Introduction

- In these two lectures, we will see why real-world elections might deviate from the implications of our simple theories even more than the tests in the previous two lectures indicate.
- These challenges are, at some level, much more to the essence of electoral politics.
- They are:
  - Lobbying: the fact that organized groups can influence parties directly or indirectly.
  - Vote buying: the possibility that organized groups can directly by votes from legislators. (This does also relate to political agency and other aspects of representative democracy we will discuss into lectures).
  - Clientelism and coercion: how voters can be influenced to vote in ways that are not directly in their interests.
  - Populism: how extreme or nonsustainable policies may result.
Lobbying

- We start with a simple model of lobbying due to Grossman and Helpman (1994).
- The advantage of this setup is that it links to our simplest model of electoral politics — where parties choose policies ex ante — and also to our analysis of probabilistic voting.
- Imagine that there are $G$ groups of agents, with the same economic preferences.
- The utility of an agent in group $g$, when the policy that is implemented is given by the vector $p \in \mathcal{P} \subset \mathbb{R}^K$, is equal to

$$U^g(p) - \gamma^g(p)$$

- $U^g(p)$ is the usual indirect utility function, and $\gamma^g(p)$ is the per-person lobbying contribution from group $g$.
- We will allow these contributions to be a function of the policy implemented by the politician, and to emphasize this, it is written with $p$ as an explicit argument.
Following Grossman and Helpman, let us assume that there is a politician in power, and he has a utility function of the form

\[
V(p) \equiv \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g \gamma^g (p) + a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g U^g (p)
\]

(1)

- \(\alpha^g\) is the share of group \(g\) in the population.
- \(a\) determines how much the politician cares about aggregate welfare. When \(a = 0\), he only cares about money, and when \(a \to \infty\), he acts as a utilitarian social planner.
- One reason why politicians might care about aggregate welfare is because of electoral politics (for example, they may receive rents or utility from being in power as in the last subsection and their vote share might depend on the welfare of each group).
Now consider the problem of an individual $j$ in group $g$.

By contributing some money, he might be able to sway the politician to adopt a policy more favorable to his group, but standard free rider problem.

Therefore, only organized groups can contribute.

Suppose that out of the $G$ groups of agents, $G' < G$ are organized as lobbies, and can collect money among their members in order to further the interests of the group.

The remaining $G - G'$ are unorganized, and will make no contributions. Without loss of any generality, let us rank the groups such that groups $g = 1, \ldots, G'$ to be the organized ones.
The lobbying game takes the following form:
- every organized lobby $g$ simultaneously offers a schedule $\gamma^g(p) \geq 0$ which denotes the payments they would make to the politician when policy $p \in \mathcal{P}$ is adopted.
- after observing the schedules, the politician chooses $p$.

Notice the important assumption here that contributions to politicians (campaign contributions or bribes) can be conditioned on the actual policy that’s implemented by the politicians.

This assumption may be a good approximation to reality in some situations, but in others, lobbies might simply have to make up-front contributions and hope that these help the parties that are expected to implement policies favorable to them get elected.

This is a potentially complex game, since lobbies are choosing functions (rather than real numbers or vectors).

Nevertheless, the equilibrium of this lobbying game takes a relatively simple form.
Lobbying Equilibrium

Theorem

In the lobbying game described above, contribution functions for groups \( g = 1, 2 \ldots J \), \( \{ \hat{\gamma}^g (\cdot) \}_{g=1,2 \ldots J} \) and policy \( p^* \) constitute a SPE if:

1. \( \hat{\gamma}^g (\cdot) \) is feasible in the sense that \( 0 \leq \hat{\gamma}^g (p) \leq U^g (p) \).
2. The politician chooses the policy that maximizes its welfare, that is,

\[
p^* \in \arg \max_p \left( \sum_{g=1}^{G'} \alpha^g \hat{\gamma}^g (p) + a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g U^g (p) \right).
\]

3. There are no profitable deviations for any lobby, \( g = 1, 2, \ldots, G' \), that is,

\[
p^* \in \arg \max_p \{ \alpha^g (U^g (p) - \hat{\gamma}^g (p)) \} \quad (2)
\]

\[
+ \sum_{g'=1}^{G'} \alpha^{g'} \hat{\gamma}^{g'} (p) + a \sum_{g'=1}^{G} \alpha^{g'} U^{g'} (p) \}.
\]
Lobbying Equilibrium (continued)

Theorem

4. There exists a policy $p_g^g$ for every lobby $g = 1, 2, \ldots, G'$ such that

$$p_g^g \in \arg \max_p \left( \sum_{g'=1}^{G'} \alpha^{g'} \hat{\gamma}^{g'} (p) + a \sum_{g'=1}^{G} \alpha^{g'} U^{g'} (p) \right)$$

and satisfies $\hat{\gamma}^g (p_g^g) = 0$. That is, the contribution function of each lobby is such that there exists a policy that makes no contributions to the politician, and gives her the same utility.
Sketch Proof

- These results follow using an analysis similar to the menu options of Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
- Conditions 1 and 2 are easy to understand.
- No group would ever offer a contribution schedule that does not satisfy Condition 1.
- Condition 2 has to hold, since the politician chooses the policy.
- If Condition 3 did not hold, then the lobby could change its contribution schedule slightly and improve its welfare, as we show next.
Sketch Proof (continued)

- Suppose condition 3 does not hold for lobby \( g = 1 \), and instead of \( p^* \), some \( \hat{p} \) maximizes (2).
- Denote the difference in the values of (2) evaluated at these two vectors by \( \Delta > 0 \).
- Consider the following contribution schedule for lobby \( g = 1 \):

\[
\tilde{\gamma}^1 (p) = \frac{1}{\alpha^1} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^{G'} \alpha^g \gamma^g (p^*) + a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g U^g (p^*) \right.
- \left. \sum_{g=2}^{G'} \alpha^g \gamma^g (p) - a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g U^g (p) + \varepsilon c^1 (p) \right]
\]

where \( c^1 (p) \) is an arbitrary function that reaches its maximum at \( p = \hat{p} \).
- Following this contribution offer by lobby 1, the politician would choose \( p = \hat{p} \) for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \).
Sketch Proof (continued)

- To see that this choices optimal for the politician, note that by part (1), the politician would choose policy \( \hat{p} \) that maximizes

\[
\alpha^1 \tilde{\gamma}^1 (p) + \sum_{g=2}^{G'} \alpha^g \hat{\gamma}^g (p) + a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g U^g (p)
\]

\[
= \sum_{g=1}^{G'} \alpha^g \hat{\gamma}^g (p^*) + a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g U^g (p^*) + \varepsilon c^1 (p).
\]

- Since for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \) this expression is maximized by \( \hat{p} \), the politician would choose \( \hat{p} \).

- The change in the welfare of lobby 1 as a result of changing its strategy is \( \Delta - \varepsilon c^1 (\hat{p}) \).

- Since \( \Delta > 0 \), for small enough \( \varepsilon \), the lobby gains from this change, showing that the original allocation could not have been an equilibrium.
Finally, condition 4 ensures that the lobby is not making a payment to the politician above the minimum that is required.

Suppose this condition were not true for some lobby, say lobby 1. Then lobby 1 could reduce its contribution function by a constant — from $\gamma^1(p)$ to $\gamma^1(p) - \epsilon$. Since the shift down by a constant does not change marginal incentives for the politician, for $\epsilon$ sufficiently small, the politician would still choose the same policy. But since $\epsilon > 0$, lobby 1 would increase its payoff.
Next suppose that these contribution functions are differentiable.

Then, it has to be the case that for every policy choice, $p^k$, within the vector $p^*$, we must have from the first-order condition of the politician that

$$
\sum_{g=1}^{G'} \alpha^g \frac{\partial \hat{\gamma}^g (p^*)}{\partial p^k} + a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g \frac{\partial U^g (p^*)}{\partial p^k} = 0 \text{ for all } k = 1, 2, \ldots, K
$$

From the first-order condition of each lobby that

$$
\alpha^g \left( \frac{\partial \hat{\gamma}^g (p^*)}{\partial p^k} - \frac{\partial U^g (p^*)}{\partial p^k} \right) + \sum_{g'=1}^{G} \alpha^g \frac{\partial \hat{\gamma}^{g'} (p^*)}{\partial p^k} +
\sum_{g'=1}^{G} a \sum_{g=1}^{G} \alpha^g \frac{\partial U^{g'} (p^*)}{\partial p^k} = 0
$$

for all $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$ and $g = 1, 2, \ldots, G'$. 

Differentiable Contribution Functions (continued)

- Combining these two first-order conditions, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\gamma}^g (p^*)}{\partial p^k} = \frac{\partial U^g (p^*)}{\partial p^k}$$

(3)

for all $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$ and $g = 1, 2, \ldots, G'$.

- Intuitively, at the margin each lobby is willing to pay for a change in policy exactly as much as this policy will bring them in terms of marginal return.

- But then this implies that the equilibrium can be characterized as

$$p^* \in \arg \max_p \left( \sum_{j=1}^{G'} \alpha^g U^g (p) + a \sum_{j=1}^{G} \alpha^g U^g (p) \right).$$
Consequently, there is an interesting parallel between the lobbying equilibrium and the pure strategy equilibria of probabilistic voting models analyzed before.

Like the latter, the lobbying equilibrium can also be represented as a solution to the maximization of a weighted social welfare function, with individuals in unorganized groups getting a weight of \( a \) and those in organized group receiving a weight of \( 1 + a \). Intuitively, \( 1/a \) measures how much money matters in politics, and the more money matters, the more weight groups that can lobby receive.

As \( a \to \infty \), we converge to the utilitarian social welfare function.
Lobbying and Distributional Conflict

- Consider a simple setting with two groups, rich and poor.
- Suppose that the rich are organized and the poor are not.
- Without lobbying, social welfare maximization would typically involve redistribution from the rich to the poor.
- But with lobbying, the weight of the rich in the induced social welfare function increases, and we may end up with no redistribution.
An alternative conception of what organized groups do: campaign contributions used for affecting equilibrium election outcomes.

Consider a probabilistic voting model with campaign contributions.

Let contributions to party $P$ be where

$$C_P = \sum_g O^g \alpha^g C^g_P$$

$O^g$ is an indicator variable for whether group $g$ is organized or not, $C^g_P$ is contribution per member, and $\alpha^g$ denotes the size of group $g$.

The effect of contributions is introduced as affecting the balance of different politicians. In particular, suppose as before that individuals in a group will vote for

$$U^i(p_A) - U^i(p_B) - \delta \geq \sigma^i,$$

where $\delta$ is an aggregate random valance variable affecting all voters.
Electoral Politics Gone Wrong

Campaign Contributions

Assume that

$$\delta = \tilde{\delta} + \eta \times (C_B - C_A),$$

so campaign spending influences this valance parameter. The parameter $\eta$ measures the effectiveness of campaign spending.

With usual arguments, the indifferent voter in group $J$ is defined by the threshold

$$\sigma^g = U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B) + \eta(C_A - C_B) - \tilde{\delta}.$$ 

In addition, assume that all groups are symmetric, and have $\sigma^g$ distributed uniformly over

$$\left[ -\frac{1}{2\phi}, \frac{1}{2\phi} \right].$$

Suppose also that the parameter $\tilde{\delta}$ has a uniform distribution on

$$\left[ -\frac{1}{2\psi}, \frac{1}{2\psi} \right].$$
This implies that the probability of party A winning the election is

\[ \Pr[A] = \frac{1}{2} + \psi \left[ U(p_A) - U(p_B) + \eta(C_A - C_B) \right] \]

where

\[ U(p_P) = \sum_g \alpha^g U^g(p_P) \]

is a measure of average preferences.

A utilitarian social planner would have simply maximized this.

Moreover, given the symmetry of all the groups, we know from our above analysis that probabilistic voting would have also maximized this. (Symmetry of all groups is adopted to highlight that any deviation from utilitarian social welfare function is due to the effects of lobbying).
We continue to assume that the only objective of the parties is to come to power. The question is how lobbying changes this. To understand this, let us look at the objective function of lobbies.

Assume that the lobby for group $J$ has the objective function:

$$\Pr[A] U^g(p_A) + (1 - \Pr[A]) U^g(p_B) - \frac{1}{2} \left( (C^g_A)^2 + (C^g_B)^2 \right),$$

which means that they don’t care about which party comes to power, only about the implemented policy. And there are convex costs of contributing to each party.

The exact timing of events is as follows:

- The two parties simultaneously choose their platforms, $p_A$ and $p_B$;
- Lobbies, observing the platforms, decide how much to give to each party.
- Voters observe their own $\sigma$’s and vote.
The important assumption here is that voters are essentially myopic, in the sense that they can be swayed by campaign contributions. This implies the following complementary slackness conditions for campaign contributions (for all groups that are organized)

\[
\eta_\psi \alpha^g [U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B)] - C^g_A \leq 0,
\]

and

\[
-\eta_\psi \alpha^g [U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B)] - C^g_B \leq 0,
\]

which exploits the fact that \( \partial p_A / \partial C^g_A = \eta_\psi \alpha^g \) and takes into account that we may be at a corner solution.
The equilibrium involves

\[
C^g_A = \max [0, \psi \eta \alpha^g (U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B))]
\]

\[
C^g_B = -\min [0, \psi \eta \alpha^g (U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B))].
\]

In other words, despite the convexity of the costs of contribution, each lobby only contributes to one party; in particular, it contributes to the party that has a platform that gives its members greater utility.
Now consider the first stage of the game where each party chooses their platform.

Since parties only care about coming to power, party A will maximize:

$$\psi \left[ U(p_A) - U(p_B) + \eta \times \sum_g \left( \max [0, \psi \eta \alpha^g (U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B))] + \min [0, \psi \eta \alpha^g (U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B))] \right) \right]$$

Party B will try to minimize this object.

It is clear that this is a concave problem, so the parties will again adopt symmetric platforms.

This has a very important implication: in equilibrium lobbies will make no contribution (from (4)); but they still influence policy with the threat of campaigning against the party that deviates from a particular equilibrium platform!
In the symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions become
\[ \sum_g \alpha^g \left[ \psi + O^g \alpha^g (\psi \eta)^2 \right] \nabla U^g (p_A) = 0. \]

Thus equilibrium again maximizes a weighted utility function.
\[ \sum_g \alpha^g \left[ 1 + O^g \alpha^g \psi \eta^2 \right] U^g (p_A). \]

When no group is organized, i.e., \( O^g = 0 \) for all \( g \), this is equivalent to the maximization of utilitarian social welfare (the assumption that \( \phi^g = \phi \) this of course important for this).

Otherwise, organized groups will get more weight, and interestingly larger groups will get more weight, because they can generate greater campaign contributions.

The additional weight that organized groups receive will also be a function of \( \eta \), the effectiveness of lobbies.

But importantly, lobbies make no spending. So influence is cheap.
A Simple Model of Vote Buying

- Consider a model due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996).
- There are two lobbies, acting sequentially.
- Suppose, for example, lobby A wants to change the status quo, lobby B wants to preserve it. This forces lobby A to make the first offer in order to get out of the status quo.
- But in fact there will still be a status quo bias because of a major second-mover advantage.
- This can be viewed as a model of lobbying where the votes that are being bought are from legislators or it could be a model of buying votes from voters directly.
Advantages of Supermajorities

- We will see that sequential vote buying will have a tendency to generate a supermajority.
- This is particularly interesting in the context of legislatures (e.g., rollcall votes), where typically legislation is not passed with a minimum majority but with a supermajority.

Intuition for supermajority:

- If lobby A buys bare majority, lobby B just has to buy back one guy. This is profitable for lobby B unless lobby A pays each voter lobby B’s entire value.
- If lobby A buys one extra voter, lobby B has to buy back two guys. Then lobby A only has to pay each voter half of lobby B’s value.
- Supermajorities are more robust, and therefore can be cheaper in total than bare majorities: pay more guys, but pay each one a lot less.
Model

- Status quo $x$, lobby A wants to change to $y$.
- Voter (or legislator) $i$ has utility $v(i) = u_i(x) - u_i(y)$ for $x$ over $y$.
- Lobby A has value $w_A$ for $y$ over $x$, lobby B has value $w_B$ for $x$ over $y$.
- Lobby A first offers each legislator a payment $b(i)$ if votes for $y$.
- Lobby B then offers each legislator a payment $g(i)$ if votes for $x$.
- Voting in undominated strategies.
- Policy determined by majority rule (assume #voters $n$ is odd).
Lobby A’s Problem

- In equilibrium, lobby A either buys cheapest (super)majority that lobby B can’t profitably overturn, or gives up and doesn’t pay anything.
- What’s lobby A’s cheapest stable supermajority?
- Lobby B will attack cheapest members of lobby A’s majority.
- → lobby A must minimize total cost subject to cheapest majority for lobby B costing $\geq w_B$.
- Consequently, lobby A must equalize the utility of all voters it bribes — otherwise it will allow some voters to be cheaply bought back by lobby B.
- We next study this problem in greater detail when all voters are homogeneous.
Equilibrium

- Suppose $v(i) = v > 0$ for all $i$ for simplicity.
- If lobby A buy $m$ extra voters, it must pay all bribed voters
  
  $$b = v + \frac{w_B}{1 + m}.$$ 

- Therefore, lobby A’s optimization problem is
  
  $$\min_m \left( v + \frac{w_B}{1 + m} \right) \left( \frac{n + 1}{2} + m \right).$$ 

- Solution:
  
  $$m^* = \sqrt{\frac{n - 1}{2} \frac{w_B}{v}} - 1$$

  and lobby A offers each one of $\frac{n+1}{2} + m^*$ voters

  $$b^* = v + \frac{w_B}{1 + m^*}.$$
Unique equilibrium:

- If \( w_A > (v + \frac{w_B}{1+m^*}) \left( \frac{n+1}{2} + m^* \right) \), then lobby A offers each one of
  \( \frac{n+1}{2} + m^* \) voters and amount of \( b^* = v + \frac{w_B}{1+m^*} \), and it wins and
  implements the reform.
- If \( w_A < (v + \frac{w_B}{1+m^*}) \left( \frac{n+1}{2} + m^* \right) \), then lobby A makes no further and
  there is no reform.

The second-mover advantage (or status quo bias) is obvious —
\( w_A > w_B + n v \) is not sufficient for reform.

What happens if \( n \rightarrow \infty \)? Then \( m^*/n \rightarrow 0 \). Then we approach
minimal winning coalition.

Take next the special case where \( v \rightarrow 0 \), then

\[
m^* = \sqrt{\frac{n-1}{2} \frac{w_B}{v}} - 1 \rightarrow \infty
\]

so that lobby A bribes everybody.
Equilibrium in General

- When we consider a general $v(i)$ function, the structure of the equilibrium is similar.
- In particular, the same limiting results apply.
Why the Assumptions?

- Let’s instead consider the other important assumptions here.
  1. What happens if the two lobbies make offers at the same time?
     - No pure-strategy equilibrium. Why not?
  2. What happens if the two lobbies can make sequential offers until both are happy to fold.
What Do Lobbyists Do in Practice?

What do lobbies do in practice?

One view is that they advice and provide information to legislators.

Casual empiricism suggests, instead, that they are much more pernicious than that.

Blanes-i-Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen (2012) document that they exploit the revolving door and their connections to politicians.
Lobbying Revenue and Connected Senators

- Lobbying revenue strongly predicted by such connections

\[2\]
Regression Estimates

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<th>Dependent variable: (log) revenue per lobbyist</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Plus party (2)</td>
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<td>Plus chamber (3)</td>
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<td>Plus experience (4)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>0.23***</th>
<th>0.21***</th>
<th>0.24***</th>
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Notes: This table presents the average effects of political connections on ex-staffers lobbying revenue. The dependent variable is the log of the revenue generated from all the clients that an individual lobbyist serves in a time (semester) period. The two main independent variables are the number of senators and representatives that an individual lobbyist worked for previous to entering the lobbying industry and are serving in Congress in that time period. All regressions use a sample containing ex-staffers-turned-lobbyists and include both individual lobbyist dummies and time effects (i.e., semester dummies). Column 2 allows for different time effects for lobbyists connected to politicians in different parties (i.e., Democrats versus Republicans). Columns 3 and 4 allow for different
Another reason why democracy may not reduce inequality is clientelism and patronage politics.

Patronage has many meanings, but in our context, by clientelism, we mean the practice of providing specific services, public goods or even payments to those who vote for a party or candidate.

In particular, with clientelism, democratic competition leads to each party catering to the needs of a narrow group through inefficient transfers or policies.

Particularly common in Africa after independence:

“African leaders typically used state resources to co-opt different ethnic elites to maintain political stability. The clientelism that resulted was not redistributive and generally benefited only a relatively small proportion of the citizenry” (van de Walle, 2003).
Ideas on Clientelism

- Clientelism may result from “repeated game interactions”: if the particular village doesn’t vote for a particular politician, they won’t get transfers in the future.
- But in practice, clientelism seems to be related to political middlemen and networks (e.g., Finan and Schechter, 2012).
- It might be very effective in buying turnout (rather than buying votes) (e.g., Nichter, 2008).
- Clientelism is most straightforward when it takes the form of “vote buying” or even “vote coercion” (e.g., Baland and Robinson, 2008).
- But even with secret ballots, “reciprocity”-type concerns may support clientelism (e.g., Finan and Schechter, 2012).
- Why is clientelism different than usual electoral politics? Why is it inefficient? Here let us focus on a simple model based on a paper by Lizzeri and Persico (though much simplified).
Modeling Clientelism

- Let us use a version of probabilistic voting.
- Suppose that parties $A$ and $B$ which aim to maximize their vote share.
- Citizens divided into groups $i \in \{0, 1, .., N\}$. Each group $i$ is of size $n_i$, normalize for simplicity to $1/N$.
- Each individual has utility given by
  \[
  (1 - \tau) y_i + g_i + \alpha \Gamma (G),
  \]
  where $\tau$ is a tax rate, $y_i$ is the income of group $i$, $g_i$ is the group-specific public good or transfer directed to this group, and $G$ is a general public good ($\alpha$ parameterizing its efficiency).
- We assume that $\Gamma$ is strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions.
Utilitarian Benchmark

- The government budget constraint is

\[ G + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=0}^{N} g_i \leq \frac{1}{N} (\tau - C(\tau)) \sum_{i=0}^{N} y_i, \]

where \( C(\tau) \), which is increasing and concave, captures the costs of taxation.
Utilitarian Benchmark

- Let us start with utilitarian benchmark (with equal weight from all groups).
- This is a solution to maximizing

\[
\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=0}^{N} \left((1 - \tau) y_i + g_i\right) + \alpha \Gamma (G)
\]

subject to the government budget constraint.
- Denoting the Lagrange multiplier on the government resources by \(\lambda\), the complementary slackness conditions are:

\[
\alpha \Gamma'(G) = \lambda \\
1 \leq \lambda \\
\bar{y} = \lambda \bar{y} \left(1 - C(\tau)\right).
\]

- Inspection shows that if \(\alpha\) is greater than some \(\alpha^*\), then the conditions for group specific transfers will be all slack, and all redistribution will be through the public good.
Political Game

- Individuals vote for party $A$ if it provides them a utility benefit greater than $x$, where $x$ is drawn from the distribution $H_i$ with density $h_i$.
- Parties simultaneously choose platforms $(\tau, G, g_1, \ldots, g_N)$ that satisfy the government budget constraint to maximize their vote shares.
- Assuming no corner solution, the vote share of party $A$ can be written as:

$$S_A = \sum_{i=0}^{N} H_i \left[ \left( 1 - \tau^A \right) y_i + g_i^A + \alpha \Gamma \left( G^A \right) - \left( 1 - \tau^B \right) y_i + g_i^B + \alpha \Gamma \left( G^B \right) \right]$$
Political Equilibrium

- Under usual conditions, a symmetric political equilibrium will exist and will satisfy the first-order conditions

\[ \alpha \Gamma'(G) = \frac{\lambda'}{\sum_{i=0}^{N} h_i(0)} \]

\[ h_i(0) \leq \lambda' \]

\[ \bar{y} = \frac{\lambda'}{\sum_{i=0}^{N} h_i(0)} \bar{y} (1 - C(\tau)) \]

- Now suppose that \( h_i(0) \) is very high for some group (i.e., they are very responsive transfers). Then relative to the utilitarian benchmark, this will lead to equality for the group-specific transfer for that group.

- This will also increase \( \lambda' \) above \( \lambda \), which will have two implications:
  1. There will be underinvestment in the general public good.
  2. Taxes will increase (because government resources are now more valuable to the party seeking to increase its vote share).
More Generally

- More generally, if the utility function is also concave in group-specific transfers, several groups will receive such transfers, and even more underinvestment in the general public good will result.

- Interpretation: vote seeking will bias policies away from general public goods to those that can be targeted to the most responsive groups, even if this is inefficient.
Clientelism and Democracy

- What’s the relationship between clientelism and democracy?
  - Clearly, it is democratic competition of sorts that is at the root of the type of clientelism outlined here.
  - But Lizzeri and Persico (2004) show that an extension of the franchise can reduce clientelism— because it increases the importance of the general-purpose public goods rather than group-specific public goods. This is in fact the basis of their alternative theory of democratization in 19th century Britain.
  - If so, the solution to clientelism might be to strengthen rather than rein in democracy.
Clientelism in Indian Villages

- Anderson, François and Kotwal (2011) provides a possible example of captured democracy, rural governance institutions (Gram Panchayats) in Maharashtra India.
- Elections are free, with very limited fraud and coercion, and typically lead to high representation.
- Citizens also appear to believe that the democratic process works.
- However, land-owning elite from the leading caste, Marathas, dominate politics both directly and indirectly, and this often has the effect of undermining redistributive policies and also poverty alleviation programs.
Villagers are generally dissatisfied with the performance of rural governance institutions, and there is general recognition that power is in the hands of upper caste members and landowners.

Empirical work by Anderson et al. shows that Maratha elites dominate politics in places where they are more numerous (in part because of block caste voting and the greater social cohesion) but also in places where they own more land.

In such elite-dominated villages, wages are lower (even though productivity on agricultural lands and profits are higher).

Anderson et al. suggest that this pattern reflects patron-client relations in Maharashtra villages, empowering the elite. We next turn to a brief discussion of clan to listen.
The Effects of Elite Domination

- Maratha domination (MLD) has a negative effect in villages with small fraction of Marathas (low MPROP):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Coefficient ($\beta_1$) MLD</th>
<th>Coefficient ($\beta_2$) MPROP</th>
<th>Coefficient ($\beta_3$) MLD · MPROP</th>
<th>Coefficient ($\beta_1 + \beta_3$)</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maratha Pradhan</td>
<td>0.43 (0.15)**</td>
<td>1.21 (0.24)**</td>
<td>−0.51 (0.28)*</td>
<td>−0.08 (0.18)</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs (household data)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>All programs (1)</td>
<td>−1.01 (0.36)**</td>
<td>−1.19 (0.57)**</td>
<td>1.84 (0.72)**</td>
<td>0.83 (0.49)*</td>
<td>8,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPL programs (1)</td>
<td>−0.42 (0.12)**</td>
<td>−0.37 (0.21)*</td>
<td>0.81 (0.27)**</td>
<td>0.39 (0.18)**</td>
<td>8,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGS (1)</td>
<td>−0.10 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.10)**</td>
<td>0.09 (0.07)</td>
<td>8,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income programs (1)</td>
<td>−0.98 (0.33)**</td>
<td>−1.11 (0.54)**</td>
<td>1.84 (0.68)**</td>
<td>0.87 (0.46)*</td>
<td>8,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-income programs (1)</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>−0.08 (0.07)</td>
<td>−0.004 (0.08)</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.05)</td>
<td>8,140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programs (village data)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All programs (2)</td>
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<td>−1.04 (0.57)*</td>
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<td>0.49 (0.50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPL programs (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGS (2)</td>
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<td>0.02 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.11)*</td>
<td>0.10 (0.08)</td>
<td>291</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income programs (2)</td>
<td>−0.92 (0.34)**</td>
<td>−1.00 (0.54)**</td>
<td>1.53 (0.70)**</td>
<td>0.61 (0.47)</td>
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<td>Non-income programs (2)</td>
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<td>−0.04 (0.07)</td>
<td>−0.009 (0.09)</td>
<td>−0.11 (0.06)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue (1)</td>
<td>−157.4 (86.2)*</td>
<td>−173.5 (237.1)</td>
<td>122.8 (231.5)</td>
<td>−34.6 (200.5)</td>
<td>220</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue (2)</td>
<td>−10.4 (5.4)**</td>
<td>−16.0 (8.0)**</td>
<td>25.4 (10.7)**</td>
<td>14.9 (5.8)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>−10.0 (5.2)**</td>
<td>−15.2 (7.9)**</td>
<td>27.2 (10.5)**</td>
<td>14.2 (5.7)**</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDO meetings</td>
<td>−2.37 (1.04)**</td>
<td>1.46 (3.92)</td>
<td>0.15 (4.03)</td>
<td>−2.22 (3.45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP meetings</td>
<td>−3.04 (1.54)**</td>
<td>−2.05 (2.49)</td>
<td>3.28 (1.92)*</td>
<td>0.25 (1.46)</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC meetings</td>
<td>−2.04 (0.87)**</td>
<td>−3.96 (1.77)**</td>
<td>3.32 (1.67)**</td>
<td>1.29 (1.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meetings (AES)</td>
<td>−2.48 (1.06)**</td>
<td>−1.51 (1.85)</td>
<td>2.25 (2.13)</td>
<td>−0.23 (1.53)</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All estimations include village-level controls (latitude, longitude, elevation, presence of river/canal, distance to natural water sources, distance to railways and national roads, soil quality measures, rainfall levels, proportion of the population that is SC/ST, total village population, and whether the GP is reserved) and regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Acronyms used are: Maratha land dominated (MLD); Maratha population.
Clientelism in Argentina

- Nichter (2008) argues that the main role of patronage and machine politics in Argentina is to encourage turnout.

![Figure 2: Opinion of Peronists among Recipients and Nonrecipients of Rewards](image-url)

*Note: This figure is a corrected version of Figure 3 in Stokes 2005, 324. Rewards reflect particularistic benefits received during the 2011 electoral campaign by Stokes's survey respondents. Individuals coded as receiving rewards if answering “Yes” to this question: “Did you receive goods distributed by a party in the last campaign?” The most frequent reward was food; other rewards frequently mentioned were work, gifts, and money.*
Electoral Politics Gone Wrong
Evidence on Clientelism

Clientelism Networks in Mexico

- In Mexico, such networks seem to have been important for the last 70 years for the support for PRI.
  - Particularly important in *ejidos* and *comunidades agrarias* controlled by the PRI.
- These networks will be particularly powerful when:
  - they have the resources and the power to fund political brokers and reward voters, and
  - they have the ability to monitor vote behavior and particularly, the performance of political brokers.
Empirical Strategy

- Suppose that PRI uses electoral data to monitor the performance of the brokers that control their networks.
- Exploit the fact that parties face a mismatch between
  - the level at which brokers operates their networks, and
  - the level at which electoral data they can use to monitor brokers is disclosed.
Empirical Model

\[ y_{emst} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot I_{st}^{PRI} + \beta_2 \cdot fit_{ems} + \beta_3 \cdot I_{st}^{PRI} \cdot fit_{ems} + \epsilon_{emst} \]

- \( y_{mst} \): vote share for the PRI in communal land \( c \) municipality \( m \) in state \( s \) in year \( t \).
- \( I_{st}^{PRI} \): dummy variable that indicates whether the PRI controls the state government at the time of the election—resource effect.
- \( fit_{ems} \): fit of communal land to the electoral district, measuring mismatch—monitoring effect.
- \( \epsilon_{emst} \): error term.
Results

Under PRI Control

Vote Share for the PRI and Fit under PRI Governor

Under Non PRI Control

Vote Share for the PRI and Fit under Non-PRI Governor
Results (continued)

- Vote Share for the PRI (y axis) and Election Since Change from the PRI in State Government (x axis).
Outcome Results

- Greater power of PRI networks associated with more success for PRI in controlled by PRI governors.
- But also worse public good outcomes.
Coercion

- Even more pernicious than vote buying and clientelism would be direct coercion.
- Sometimes the line between coercion and vote buying are blurred (traditional networks are good for threats of coercion also).
- An interesting setting is studied by Baland and Robinson (2008), who argued that Chilean landowners before the introduction of the secret ballot were able to coerce their tenants into voting for right-wing parties.
- This changed after the introduction of the secret ballot in 1958.
The Effects of the Secret Ballot

**Figure 1. Right-Wing Votes and the Ratio of Inquilinos to Registered Voters in 1957 and 1965**

(Scatter plot and simple regression line)
Not so Different in the United States

- Machine politics in the United States is not so different.
- Especially before civil service reforms, public sector jobs were under the control of mayors, state legislatures and governors.
- In the same way that landowners may use their control of land to influence the voting patterns of their tenants, machine politics may involve the use of patronage jobs at the state level to influence voting.
- This is studied by Folke, Hirano and Snyder (2011) using a differences-in-differences design (with a touch of close election comparison).
- The empirical strategy is to look at the effects of control of state lower house on future election outcomes differentially by states that have or have not undergone civil service reforms (which took place between 1880 and 1980).
Results

* Coefficient on patronage (no civil service reform), controlling for majority in the lower house for the party in power. Estimates suggest as much as 28% more votes due to patronage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1. Patronage and Election Outcomes 1885–1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specification and Sample</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Linear controls, no FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full controls, no FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full controls, state and year FE</td>
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<td>Full sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No controls, no FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower house margin ≤ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No controls, no FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower house margin ≤ 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No controls, no FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower house margin ≤ 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>No controls, no FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower house margin ≤ 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each column presents estimates of the coefficient on the Patronage variable with the dependent variable listed.
What is Populism?

- Growing populist currents around the world.
- They take different forms in different countries (e.g., right-wing, nationalist populism in the US, Hungary, the Netherlands and France, and of course in the US; left-wing populism in Greece, Spain and to some degree France; a different brand in the Philippines or Turkey).
- How do you explain this phenomenon?
- Many factors, including economic inequality, grievances, charismatic leadership, decline of trust in democratic institutions or existing parties.
Demand and Supply for Populism

- **Demand-side factors**: voters are not happy with the policy offerings of traditional parties, perhaps because of inequality, grievances, or other forces.
- **Supply-side factors**: parties and leaders offer an attractive populist menu, perhaps combined with charismatic leadership.
- Is the recent surge in populism demand-driven or supply-driven? 
- Probably both.
Supply of Populism

- Guiso et al. (2020) provide some evidence on this.

**Figure 4: The Rise of Populism**

- The left panel shows the evolution of the share of European countries in the ESS sample that have at least one populist party. The right panel shows the histogram of the number of populist parties in our sample.

- But this increase in supply may be a response to demand.
Recent Rise in Populism Has Been Mostly Right-Wing

Why? Poorly understood at the moment.
### Table 3: Main specification - Heckman probit estimates of populist party vote and participation in voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Heckprobit</th>
<th></th>
<th>(2) Heckprobit</th>
<th></th>
<th>(3) Heckprobit</th>
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<th>(4) Heckprobit</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>Vote</td>
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<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>0.00313</td>
<td>0.0228***</td>
<td>0.00480</td>
<td>0.0227***</td>
<td>0.00455</td>
<td>0.0245***</td>
<td>0.00659</td>
<td>0.0240***</td>
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<td>(0.0120)</td>
<td>(0.00550)</td>
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<td>(0.00560)</td>
<td>(0.0128)</td>
<td>(0.00560)</td>
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<td>ln(Age)</td>
<td>-0.0985</td>
<td>0.835***</td>
<td>-0.0907</td>
<td>0.831***</td>
<td>-0.0555</td>
<td>0.850***</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.859***</td>
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<td>(0.0670)</td>
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<td>(0.0878)</td>
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<td>ln(Education)</td>
<td>-0.264***</td>
<td>0.473***</td>
<td>-0.305***</td>
<td>0.471***</td>
<td>-0.247***</td>
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<td>TV total</td>
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<td>0.00979</td>
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<td>0.0118</td>
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<td>(0.0151)</td>
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<td>Unemployment</td>
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<td>Income difficulties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exposure globalization</td>
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<td>Economic insecurity (PC)</td>
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<td>-0.896***</td>
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<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in pol. parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0259**</td>
<td>0.0541***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fewer non-EU immigrants</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.116***</td>
<td>-0.292***</td>
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<td>(0.0214)</td>
<td>(0.00884)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Limits of Individual-Level Correlations

- However, individual-level correlations appear to be non-robust in general.
- In the US, for example, it is working class people who have suffered the most severe declines in real incomes over the last four decades.
- But stronger support for Trump is often among middle-class individuals, small business owners etc.
- Could it be that the right place to look is at the level of communities? This might be because of hardship at the community level, but it is not clear why this is the one that should matter ahead of individual-level hardship.
Community-Level Correlations?

- The best evidence for this comes from Autor et al.’s study of the effects of China shock at the commuting zone-level.
- Chinese import shocks lead to greater Fox News viewership:
Community-Level Correlations? (continued)

- Chinese import shocks also lead to a polarized pattern of campaign contributions:

![Graph showing community-level correlations](image_url)

**Figure 4. Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002–2004/2016**
Community-Level Correlations? (continued)

Figure 5. Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002–2004/2016
Community-Level Correlations? (continued)

- Another polarization pattern.

![Graph showing community-level correlations](image-url)
Community-Level Correlations? (continued)

- At the presidential level, mostly an advantage for Republicans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5 — Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Presidential Election Vote Shares, 2000–2008 and 2000–2016, 2SLS Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A. ΔNet Republican vote share, 2000–2008</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔCZ import penetration, 2000–2008</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔNet Republican vote share, 2000–2008</td>
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<td>ΔCZ import penetration, 2000–2008</td>
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<td><strong>Panel B. ΔNet Republican vote share, 2000–2016</strong></td>
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<td>ΔCZ import penetration, 2000–2008</td>
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<td>1992/1996 election controls</td>
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</table>
How to Make Sense of This?

- Not unrelated to a decline in trust in institutions. Votes shifting towards extremes.
- A huge decline in trust in democracy in the US.
Latin American Populism

- How to think about such shifts to extremes?
- Let us start with a model of Latin American style, “left-wing” populism.
- Typical “left-wing” populism associated with various policies:
  - Budget deficits, mandatory wage increases, price controls, overvalued exchange rates, expropriation of foreign investors / large businesses.
- Costly to businesses, but also costly to the population at large.
- Dornbush and Edwards (1991):
  
  "Populist regimes have historically tried to deal with income inequality problems through the use of overly expansive macroeconomic policies. These policies, which have relied on deficit financing, generalized controls, and a disregard for basic economic equilibria, have almost unavoidably resulted in major macroeconomic crises that have ended up hurting the poorer segments of society."

- These are rather different from the current “right-wing” populists.
Populism vs. Median Voter

- Are these policies what the “median voter” wants?
- Perhaps, but Dornbusch and Edwards’s definition and the fact that middle classes and lower middle classes suffer on their populist policies suggests may be not.
- The fact that populist policies are often to the left of the “median voter” cannot be explained solely by personal biases of the populist politician.
  - such biased politician would fail to be reelected.
Most populist regimes are “popular,” at least for quite a while.

Popularity of populist regimes even allows leaders to violate constitutional norms:

- Most of Latin American postwar leaders post term-limited (often by one term), but many violated the rules.
- This should not be the case if they are known to involve highly inefficient policies.

Also interestingly, many of the populist politicians or parties, at least in Latin America, often end up choosing policies consistent with the interests of traditional elites.

- E.g.: PRI in Mexico, the policies of traditional parties in Venezuela and Ecuador, Fujimori’s reign in Peru, Menem in Argentina.
Possible Definition

- Populism = policy to the left of median voter’s ideal policy but still popular
- Why would this be the case?
- One-dimensional policy space
- Two points of attraction for politician
  - median voter’s preferences
  - elite’s preferences, exercised through bribes
  - (personal preferences if partisan)
- Normally, policy should lie between median voter’s and elite’s ideal points.
- But there are informational reasons for policy to be to the left of the median voter—i.e., populist.
Major concern of the median voter under weak institutions: a politician is secretly biased to the right or being disproportionately influenced by the elite (e.g., through bribery, corruption or lobbying).

Relevant for the Latin American context.

Politicians will move to the left to signal that they are not closet right-wingers or in the pockets of the traditional elites.

Then: moderate politicians will necessarily adopt populist policies and even right-wingers (or corrupt politicians) may adopt such policies.

Intuition: it is the threat of excessive elite influence under weaker institutions that leads to populist policies.
Policy Space and Voters

- One-dimensional policy space
- Two periods, 1 and 2
- Two groups of voters
  - majority (poor), with bliss point $\gamma^p = 0$
  - minority (elite), with bliss point $\gamma^r = r > 0$
  - results identical if there is a distribution of preferences with median at $\gamma = 0$
- Voters care about policy only
  - Person with bliss point $\gamma$ gets utility
    \[
    u(x_1, x_2) = -\sum_{t=1}^{2} (x_t - \gamma)^2
    \]
    from policies $x_1$ and $x_2$ in periods 1 and 2
- Elections are decided by median voter who is poor
Politicians

- Politicians’ utility in each period depends on:
  - policy
    \[ \nu = -\alpha (x - \gamma)^2 \ldots \]
  - office
    \[ \ldots + \text{WI}_{\{\text{in office}\}} \ldots \]
  - bribes
    \[ \ldots + B \]

- Two types of politicians
  - share \( \mu \) has \( \gamma = 0 \) (“moderate”)
  - share \( 1 - \mu \) has \( \gamma = r \) (“right-winger”)

- We start with \( B = 0 \)
Timing

1. Politician chooses first-period policy $x_1 \in \mathbb{R}$.
2. Population gets a noisy signal $s = x_1 + z$.
3. Median voter decides whether to replace the current politician with a random one drawn from the pool.
4. In the second period, the politician (the incumbent or the new one) chooses policy $x_2 \in \mathbb{R}$.
5. Everyone learns the realizations of both policies and gets payoffs.
Noisy Signal

- Noise \( z \) has a distribution with support on \((-\infty, +\infty)\) with c.d.f. \( F(z) \) and p.d.f. \( f(z) \).
- Density \( f(z) \) is assumed to be an even (i.e., symmetric around 0) function, which is everywhere differentiable and satisfies \( f'(z) < 0 \) for \( z > 0 \).
  - the density function \( f \) is single-peaked
- Noise \( z \) is sufficiently high and well-behaved:

\[
|f'(z)| < \frac{1}{\frac{r^2}{2} + \frac{W^2}{2\alpha}} \quad \text{for all } z.
\]

- implies \( \Pr(|z| > \frac{r}{4}) > \frac{1}{4} \)
- implies \( f(0) < \frac{2}{r} \)
- holds for \( \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2) \) if \( \sigma^2 \) is sufficiently high, i.e., \( \sigma^2 > \frac{r^2}{2} + \frac{W^2}{2\alpha} \).
Equilibrium Concept

Period 2

- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies

- In period 2:
  - moderate politician chooses $x_2 = 0$
  - right-wing politician chooses $x_2 = r$

- Median voter prefers to have moderate politician in period 2
  - incumbent reelected if and only if his posterior that he is moderate is at least $\mu$
Period 1: Elections

- Suppose that in equilibrium:
  - moderate politicians choose $x_1 = a$
  - right-wing politicians choose $x_1 = b > a$ (proved in the paper that this is always the case).

- For median voter who gets signal $s$, posterior probability that politician is moderate equals

  $$\hat{\mu} = \frac{\mu f(s - a)}{\mu f(s - a) + (1 - \mu) f(s - b)}$$

- It exceeds $\mu$ if and only if

  $$s < \frac{a + b}{2}$$

- The probability of reelection if policy is $x$ equals

  $$\pi(x) = F\left(\frac{a + b}{2} - x\right)$$
Period 1: Policy Choices

- **Moderate politician maximizes**
  \[ \max_x -\alpha x^2 + W \pi(x) - (1 - \mu) \alpha r^2 (1 - \pi(x)) \]

- he loses \( \alpha r^2 \) in period 2 only if right-wing politician comes to power
- FOC must hold at \( x = a \):
  \[-2\alpha a - \left( W + (1 - \mu) \alpha r^2 \right) f \left( \frac{b - a}{2} \right) = 0 \]

- **Right-wing politician maximizes**
  \[ \max_x -\alpha (x - r)^2 + W \pi(x) - \mu \alpha r^2 (1 - \pi(x)) \]

- FOC at \( x = b \):
  \[-2\alpha (b - r) - \left( W + \mu \alpha r^2 \right) f \left( \frac{b - a}{2} \right) = 0 \]
Equilibrium

Intuition for shapes: related to effects of policies on likelihood ratios.
Solution

- In equilibrium, $a < 0$
  - moving from $x_1 = 0$ to $x_1 < 0$ causes second-order loss
  - but first-order gain due to higher chance of reelection

- $b < r$ for the same reason

- This moves $a$ left even further

- For moderate politicians: a right-wing alternative necessitates populist bias!

- This would be true even if $W = 0$
  - reelection is valuable as it allows to influence second-period policy
Comparative Statics

\[ W^1 \]

\[ b = b(a) \]

\[ a = a(b) \]
Comparative Statics (continued)

- Populist bias is stronger if
  - $W$ is higher (i.e., politicians value being in office more)
  - $\alpha$ is lower (i.e., changing political positions is relatively costless for politicians)
  - $\mu$ is lower (i.e., moderate politicians are rarer)

- This holds even if $W$ increases or $\alpha$ decreases for only one type of politician
  - e.g., higher $W$ for pro-elite politicians makes them move left
  - and then pro-poor politicians move left as well
Comparative Statics (continued)

- Also, under additional conditions on distribution $F$, populist bias is stronger if:
  - $r$ is greater (i.e., greater polarization).
  - two competing effects:
    1. benefits from reelection to both types of politicians is greater, which leads to more signaling;
    2. cost of signaling is also higher to right-wingers. Additional conditions ensure that the first effect dominates.

- Populist bias would be weaker if elitist politicians could commit to $b = r$
Populism of Centrist Politicians

- If $W = 0$, then $0 < b < r$
  - $x_1 < 0, x_2 = r$ is dominated even by $x_1 = r, x_2 = 0$
  - hence switching to $x_1 = r$ is better even if it guaranteed losing elections

- If $W > 0$, then $b < 0$ is possible
  - if office is very valuable per se, *all* politicians will be populists!
Lessons for Right-Wing Politicians?

- The same type of signaling issues may be relevant.
- The language of populism is quite distinctive and has an important signaling aspect—rejecting conventional politics.
- But it is not plausible to think that in places such as the US or France, politicians were excessively pursuing left-winger agendas, so parts of the model are not a good fit.
- Other missing element here is “identity”, which seems to have played an important role in recent political dynamics.
Identity and Populism

- Missing from most standard models, including the one presented above, is a notion of identity, which may be important for populism of the right—national rhetoric plays an important role in most right-wing populist movements.

- The first political economy model of identity was developed in Shayo (2009).

- Here I will present a version of Shayo (2009), simplified for exposition and clarity.

- Other models of political economy and identity have since been developed, for example, Bonomi, Gennaioli and Tabellini (2021) or Grossman and Helpman (2021).

- The key in all of these models is that an individual (effectively) chooses their identity and the identity choice impacts their policy preferences—and possibly feedbacks the other way around as well.
Material and Identity Payoffs

Suppose individual utility consists of material utility ($\pi_i$) and identity payoff ($S_i$), so that

$$U_i(\tau, a) = \pi_i(\tau) + \gamma S_i(\tau, a),$$

where $\tau$ is a tax rate (the only dimension of political economy for simplicity) and $a$ is an action profile, related to identity choices of others (and $\gamma > 0$ is a parameter). Suppose as in Shayo (2009) that

$$\pi_i(\tau) = (1 - \tau)y_i + T,$$

where the transfer term is $T = (\tau - C(\tau))y$, with $C(\tau)$ capturing deadweight losses from distortionary taxation and $y$ is average income.

In addition, suppose that there only two economic groups, the poor, which make up a fraction $\lambda > 1/2$ of the population, with income $y_p$, while the remaining rich have income $y_r > y_p$.

Finally, suppose that individuals also have some non-economic characteristic denoted by $q_i$ (e.g., nationalistic belief etc.).
Identity Payoffs

- Here I will simplify the identity payoffs relative to Shayo. Suppose, in particular, that there are $G$ distinct groups, and $a_i = g$ means that an individual identifies with group $g$.

$$S_i(\tau, a_i, a_{-i}) = \mathbb{E}[\pi_j(\tau) | a_j = a_i] - w_y (y_i - \mathbb{E}[y_j | a_j = a_i])^2$$

$$- w_q (q_i - \mathbb{E}[q_j | a_j = a_i])^2 - w_Q (q_i - Q_{a_i})^2.$$  

- Here, the first term is capturing the fact that the individual partially internalizes the economic interests of the group he identifies with.

- The second term is a penalty for the distance between the economic characteristics of the individual and the group, while the third term is a penalty for the distance between the non-economic characteristics of the individual in the group.

- Finally, the fourth term anchors things relative to a fixed characteristic of the group (so that group labels are meaningful).
Equilibrium

- An equilibrium requires that, given the action profile of other agents $a_{-i}$, agent $i$ has

$$U_i(\tau, a_i, a_{-i}) \geq U_i(\tau', a'_i, a_{-i})$$

for all $\tau', a'_i$.

- Here, we are assuming that the individual is pivotal in the tax decision.

- This definition of equilibrium clearly generalizes the standard one without identity.
National vs. Class Identity

- Let us next follow Shayo (2009), and suppose that there are only three identities: national, working class and rich.
- Let us then construct an equilibrium in which the majority of the poor choose a working-class identity, while the rich choose a rich identity.
- When this is the case, the working class have political preferences in line with their economic interests. The distance from the economic mean of their group is also zero.
- Given their group identity, they will indeed choose taxes that maximize their economic interests.
- What about the distance in $q$?
Choosing Class Identity

- If we assume that the majority of the working class have $q$ concentrated around the same value, then there will not be much distance between the group average $q$ and their own $q$.

- In particular, suppose that both among the poor [rich] a fraction $\omega_p > 1/2$ [$\omega_r > 1/2$] has $q = 0$. Let me refer to these agents as the majority. The remaining agents in each group are distributed equally between $q = 1$ and $q = -1$.

- Suppose also $Q_{national} = 0$, $Q_{working\ class} = -1$, and $Q_{rich} = 1$.

- Now, would the majority like to change identity?

- The only viable alternative choice starting from this configuration is to switch to a national identity. This will be beneficial because of the final term in the utility function, but costly because of the second and third terms. If $w_Q$ is not very large, then switching is not optimal.

- This thus constructs a class identity equilibrium.
Multiple Equilibria: Choosing National Identity

- But multiple equilibria can easily exist.
- For the same parameter configuration, now suppose that the majority of the poor choose a national identity.
- Suppose also that $w_y$ and/or $w_q$ is sufficiently large. Then it is optimal to choose a national identity for the poor.
- With a similar argument, it is also optimal for the rich to choose a national identity.
- In this case, there will be much less redistribution.
Identity Shifts and the Nature of Political Conflict

- If there are multiple equilibria, then for “unmodeled” reasons, we can have a shift from class to national identity.
- This will change the nature of conflict.
- Shayo (2009) provides evidence consistent with this pattern.
National Identification and Support for Redistribution

FIGURE 3. Support for Redistribution by National identity and Income

a. Advanced Economies

- Very Proud
- Less Proud
National Identification and Support for Redistribution (continued)

FIGURE 8. Social Expenditure and National Identity

a. ISSP

b. WVS

N = 14, R² = .27

N = 42, R² = .25, Without Japan: N = 39, R² = .48
Right-Wing Populism

- Now let us add another identity, corresponding to more extreme nationalism all right-wing populism. With similar arguments, the poor may initially stay away from this identity.
- But if a sufficient number of people with their preferences and characteristics start switching to this identity, this may create a cascade effect.
- Once sufficient people switch to this identity, the economic interests of the identity and thus policy preferences will change to some degree as well. But if the identity is not just representative of the poor, then it will not be aligned with class interests.
- But why this new identity emerges and why people start switching to it is underspecified.
- One argument may be that if incomes are negatively affected because of trade with China or because of perceived immigration, then this may make a nationalistic identity more salient for a subgroup, which can then affect the identity choices of other groups.
Distorted Beliefs

- The framework of Bonomi, Gennaioli and Tabellini (2021) is significantly richer than what I have just described, because they add an additional behavioral element—distorted beliefs along the lines of group stereotypes.

- This in particular assumes that a person identifies with a group on the basis of a “salient” characteristic, which gets overweighted.

- An alternative may be to endogenize the weights, \( w_y, w_q \) and \( w_Q \). Depending on salience, being more different on certain dimensions relative to the group may matter more or less.

- So working class people may not have wanted to be in the same group as very nationalistic individuals before, but depending on cultural conflicts and relevant concerns, \( w_q \) may decline in this consideration may become less important.

- Much more thinking necessary in this area.