Private guess

Discussion and joint guess

PRIVATE GUESS

PRIVATE GUESS
Directly informed of partner’s draws by experimenter

“Your partner got 5 draws, of which 4 were white and 1 was red”
Individual vs. Informed of Partner’s Draws rounds:

Is info uncovered yourself weighted differently than info uncovered by your partner but perfectly shared with you?

Note: no joint deliberation, no communication frictions
Three empirical approaches lead to very similar conclusions

- **Non-parametric**: Plot average guesses as function of signals (net red draws)
  - By source of information (own draws vs. partner’s draws)

- **Reduced-form**: Linear regressions of guesses on signals
  - By source of information

- **Structural**: Quasi-Bayesian updating (not today)
  - Weights on signals allowed to differ by source of information

**Note**: Always comparing responsiveness to second set of draws
Guesses as a function of “net red draws”, i.e. red minus white draws

On average, fairly close to risk-neutral Bayesian

We will compare guesses in the treatment rounds to those in the Individual round.
Experiment 1
Non-parametric results
Guesses less sensitive to partner’s signals than to own...
...even when directly informed of them by experimenter!
Experiment 1
Reduced-form analysis
People are at least 50% less sensitive to their partner’s info

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Informed Of Partner's Draws (Post-Discussion)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own Info</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Partner's Info</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coefficient on 2nd Private Guess ($\beta_2$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>p = 0.02</td>
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</table>
Ruling out confounds

- **Confusion and errors in probabilistic reasoning**
  - Don’t require people to be Bayesian. Simply test if treat info equally across treatments.
  - Comprehension scores are excellent; no heterogeneity in effect by comprehension

- **Order effects**
  - Always compare weights on second info. Order of own and spouse’s info thus held fixed
  - Recency effects, base-rate neglect therefore cannot explain our results.

- **Risk aversion**
  - Risk aversion might make people guess more conservatively overall
  - But it should not affect how people treat own vs. others’ info.

- **Differences in actual or perceived ability**
  - Even if you think you are better at the game, you should use your own vs. other’s information the same once you know it.
Ruling out confounds

- Confusion and errors in probabilistic reasoning
- Order effects
- Risk aversion
- Differences in actual or perceived ability

- **Mistrust** of the experimenter
  - Might put less weight on info that is not seen with own eyes

- **Competitiveness/rivalry**
  - Aligned monetary incentives
  - Competitive person might conceal info but should themselves *use* all available info
  - But, haven’t (yet) ruled out this form of rivalry: I guess differently to you because I particularly like being right when you are wrong
Experiment 2: address confounds, explore the limits of these effects

- **Two lab experiments** with strangers in Chennai, India
  - Experiment 1: establishes main findings
  - Experiment 2: addresses confounds and explores mechanisms

- **Online experiment with strangers** in US and UK

- **Lab experiment with married couples** in Chennai
Experiment 2

- **Informed** round repeated from above design

- **Observe** round: key new treatment in which participant watches partner draw their signals (sitting right next to each other!)

- Also includes other variations on Informed round aimed at ruling out confounds related to presentation of information

- **Caveat:** Limited power as this experiment stopped well short of target sample size (146 out of 400 pairs) due to pandemic-induced shutdown
Underweighting even when you watch other person draw their signals!

- p = 0.02
- p = 0.18
- p = 0.12
- p = 0.04
Experiment 3: Large-scale online experiment on Prolific (n=4,489)

- Replicate main findings in a higher numeracy sample from a different cultural context (US + UK)

- Simpler experimental design
  - Entirely between-subjects design
  - Randomized order of receiving own vs. others’ signals

- Use more precise control in online setting to unpack mechanisms:
  - Is purely labeling some information as ‘yours’ enough?
  - If not, is it about different visual salience and presentation of information?
  - Or needing to take some action / exert effort to uncover info to feel ‘ownership’?

- Note: Did not expect identical effect size due to online format, less sense of ‘other’, different sample, etc. (Gupta et al., ’22)
Experiment 3: Three main treatments

1. **Informed**: click a button to draw own balls one by one; see a summary of partner’s draws

2. **Observe**: click a button to draw own balls one by one; watch partner’s draws appear one by one

3. **Labels Only**: watch own draws appear one by one; watch partner’s draws appear one by one
   - Only difference is label (“your draws” vs. “your partner’s draws”)
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1 vs 2: isolate effect of visual salience / presentation
2 vs 3: isolate effect of (taking action to generate) ownership
Drawing ‘own’ marbles online

Game 1

Draw your first marble
Drawing ‘own’ marbles online

Game 1

Put marble back
Underweighting others’ signals when you click to draw your own signals...

![Bar chart showing coefficient on 2nd Private Guess for Informed Of Partner's Draws and Observe Partner's Draws, with error bars and p-values: p = 0.00, p = 0.00, p = 0.74, p = 0.00, p = 0.02, and a range of 0 to 0.6 on the y-axis.]

- Informed Of Partner's Draws: Own Signal and Partner's Signal with p = 0.00 and p = 0.00, respectively.
- Observe Partner's Draws: Own Signal and Partner's Signal with p = 0.74 and p = 0.00, respectively.

Weights on Own vs. Others' Signals: +/- 1 SE.
...but not when the difference is purely labeling.

Weights on Own vs. Others' Signals

- Informed Of Partner's Draws: p = 0.00
- Observe Partner's Draws: p = 0.00
- Labels Only: p = 0.27

Coefficients on 2nd Private Guess:

- Informed Of Partner's Draws: Own Signal
- Observe Partner's Draws: Own Signal
- Labels Only: Own Signal

Legend:
- Own Signal
- Partner's Signal
- +/- 1 SE
• Similar effect even when partner’s draws are perfectly recalled (does not operate wholly through through memory)

• Lack of awareness of bias:
  • 77% reported using own and partner’s draws equally in making guesses
  • But these individuals were just as insensitive to their partner’s signals

• No effect of:
  • Rivalry (whether partner also guesses)
  • Doubling the monetary stakes
Summary

- People are less sensitive to information gathered by someone else compared to equally-relevant information gathered themselves
  - Whether they learn others’ info through discussion, via a third party, or even seen with their own eyes
  - In different cultural contexts with populations with very different education levels
  - In a fairly simple experimental setup

- Rule out distrust, visual salience or presentation, overconfidence, confusion etc.

- Conclude that people have a bias against information generated by others

- Can interpret as an ‘ownership effect’ over information
  - Hartzmark et al. (2021): People react more to info about goods they own
  - We suggest notion of ownership may extend to information itself
Discussion

- Potentially far-reaching barrier to social learning
  - May underlie other documented cases of incomplete social learning, e.g.:
    - Information cascade experiments (Weizsäcker, 2010)
    - Farmers learning less from neighbors’ plots (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995)
    - Central bankers sensitivity to personal experience (Malmendier et al., 2021)

- Need for more evidence from natural field settings and with higher stakes
  - Low sensitivity to others’ info might sometimes be a good heuristic

- Open questions:
  - What types of actions generate a sense of ownership over info in natural settings?
  - What types of contexts and relationships help or hinder learning from others?
Learning in the Household
Motivation - 1

• Social learning *within* the household
  • Members have access to independent info + many opportunities to share
  • Household models assume full information pooling
  • Except: Strategic motives can inhibit information flow (Ashraf et al. 2014, 2020)
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  • Household models assume full information pooling
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• In many situations, spouses have common objectives
  • Invest money wisely, send child to a good school, consult a competent doctor
  • Making good decisions here requires spouses to pool information

• Little evidence on:
  • How well spouses learn from each other
  • What factors inhibit learning
• Our previous experiments involved having the opportunity to learn from a stranger

• How might this change in the context of actual social relationships?
  • Higher trust and higher cost of repeatedly ignoring spouse’s information
  • Hierarchy, norms, domains of expertise etc. might affect learning
Related literature

- **Information frictions in the household**
  - Strategic hiding or mistrust of information
    Ashraf et al. '14, '20; Ambler '15; Apedo-Amah et al. '20; Ashraf et al. '21
  - Intra-household spillovers of info interventions
    Hoff et al., '17; Lowe & Mckelway '19; Ashraf et al. '20; Fehr et al. '22;

- **Role of gender in sharing and listening to information/ideas**
  Coffman '14; Beaman & Dillon '18; BenYishay et al. '20; Coffman et al. '21; Isaksson '18...
Experimental Design

• We recruit 400 married couples to visit our lab in Chennai, India
  • Given local context, all married couples are male-female pairs

• Couples play Experiment 1 from Not Learning from Others

• We compare their behavior with men and women playing with strangers
  (re-analyzing data from Experiment 1)

• Men and women are equally good at the task + equally overconfident regarding it
  • Not a gender-stereotyped task (Coffman '14)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Couples</th>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Couples</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husbands</td>
<td>Wives</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years married</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>12.23</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.47)</td>
<td>(8.45)</td>
<td>(7.65)</td>
<td>(8.66)</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>36.46</td>
<td>31.86</td>
<td>34.92</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(8.34)</td>
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<td>8.11</td>
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<td>(3.29)</td>
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<td>Reads Tamil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Works (at least 1 day/week)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<td>Daily work hours</td>
<td>Works</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 400 married couples
- Similar recruitment procedures, similar demographics to Experiment 1 (‘Non-Couples’)
- Ideally, would have recruited couples but randomized to play with spouse versus stranger. But recruiting couples is slow and would have greatly increased cost.
Reminder of design

- Individual
  - Random Order
  - Discussion
  - Random Order
  - Discussion
  - Informed of Partner’s Draws
  - Random Order
  - Informed of Partner’s Guess
Experiment 1: Men underweight strangers’ information

Men's Guesses (Strangers Experiment)

Cannot reject equal underweighting by men and women, and across same and mixed-gender pairs
Experiment 1: Women similarly underweight strangers’ information

Women's Guesses (Strangers Experiment)

Cannot reject equal underweighting by men and women, and across same and mixed-gender pairs.
Husbands discount their wife’s info

Husbands' Guesses (Couples Experiment)

Coefficient on Second Info

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
<th>Informed of Draws Pre-Discussion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own Info</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner's Info</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But wives treat own and husbands’ info the same

![Graph showing Wives' Guesses (Couples Experiment) with annotations]

- Own Info: p = 0.61
- Partner's Info: p = 0.94
- Individual: 0.2
- Discussion: 0.4
- Informed of Draws Pre-Discussion: 0.6
- Informed of Draws Post-Discussion: 0.8

Difference between husbands and wives is statistically significant (p=0.04)
Why do wives place equal weight on their husband’s info?

- Not gender differences per se: men and women treat strangers similarly.
  - In both same- and mixed-gender pairs of strangers

- Gap not explained away by controlling for individual-level observables such as relative age, competence, beliefs about competence, or marital status

- Implies the asymmetry is generated by the marital context itself

- We explore heterogeneity by features of marital context:
  1. **Index of Husband’s Decision-Making Power:** average *both* spouses’ answers on who makes decisions in various domains
  2. **Index of Husband’s Relative Ability:** differences in perceived ability of husband, comprehension and first-guess performance
Husband’s decision-making power & relative ability predict weight on his info

<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Signal</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wife’s Signal</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>H’s X HHDM Index</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
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<td>W’s X Ability Index</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>10.22***</td>
<td>10.21***</td>
<td>10.21***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- More weight placed (by both spouses) on info of spouse who makes more decisions at home
- And who is seen as higher ability at the task
- Suggests habits or norms of deference and decision-making power also affect weight placed on *information*
Summary

• In our study context, men largely ignore their wife’s information while women equally weight their own and their husband’s information

• Gender difference in social learning only in the household
  • No difference when learning from strangers

• Implies that wives face a force which countervails the general tendency to underweight others’ info
  • Norms and habits of deference (related to household decision-making)
  • Incorrect beliefs that their husbands are better than they actually are
  • Another possibility: differences in sense of identity (what counts as me/mine)
Discussion

• Tentative ‘policy’ implications (for similar cultural contexts):
  • Households may not pool information, even when they have incentives to do so
  • Women might make better decisions when aggregating household info would help
  • Worse decisions when husbands decide but wives have some relevant info
  • Higher pass-through of info from husbands to wives than vice-versa
    (also in Fehr et al., ’22)

• Open questions:
  • Documenting belief dispersion within the household
  • Studying intra-household learning in natural field settings with higher stakes
  • In domains where gender stereotypes regarding expertise exist
  • Studying learning in other types of relationships, e.g. elders and youth, friends, kin,
    co-workers, managers and employees, etc.
Thank you!
Guesses earn less when second info collected by another.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Earnings (Rs)</th>
<th>Own Info</th>
<th>Teammate's Info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td># Second Draws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Own Info
- Teammate’s Info

Graph shows expected earnings (Rs) against the number of second draws.
Clicking to draw affects memory...

Fraction Remembering:
- Draw-Sharing
- Watch Draws
- Just Labels

- Own Info
- Partner's Info

p-values:
- Draw-Sharing: p = 0.00
- Watch Draws: p = 0.00
- Just Labels: p = 0.05

Fraction Remembering: ± 1 SE
But memory not the whole story

Remembered all draws

- Own Info
- Teammate's Info

$p = 0.00$
Ruling out rivalry: behavior persists when other person not guessing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guessing partner</th>
<th>Non-guessing partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>p</strong></td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>+/- 1 SE</td>
<td>+/- 1 SE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Guessing partner**
  - Coefficient: 0.5 ± 0.1
  - p = 0.08

- **Non-guessing partner**
  - Coefficient: 0.7 ± 0.1
  - p = 0.00
2x higher stakes makes no difference

Experiment 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Usual stakes</th>
<th>Higher stakes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own Signal</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>p = 0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner's Signal</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 +/- 1 SE
Reduced-Form Specification

Examine how private guesses depend on the ‘second info’ by treatment:

\[
\text{Guess}_{ir} = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{First Info}_{ir} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \\
+ \beta_{3,1} \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \cdot 1(\text{Discussion})_{ir} \\
+ \beta_{3,2} \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \cdot 1(\text{Draw-sharing pre-discussion})_{ir} \\
+ \beta_{3,3} \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \cdot 1(\text{Draw-sharing post-discussion})_{ir} + \epsilon_{ir},
\]

where:

\(\text{First Info}_{ir} = \text{Red minus White draws in first set of signals}\)
\(\text{Second Info}_{ir} = \text{Red minus White draws in second set of signals}\)
Reduced-Form Specification

Examine how private guesses depend on the ‘second info’ by treatment:

\[ \text{Guess}_{ir} = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{First Info}_{ir} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \]
\[ + \beta_{3,1} \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \cdot 1(\text{Discussion})_{ir} \]
\[ + \beta_{3,2} \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \cdot 1(\text{Draw-sharing pre-discussion})_{ir} \]
\[ + \beta_{3,3} \cdot \text{Second Info}_{ir} \cdot 1(\text{Draw-sharing post-discussion})_{ir} + \epsilon_{ir}, \]

where:

\[ \text{First Info}_{ir} = \text{Red minus White draws in first set of signals} \]
\[ \text{Second Info}_{ir} = \text{Red minus White draws in second set of signals} \]

Key hypothesis: \( \beta_{3,1} = \beta_{3,2} = \beta_{3,3} = 0 \) (equal weight on own and spouse’s signals)
Other results from mechanisms experiment

• None of the following eliminate underweighting of others’ info:
  (1) **Draw by draw**: informed of other’s information ball by ball
  (2) **No first guess**: Do not elicit first guess after seeing own private draws
  (3) **Reverse order**: Learn partner’s info before receiving own draws
  (4) **Stakes**: Randomizing 50% higher stakes has no effect
Experiment 1 (Strangers): Mixed-gender vs. Same-gender pairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pooled (1)</th>
<th>Men (2)</th>
<th>Women (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_1$: First Info</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.49*** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_2$: Second Info</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.53*** (0.10)</td>
<td>0.48*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{3,1}$: Second Info $\times$ Discussion</td>
<td>-0.29*** (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.39*** (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{3,2}$: Second Info $\times$ Discussion $\times$ Same-Gender Pair</td>
<td>0.06 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$: Constant</td>
<td>10.71*** (0.13)</td>
<td>10.73*** (0.19)</td>
<td>10.69*** (0.19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 1500 750 750

- For Discussion round only, can compare same-gender and mixed-gender pairs of strangers
- No significant differences depending on same vs mixed-gender team, for either men or women (but somewhat limited power)
Why do couples and strangers behave differently?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Own Net Red</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.50***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teammate’s Net Red</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
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<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
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<td>0.26***</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teammate’s Net Red X</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guesser Is Husband In Couple</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teammate’s Net Red X</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<td>Guesser Is Woman</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td><strong>Teammate’s Net Red X</strong></td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
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<td>Guesser Is Wife In Couple</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Guesser Is Older</td>
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<td>Guesser Thinks Sole HHDM</td>
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<td>Teammate Better</td>
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<td>Guesser Thinks Teammate Better</td>
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<td>Guesser Is Married</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teammate’s Net Red X</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
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<td>Guesser Comprehension index</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>10.67***</td>
<td>10.67***</td>
<td>10.66***</td>
<td>10.66***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Not explained away by observables such as relative age, ability, confidence
- Being married vs. single *per se* does not significantly explain behavior
- But married women behave differently *when paired with their spouse*