14.472 Public Finance II

Topic IIIb: Empirics: Cost and Value of Insurance

Amy Finkelstein
Fall 2022
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1. Brief background on UI [DONE]
2. Theory: Optimal benefit and duration level (Baily/Chetty) [DONE]
3. Empirics: Taking Baily / Chetty to Data [UP NEXT]
   3.1 RHS: Fiscal externality from higher benefit level on government budget (via behavioral response to increased benefit)
   3.2 LHS: Gap in MUs across states
• Formula offers a potential road map for empirical work: to tell you if locally should raise or lower benefits:
\[
\frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)} = \frac{\varepsilon_{1-e,b}}{e}
\]

- RHS: Elasticity of duration of UE wrt benefits. Or more generally, impact of benefit on government budget (in principle, empirics are straightforward).

- LHS: Gap in MU across states (harder)
  - Estimating willingness to pay for a non-traded good (recall "analyzing markets that don't exist")
Taking Baily/Chetty to the Data: Plan

• (Brief) recap of moral hazard literature - impact of expanded UI benefits on cost of providing UI
• (Not brief) discussion of various strategies for estimating value of insurance (LHS)
  • Useful for other questions and settings
• Return to moral hazard literature but this time for health insurance
  • Methodological focus: importance of modeling choices; complementarities across reduced form and “structural” approaches
Empirics: RHS
Want to know how much expanded UI benefits change the cost of providing UI.
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Reminders
- Care about behavioral cost, not mechanical cost.
  - Behavioral cost is relevant because less job search raises cost of UI program (which is financed through taxes)
- Workers don’t care that they are searching less because of Envelope Theorem
Estimating the “cost” side of Baily-Chetty

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- How might expanded UI affect cost of policy?
Recall the mechanics of UI

- **Premium**: monthly payments by firms to government

- **Claims**
  1. Firm and worker separate
  2. First payment
     - 2.1 Worker files a claim
     - 2.2 Firm / Agency verify that layoff occurred (rather than quit or firing)
     - 2.3 Agency verifies that policy is in good standing (sufficient premium payments)
     - 2.4 Payments begin. Amount is a fraction of prior earnings.
  3. Worker searches for a job. Payments continue until new job or benefits are exhausted.
1. More job separations, given imperfect experience rating [channel #1, e.g. Topel 1983]

2. More claims [channel #2, e.g. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis 2016]

- Take-up of UI is important and understudied
- Possibly offsetting: firms might contest claims (Sorkin, Lachowska, and Woodbury 2021)

3. Longer spells conditional on first payment [channel #3]

Lamppost I: Most research has focused on (channel #3). It is the easiest to measure because the universe is clearly defined. Two requirements:

- Dataset with UI claims
- Exogenous variation in UI policy

Lamppost II: Eligibility margin of policy is important and understudied

- Although see Leung and O’Leary AEJ 2020 - RD of UI minimum recent work requirement on other program participation (eg TANF)
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Fiscal cost of expanded UI benefits – channels

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Figure 1: Channel #2 example: estimated take-up ranges from ~60% to 100% pre-pandemic.

Source: Chodorow-Reich via Ganong, building on work in Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis 2016.
UI research has focused on disincentive conditional on receipt (margin 3)

- Although in Baily-Chetty benefits last forever, within margin 3 there are actually two obvious policy levers
  1. Change in benefit level
  2. Change in potential duration
Estimating the UI disincentive effects of UI on claimants

- Effect of changes in levels
  - Replacement rates have changed little in the US since policy’s inception.
  - Most policy variation in levels comes from increases in the maximum benefit (which occur periodically to keep up with inflation). You therefore often see regressions where the maximum benefit is used as an instrument for the average benefit level.
    - Enormous empirical literature
  - An alternative identification strategy, the “regression kink” design, is described in Card et al. (2015)
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- Effect of changes in potential duration
  - Potential duration often linked to worker’s contribution history or age.
  - Illustrative (clean) example: Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2012) on potential duration
Figure 2: Potential benefit duration and age in Germany

**Figure I**
Potential Unemployment Insurance Durations by Period for Workers with High Prior Labor Force Attachment
Figure 3: Realized duration and age

Figure III
The Effect of Potential Duration in Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits on Months of Actual UI Benefit and Months of Nonemployment by Age—1987 to 1999
**Figure 4:** Job-finding hazard: Spike at exhaustion; Anticipation (lower hazard prior to initial exhaustion).

**FIGURE V**
The Effect of Increasing Potential Unemployment Insurance (UI) Durations from 12 to 18 Months on Hazard Function—Regression Discontinuity Estimate at Age 42 Discontinuity
Figure 5

Source: Schmieder and von Wachter (2016) Annual Review
Extensive literature on fiscal externality from UI on government budget

- Schmeider and von Wachter (AR 2016) provide a relatively recent overview
- My sense is that papers have not focused on full fiscal externality but rather components of it
  - Lee et al. (2021) is an exception
Empirics: LHS
Estimating Gap in Marginal Utilities

- How much of a markup would individuals be willing to pay for UI insurance?
  \[
  \frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)}
  \]
  - Recall with full insurance the "gap" would be 0
- Many approaches (potentially generally useful for estimating WTP for non-traded good)
  - Approach #1: Impact of unemployment on consumption (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017)
  - Approach #2: Ex-ante impact of learning about unemployment on consumption (Hendren 2017)
  - Approach #3: Impact on labor supply of indirectly affected spouse (Fadlon and Nielsen forthcoming)
  - Approach #4: Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard benefit response (Chetty 2008)
  - Approach #5: Reservation wages (Shimer and Werning 2007)
  - Approach #6: Revealed preference (Landais et al. 2021)
Approach #1: Impact of Unemployment on Consumption

- Intellectual history: huge moral hazard lit pointing out distortions caused by UI
  - See e.g. Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a literature review
- What about the benefits side? Enter Gruber (1997):
  - Estimates consumption smoothing benefits of UI
    - Hugely important for asking the question not being asked
    - A new point – prior lit just focused on documenting distortions
  - Combines these estimates with existing moral hazard estimates and plausible risk aversion values to implement Bailey formula
    - Goes beyond demonstrating that “consumption smoothing benefits exist” to try to make welfare statements
Gruber (1997) Overview

- Two main parts to paper:
  - How does consumption change when becomes unemployed (how "smooth" is consumption)?
  - Combines consumption-smoothing estimates with existing moral hazard estimates and "plausible" risk aversion values to implement an approximation to the Baily formula
Baily (1978): consumption drop + risk aversion identify willingness to pay

• No state dependence \( \nu(c) = u(c) \)
Baily (1978): consumption drop + risk aversion identify willingness to pay

- No state dependence $v(c) = u(c)$
- first order Taylor expansion
  
  $$u'(c_l) - u'(c_h) = u''(c_h)(c_l - c_h) + o((c_l - c_h)^2)$$

  second order term; ignore going forward

  
  $$\frac{u'(c_l) - u'(c_h)}{u'(c_h)} \approx -\frac{u''}{u'} c_h \frac{c_l - c_h}{c_h}$$

  welfare gain from increase in insurance benefit

  $$= \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c_h}$$

  where $\gamma \equiv -\frac{u''}{u'} c_h$ and is the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the employed state

- Formula in Baily (1978) and also in Section 2 of Chetty (2006)

- Define $\bar{c}_h$ as avg cons when employed, $\bar{c}_l$ as av cons when unemployed.

$$\frac{u'(c_l) - u'(c_h)}{u'(c_h)} \approx \gamma \frac{\bar{c}_l - \bar{c}_h}{\bar{c}_h}$$

welfare gain from increase in insurance benefit.

- Perfect equality if $E u'(c_l) = u'(\bar{c}_l)$ and $E u'(c_h) = u'(\bar{c}_h)$

- Assumes $u'''' = 0$ (which implies no precautionary savings motives)

- Chetty 2006: potentially substantial bias (formula holds exactly for quadratic utility)

- Ignores Jensen's inequality (so would hold with homogenous consumption by state across people and time)

- Jensen's inequality implies that $E u'(c_l) - E u'(c_h) > u'(\bar{c}_l) - u'(\bar{c}_h)$

- Magnitude of error depends on extent of heterogeneity and shape of utility function.

- Assumes no state dependent utility (equating MU's means equating consumption)

- Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2013) show this can have big effects on optimal benefit level (why?)

- Define $\bar{c}_h$ as avg cons when employed, $\bar{c}_l$ as av cons when unemp
  
  $$\frac{u'(c_l) - u'(c_h)}{u'(c_h)} \approx \gamma \frac{\bar{c}_l - \bar{c}_h}{\bar{c}_h}$$

  welfare gain from increase in insurance benefit

- Perfect equality if $Eu'(c_l) = u'(\bar{c}_l)$ and $Eu'(c_h) = u'(\bar{c}_h)$
  - And assumes $u''' = 0$ (which implies no precautionary savings motives)
    - Chetty 2006: potentially substantial bias (formula holds exactly for quadratic utility)
  - Ignores Jensen’s inequality (so would hold with homogenous consumption by state across people and time)
    - Jensen’s inequality implies that $Eu'(c_l) - Eu'(c_h) > u'(\bar{c}_l) - u'(\bar{c}_h)$ so formula understates value of UI.
    - Magnitude of error depends on extent of heterogeneity and shape of utility function.
  - Assumes no state dependent utility (equating MU’s means equating consumption)
    - Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2013) show this can have big effects on optimal benefit level (why?)
Using consumption drops for LHS of Baily

\[ \gamma \frac{\bar{c}_l - \bar{c}_h}{\bar{c}_h} = \frac{\varepsilon_{1-e,b}}{e} \] (1)

- Key: in principle we can estimate these three components empirically:
  - Elasticity of ue wrt benefits - huge literature
  - Drop in consumption when become unemployed - how measure consumption?
  - Risk aversion - how estimate that?
Measuring consumption: surveys

- Data sources
  - PSID (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017)
  - CEX (Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis 2016)
  - HRS (Hendren 2017)
  - Scanner data (Nielsen)
  - SIPP: no spending, but has material hardship module
Measuring consumption: surveys

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Issues with survey data
- Small samples
- Recall bias leads to understated consumption
- Attrition – hard to construct a panel
Measuring consumption: admin data

- Data sources
  - Impute from income and wealth in registry data – e.g. Landais and Spinnewijn in Sweden (2021)
  - Consumption tax data – Gerard and Naritomi in Brazil (2021)
  - Bank account data – e.g. Ganong and Noel in US (2019)
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• Issues with admin data
  • Picture of spending “too narrow” – bank account / credit card / consumption tax
  • Picture of spending “too broad” – registry data in e.g. Europe (income minus change in wealth)
  • Poor coverage for low-income households
  • Misses informal transfers
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- Issues with both – expenditure != consumption; misses in-kind transfers
Figure 6: Income and Spending by (Completed) Duration of UI Receipt

Panel A. Income (labor + UI)

Panel B. Spending

Source: Ganong and Noel (2019)
Figure 7: Evolution of income and spending if stay unemployed

Panel A. Income (labor + UI) if stay unemployed

Panel B. Spending if stay unemployed

Source: Ganong and Noel (2019)
Figure 8: Spending tracks income by state; consistent with causality

Source: Ganong and Noel (2019)
Gruber (1997) estimates $\frac{\Delta c}{c}$ using first difference impact of unemployment on consumption expenditure (food expenditure) in the PSID.

- Sample of hh where head was employed last year and is now unemployed (panel = key bc dep var is change in consumption)
- Key dependent variable: Food consumption

Finds a 6-10% drop in consumption (food expenditure) upon unemployment.
• Baily-Chetty formula implies that at optimum:

\[ \gamma \frac{\bar{c}_l - \bar{c}_h}{\bar{c}_h} = \frac{\epsilon_{1-e,b}}{\epsilon} \]

• Having estimated \( \frac{\bar{c}_l - \bar{c}_h}{\bar{c}_h} \), Gruber uses
  • estimate of \( \epsilon \) from Meyer (1990)
    • Ideally estimate all the parameters you need internally to your paper
    • Do consumption smoothing and ue duration estimates come from same population / same source of variation?
  • \( \gamma \) – takes “range of plausible values” of 1 – 4 (or more. . . !)

• Results
  • for \( \gamma < 2 \), optimal benefit level is lower than current level (i.e. LHS < RHS)
  • However, for \( \gamma \approx 4 \) current benefit level \( \approx \) optimal (two sides \( \approx \) equal)
Figure 9: Optimal benefit hinges on \( \gamma \) and knowledge of \( \gamma \) is highly uncertain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative risk aversion</th>
<th>Base case</th>
<th>Include temporary layoffs</th>
<th>Duration elasticity of 0.6</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.280</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table presents evaluation of equations (4), as described in text. Base case uses estimates from column (2) of Table 2, and elasticity of benefits duration of 0.9*0.48 = 0.432. In second column, consumption smoothing estimate includes temporary layoffs. In third column, elasticity of benefits duration is reduced to 0.6*.48 = 0.288.

Source: Gruber (1997)
Sensitivity of results to assumption about risk aversion

- Hard to estimate this parameter
  - Cohen and Einav (1997) present one approach and discuss some others (race track bettors; jeopardy players; labor supply...)
  - There is a great deal of uncertainty about this parameter ("plausible" values range from 1 (in macro) to 50+ (equity premium puzzle))
- Moreover risk preferences may vary across contexts
  - Size of risk (Rabin 2000)
  - Consumption commitments (Chetty and Szeidl 2007): may be locally much more risk averse than globally where can undue commitments
  - Context-specific risk preferences (e.g. Barseghyan et al. AER 2011, Einav et al. AER 2012)
  - [Aside: Gruber measures food consumption not total consumption. Need the "right" curvature... i.e. curvature of utility wrt food cons.]
- How useful is an "empirical formula" when very hard to pin down one of the parameters?
"Endogenous" consumption smoothing

- Lack of knowledge about risk aversion even more concerning given that consumption smoothing likely endogenous to level of risk aversion
- Chetty and Looney (JPubEc 2006):
  - US and Indonesia have similar smoothness of consumption following an UE shock
  - Very little social insurance in Indonesia
- Does Baily formula imply if UI is at optimal level in US, don’t need social insurance in Indonesia (same consumption smoothing without social insurance)?
“Endogenous” consumption smoothing (con’t)

- US and Indonesia have similar smoothness of consumption following an UE shock
  - Very little social insurance in Indonesia
  - More and less efficient forms of consumption smoothing
  - In US smooth through spousal labor supply and savings; in Indonesia, by e.g. pulling kids out of school and setting them to work
  - If you are very poor / very near subsistence level, you become effectively very risk averse
    - will do anything to maintain a minimum consumption including highly inefficient smoothing
  - So can’t just “import” a common risk av. param in difft contexts
- Relatedly: “cost” of crowd out of self insurance varies
  - How inefficient is the crowded out consumption smoothing mechanism?
  - So evidence of what is crowded out may be relevant (if unsure about risk aversion...)
  - but otherwise, not clear why it matters ”what is crowded out” by UI (e.g. savings, spousal labor supply etc)
Question: What About Savings?

- Q1: If people can save, why is unemployment insurance welfare improving relative to savings?
- Q2: If people can save, why is there a drop in consumption when become unemployed (assuming workers are optimizing)?
- Answer to both:
  - It is more costly to transfer resources across states with savings (because you get it tomorrow regardless of employment state) than with insurance (which transfers money across states)
  - Savings can equate marginal utility across time, while UI can equate across states as well
Toy example: insurance vs savings

- Agent employed today; employed tomorrow with probability $p$
- No discounting or moral hazard
- Income if employed is $y$
- Actuarially fair insurance technology:
  - consumption if employed: $y - t$ where $t$ is tax when employed
  - consumption if unemployed: $b$
  - Actuarially fair insurance: $(1 - p)b = t(1 + p) \Rightarrow b = t \frac{1 + p}{1 - p}$
- Savings technology:
  - $c_o = y - s$
  - $c_1 = y + s$ if employed, $s$ if unemployed
With actuarially fair insurance, can equate MU of C across all three “states”

Welfare is:

\[ V(t) = u(y - t) + pu(y - t) + (1 - p)u(b) \]

FOC wrt \( t \):

\[ V'(t) = -u'(y - t) + -pu'(y - t) + (1 - p)u'(t(\frac{1+p}{1-p})) = 0 \]

\[ \Rightarrow u'(y - t) = u'(b) \]
Toy example: savings

- With savings, equate marginal utility of consumption today with expected marginal utility of consumption tomorrow
  - ex post, MU of C tomorrow not equal to MU of C today
- Welfare is:
  \[ V(s) = u(y - s) + pu(y + s) + (1 - p)u(s) \]
- FOC wrt \( s \):
  \[ u'(y - s) = pu'(y + s) + (1 - p)u'(s) \]
- Note also the FOC tells us:
  - \( s^* > 0 \) (savings is a substitute for insurance)
  - \( s^* < y/2 \) (savings is an imperfect substitute; will have a consumption drop if become unemployed)

- Gruber (1997) estimates $\frac{\Delta c}{c}$ using first difference impact of unemployment on consumption expenditure (food expenditure) in the PSID
  - Finds a 6-10% drop in consumption (food expenditure) upon unemployment
- Hendren (2017) re-estimates this in PSID, showing result visually
  - Does not restrict to those who become unemployed
  - Regresses change in log consumption on a series of leads and lags for periods relative to when became unemployed:

- Hendren (2017) in PSID regresses $\log(c_{i,t}) - \log(c_{i,t-1})$ on $U_{i,t-k}$: leads and lags of indicators for whether unemployed in year $t - k$:

$$\log(c_{i,t}) - \log(c_{i,t-1}) = \alpha_k + \Delta_{k}^{FD} U_{i,t-k} + \Gamma_k X_{i,t} + \nu_{i,t}$$

- where $U_{i,t}$ is an indicator for being unemployed in survey year $t$
  - key coefficients are $\Delta_{k}^{FD}$ which measure average difference in consumption growth in period $t$ for those who are and are not unemployed in period $t - k$
  - To control for other life-cycle or aggregate trends in consumption growth, includes a full set of year dummies and cubic in household age in $X_{i,t}$
- Runs separate regressions for each value of $k = -4, -3, \ldots, 4$
  - Plots coefficients $\Delta_{k}^{FD}$
**Impact of UE on Consumption Growth**

**FIGURE IV: Impact of Unemployment on Consumption Growth**

-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 Coefficient on Unemployment Indicator -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 Lead/Lag Relative to Unemployment Measurement Coeff 5%/95% CI

*Notes:* These figures present coefficients from separate regressions of leads and lags of the log change in food expenditure on an indicator of unemployment, along with controls for year indicators and a cubic in age. Data is from the PSID with one observation per household per year. Unemployment is defined as an indicator for the household head being unemployed. Following Gruber (1997) and Chetty et al. (2005), food expenditure is the sum of food in the home, food outside the home, and food stamps. The horizontal axis presents the years of the lead/lag for the consumption expenditure growth measurement (i.e. 0 corresponds to consumption growth in the year of the unemployment measurement relative to the year prior to the unemployment measurement). The sample is restricted to household heads who are employed in $t - 1$ or $t - 2$. 
Findings

- 7-8% drop in consumption at onset of unemployment
  - Consistent with prior estimates (e.g. Gruber 1997)
- But what’s up with those pre-trends?
  - 2-3% reduction in consumption in the year prior to unemployment!
Does drop in consumption when become UE under-estimate consumption decline due to UE?

- Gruber (1997) looks at drop in consumption when become unemployed
- But Hendren finds drop in consumption prior to unemployment
  - Suggests looking only at "on impact" effect of UE on consumption change underestimates causal impact of unemployment
- Suggest that may underestimate LHS of Baily-Chetty formula
  - proposes a scaling of consumption drop at time of unemployment
- Other papers however do not find drop in (administrative data measures of) consumption prior to UE (Landais and Spinnewijn 2021 in Sweden; Gerard and Naritomi in Brazil; Ganong and Noel in US)
  - PSID likely picks up only long / "serious" UI spells
Recap: Challenges with Approach #1 (Consumption drops)

- Measuring consumption
  - Paucity of data and of broad-based measures
  - Challenges in handling durable goods
  - Work-related consumption (e.g. car)
  - Typically measure expenditures not consumption and these may not be the same
    - Aguiar and Hurst (2005): when unemployed or retire can substitute home production / lower prices so expenditures may go down even if consumption does not (state-dependent prices)

- Measuring change in consumption due to ue confounded by anticipated job loss (Hendren 2017)

- Requires assumptions about utility function
  - State dependent utility (or lack thereof)
  - Risk aversion
    - And note that (endogenous) consumption drop and risk aversion may be negatively correlated (Chetty and Looney 2006)
Estimating Gap in Marginal Utilities

- How far are we from full insurance / how much of a markup would individuals be willing to pay for UI insurance? \( \frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)} \)
- Approach #1: Impact of unemployment on consumption (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017)
- Subsequent approaches try to address various limitations of consumption-based approach
  - Approach #2: Ex-ante impact of learning about unemployment on consumption (Hendren 2017) [up next]
  - Approach #3: Impact on labor supply of indirectly affected spouse (Fadlon and Nielsen 2019)
  - Approach #4: Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard benefit response (Chetty 2008)
  - Approach #5: Reservation wages (Shimer and Werning 2007)
  - Approach #6: Revealed preference (Landais et al. 2021)
Approach #2: Ex-ante responses to unemployment

- Approach #1: compares consumption across states of the world
  - Original (Gruber 1997) and most common approach so far
- Approach #2: Compare ex-ante responses within states of the world (Hendren 2017)
  - Key insight: individuals make choices today (savings, spousal labor supply etc) based on probability of future job loss and extent of insurance in that case
Hendren (2017)

- Uses drops in consumption (in response to learning one might lose job) while currently employed to reveal WTP for supplemental UI
- Euler equation for optimal savings decision:

\[ v'(c_{pre}(p)) = pu'(c_u(p)) + (1 - p)v'(c_e(p)) \]

- Comments:
  - If know today will lose job tomorrow, will equate marginal utility of consumption today with marginal utility of consumption when unemployed
  - If know today will not lose job tomorrow, will equate marginal utility of consumption today to marginal utilization of consumption when employed
  - Therefore, difference in marginal utilities across employed and unemployed states can be inferred from size of consumption response to an increase in the likelihood of job loss (multiplied for coefficient of relative risk aversion)
Hendren (2017)

- Euler equation for optimal savings decision:

\[ v'(c_{pre}(p)) = pu'(c_u(p)) + (1 - p)v'(c_e(p)) \]

- Key idea: difference in marginal utilities across employed and unemployed states can be inferred from size of consumption response to an increase in the likelihood of job loss
  - Euler equation: The marginal utility of consumption today equals the expected marginal utility of consumption in the future
  - If marginal utility is higher when unemployed (i.e. individuals are under-insured: \( u' > v' \)) learning you might lose your job should cause individuals to cut back on current consumption to save for future consumption

- Therefore drops in consumption prior to becoming unemployed / ex-ante responses indicate individuals are not fully insured against risk of job loss
Hendren (2017)

- Uses drops in consumption (in response to learning one might lose job) while currently employed to reveal WTP for supplemental UI
- Difference in marginal utilities across employed and unemployed states can be inferred from size of consumption response to an increase in the likelihood of job loss (multiplied for coefficient of relative risk aversion)
  - If have full insurance (marginal utilities equalized across states) change in $p$ will not affect $c_{pre}$
- Because the measured consumption response (change in consumption prior to unemployment to change in probability of future unemployment) is within the state of being employed, can have arbitrary state dependence (vs Approach #1)
Hendren (2017): Exploit Ex-ante Responses
Proposition 2: WTP given by:

$$\frac{u'(c_u)}{v'(c_e)} = 1 + \sigma \frac{d\log(c_{pre})}{dp}$$
Hendren (2017): Exploit Ex-ante Responses

**Proposition 2:** WTP given by:

$$\frac{u'(c_0)}{v'(c_0)} = 1 + \sigma^* \frac{d\log(c_{pre})}{dp} = 1 + \sigma^* \frac{\Delta_1^{FD}}{\Delta_1^{Beliefs}}$$

$$\Delta_1^{Beliefs} = E[P_{t-1} | U_t=1] - E[P_{t-2} | U_t=1] - (E[P_{t-1} | U_t=0] - E[P_{t-2} | U_t=0])$$
Hendren (2017): Exploit Ex-ante Responses

Proposition 2: WTP given by:

\[ \frac{u'(c_u)}{v'(c_e)} = 1 + \sigma \frac{d\log(c_{pre})}{dp} \]

\[ = 1 + \sigma \frac{2.7\%}{9.4\%} \]

\[ \Delta_{1FD} = 2.7\% \]
Proposition 2: WTP given by:
\[ \frac{u'(c_u)}{v'(c_e)} = 1 + \sigma \left( \frac{\text{dlog}(c_{pre})}{dp} \right) \]

\[ = 1 + \sigma \left( \frac{2.7\%}{9.4\%} \right) \]

\[ = 1 + 58\% \text{ for } \sigma = 2 \]
Proposition 2: WTP given by:
\[
\frac{u'(c_o)}{v'(c_e)} = 1 + \sigma \frac{d\log(c_{pre})}{dp}
\]
\[
= 1 + \sigma \frac{2.7\%}{9.4\%}
\]
\[
= 1 + 58\% \text{ for } \sigma = 2
\]
\[
= 1 + 87\% \text{ for } \sigma = 3
\]
Uses estimates for several exercises

- To estimate LHS of Baily formula / value of marginal increase in benefit levels
- To ask: Could private supplemental UI exist?
  - Estimates amount of private information based on subjective probabilities
  - Computes pooled price ratio (a la Hendren 2013 EMA) - average costs of all those who are worse risks
  - Assumes a coefficient of risk aversion and concludes markups due to adverse selection (i.e. pooled price ratio in excess of own risk) exceed willingness to pay (measured by LHS of Baily)
- Concludes that privately-traded supplemental UI market would unravel due to adverse selection
  - More challenging question: what if public UI didn’t exist?
Estimating Gap in Marginal Utilities

- How far are we from full insurance / how much of a markup would individuals be willing to pay for UI insurance? \( \frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)} \)

- Approach #1: Impact of unemployment on consumption (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017) [done]

- Subsequent approaches try to address various limitations of consumption-based approach
  - Approach #2: Ex-ante impact of learning about unemployment on consumption (Hendren 2017) [done]
  - Approach #3: Impact on labor supply of indirectly affected spouse (Fadlon and Nielsen 2019) [up next]
  - Approach #4: Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard benefit response (Chetty 2008)
  - Approach #5: Reservation wages (Shimer and Werning 2007)
  - Approach #6: Revealed preference (Landais et al. 2021)
Approach #3 Labor Supply of Indirectly Affected Spouse

- Fadlon and Nielsen (JPubEc 2019)
- Trying to estimate gap in marginal utilities across states of nature without using consumption data
  - See challenges to using consumption data (difficult to measure broadly; how to handle durables, home production etc)
- Idea: If households jointly optimize, spousal labor supply response to shocks can be used to measure welfare gains of more generous government insurance benefits
  - Spouses work to point where own marginal disutility from working equals each household member’s valuation of additional consumption from spousal earnings increase
  - Amount to which household labor supply responses to shocks / self insured is related to degree to which formal insurance is lacking
Labor Supply of Indirectly Affected Spouse

- Idea: If households jointly optimize, spousal labor supply response to shocks can be used to measure welfare gains of more generous government insurance benefits
  - Spouses work to point where own marginal disutility from working equals each household member’s valuation of additional consumption from spousal earnings increase
  - Amount to which household labor supply responses to shocks / self insured is related to degree to which formal insurance is lacking
- Formula for LHS of Baily in terms of spousal labor supply:
  \[
  \frac{u_i'(c^b_i) - u_i'(c^g_i)}{u_i'(c^g_i)} = \frac{v_2'(l^b_2) - v_2'(l^g_2)}{v_2'(l^g_2)}
  \]
- Intuition: use household optimality conditions to infer degree to which households are able to smooth marginal utility of consumption from degree to which they are able to smooth marginal disutility of spousal labor supply
• Take a quadratic approximation to member 2's labor disutility around $l^g_2$:

$$\frac{u_i'(c^b_i) - u_i'(c^g_i)}{u_i'(c^g_i)} \approx \varphi \frac{l^b_2 - l^g_2}{l^g_2}$$

where $\varphi = \frac{v''_2(l^g_2)}{v'_2(l^g_2)} l^g_2$

• Parallel to Consumption based approach. Here we multiply change in spousal labor supply in response to shock by rate of change in spouse’s disutility from additional work (which captures the utility “price” of the labor supply quantity fluctuations across states)
Implementation

- Key advantage: Do not have to measure consumption
- Requires spouses are not at a corner
  - Intensive margin model assumes interior solution in spousal hours
  - Extensive marginal model requires the presence of marginal households
- Requires household optimization (and spouses!)
- Requires state-independent utility for indirectly affected spouse
- Just as previously we had to calibrate the utility curvature (risk aversion) now need to calibrate the rate of change of spousal disutility from additional work
Estimating Gap in Marginal Utilities

- How far are we from full insurance / how much of a markup would individuals be willing to pay for UI insurance? \( \frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)} \)

- Approach #1: Impact of unemployment on consumption (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017) [done]

- Subsequent approaches try to address various limitations of consumption-based approach
  - Approach #2: Ex-ante impact of learning about unemployment on consumption (Hendren 2017) [done]
  - Approach #3: Impact on labor supply of indirectly affected spouse (Fadlon and Nielsen 2019) [done]
  - Approach #4: Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard benefit response (Chetty 2008) [up next]
  - Approach #5: Reservation wages (Shimer and Werning 2007)
  - Approach #6: Revealed preference (Landais et al. 2021)
Approach #4

- Chetty (2008): An alternative approach to calculating optimal UI benefits / implementing Bailey formula
  - Major motivation: get away from needing to measure consumption and make assumption about risk aversion
- Policy application: UI accounts
- Develops an alternative formula to Baily formula for optimal benefit level that depends on ratio of liquidity effect to moral hazard effect
- Estimates liquidity effect and moral hazard effect of unemployment benefits
  - Estimates that ~60% of impact of UI benefits on durations is due to liquidity effect
- Plugging estimates into new formula finds that an increases in ue benefits from current rate (~50% rr) would produce small (positive) welfare gain
  - Vs Gruber results? (varied with risk aversion choice)
• Individuals experience an event (job separation / ue) with probability $p$, chosen with separable effort $\Psi(p)$
  • two states: employed state (e) and unemployed (ue)
  • probability of event $p$ is decreasing in effort, with disutility of effort $\Psi$

• Utility is given by:

$$pu(c_{ue}) + (1 - p)u(c_e) - \Psi(p)$$

• So can think of individuals choosing effort or choosing $p$
• Utility is given by:

\[ pu(c_{ue}) + (1 - p)u(c_e) - \Psi(p) \]

• Note that \( p \) multiplies the level of utility in each state of the world

• As a result, FOC for \( p \) relates the level of utilities in each state of the world to the marginal cost of effort:

\[ u(c_{ue}) - u(c_e) = \Psi'(p) \]
Derivation (con’t)

- FOC: \( u(c_{ue}) - u(c_e) = \Psi'(p) \)
- Comparative static in assets (A): assumed to change \( c_e \) and \( c_{ue} \) by equal amount:
  \[
  u'(c_{ue}) - u'(c_e) = \Psi''(p) \frac{dp}{dA}
  \]
- Comparative static in benefits (b): affects \( c_{ue} \) but not \( c_e \):
  \[
  u'(c_{ue}) = \Psi''(p) \frac{dp}{db}
  \]
- Combining:
  \[
  \frac{u'(c_{ue})}{u'(c_e)} = \frac{\frac{dp}{db}}{\frac{dp}{db} - \frac{dp}{dA}}
  \]
  \[
  \frac{u'(c_e) - u'(c_{ue})}{u'(c_e)} = \frac{\frac{dp}{dA}}{\frac{dp}{db} - \frac{dp}{dA}}
  \]
\[
\frac{u'(c_e) - u'(c_{ue})}{u'(c_e)} = \frac{dp}{dA} \frac{dp}{db} - \frac{dp}{dA}
\]

- LHS of Baily formula (difference in MU’s across states) can be rewritten as a ratio of liquidity effect \( \frac{dp}{dA} \) to ”moral hazard” effect \( \frac{dp}{db} \)
- The bigger the role of the liquidity effect (relative to the total moral hazard effect) the larger the optimal benefits
What happened to risk aversion?

- Consumption drops (Gruber 97) representation of Baily requires risk aversion, liquidity effect (Chetty 2008) does not. Why?
- Ratio of liquidity to moral hazard elasticities related to risk aversion.
  - Highly related to Chetty 2006 AER (estimating risk aversion from labor supply responses...
Why is formula intuitive (and also not)?

\[
\frac{u'(c_e) - u'(c_{ue})}{u'(c_e)} = \frac{dp}{dA} - \frac{dp}{db}
\]

- **Intuitive: Value of liquidity**
  - Insurance is more valuable if it relaxes liquidity constraints
- **Not intuitive: why does one need to isolate the impact of liquidity per se on behavior to capture this?**
  - Value of insurance (WTP) is a function of first derivatives (MRS)
  - Behavioral response (elasticities) reflect second derivatives (how MUs change)
    - derivative of the FOC with respect to liquidity
    - How did we manage to write WTP (LHS of Baily) as a function of second derivatives (elasticities)?
  - In general welfare impact of insurance depends on first derivative of utility function (marginal utility of consumption) while how behavior changes with change in budget set depends on second derivative
• How did we manage to write WTP / value (= LHS of Baily) as a function of second derivatives (elasticities)?
• Key is that $p$ does not enter utility function directly - it multiplies utility function:

$$pu(c_{ue}) + (1 - p)u(c_e) - \Psi(p)$$

• So $u(c, x)$ has been written $xf(c)$
  • Quite restrictive
  • Natural when $p$ is a probability (this is the vNM utility structure)
  • But what about when we think of $p$ (as in empirical work) as duration of $ue$ rather than its incidence
  • e.g. if searching for a job requires gas money, then this structure is violated
• In addition, key assumption that disutility of search effort $\Psi(p)$ is additively separable from utility of consumption
  • Without additive separability, you’d get more terms
• Formula may not be robust?
Where do we go from here?

- Potentially fruitful research project: under what conditions can we write MUs as elasticities?
  - Often want to know value of goods but only see behavioral changes, not WTP. So would be great if behavioral changes (elasticities) could tell us about value
- Hendren conjecture: requires additively separable effort cost (no complementarities between consumption and effort) + binary state variable
- Some takeaways:
  - “sufficient” statistics are sufficient *given the model*
  - Portability across contexts: what might be a reasonable model in one context may not be in another
• Provides evidence from SIPP that most of the duration response to benefits is driven by those who are liquidity constrained
Approach 1

  - Needs panel (vs e.g. CPS) in part bc needs pre ue wealth
  - Restrict to prime age males searching for a job and on UI in first month after job loss
- Standard state x year variation in ui benefits
  - Innovation: look at differential impact of benefits on ue duration by pre-ue wealth level
- Key finding: Impact of UI benefits on ue duration is declining as pre-ue wealth increases
  - Can’t reject no effect for highest quartile wealth group
  - Suggests effect may be primarily a liquidity (vs moral hazard) effect
- Main results: visible in figures (now standard... at time relatively novel)
Graphical approach

- Divides sample by average UI benefit (state x year variation) into above vs below median benefits (and also by (pre-ue) wealth quartile)
- Plots UE duration separately for state-years above vs below median benefit levels, separately by wealth quartile
  - Always nice to begin with a simple cut of the data (although important to follow up with the more formal / careful analysis)
  - i.e. here we are pooling cross state and cross time variation and not using the DD as intended...
Effect of UI Benefits on Duration: Lowest Net Worth Quartile

- Mean rep. rate = 0.53
- Mean rep. rate = 0.48
- Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.01

Graph showing the fraction unemployed over weeks unemployed with averages UI benefit below mean and above mean.
Effect of UI Benefits on Duration: Second Net Worth Quartile

- Mean rep. rate = .53
- Mean rep. rate = .48

Wilcoxon Test for Equality: \( p = 0.04 \)

- Blue line: Avg. UI benefit below mean
- Red line: Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Duration: Third Net Worth Quartile

Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.69

Mean rep. rate = 0.52
Mean rep. rate = 0.46
Effect of UI Benefits on Duration: Top Net Worth Quartile

![Graph showing the effect of UI benefits on duration. The graph compares the fraction of unemployed individuals over weeks unemployed between two groups: average UI benefit below mean and average UI benefit above mean. The graph indicates that the mean representation rate is 0.52 for the lower group and 0.43 for the higher group. A Wilcoxon test for equality shows a p-value of 0.43.](image)
Formal hazard model analysis

- Cox proportional hazard model. Hazard \( h \): probability of leaving ue at date \( t \) conditional on entering date \( t \) unemployed
  - Kiefer (1988 JEL) is very nice intro to hazard models.
- \( \log h_{i,t} = \alpha_t + \beta_1 \log b_i + \beta_2(t \times \log b_i) + \beta_3 X_{i,t} \)
  - Alpha’s are week fixed effects (specifying baseline hazard fully flexibly)
  - Effect of benefits (b) allowed to vary w duration (t)
  - Coefficient of interest \( \beta_1 \): elasticity of hazard wrt UI ben at beg. of spell
  - Theory is about impact of benefit on initial hazard (no clear prediction regarding time varying effect of UI on benefits)
  - X’s include: state and year fe (for DD), other flexible controls (occupation and industry dummies, pre-ue wage, wealth, age, education etc)
    - How define benefits? (see next slide)
Formal hazard model analysis (con’t)

- Cox proportional hazard model. Hazard \( h \): probability of leaving ue at date \( t \) conditional on entering date \( t \) unemployed

\[
\log h_{i,t} = \alpha_t + \beta_1 \log b_i + \beta_2 (t \times \log b_i) + \beta_3 X_{i,t}
\]

- How define benefits?
  - Baseline: avg ue benefits in state and year. Issue: picks up demographic differences across states (although tries to control for them)
  - Max weekly benefit
  - Predict individual wages based on demographics and then calculate benefits based on predicted wage, state and year
  - [Why not use simulated instrument a la Gruber? IV w hazard models... control function approach?]
replacement rate for which individual i is eligible \((b_i)\) depends on state, year, and past earnings history

- Presumably people with different earnings would have different change in consumption when become unemployed
- Goal: isolate variation in \(b_i\) due to policy variation within states over time

How to do this? i.e. How measure "UI" variable?

- Max possible benefit rate (low first stage / low powered)
- Average replacement rate for people in your state
  - Variation comes from rules and also state demographics
- Simulated replacement rate
  - Instrument for UI replacement rate you are eligible for with "simulated" replacement rate
Simulated instruments (eligibility)

- Gruber (1997) uses simulated instruments to generate variation in benefit levels for which individuals are eligible
- Calculating simulated replacement rate:
  - Take national sample of u.e and assign them to each state in that year
  - Using that state’s rules that year calculate average replacement rate for whole national sample
  - Variation in RR coming only from legislative variation
    - Simulated state-year replacement rate is a function of legislated benefits for that state year, applied to a nationally uniform population
    - independent of the actual characteristics of individuals in that state-year
  - Instrument for replacement rate with simulated replacement rate
- Technique has many uses / applications
  - Idea of purging sample endogeneity / limiting to program variation through use common sample
  - Parsimonious way to summarize multi-dimensional programs (e.g. Medicaid eligibility)
Formal hazard model analysis (cont)

- \( \log h_{i,t} = \alpha_t + \beta_1 \log b_i + \beta_2 (t \times \log b_i) + \beta_3 X_{i,t} \)
- \( \log h_{ijt} = \alpha_{tj} + \beta_{j,1} Q_{ij} \log b_i + \beta_{j,2} Q_{ij} (t \times \log b_i) + \beta_3 X_{ijt} \)
  - Same model by stratified by asset quartile (\(Q_j\))
  - \(Q_{i,j}\) is an indicator variable for whether agent \(i\) belongs to quartile \(j\) of wealth distribution
  - \(\beta_{j,1}\) is elasticity of hazard rate w.r.t UI benefit in quartile \(j\) of asset distribution
  - Key question: how does elasticity of ue hazard wrt UI vary by wealth quartile?
### TABLE 2
Effect of UI Benefits: Cox Hazard Model Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marshallian elasticity</td>
<td>Pooled</td>
<td>Stratified</td>
<td>Stratified with Full Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marshallian elasticity</td>
<td>Full cntrs</td>
<td>No cntrs</td>
<td>Avg WBA</td>
<td>Max WBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log UI ben</td>
<td>$-0.527$</td>
<td>$-0.721$</td>
<td>$-0.978$</td>
<td>$-0.727$</td>
<td>$-0.642$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 x log UI ben</td>
<td>$-0.721$</td>
<td>$-0.978$</td>
<td>$-0.727$</td>
<td>$-0.642$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 x log UI ben</td>
<td>$-0.699$</td>
<td>$-0.725$</td>
<td>$-0.388$</td>
<td>$-0.765$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
<td>(0.420)</td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 x log UI ben</td>
<td>$-0.368$</td>
<td>$-0.476$</td>
<td>$-0.091$</td>
<td>$-0.561$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 x log UI ben</td>
<td>$0.234$</td>
<td>$0.103$</td>
<td>$0.304$</td>
<td>$0.016$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.369)</td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1=Q4 p-val</td>
<td>$0.039$</td>
<td>$0.013$</td>
<td>$0.001$</td>
<td>$0.090$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1+Q2=Q3+Q4 p-val</td>
<td>$0.012$</td>
<td>$0.008$</td>
<td>$0.002$</td>
<td>$0.062$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Spells</td>
<td>4529</td>
<td>4337</td>
<td>4054</td>
<td>4054</td>
<td>4054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key finding: effect of UI benefits declines monotonically in net wealth

Concern I: People with different asset levels may differ in other ways than their liquidity that affect their elasticity of ue wrt benefit levels (why do people choose difft asset levels?)
  - Relatedly, do not know what fraction of constrained group's behavioral response is liquidity vs. substitution effect unless assume substitution effect same for constrained and unconstrained groups (i.e. same preferences)
  - NB: a huge strength of paper is that Chetty is aware of and discusses this issue up front
    - Also tries an alternative strategy w its own (but different!) concern
• Concern II: are we measuring liquidity constraints?
  • Ideally want to identify those who are able to smooth consumption in response to temporary income shocks (i.e. can equate mu of consumption in ue and employed states) vs. those who cannot
  • Is liquid net wealth a good proxy for this?
    • Perhaps it is the people who are not liquidity constrained who don’t feel the need to save! (i.e. the high net wealth people may be high net wealth precisely because they need to save bc borrowing is costly)!
    • Might say: but then how explain patterns? But see heterogeneous treatment effects issue. . .
• Concern II: are we measuring liquidity constraints?
  • Paper investigates robustness to other measures of constraints and finds similar results (nice)
    • Spousal work status: evidence that cons smoothing is lower (i.e. drop in cons when get ue is greater) among single earners.
    • Do you have a mortgage? If yes have less ability to smooth the remainder of your consumption than a renter (evidence in other papers that renters move not infrequently in response to ue but owners rarely sell houses. Although perhaps can borrow against home equity...?)
Approach 2: Variation in severance pay

- Recall ideal experiment: randomly assign some job losers lump sum (non work contingent) payments and others traditional (work contingent) benefits
  - Compare subsequent unemployment durations
- In practice, some firms pay (lump sum) severance pay
  - Not contingent on subsequent work; therefore behavioral response picking up pure liquidity effect
  - Does not affect UI benefits
  - On average about one week of wages per year of service at firm
- Variation across firms in whether pay severance pay and amount of severance pay used to id liquidity effect
  - Major concern: this is not randomly assigned! Workers who receive severance pay may differ in other ways that is related to their expected unemployment duration
• Finds neat data (another v nice feature of a good paper!)
  • Two surveys conducted by Mathematica on job losers that contain data on receipt of severance pay and self-reported time duration
• NB: Chetty notes that workers who receive severance pay look different from ones who don’t on observables (see next slide)
  • Can control for observable differences but...
### TABLE 3

Summary Statistics for Mathematica Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pooled</th>
<th>No Severance (0.83)</th>
<th>Severance (0.17)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent dropouts</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent college grads</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent married</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median pre-unemp annual wage</td>
<td>$20,848</td>
<td>$19,347</td>
<td>$30,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median job tenure (years)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5

Effect of Severance Pay on Durations (controlling for job tenure)

Fraction Unemployed

Weeks Unemployed

- No Severance
- Received Severance
Is effect of severance pay causal?

- Obvious concern: Receipt of severance pay correlated with other factors that are correlated with observables:
  - omitted variable bias
  - endogeneity: firms offer severance packages because finding new job difficult

- Three additional pieces of evidence consistent with a causal interpretation
  - Results not sensitive to controlling for rich set of covariates
  - Relationship between severance pay and duration much longer among “constrained” (assets below median) than “unconstrained” (assets above median)
    - again not clear that assets are a good measure of constraint
    - doesn’t observe assets directly but predicts based on covariates (and asset-covariate relationship in SIPP)
  - Larger severance packages correlated with longer duration (intensive margin)
    - Variation in severance package comes from job tenure.
### Table 4
Effect of Severance Pay: Cox Hazard Model Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pooled</th>
<th>By Liquid Wealth</th>
<th>By Sev. Amt.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severance Pay</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.071)</td>
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<td>(Netliq &lt; Median) x Sev Pay</td>
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<td>-0.457</td>
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<td>(0.099)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Netliq &gt; Median) x Sev Pay</td>
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<td>-0.088</td>
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<td>(0.081)</td>
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<td>(Tenure &lt; Median) x Sev Pay</td>
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<td>-0.143</td>
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<td>(0.055)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Tenure &gt; Median) x Sev Pay</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.340</td>
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<td>(0.119)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equality of coeffs p-val</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=2428; all specs. include full controls.
Is effect of severance pay causal? (con't)

• Bonus round: Card, Chetty and Weber (QJE 2007)
  • Austrian system: eligibility for severance pay (not job contingent) based on discontinuous rule: People w 3+ years of job tenure are eligible, those w shorter job tenure are not
  • RD design
  • Estimates impact of severance pay on duration
Magnitude of moral hazard vs liquidity effect

- Doubling UI benefit reduces hazard rate by approximately 41%
  - Comes from state x year variation (average across groups)
  - See Table 2 column 1 (hazard model coeff on b is -0.51.
    - $\exp(-0.53)-1 \approx 41$
- “Pure liquidity effect”: Severance pay estimated to reduce hazard by approximately 21%.
  - Comes from estimates of effect of severance pay (Table 4)
  - So mixing different estimation strategies and samples.
  - Scaling: At mean spell length and mean job tenure, receipt of severance pay is equivalent to an 85% increase in UI benefit level
  - Cash grant equivalent to doubling UI benefit would reduce hazard by $21/0.85 = 25$
- Putting all together: Roughly 60% of UI-duration link due to liquidity effect
  - Durations rise largely because job losers have more cash-on-hand; not purely “gaming the system” because of distorted wage
Calibration: welfare implications

• Take these estimates & Chetty’s new formula for optimal b
• Estimates welfare gain from (balanced budget) raising of weekly benefit level by $1 from current level in U.S. (50% wage replacement) is equivalent in utility terms to a 4 cent weekly wage increase for all workers, or $2.00 per year
  • welfare gain from raising benefit level in U.S.
• NB: this is a local result
  • Formula tells you whether at an optimum and welfare gain associated with marginal change
  • Once again, would want more structure to go much further out of sample to get at optimal benefit level
    • E.g. elasticities estimated may not be the same at different benefit levels so useful for marginal welfare effects (local policy change around observed value) vs. any policy change
Comment: Risk aversion

- Consumption drops (Gruber 97) representation of Baily requires risk aversion asmpt, liquidity effect (Chetty 2008) does not (ratio of liquidity to mh effect related to risk aversion):
  - Gruber (1997) estimates that \( \frac{c(u)}{c(e)} \sim 0.9 \) so would need \( \gamma \sim 5 \) to be consistent with 60% liquidity effect.
- Is \( \gamma \sim 5 \) reasonable?
  - Wide range of risk aversion estimates
  - Seems “high” but depends on context.
    - Risk aversion may be higher in context of moderate shocks bc of consumption commitments.
    - May not be a universal “risk aversion” parameter (Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu and Cullen 2012)
Comment: policy implications

- If major benefit from UI is to provide liquidity / combat credit market failures, perhaps optimal UI policy should combine loans to unemployed (to provide liquidity) with traditional unemployment benefits (insurance against uncertain duration)
- Currently UE benefits play a dual role
  - Insure workers against uncertainty in finding a job
  - Provide workers with ability to consumption smooth while unemployed (given credit market failures)
- Best policy is usually the direct policy
  - If problem is credit market failure / liquidity, solve that directly
- See:
  - Shimer and Werning (2006) “liquidity and insurance”
  - Feldstein and Altman (1998) “unemployment insurance accounts”
Unemployment insurance accounts

- Required to save a fraction of wage income
- If lose job and eligible for UI, withdraw amount equal to regular UI benefits from personal account
  - So held harmless wrt current program
- If funds not sufficient to pay benefit, government lends necessary amount
- Key point: an individual who always has positive balance (and expects to remain positive) is residual claimant on funds and therefore internalizes effect of increased duration on budget constraint
  - At retirement age, funds are merged into individual’s IRA (if die, bequeathable)
  - Individuals who expect to retire or die with negative balance (at which point govt cancels debt) face same incentive problem as under current system (but w/o the discipline that comes from employer experience rating)
    - They estimate that most insured uie would have positive balances
UI Savings accounts

- Overall seems a compelling idea
- Potential concerns:
  - Liquidity constraints among young
  - Less redistributive?
Estimating Gap in Marginal Utilities

How far are we from full insurance / how much of a markup would individuals be willing to pay for UI insurance? \( \frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)} \)

Approach #1: Impact of unemployment on consumption (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017) [done]

Subsequent approaches try to address various limitations of consumption-based approach

- Approach #2: Ex-ante impact of learning about unemployment on consumption (Hendren 2017) [done]
- Approach #3: Impact on labor supply of indirectly affected spouse (Fadlon and Nielsen 2019) [done]
- Approach #4: Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard benefit response (Chetty 2008) [done]
- Approach #5: Reservation wages (Shimer and Werning 2007) [up next]
- Approach #6: Revealed preference directly (Landais et al. 2021)
Approach #5: Reservation Wages

- Reservation wage: wage that would make agent indifferent about accepting a job immediately vs remaining unemployed (receiving benefits and random draws from wage offer distribution)
- Empirical literature on how UI increases reservation wages
  - Often interpreted as "moral hazard"
  - People don’t take jobs because they have UI
- Shimer and Werning (QJE 2007)
  - Infer gap in marginal utilities across states from comparative statistics of reservation wages
- Key statistic: response of (after-tax) reservation wage to UI benefit levels
  - Encodes the marginal value of insurance because reservation wage directly measures expected value when unemployed
    - The higher the reservation wage, the higher the utility when unemployed
  - Raising benefits is desirable when it raises the (after-tax) reservation wage.
    - Nets two effects...
Raising benefits is desirable when it raises the (after-tax) reservation wage.

Two effects of raising benefits:

- Effect 1: Utility when unemployed (benefits): Higher benefits reduce cost of remaining ue and therefore raise the pre tax reservation wage
  - If the pre tax reservation wage is very responsive to UI benefits, raising UI benefits has a strong positive effect on workers’ welfare
- Effect 2: Utility when employed (taxes): Higher benefits must be funded by an increase in taxes when employed. The higher the ue rate or the more responsive it is to UI benefits, the greater is the need to raise the tax.
  - Formula nets this out by looking at responsiveness of after tax reservation wage to benefits.
Implementation

• Issue: How to measure reservation wages (and their response to benefits)?
  • Direct survey evidence - Feldstein and Poterba (1984); Krueger and Mueller (2016)
  • In France, the unemployed must declare their reservation wage when register for UI!
    • LeBarbanchon et al. (2019) estimate (precise v. small) elasticities of reported reservation wage wrt benefit duration

• How reliable? Esp since UI benefit levels don’t seem to impact subsequent wage rates (Card et al. 2007)
  • In general we tend to be skeptical of what people say that they would do

• Finding: large welfare gain from raising benefits from current levels
  • Similar finding to Chetty (2008) vs Gruber (1997)
    • Recall though Gruber “conclusion” depends on choice of risk aversion.
Estimating Gap in Marginal Utilities

- How far are we from full insurance / how much of a markup would individuals be willing to pay for UI insurance? $\frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)}$
- Approach #1: Impact of unemployment on consumption (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017) [done]
- Subsequent approaches try to address various limitations of consumption-based approach
  - Approach #2: Ex-ante impact of learning about unemployment on consumption (Hendren 2017) [done]
  - Approach #3: Impact on labor supply of indirectly affected spouse (Fadlon and Nielsen 2019) [done]
  - Approach #4: Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard benefit response (Chetty 2008) [done]
  - Approach #5: Reservation wages (Shimer and Werning 2007) [done]
  - Approach #6: Revealed preference (Landais et al. 2021) [up next]
Approach #6: Revealed preference

- Landais, Nekoei, Nilsson, Seim and Spinnewijn (2021) "Risk-based selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications"
- Study demand for (optional, public) supplemental UI in Sweden
  - All Swedish workers are entitled to a minimum benefit financed by payroll tax
  - Option to buy a more comprehensive policy (same duration etc, just higher payouts) at a (uniform) premium set by government
- Administrative data on worker choices and outcomes
- 2007 reform changed prices
Test for asymmetric information in Swedish UI

- Positive correlation test: correlation between probability of buying supplemental UI coverage in year $t$ and unemployment outcomes in year $t+1$
  - Importantly: control for individual characteristics that affect UI contracts available to each individual
  - Find those buy supplemental coverage more likely to subsequently experience unemployment
- Unused observables test: characteristics correlated with unemployment risk but not priced (e.g. firm-specific risk)
  - Look at how it correlates with supplemental UI coverage and subsequent UE outcomes
- Cost curve test: exogenous variation in prices from sudden and unanticipated increase in the premia for supplemental coverage in 2007
Price variation

Figure 11: Price Variation: Evolution of Premia and of the Fraction of Workers Insured Around the 2007 Reform

The Figure reports the evolution of monthly premium for the supplemental UI coverage over time. As explained in Section 2, there are no sources of premium differentiation up to 2008, apart from small rebates for union members and for unemployed individuals. Here, we report the value of the premium for employed union members. The Figure shows a large and sudden increase in the premia paid for the supplemental coverage in 2007. This increase followed the surprise ousting of the Social Democrats from government after the September 2006 general election. Note that from July 2008 on, premia started to be differentiated across UI funds. For 2008 and 2009 we therefore report the average monthly premium among unemployed union members across all UI funds. The Figure also shows the evolution of the take-up of the supplemental UI coverage, measured as the sum of all individuals buying the supplemental coverage divided by the total number of individuals aged 18 to 60 meeting the eligibility criteria for receiving UI benefits.
How does WTP correlate with risk?

**Figure 5. Price Variation: Unemployment Risk by Willingness-To-Pay**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A. Total unemployment duration in 2008</th>
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<tr>
<td>Days spent unemployed in 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 1 under comprehensive in 2006 &amp; 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marginals under comprehensive in 2006 only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 0 under basic in 2006 &amp; 2007</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
- The figure reports average risk for three groups of individuals defined by descending order of willingness-to-pay. Group 1 individuals are in the comprehensive coverage both in 2006 and 2007: they have the highest valuation of the supplemental coverage ($u > 0$).
- Marginals were buying the comprehensive coverage in 2006 but switch out in 2007 when premia $p$ increase: they are close to indifferent between the two coverages at current prices ($u \approx 0$).
- Individuals from group 0 were neither buying the comprehensive coverage in 2006 nor in 2007, and have the lowest willingness-to-pay for the supplemental coverage ($u < 0$).

For each panel, we report $E(\pi | Z = Z – 0, D = j)$, the average risk outcome $\pi$ of each group $j = 1, M, 0$ estimated at the average value of $Z$ for group 0. The vector $Z$ are characteristics affecting contract differentiation.

- Panel A reports the average number of days spent unemployed in 2008 for each group.
- Panel B plots the average predicted risk under basic coverage, and panel C the average predicted risk under comprehensive coverage. See text for details.
Find evidence of adverse selection in private UI
Then go beyond testing for selection to assess welfare and policy implications: should we mandate supplemental UI?
First implement bounds:
- Upper bound on valuation: workers who do not buy supplemental coverage at lower (pre 2007) premiums have valuation less than this premium
- Lower bound on costs of supplemental coverage for these workers: mechanical cost of more generous benefits, holding behavior constant (ignoring moral hazard)
Find lower bound on cost is just below upper bound on valuation
Suggests that with even a small moral hazard effect, these workers do not value coverage in excess of its costs
Suggests imposing a universal mandate for supplemental UI on them would be inefficient
Estimating WTP

- Exploit price variation to identify marginal buyers and their costs
- 8 percent of workers who switch out of comprehensive UI in response to price increase value it at somewhere between pre-reform and post-reform price
- Unfortunately only observe demand and costs at two different prices so will have to do a fair amount of (linear) extrapolation
  - But with that can back out demand and cost curves (see Figure 8)
- Findings:
  - Most workers not buying comprehensive coverage value it at less than the cost of covering them (why would that be?)
  - Therefore mandate for comprehensive coverage is welfare decreasing
  - Large subsidies for supplemental UI can enhance welfare, given adverse selection
- Very nice paper: uses pricing variation and choices to
  - Test for adverse selection in a market with little / no prior evidence
  - Estimate LHS of Baily formula (Value of insurance)
  - Consider welfare impacts of alternative policy instruments (mandates vs. subsidies)
Estimating Gap in Marginal Utilities

- How far are we from full insurance / how much of a markup would individuals be willing to pay for UI insurance? \( \frac{u'(c_l) - v'(c_h)}{v'(c_h)} \)

- Approach #1: Impact of unemployment on consumption (Gruber 1997; Hendren 2017) [done]

- Subsequent approaches try to address various limitations of consumption-based approach
  - Approach #2: Ex-ante impact of learning about unemployment on consumption (Hendren 2017) [done]
  - Approach #3: Impact on labor supply of indirectly affected spouse (Fadlon and Nielsen 2019) [done]
  - Approach #4: Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard benefit response (Chetty 2008) [done]
  - Approach #5: Reservation wages (Shimer and Werning 2007) [done]
  - Approach #6: Revealed preference (Landais et al. 2021) [done]

- Putting it all together: Landais and Spinnweijn (2021) [up next]
Putting it all together: Landais and Spinnweijn (2021)

• Question is in title: "The Value of Unemployment Insurance"
• Same setting as their prior paper: Swedish supplemental UI
• Really nice feature of this paper: Implements different approaches in same setting (and similar populations) and compare
  • plus a seventh (!) bounding approach: how MPC varies across states
• Use three different approaches to estimate MRS - i.e marginal utility of consumption when unemployed / marginal utility of consumption when employed
  • What would full insurance imply for MRS?
Comparison across two existing approaches

- Consumption based approach: drop in consumption when become unemployed
  - Recall key issues: must make assumptions about shape of utility function (e.g. risk aversion, state dependence) + measure consumption

- Revealed preference / Choice-based approach: direct estimate of WTP using choices over supplemental UI

- Plus implements a third (new) approach that generates lower bound on WTP based on difference across states in marginal propensity to consume out of extra income
Consumption based approach

Figure 1: Estimated consumption dynamics around start of unemployment spell

Drop in consumption at U
\[ \frac{\Delta C}{C} = -12.9\% \text{ (.028)} \]

MRS for different values of risk-aversion γ:

- \( \gamma = 1 \) 1.129 (.028)
- \( \gamma = 2 \) 1.258 (.056)
- \( \gamma = 4 \) 1.516 (.112)

Notes:
The figure reports event study estimates of household annual consumption around the time when a household member loses her job. Coefficients and confidence intervals come from specification (16) run on the sample of treated individuals and a control group of individuals obtained from nearest-neighbor matching on pre-event characteristics. All point estimates are expressed as a fraction of average total household consumption as of event year -1. We restrict the sample to individuals aged 25 to 55, who are eligible for any form of UI at the time of the event and who are unemployed in December of the year in which they lose their job for the first time. We also report on the graph an estimate of the drop in flow consumption at unemployment \( \frac{\Delta C}{C} \) estimated using the parametric approach of specification (17). We convert this estimate of \( \frac{\Delta C}{C} \) into a measure of the MRS, following the standard version of the consumption-based implementation, which is to assume that third and higher order terms of the utility function are negligible and that there is no state dependent utility. We report the corresponding MRS for three different values of risk-aversion γ. See text for details.
Consumption-based approach

• Drop in consumption of ~12% (similar to existing literature)
  • Note in year 0, they are unemployed as of December so unemployed for some fraction of year
  • Don’t seem to have much anticipatory response (vs. Hendren 2017)

• Implies relatively low value of marginal increase in benefits, even when assuming high levels of risk aversion
  • Even risk aversion of 4 yields only MRS of 1.51
  • Interpretation: workers are willing to pay a markup of about 50% to transfer a dollar of consumption from employed to unemployed state
85 percent of workers buy supplemental UI.

So for them we know that \( WTP > p_i \) (where \( p_i \) is the subsidized price of insurance)

To do better we need some (exogenous) variation in \( p_i \)
Choice Based Approach

- Direct estimate of WTP based on choices (demand) for supplemental UI
- Requires (exogenous) variation in premium
- Premium variation:
  - uniform premium charged to workers with different underlying risks of unemployment
  - Underlying ue risk varies with observables (e.g. firm, tenure, interaction etc)
  - requires assumption that some shifters of unemployment risk are orthogonal to preferences (do not affect WTP except via costs)
- Why not use the prior premium variation?
Implementation

- Price to coverage ratio for an additional unit of insurance:

\[
\frac{p_u}{p_e} = \frac{\tau_1 - \tau_0}{b_1 - b_0}
\]

where \( p_s \) is the price of increasing resources in state \( s \), \( b \) is benefits and \( \tau \) is "premium", and basic coverage is \((b_0, \tau_0)\) and comprehensive coverage is \((b_1, \tau_1)\).

- Expected price per unit of coverage for individual \( i \)

\[
\tilde{p}_i = \frac{p_u}{p_e} \frac{1 - \pi(Z_i)}{\pi(Z_i)}
\]

where \( \pi(Z_i) \) is predicted number of days unemployed in \( t + 1 \), predicted from rich set of observables \( Z_i \) measured at \( t \).

- Observed substantial heterogeneity in \( \pi_i \) and hence in prices across individuals.
First pass at a demand curve

Figure 6: Non-parametric Relation between Expected Price and Insurance Coverage

Notes: The scatter plot shows the average expected price and share buying comprehensive insurance coverage for workers grouped by cells based on a rich set of observables. In particular, the cells are defined by the intersections of 3 income groups, 3 age groups, 5 marital statuses, 20 regions, 9 education levels, 10 industries, 2 genders, 2 union membership statuses, 2 halves of firm level risk, 2 types of layoff histories (ever unemployed and never unemployed), and 2 halves of firm tenure ranks. Cell sizes on the graph are proportional to the number of individuals within them. The black line connects the average coverage for 20 quantiles of expected price, weighted by cells masses. The expected price is calculated given the predicted risk under comprehensive coverage. Appendix Figure 13 shows the same plot using the predicted risk under basic coverage.
- Non-parametric relationship is non-monotonic
- Presumably reflects
  - Noise
  - Some $Z_i$ shift not only risk but also have independent effect on WTP
- Supplemental UI is subsidized therefore $p_i < 1$ for most workers, so even risk neutral should buy UI
Estimating demand

- Predict heterogeneity in unemployment risk \( \pi(Z_i) \) and find people for whom \( \pi(Z_i) \) is low, therefore \( p_i > 1 \)
  - people with low unemployment rates still buy UI at very high rates

- Parametric model
  - Impose structure
  - Allow for a rich set of observables \( (X_i) \) to directly affect WTP, including various demographics (age, gender, income, education, region, industry etc)

- Identification relies on excluded instruments \( Z_i \) that affect predicted risk but don’t independently affect MRS
  - e.g. job tenure ranking within establishment x occupation (bc LIFO rules)
• Logit demand model for comprehensive coverage that is linear in price

• Individual $i$ buys comprehensive insurance at time $t$ iff:

\[ X_{it} \beta - \gamma \tilde{p}(Z_{it}) + \epsilon_{it} \geq 0 \]

$\epsilon_{it}$ is logit error

• Generates corresponding MRS as function of estimated parameters:

\[ MRS(X_{it}) = \frac{X_{it} \beta}{\gamma} \]

• (Also try a version that allows for wedge between true and perceived risk based on Swedish survey evidence)
• Generates corresponding MRS as function of estimated parameters:

\[ MRS(X_{it}) = \frac{X_{it}\beta}{\gamma} \]

• Roe of moral hazard
  • If use predicted risk under comprehensive coverage, creates downward bias of MRS if workers change effort under basic coverage
  • If use predicted risk under basic coverage, get upper bound on MRS
Figure 7: Distributions of MRS from RP Structural estimation

A. Lower and Upper Bound in Baseline Risk Model

Notes:
Panel A shows the estimated distribution of MRS on the sample of individuals with spells in December. The risk of unemployment is estimated using the baseline specification with all risk shifters. The solid (dashed) line represents the MRS with the risk model predicting workers probability of unemployment under comprehensive (basic) coverage. Panel B show the distribution of MRS with unemployment risk under the comprehensive coverage for different measures of risk. The solid line includes all risk shifters. The long dashed line accommodates salient risk shifters, i.e. the unemployment history of a worker and the recent layoff rate of the employer. The short dashed line allows for workers' mis-perception of their unemployment risk. See text for further details.
• Average MRS (under lower bound approach) = 2.24
  - workers on average are willing to pay more than a 100% mark-up to get comprehensive coverage
  - substantially higher than Consumption-Based estimates

• Substantial heterogeneity in MRS (above and beyond heterogeneity in unemployment risk)
  - For 75% of workers, MRS is higher than 1.7
  - For 25% it is higher than 3
Ex-post vs ex-ante measures

- Ex-post (Consumption based):
  - Observe impact of shock
  - Assume utility function

- Ex-ante (Revealed preference)
  - Observe wtp to move $$ across states
  - Assumes revealed preference
Approach #7 (?!): Bounds based on State-Specific MPC

- Observed drop in consumption when become unemployed reflects both worker’s preference to smooth consumption and price of consumption smoothing
  - Recall Chetty and Looney (2007)
  - This was a challenge for consumption-based approach
- In other words, a worker may smooth consumption less either bc the price is high or bc she care little about the drop
- Insight: can uncover state-specific prices through state-specific marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of an extra dollar of income ($dc_s/dy_s$)
  - MPC reveals shadow cost of resource that is used on the margin
  - MPC will be higher in state $s$ if state-specific price of consumption is higher
$$V = \pi(z)v_u(c_u, x_u) + \left(1 - \pi(z)\right)v_e(c_e, x_e) - z$$

- $c$ denotes consumption
- $z$ denotes actions that can reduce ue risk, $\pi(z)$ is probability of ue, $z$ is utility
- $x$ denotes actions that can be used to smooth consumption across states.
  - e.g. precautionary savings, access to credit, formal and informal insurance, household labor supply
  - $x_s$ denotes resources used to increase or decrease consumption relative to state-specific income
  - $p_s$ : price of increasing resources can be state dependent
Framework (con’t)

\[
V = \pi(z)v_u(c_u, x_u) + (1 - \pi(z))v_e(c_e, x_e) - z
\]

- Agents maximize expected utility \( V \) subject to her state-specific budget constraint:

\[
c_s = y_s + \frac{1}{p_s}x_s
\]

- Therefore within a state, equate marginal utility of consumption and marginal utility cost of generating resources:

\[
\frac{\partial v_s(c_s, x_s)}{\partial c} = -p_s \frac{\partial v_s(c_s, x_s)}{\partial x}
\]

- Implicitly differentiating the above optimality condition (and using \( y_s = c_s + x_s \)) yields

\[
MPC \equiv \frac{dc_s}{dy_s} = \frac{p_s \frac{\partial^2 v_s}{\partial x^2} / \frac{\partial v_s}{\partial x}}{-\frac{\partial^2 v_s}{\partial c^2} / \frac{\partial v_s}{\partial c} + p_s \frac{\partial^2 v_s}{\partial x^2} / \frac{\partial v_s}{\partial x}}
\]
Bounds based on State-Specific MPC

- Insight: can uncover state-specific prices through state-specific marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of an extra dollar of income \((dc_s/dy_s)\)
  - MPC reveals shadow cost of resource that is used on the margin
  - MPC will be higher in state \(s\) if state-specific price of consumption is higher
- Within a state: optimizing agents equalize the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal cost of generating resources
- Therefore, across states, ratio of marginal utilities of consumption (i.e. \(MRS\)) is equal to the ratio of state-specific prices times the ratio of state-specific marginal utility cost of generating resources

\[
MRS \equiv \frac{\frac{\partial v_u(c_u, x_u)}{\partial c}}{\frac{\partial v_e(c_e, x_e)}{\partial c}} = \frac{p_u \frac{\partial v_u(c_u, x_u)}{\partial x}}{p_e \frac{\partial v_e(c_e, x_e)}{\partial x}}
\]
Bounds based on State-Specific MPC

- Result: Assuming preferences are separable, households are making optimal decisions, income is lower when unemployed and marginal cost of generating resources is higher in the unemployed state (so that consumption is lower and resources used to smooth consumption are higher) and, then

\[
MRS \geq \frac{MPC_u}{MPC_e}
\]

- Recall:

\[
MRS \equiv \frac{\frac{\partial v_u(c_u,x_u)}{\partial c}}{\frac{\partial v_e(c_e,x_e)}{\partial c}} = \frac{p_u \frac{\partial v_u(c_u,x_u)}{\partial x}}{p_e \frac{\partial v_e(c_e,x_e)}{\partial x}}
\]

\[
MPC \equiv \frac{dc_s}{dy_s} = \frac{p_s \frac{\partial^2 v_s}{\partial x^2} / \frac{\partial v_s}{\partial x}}{-\frac{\partial^2 v_s}{\partial c^2} / \frac{\partial v_s}{\partial c} + p_s \frac{\partial^2 v_s}{\partial x^2} / \frac{\partial v_s}{\partial x}}
\]
• Attraction: do not have to worry about confounders to consumption-based approach like work-related expenses, durables, home production opportunities
  • home production can be a reason that price of consumption is state-specific
  • work or on the job search related expenditures (which affect drop in c between employed and unemployed) do not change MPC and how it relates to state specific prices
• Limitations
  • A bound, not a point estimate
  • Assumption that marginal cost of generating resources is higher in the unemployed state
    • Seems reasonable: income lower, so use more state-specific resources
    • Or not: marginal disutility of my spouse working (generating resources) may be lower when I am unemployed and can do more home production
  • Need comparable exogenous variation in income both when employed and unemployed to estimate state-specific MPCs
Implementation and Results

- Use variation in social assistance benefits within households (due to change in family structure and legislative changes over time within municipalities)
- Find substantially larger MCP when unemployed (~0.61) compared to when employed (0.44)
Comparison across approaches

• Consumption-based approach yields lowest value for UI benefits
  • Approach based on MPC out of income when unemployed vs employed suggests a lower bound on value of UI benefits that is higher than Consumption-based approach even for risk aversion of 4
  • Revealed preference approach suggests even higher value of UI benefits, as well as substantial heterogeneity

• What to conclude?
  • MPC and RP approach give value of UI that is much higher than consumption based approach. Could reconcile with large risk aversion (plausible if low income and have consumption commitments?)
  • Concerns about modeling errors
Comparison across approaches and to MH estimates

Figure 8: Comparison of MRS Estimates Across Different Approaches for the Baseline Sample

**Notes:** The graph summarizes the estimates of the MRS form different approaches. The region shaded in orange represent the range of MRS estimates using the drop in consumption of 12.9% and $\gamma \in [1; 4]$. The red line represents the estimates of MRS derived from the state-specific MPCs. The dashed line shows the distribution of MRS estimated using salient risk shifters, based on the predicted risks under comprehensive UI coverage. Its mean is represented by the vertical dashed line. Blue bars show the upper and lower bounds on MRS, using average predicted unemployment risk under basic and comprehensive coverage respectively. The area shaded in grey represents the moral hazard bounds estimated by Krueger and Meyer [2002] and Kolsrud et al. [2018].

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insured</th>
<th>Uninsured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1+\epsilon_{KM '02}$</td>
<td>$1+\epsilon_{KLNS '18}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2002-2006$</td>
<td>$2002-2006$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNINSURED</td>
<td>INSURED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP: 2.13</td>
<td>MPC: 1.97 (.32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marginal Rate of Substitution

CB MPC RP - Structural RP - non-para. MH
Figure 10: Huge uncertainty about gains from additional $1 of UI.

Source: Schmieder and von Wachter (2016) AR + Ganong additions for WTP.
The central question was how to set the generosity of benefits. On the benefit side, different approaches yield (wildly) different conclusions. Not really clear (to me) why. Echoes uncertainty on the cost side.
Policy implications?

- Central question: what is the rationale for UI / what problem are we trying to solve?
  - What policies are welfare enhancing if motive for UI is incomplete markets?
  - What policies are welfare enhancing if motive for UI is correcting a behavioral mistake?
- If the high estimates of value of UI arise from incomplete borrowing markets, then a loan is superior to more benefits (although doesn’t insure uncertainty of job finding rate)
- If the high value of UI arises from time-inconsistent preferences over consumption (e.g. think hyperbolic disconting), then with loans, would “over-borrow” and “under-search” relative to private optimum.
- “Liquidity constraints” from market failures (incomplete borrowing markets) coupled with behavioral frictions (people don’t save for ue)
Some musings

• Multiple competing rationales for UI - need more evidence / clarity here
  • This is almost always the key question / starting point for any policy evaluation (will come back to in health insurance)

• Optimal UI with non optimizing workers has not been worked out (I think)
  • Behavioral job search (e.g. reference dependence)
  • Behavioral consumption
    • consumption drops at predictable expiration of UI benefits
    • expected earnings loss from unemployment is highly countercyclical, yet consumption drop at start of unemployment is acyclical

• Methods seem highly useful for other contexts