

14.773: Political Economy of Institutions and Development

January, 2026

Lecture: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:30-12:00 (E51-151)

Recitation: Fridays, 4:00-5:30 (E51-395)

Canvas: <https://canvas.mit.edu/courses/35886>

Instructors:

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Course Description: This course is intended as an introduction to the newly emerging field of political economy of institutions and development. Its purpose is to give you both a sense of the frontier research topics and a good command of the tools in the area. The reading list is intentionally long, to give those of you interested in the field an opportunity to dig deeper into some of the topics in this area. The lectures will cover the material with * in detail and also discuss the material without *, but in less detail.

Grading: The course grade will be a combination of a final exam and 5 problem sets, with 25% weight on problem sets.

Note: the syllabus will be updated throughout the semester, and students should refer to the latest version posted on Canvas.

1 Introduction

1.1 Does Political Economy Matter? (DA, Feb 3)

1. * Acemoglu, Daron (2025) “Institutions, Technology and Prosperity” Nobel Lecture: <http://alturl.com/bv6ya>

2. *Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James (2006) “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth” in *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Aghion, Philippe and Durlauf, Steven, eds. Amsterdam; North-Holland.
3. *Acemoglu, Daron (2003) “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?” *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31, 620-652.
4. Demsetz, Harold (1967) “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” *American Economic Review*, 57, 61-70.
5. Taylor, M Scott (2011) “Buffalo Hunt: International Trade and the Virtual Extinction of the North American Bison.” *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 3162-95.
6. Allen, Robert C. (1982) “The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures,” *Economic Journal*, 92, 937-953.
7. La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. (1998) “Law and Finance,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 106, 1113-1155.
8. *Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A. (2001) “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review*, 91, 1369-1401.
9. Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James (2002) “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107, 1231-1294.
10. *Dell, Melissa (2010) “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita,” *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.
11. *Jones, Benjamin F. and Olken, Benjamin A. (2005) “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120, 835-864.
12. Udry, Christopher and Goldstein, Markus (2008) “The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana”, *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 116, No. 6, pp. 981-1022.
13. Banerjee, Abhijit and Iyer, Lakshmi (2005) “History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India.” *American Economic Review*, 95, 1190-1213.
14. Pande, Rohini and Udry, Christopher (2005) “Institutions and Development: A View from Below,” to appear in the Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Blundell, Richard, Newey, W., and Persson, Torsten
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~rp269/website/papers/institutions_draft.pdf

15. Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido (2003) *The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say?* MIT Press, Cambridge.
16. Acemoglu, Daron (2005) “Constitutions, Politics and Economic Growth: Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, XLIII, 1025-1048.

2 Distribution and Efficiency

This part of the course will consider how various economic arrangements and policies meant to influence the distribution of resources affect efficiency. The focus is on situations in which a well-defined elite holds political power and political power is not contested.

2.1 Review: Static Models (Recitation)

This lecture will provide an introduction to models of collective choice and voting, and will consider an application of voting with multidimensional policy spaces to the problem of clientelism in the context of development economics.

1. *Acemoglu, Daron (2008) *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, Chapter 22.
2. Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1999) *Positive Political Theory: Collective Preference*, Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press.
3. Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido (2000) *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*, Cambridge; The MIT Press, Chapters 2, 3 and 6.
4. Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James (2006) “Chapter 4: Democratic Politics” and “Appendix to Chapter 4: Distribution of Power in Democracy” in *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, eds. Cambridge University Press.
5. *Lindbeck, Assar, and Weibull, Jorgen W. (1987) “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition.” *Public Choice* 52: 273-297.

2.2 Economic Policies under Elite Control (DA, Feb 5)

1. * Acemoglu, Daron (2006). “Modelling Inefficient Institutions”, *Advances in Economic Theory World Congress 2006*. Available at:
<https://economics.mit.edu/files/5697>
2. * Acemoglu, Daron (2009). *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, Princeton University Press, Chapter 22.

3. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2006). “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective”, *American Political Science Review* 100 (1), pp. 115-131.
4. Fergusson, Leopoldo (2013). “The Political Economy of Rural Property Rights and the Persistence of the Dual Economy”, *Journal of Development Economics* 103, pp. 167-181.
5. * Acemoglu, Daron (2008). “Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies”, *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6 (1), pp. 1-44.
6. Olson, Mancur (1982). *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*, Yale University Press.
7. Stasavage, David (2014). “Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise”, *American Political Science Review* 108 (2), pp. 337-354.
8. Stasavage, David (2017). “When Inclusive Institutions Failed: Lessons from the Democratic Revolutions of the Middle Ages”, mimeo. Available at:
<https://stasavage.com/research/>
9. Bergeron, Augustin, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan L. Weigel (2021). “The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC.” Harvard mimeo.

2.3 Labor Coercion (DA, Feb 10)

This literature focuses on one type of economic institution under the domination of one group, coercive labor relations, to provide more insights on how different types of inefficiencies can emerge.

1. *Brenner, Robert (1976) “Agrarian Class-Structure and Economic-Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,” *Past and Present*, 70, 30-75.
2. Aston, T.H. and Philpin, C.H.E. (1987) *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. *Acemoglu, Daron and Alexander Wolitzky (2011) “The Economics of Labor Coercion,” *Econometrica*, March 2011, 79(2), pp. 555-600.
4. Chwe, Michael (1990) “Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model,” *Economic Journal*, 100, 1109-1121.
5. Basu, Kaushik (1986) “One Kind of Power,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 38, 259-282.

6. Barzel, Yoram (1977) "An Economic Analysis of Slavery," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 20, 87-110.
7. Bloom, J. (1998) *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Domar, Evsey D. (1970) "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis," *Journal of Economic History*, 30, 18-32.
9. Lagerlöf, N. (2009) "Slavery and Other Property Rights," *Review of Economic Studies*, 76, 319-342.
10. *Dell, Melissa (2010) "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita," *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.
11. *Naidu, Suresh and Noam Yuchtman (2013) "Coercive Contract Enforcement: Law and the Labor Market in 19th Century Industrial Britain," *American Economic Review*, 103(1), 107-144.
12. *Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno and James Robinson (2012) "Finding El Dorado: Slavery and Long-run Development in Columbia" *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 40(4), pp. 534-564.

3 Dynamics of Political Power

This part of the course turns to how political power evolves and interacts with economic decisions.

3.1 Introduction to Dynamic Voting and Constitutional Choice (DA, Feb 12 & 17)

This lecture provides a basic introduction of voting over distributive policies in dynamic models, and contrasts myopic versus non-myopic behavior by voters. It will also introduce ideas related to endogenous institutions and laws. We will focus on dynamic, game-theoretic models.

1. *Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin (2008) "Coalition Formation in Nondemocratic Societies." *Review of Economic Studies*, 75: 987-1009.
2. Roberts, Kevin (2005) "Dynamic Voting in Clubs" <http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/RobertsK/papers.html>.
3. *Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin (2015) "Political Economy in a Changing World," *Journal of Political Economy*, 123(5): 1038-1086.

4. Alesina, Alberto and Rodrik, Dani (1994) "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109: 465-490.
5. Hassler Jon, Mora, Sevi, Storlesseten, Kjetil and Zilibotti, Fabrizio (2003) "Survival of the Welfare State," *American Economic Review*, 93, 87-112.
6. Krusell, Per and Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor (1996) "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," *Review of Economic Studies* 63, 301-329.
7. Benabou, Roland and Ok, Efe, "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 2001.
8. Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin (2016) "Reevaluating De Tocqueville: Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy," NBER Working Paper.
9. Mailath, George J., Morris, Stephen and Postelwaite, Andrew (2001) "Laws and Authority," <http://www.econ.yale.edu/~sm326/authority.pdf>
10. *Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin (2011) "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs," *American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1446-1476.
11. Barbera, Salvador and Jackson, Matthew (2004) "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119, 1011-1048.
12. Dixit, Avinash, Grossman, Gene M., and Gul, Faruk (2000) "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," *Journal of Political Economy* 108, 531-568.

3.2 Review: Dynamic Games (Recitation)

This review lecture will go over the analysis of dynamic games, in particular, differences between Markov Perfect Equilibria and Subgame Perfect Equilibria, their properties and how they can be computed in simple games.

1. *Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1991) *Game Theory*, Cambridge; MIT Press. Chapters 4, 5 and 13.
2. *Acemoglu, Daron (2008) *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, Appendix Chapter C.
3. *Acemoglu, Daron (2005) "Modelling Inefficient Institutions," *Advances in Economic Theory World Congress 2006*, <https://economics.mit.edu/files/5697>

4 Modeling Institutions

This part of the course will focus on using the insights from the previous part to develop political economy models of institutions where we study simultaneously the consequences and the origins of institutions.

4.1 Political Economy of Weak States and State Building (DA, Feb 19 & 24)

These lectures will discuss the role of the state and how weak states can become a barrier to economic development. They will then turn to see how and under what circumstances states form and why weak states persist.

1. Tilly, Charles (1990) *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*, Blackwell, Cambridge MA.
2. Mann, Michael (1986) *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
3. Evans, Peter (1989) “Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” *Sociological Forum*. 4(4):561-587 (December, 1989)
4. *Gennaioli, Nicola and Ilia Rainer (2007) “The Modern Impact of Pre-Colonial Centralization in Africa”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(3), 185-234.
5. *Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou (2013) “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”, *Econometrica*, 81(1), 113–152.
6. Bockstette, Valerie, Areendam Chanda and Louis Puterman (2002) “States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 7: 347-69.
7. Tilly, Charles (1985) “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in P. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer and T. Skocpol eds. *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press.
8. Gennaioli, Nicola and Hans-Joachim Voth (2015) “State Capacity and Military Conflict” *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 1409-1448.
9. Herbst, Jeffery I. (2000) *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
10. Besley, Timothy and Persson, Torsten (2011) *Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters*, Princeton University Press.

11. Osafo-Kwaako, Philip and James A. Robinson (2013) “Political Centralization in Pre-Colonial Africa,” , *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 41(1), 534-564.
12. Blair, Robert (2013) “Peacebuilding and State Legitimacy: Evidence from Two Lab in the Field Experiments in Liberia” Yale mimeo.
13. *Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul (2018) “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo” forthcoming *Journal of Political Economy*.
14. *Balan, Pablo, Bergeron, Augustin, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan L. Weigel (2020). “Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the DR Congo.” forthcoming *American Economic Review*.
15. Acemoglu, Daron (2005) “Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 52, 1199-1226.
16. *Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2009) “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics”, *American Economic Review*, 99(4), 1218-44.
17. *Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2018) “The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States” mimeo.
18. *Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2019) *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, Penguin, New York, Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 9.
19. Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson (2016) “Paths to Inclusive Political Institutions” *Economic History of Warfare and State Formation, Essays in Honor of Mark Harrison*, Springer Singapore, 3-50.
20. Waldner, David (1999) *State-Building and Late Development*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
21. Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson (2015). “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 105, No. 8, pp. 2364-2409.
22. Koyama, Mark, Chiaki Moriguchi, and Tuan-Hwee Sng (2015). “Geopolitics and Asia’s Little Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of State Building in China and Japan after 1850 ” unpublished, George Mason University.

4.2 Democratization and Persistence (DA, Feb 26 & March 5)

These two lectures will first provide a basic model of nondemocratic politics and highlight central commitment problems involved in such interactions. It will then introduce the basic models of institutional change in the context of transitions from nondemocratic to

democratic politics. Finally, it will discuss various ways in which the distribution of power may persist despite institutional change.

1. *Acemoglu, Daron, *Lecture Notes*, Chapters 17, 18 and 20.
2. *Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James (2006) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Chapters 5 and 6.
3. *North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R. (1989) “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, *Journal of Economic History*, 49, 803-832.
4. *Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2000) “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth, Inequality and Democracy in Historical Perspective”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CXV, 1167-1199.
5. *Aidt, Toke S. and Peter S. Jensen (2013) “Workers of the World Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938,” University of Cambridge mimeo.
6. Collins, William and Robert A. Margo (2007) “The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in American Cities: Evidence from Property Values” *Journal of Economic History*, 67(4), 849-883.
7. *Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger and David Yanagizawa-Drott 2013) “the Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(4), 1633-1685.
8. Llavador, Humberto and Oxoby, Robert J. (2005) “Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120, 1155-1192.
9. Jack, William and Lagunoff, Roger (2006) “Dynamic Enfranchisement,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 90(4-5), 551-572
10. Moore, Barrington (1966) *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Beacon Press, Boston MA.
11. Lagunoff, Roger (2006) “Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions” <http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/lagunoff/>
12. Lagunoff, Roger (2006) “Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions,” <http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/lagunoff/>
13. Arthur, W. Brian. (1989) “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-In by Historical Events,” *Economic Journal*, 1989, 99(1), pp. 106-131.

14. Coate, Stephen and Morris, Stephen E. (1999) "Policy Persistence." *American Economic Review*, 1999, 89(5), pp. 1327-1336.
15. Page, Scott (2006) "Path Dependence," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1, 87-115.
16. *Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2008) "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions," *American Economic Review* 98(1), 267-291.
17. Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo (2013) "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance During Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution," *British Journal of Political Science*.
18. *Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson (2008) "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile," *American Economic Review*, 98, 1737-65.
19. *Anderson, Siwan, Patrick François and Ashok Kotwal (2015) "Clientelism in Indian Villages," *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1780-1816.
20. Thelen, Kathleen (2004) *How institutions evolve: the political economy of skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan*, New York; Cambridge University Press.
21. Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005) "A drawback of electoral competition." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3 (4), 1318-1348.
22. Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2010) "Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States," *Journal of European Economic Association*, 9(2), pp. 177-208.
23. Horacio Larreguy (2012) "Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico" mimeo.
24. François, Patrick, Ilia Rainer and Francesco Trebbi (2015) "How Is Power Shared in Africa?" *Econometrica*, 83(2), 465-503.
25. *Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik (2012) "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?" *Review of Economic Studies*.

5 Beliefs, Norms and Institutions

This part of the course turns to the interplay between beliefs, norms and political choices.

5.1 Beliefs, Information, Norms and Politics (DA, March 10 & 12)

This lecture will discuss the two-way interaction between voting and beliefs, shaped by learning.

1. *Piketty, Thomas (1995) "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3): 551-584.
2. Austen-Smith, David (1991) "Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters," *Economics and Politics*, 3(1): 73-92.
3. Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996) "The Swing Voter's Curse," *American Economic Review*, 86(3): 408-424.
4. Fey, Mark and Jinhee Kim (2002) "The Swing Voter's Curse: A Comment," *American Economic Review*, 92(4): 1264-1268.
5. *Strulovici, Bruno (2010) "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," *Econometrica*, 78(3): 933-971.
6. Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy, and Sonin, Konstantin (2013) "A Political Theory of Populism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2): 771-805.
7. *Acemoglu, Daron and Alexander Wolitzky (2014) "Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model," *American Economic Review*, 104(4): 1350-1367.
8. *Acemoglu, Daron and Matthew Jackson (2015) "History and Expectations in the Evolution of Cooperation," *Review of Economic Studies*, 82(1): 423-456.

5.2 Culture, Norms and Political Economy (DA, March 17 & 19)

These three lectures will discuss some of the recent evidence suggesting persistence of culture and values, and recent models of culture and endogenous beliefs and how they interact with political economy and cooperation in society.

1. *Greif, Avner (1994) "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(5): 912-950.
2. *Tabellini, Guido (2008) "Institutions and Culture," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(2-3): 255-294.
3. Tabellini, Guido (2010) "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 8(4): 677-716.

4. *Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2006) “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(2): 23-48.
5. Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2009) “Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(3): 1095-1131.
6. *Fernandez, Raquel and Alessandra Fogli (2009) “Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1(1): 146-177.
7. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2019) *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, Penguin, New York, Chapters 2, 4, and 6.
8. *Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2021) “Culture, Institutions, and Social Equilibria: A Framework,” NBER Working Paper No. 28832.
9. *Swidler, Ann (1986) “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” *American Sociological Review*, 51(2): 273-286.
10. Lowes, Sara, Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel (2015) “Understanding Ethnic Identity in Africa: Evidence from the Implicit Association Test,” NBER Working Paper No. 20892.
11. Roland, Gerard and Yury Gorodnichenko (2017) “Culture, Institutions, and the Wealth of Nations,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 99(3): 402-416.
12. *Voth, Hans-Joachim and Nico Voigtlnder (2012) “Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(3): 1339-1392.
13. *Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed, and James A. Robinson (2014) “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(2): 319-368.
14. Voth, Hans-Joachim, Shanker Satyanath, and Nico Voigtlnder (2014) “Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party,” NBER Working Paper No. 19201.
15. *Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2001) “The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 97(2): 298-319.
16. Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2000) “Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3): 955-988.

17. *Tabellini, Guido (2008) "The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3): 905-950.
18. Doepke, Matthias and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2008) "Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2): 747-793.
19. Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2011) "Laws and Social Norms," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9(1): 1-42.
20. *Acemoglu, Daron and Matthew O. Jackson (2016) "Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 15(2): 245-295.
21. Heldring, Leander (2016) "Violence and the State: Evidence from Rwanda's Decade of Atrocities," Working Paper.

6 Slavery and colonial rule (JM, March 31)

1. (**) Nunn, Nathan. "The long-term effects of Africa's slave trades." *The Quarterly journal of economics* 123.1 (2008): 139-176.
2. Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. "The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa." *American economic review* 101.7 (2011): 3221-3252.
3. Inikori, Joseph E., and J. E. Inikori. Africans and the industrial revolution in England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
4. (*) Fujiwara, Thomas, Humberto Landaes, and Felipe Valencia Caicedo. "Tordesillas, slavery and the origins of Brazilian inequality." Working Paper (2022).
5. (*) Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. "The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa." *American Economic Review* 106.7 (2016): 1802-1848.
6. Lowes, Sara, and Eduardo Montero. "Concessions, violence, and indirect rule: evidence from the Congo Free State." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 136.4 (2021): 2047-2091.
7. Wantchekon, Leonard, Marko Klanja, and Natalija Novta. "Education and human capital externalities: evidence from colonial Benin." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130.2 (2015): 703-757.
8. (**) Lowes, Sara, and Eduardo Montero. "The legacy of colonial medicine in Central Africa." *American Economic Review* 111.4 (2021): 1284-1314.
9. Blouin, Arthur. "Culture and contracts: The historical legacy of forced labour." *The Economic Journal* 132.641 (2022): 89-105.

10. Feyrer, James, and Bruce Sacerdote. "Colonialism and modern income: islands as natural experiments." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 91.2 (2009): 245-262.

7 War and conflict (JM, April 2 & 7)

Conflict origins

1. Fearon, James D. "Rationalist explanations for war." *International organization* 49.3 (1995): 379-414.
2. Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli. "Political bias and war." *American Economic Review* 97.4 (2007): 1353-1373.
3. Schelling, Thomas C. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard university press, 1980.
4. (*) Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan F. Vargas. "Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia." *Review of Economic studies* 80.4 (2013): 1384-1421.
5. Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. "Hit or miss? The effect of assassinations on institutions and war." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1.2 (2009): 55-87.
6. (***) Moscona, Jacob, Nathan Nunn, and James A. Robinson. "Segmentary Lineage Organization and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Econometrica* 88.5 (2020): 1999-2036.
7. (***) McGuirk, Eoin F., and Nathan Nunn. "Transhumant pastoralism, climate change, and conflict in Africa." *Review of Economic Studies* forthcoming.
8. Hsiang, Solomon M., Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel. "Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict." *Science* 341.6151 (2013): 1235367.
9. Schelling, Thomas C. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard university press, 1980.
10. Nunn, Nathan, and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra. "Why being wrong can be right: Magical warfare technologies and the persistence of false beliefs." *American economic review* 107.5 (2017): 582-587.
11. Heldring, Leander. "The origins of violence in Rwanda." *The Review of economic studies* 88.2 (2021): 730-763.
12. Guarnieri, Eleonora, and Ana Tur-Prats. "Cultural distance and conflict-related sexual violence." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 138.3 (2023): 1817-1861.
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9 Media and politics (April 14 – Alexey Makarin guest lecture)

10 Innovation (JM, April 21)

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13 International political economy in the modern era (JM, April 30 & May 5)

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14 Political economy of the environment (JM, May 12)

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