ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND GOVERNMENTS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

Martin Beraja (MIT)

AEA Continuing Education, January 2023

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 - 3. The Ugly: AI is a surveillance technology. Gov't misuse for repression and social control? *"AI-tocracy"* (with Kao, Yang and Yuchtman) *"Exporting the surveillance state via trade in AI"* (with Kao, Yang and Yuchtman)

1. The Good: Access to Government Data as Innovation Policy

2. The Bad: Inefficient Automation

3. The Ugly: AI-tocracy

- Much focus on how data collected by private firms shapes AI innovation (Agrawal et al., 2019; Jones and Tonetti, 2020)
- > Yet, throughout history, states have also collected massive quantities of data
- ► The state has a large role in many areas
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Can access to government data stimulate commercial AI innovation?

DATA-INTENSIVE INNOVATION AND THE STATE: EVIDENCE FROM AI FIRMS IN CHINA

A common way in which firms access to gov't data is by providing services to the state

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
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




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- Algo's trained on video of faces from many angles
- Government units collect this data through their surveillance apparatus, and contract AI firms
- Firms gaining access to this data use it to train algorithms and provide gov't services
- If gov't data or algorithms are sharable across uses, they can be used to develop commercial AI (e.g., a facial recognition platform for retail stores)





DATA 1: LINKING AI FIRMS TO GOVT. CONTRACTS

- 1. Identify all facial recognition AI firms
 - 7,837 firms
 - Two sources: Tianyancha (People's Bank of China) and PitchBook (Morningstar)

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- 3. Link government buyers to AI suppliers
 - 10,677 AI contracts issued by public security arms of government (e.g., local police department)



Registered with Min. of Industry and Information Technology

Categorize by intended customers (with RNN model using tensorflow):

- 1. **Commercial:** e.g., visual recognition system for smart retail;
- 2. Government: e.g., smart city real time monitoring system on main traffic routes;
- 3. General: e.g., a synchronization method for multi-view cameras based on FPGA chips.

Within AI public security contracts: variation in the data collection capacity of the public security agency's local surveillance network

- 1. Identify non-AI contracts: police department purchases of street cameras
- 2. Measure quantity of advanced cameras in a prefecture at a given time
- 3. Categorize public security contracts as coming from "high" or "low" camera capacity prefectures

Regional variation in contracts



Empirical strategy

Triple diff: software releases before and after firm receives 1st data-rich contract (relative to data-scarce)


$$y_{it} = \sum_{T} \beta_{1T} T_{it} \mathsf{Data}_i + \sum_{T} \beta_{2T} T_{it} + \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \sum_{T} \beta_{3T} T_{it} X_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

- T_{it} : 1 if T semi-years before/since firm *i*'s 1st contract
- **Data**_i: 1 if firm *i* receives "data rich" contract
- X_i pre-contract controls: age, size, and software prod

Regional variation in contracts



Cumulative commercial software releases



Magnitude: 2 new products over 3 years

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
- As a technology of prediction, gov'ts may use AI for repression and social control (Zuboff, 2019; Tirole, 2021; Acemoglu, 2021)
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Evidence from China?


AI-TOCRACY

Unrest and gov't procurement of AI




AI-TOCRACY

Unrest and gov't procurement of AI



Unrest \longrightarrow Gov't buys AI and cameras



EXPORTING THE SURVEILLANCE STATE VIA TRADE IN AI





Democracies: Polity Score 7 or greater, Autocracies and weak democracies: Polity Score below 7

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
Exports of AI: China v. US

Democracies: Polity Score 7 or greater, Autocracies and weak democracies: Polity Score below 7



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Autocracies and weak democracies are more likely to import Al from China



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> Past automation (robots) has displaced workers and lowered their earnings

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- Two economic arguments for slowing down automation based on:
 - 1. Equity considerations (Guerreiro et al, 2022; Costinot and Werning, 2022)
 - 2. Efficiency considerations (Beraja and Zorzi, 2023)

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Are these arguments as strong for AI (e.g., LLMs) as they were for robots?

Continuous time $t \ge 0$

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Occupations

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h = A (degree $\alpha \ge 0$) or h = N

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Final good producer

$$G^{\star}\left(\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\mathsf{A}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\mathsf{N}};\boldsymbol{\alpha}\right)\equiv G\left(\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{\mathsf{h}}\right\}\right)-\mathcal{C}\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}\right)$$

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Automation

 $\partial_{\mathsf{A}} G^{\star}\left(\mu^{\mathsf{A}},\mu^{\mathsf{N}};\pmb{lpha}
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 $G^{\star}\left(\mu^{\mathsf{A}},\mu^{\mathsf{N}};\pmb{\alpha}
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 $y^{\!\!A}=\mu^{\!\!A}+lpha$, $y^{\!\!N}=\mu^{\!\!N}$

Final good producer

$$G^{\star}\left(\mu^{A},\mu^{N};\alpha\right) \equiv \left[\left(\alpha+\mu^{A}\right)^{\frac{\nu-1}{\nu}}+\left(\mu^{N}\right)^{\frac{\nu-1}{\nu}}\right]^{\frac{\nu}{\nu-1}}-\mathcal{C}\left(\alpha\right)$$

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Profit maximization

$$\max_{\alpha\geq 0}\int_{0}^{+\infty}Q_{t}\Pi_{t}\left(\alpha\right)dt$$

$$\Pi_{t}(\alpha) \equiv \max_{\mu^{A}, \mu^{N} \ge 0} G^{\star}\left(\mu^{A}, \mu^{N}; \alpha\right) - \mu^{A} W_{t}^{A} - \mu^{N} W_{t}^{N}$$

$$U_0 = \int \exp\left(-\rho t\right) \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} dt$$

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Budget constraint

$$da_t^h = \left[\mathcal{Y}_t^{h,\star} + r_t a_t^h - c_t^h\right] dt$$

WORKERS

Preferences

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Initial allocation

$$\left(\mu_{t}^{\text{A}},\mu_{t}^{\text{N}}
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
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
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
Two frictions

- 1. Reallocation (neoclassical)
 - Random opportunities arrive at rate λ
 - Unempl. / retrain. exit at rate κ
- 2. Borrowing

 $a_t^h \geq \underline{a}$ for some $\underline{a} \leq 0$








Ricardian workers (ample savings, borrow easily)


$$\mathcal{L}_{t}^{h}=eta_{t} imes\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-\int_{0}^{\mathrm{s}}r_{\mathrm{v}}d\mathrm{v}}\mathcal{Y}_{\mathrm{s}}^{h}\left(lpha
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▶ Non-auto. better-off; Auto. worse-off



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- ► Non-auto. better-off; Auto. worse-off
- Equity rationale for taxing automation
 Permanent income redistribution




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
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Maximize output PDV. Income timing irrelevant



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
- ► Non-auto. better-off; Auto. worse-off
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 Permanent income redistribution
- But firm automation is efficient
 Maximize output PDV. Income timing irrelevant
- In practice, workers may be financially vulnerable...



HtM workers (no savings, cannot borrow)

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
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
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
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
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- ► No Efficiency v. Equity trade-off

Adds: gradual autom. + idiosync. risk (Huggett-Aiyagari) + gross flows (McFadden)


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
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$ROBOTS \neq AI$ (generative, LLMs)


Robots \neq AI (generative, LLMs)

- **Equity** rationale seems much weaker for AI than it was for robots
 - Robots automate routine, low-to-middle-wage jobs (car manuf)
 - Al (likely) automates cognitive, middle-to high-wage jobs (lawyers, journos, soft devs)



Robots \neq AI (generative, LLMs)


- Efficiency rationale seems much weaker too
 - Lawyers, journos, and soft devs not the first that come to mind as "financially vulnerable"
 - Call centers? College debt?



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 - ► Call centers? College debt?

► Weaker rationale for **slowing down AI** due to job automation. AI **alignment** concerns?



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- ▶ Touches on issues across fields: macro (growth, innovation, labor), pol. econ, IO

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- ► Touches on issues across fields: macro (growth, innovation, labor), pol. econ, IO
- ▶ We have a **responsibility** to study the benefits, risks, and policy implications of AI
 - Otherwise, we leave the task to...
- We have only started to scratch the surface. More questions as AI is widely adopted.