Empowerment in Teams: When Delegation Prevents Collaboration

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Abstract

Many companies empower employees to succeed without delegating to them. However, the economic literature on empowerment focuses on empowering through delegation. We analyze when delegation may disempower an employee, demotivating him. While delegation is motivational in a single-agent context, we show that it may be demotivational with multiple collaborative agents; delegation to an agent may demotivate him indirectly by directly demotivating his collaborator. We show that the possibility that delegation can demotivate the delegatee causes the principal to retain decision rights precisely when delegation is most profitable in a single-agent environment. Furthermore, the principal forfeits other potentially empowering managerial tools when she delegates. Our results imply an additional managerial role in motivating a collaborative team with heterogeneous preferences.

Keywords: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, Motivation-incentives, Decision making

1 Introduction

In the early 2000’s, Apple’s industrial designers were widely considered among the most empowered in the industry. While other designers haggled with management about design specifications, Apple’s designers could focus on designing beautiful products (Wilson, 2014). When Apple engineers doubted a design’s feasibility, executives told them to ‘figure it out’ (Carr, 2013). However, Apple executives did not blindly follow the designers’ judgement. CEO Steve Jobs was famous for holding design proposals to exacting standards, once requesting 50 design iterations for a cardboard box before seeing one he approved (Isaacson, 2011).

In what may appear a contradiction, Apple designers were simultaneously powerful and powerless. An expert on Apple Design explained that the group was “empowered to see its designs through to finished product” (Kahney, 2015). Designers were powerful in that their best designs always received the necessary organizational support; excellent designs would not be sidelined by narrow-minded engineers. However, designers were powerless in that Steve Jobs frequently rejected their proposals. This seeming contradiction of a micromanager empowering his employees highlights
that delegation need not be empowering. Furthermore, as we demonstrate in our model, delegation can prevent the manager from empowering employees using alternative managerial tools.

By contrast, economists studying empowerment focus on empowering through delegation.\(^1\) Perhaps primarily exploring delegation as a tool to empower is an artifact of modelling assumptions. Because these have historically been principal-agent models with a single agent, the only limit to the agent’s (employee’s) success is the principal’s (manager’s) temptation to make decisions that undermine the agent, which is solved by delegation.

However, the agent’s success faces another potential obstacle when the principal manages two collaborative agents (i.e., complementary efforts). The agent’s success can now be undermined both by the principal’s discretion and by the teammate’s reluctance to work hard on the collaboration. For example, the success of a proposed design at Apple can be thwarted by either Jobs rejecting it or engineers failing to implement it well. While delegation to the first agent disciplines the principal’s discretion, it may deter the second agent’s effort on the collaboration. As a result, giving an agent the power to make his own decisions may render him powerless to achieve success.

Inspired by the Apple case, we analyze when delegation does, and does not, motivate employees in a collaborative team setting. To do so, we build a model in the spirit of Aghion and Tirole (1997), hereafter noted as AT97, but with two agents who have differing preferences. As in AT97, the divergence in preferences between the principal and the first agent is one determinant of the principal’s willingness to delegate to that agent. However, there is now a second determinant: the second agent behaves differently depending on whether or not the principal delegates to the first agent. In some respects, delegation is changing the second agent’s boss from the principal to the first agent, who has different preferences from both the principal and second agent. The second agent changes his behavior because the principal and first agent’s differing use of ex-post decision rights changes the second agent’s ex-ante incentives.

In our basic model, we explore both when delegation is motivational and when it is optimal. We show that introducing collaborative agents causes delegation to be both demotivational and suboptimal precisely when delegation is the most attractive without collaborative agents. More specifically, delegation demotivates when (1) the agents’ efforts are most complementary and (2) the principal’s preferences are well aligned with the sum of the agents’ preferences. Condition (1)

\[^1\]A canonical example is Aghion and Tirole (1997). We provide a more thorough literature review in Section 1.1.
corresponds to the importance of the obstacles to employee success that centralization removes (coworkers not working hard on the collaboration). Meanwhile, condition (2) corresponds to the importance of obstacles to employee success that centralization introduces (principal intervening against the agents’ interests). Because most single-agent models imply that delegation is motivational, in these models, delegation is optimal when the agent is well aligned with the principal. However, condition (2) for when delegation demotivates in our model coincides with the agent being well aligned with the principal. Together, these conditions cause the principal to retain decision rights when she would otherwise delegate in a single-agent environment.

However, this model is thus far silent on the most salient part of Steve Jobs’ management style; not only did he empower designers without delegating to them, he empowered them while holding them to a meticulously high standard. Indeed, many managers, advisors, and coaches empower team members by pressuring each team member to do high quality work on a collaboration. To move closer to describing such a managerial approach, we then enrich our basic model to introduce the idea of standards. Specifically, we allow agents to perform higher-quality work at a higher effort cost, and we allow the principal to commit to reject low-quality work. Both the findings and intuition are similar to those of our primary results. While a single-agent model would conclude that standards are always demotivational, they can motivate in team settings by ensuring that both agents do high quality work on the collaboration.

In a sense, our argument is to the single-agent literature relating delegation to motivation, such as AT97, as Holmstrom (1982) is to the single-agent incentive-contracting literature. Each argues that one role of a manager is to improve incentives for a group of employees working on a common project, a role that disappears when there is only a single employee. In contrast with the incentive-contracting literature’s focus on the extrinsic motivation caused by different incentive contracts, the delegation literature often analyzes the intrinsic motivation caused by different decision-making processes. Being a part of this literature, we show that a manager can reduce the buy-in problem (i.e. inefficiently little effort on the collaboration by one agent disincentivizes the other from exerting effort on the collaboration) using a decision-making process available only because the centralized manager’s preferences cause his ex-post decisions to differ from those of a delegatee (agent).
1.1 Literature Review

Many of the seminal papers in the delegation literature (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Baker et al., 1999; Dessein, 2002), study situations with a single principal interacting with a single agent. In each of these cases, the lack of a second agent leads the principal’s temptation to violate the agent’s interests to be the primary obstacle to employee success. As a result, delegation is motivational. A similar dynamic appears in Van den Steen (2010a), but because of diverging beliefs rather than diverging preferences. In contrast with this literature, we focus on situations in which the principal manages multiple agents.

In our model, the principal acts as a decision intermediary who, similar to the delegation literature, (1) is partially aligned with the sum of the agents’ preferences and (2) must rely on intrinsic motivation, not contracting, for effort incentives. Showing that the principal retaining authority can increase agent utility is not a new concept. As Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) show, having the manager make decisions that are a convex combination of both units’ local conditions, and thus internalizing externalities, can improve profits for both units. However, these papers preclude effort choices. If one added a choice of how much effort to expend to acquire more precise information about each unit’s local condition before communicating about the local conditions and taking decisions, then delegation would be more motivational than centralization. Our paper reaches the opposite conclusion in that delegation may be demotivational.

There is a literature, including Szalay (2005) and Newman and Novoselov (2009), which alters the information structure of AT97 to make formal delegation demotivating. In both of these papers, delegation demotivates because the principal loses the ability to punish low effort. Relatedly, other papers have considered the motivational consequences of changing the beliefs (c.f. Van den Steen, 2010a, Van den Steen, 2010b) or preferences (c.f. Itoh and Morita, 2022) of the decision maker, showing that the direction of this effect may change significantly with the structure of the model. We add to these literatures by showing an alternative mechanism that can cause delegation (alternatively, a decision-maker with identical preferences, beliefs, and information to the agent) to

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2See Bolton and Dewatripont (2013) for more on single agent delegation or Gibbons et al. (2013) for more on how delegation relates to motivation in the single-agent case.

3We assume that there is a single decision right, whereas Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) assume two. Using their framework, centralization can be more motivational to agent one than is delegating a decision right to each agent. However, notice that this is an imperfect analogy to delegation in our model. A better analogy would be delegating both decision rights to agent one, which would always empower agent one in their model.
demotivate. Namely, delegation can demotivate by disincentivizing teammates from exerting high effort on a collaboration.

In the multi-agent literature on motivating agents, delegation is generally not the primary consideration. As a result, we focus on the most relevant multi-agent literature where the principal has a role in improving team effort incentives, and we analogize this role to centralization. In these models, such incentives sometimes come through the principal’s ability to write an incentive contract (Holmstrom, 1982). Other times they come through the principal’s ability to monitor (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Halac et al., 2021b), or otherwise punish agents (Bonatti and Hörner, 2011). In these papers, the effect of incentive contracts, monitoring, or punishments on the first agent’s effort does nothing to motivate the second agent because agent efforts are assumed not to be complementary. However, this indirect motivational effect is the fundamental motivational mechanism (for the first agent) in our paper.

We see our paper as being closest to Halac et al. (2021a), which considers motivating a collaborative team using incentive contracts, whereas we analyze motivating a team using the structure of decision making to alter intrinsic motivation. In Halac et al. (2021a), the complementarity of agent efforts cause the first agent’s incentive contract to incentivize the second agent (provided the second agent has an incentive contract). This leads to a buy-in effect, where agent two is motivated when agent one responds to a steep incentive contract by working hard. This logic parallels our argument about decision-making influencing a buy-in effect.

2 Model

The organization is composed of a principal (manager, she) and two agents (employees or divisions, he). After describing the game’s timing, we elaborate on each step in more detail: (i) The principal assigns the lone control right to one of the three parties, (ii) the two agents individually and simultaneously gather information about the projects’ payoffs, (iii) the agent(s) who do not have control of the decision right communicate about the information they received, and (iv) the controlling party picks if and which project to implement. We will solve for pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. To be consistent with the literature, we assume the principal can commit to a
governance structure to maximize joint surplus. However, the principal cannot contract on project realizations. Appendix Section 6.2 relaxes these assumptions and finds similar results.

**Projects.** The agents screen amongst four a-priori identical projects on behalf of the principal. Each project has two dimensions of quality, one pertaining to each agent. Agent $i$’s quality dimension, $Q_i$, can be either Good(G) or Bad(B). A project’s value to agent $i$ when implemented is a function of $(Q_i, Q_{-i})$. Both agents prefer $(Q_1, Q_2) = (G, G)$ to any other project. The next best project for agent $i$ is $(Q_i, Q_{-i}) = (G, B)$, followed by $(B, G)$, and an extremely unappealing $(B, B)$. Finally, there always exists the option to implement no project, ensuring both agents receive 0 utility. The agents’ utilities are summarized in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proj. implemented</th>
<th>$U^1$</th>
<th>$U^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(G, G)$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(G, B)$</td>
<td>$1 - 2\tau$</td>
<td>$-1 - 2\epsilon$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(B, G)$</td>
<td>$-1 - 2\epsilon$</td>
<td>$1 - 2\tau$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(B, B)$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Each agent’s payoff when a project of quality $(Q_1, Q_2)$ is implemented.

We will explain the parameters and features of the agents’ payoffs after describing the information structure and presenting Table 2. When the principal implements a project, she receives the sum of the agents’ payoffs. However, with probability $1 - \alpha$, implementing a project requires the principal to pay an implementation cost $M$. With complementary probability, $\alpha$, implementation is costless. We call the parameter $\alpha$ *principal alignment* because it is the probability that the principal’s implementation preferences align with the sum of the agents’ preferences. To maintain this interpretation, we assume $M > 2$.

**Information.** We assume that players have the same uniform prior about project identities.

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4Joint surplus is the sum of all parties payoffs.

5Note that setting the value of $(G, G)$ to 1 is a normalization. Further, setting the value of $(B, B)$ to be extremely negative ensures agents’ must acquire some information before implementing a project. Finally, $\tau$ reflects how much better a $(G, G)$ is to an intermediate project.

6$M > 2$ guarantees that the principal never implements when facing a non-zero implementation cost. Other $M$’s may be appropriate, but this choice is most consistent with the analysis in Aghion and Tirole (1997). Further, this payoff structure could be framed as agents maximizing their divisions’ revenues, with only the principal internalizing the corresponding cost.
After incurring private cost \( g(e_i) \), agent \( i \) learns \( Q_i \) for all four projects with probability \( e_i \), otherwise learning nothing.\(^7\) Note that agent \( i \) cannot independently learn \( Q_j \), but as discussed in the following paragraphs, agents can communicate about their projects. After the agents communicate, the principal observes the implementation cost.\(^8\)

To help explain the payoff parameters, we calculate each agent’s expected payoffs as a function of all learned information, assuming that the best project is implemented. Note that all parties agree on which project is best, though they may differ on whether they prefer to implement no project at all. These payoffs are summarized in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( i ) Informed</th>
<th>(-i) Informed</th>
<th>( U^i )</th>
<th>( U^{-i} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>( 1 - \tau )</td>
<td>(-\epsilon )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(-\infty )</td>
<td>(-\infty )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Expected Utilities When Ex-Ante Best Available Project is Implemented as a Function of Learned Information.

This payoff structure has two notable implications about when parties prefer to implement a project and one notable implication about the complementary value of information. First, an agent prefers to implement a project (as opposed to implementing none) if and only if he is informed. Second, the principal prefers to implement a project if and only if both implementation is costless and at least one agent is informed. We assume a vanishingly small \( \epsilon \) to ensure the first two features hold for all parameter values. Finally, each agent’s information becomes more valuable when the other agent is informed.\(^9\) This increase in the value of information is indexed by \( \tau \in [0, 1] \), or the relative value of teamwork.\(^10\)

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\(^7\)In Section 4 we endogenize the information acquisition choice. Recent papers such as Bardhi and Bobkova (forthcoming, 2023) have costless information acquisition, however in line with the delegation literature we assume it is costly.

\(^8\)This is equivalent to AT97 except (i) the principal’s cost of acquiring information being 0, and (ii) the information each party has is incomplete and complementary to the other parties information. Similar to AT97, we assume the principal realizes her alignment after the agent’s effort. However, in both our setting and theirs, if it was technologically feasible for the principal to discover her alignment first then it would be optimal for her to do so.

\(^9\)There are at least two reasons why agent 1 may prefer \((G, G)\) to \((G, B)\). The first is due to an intrinsic motivation story in which a \((G, G)\) project is more successful than a \((G, B)\) project and thus gives the agent more utility. A second is that, there may exist an additional ex-post implementation cost that agent 1 must bear more of under \((G, B)\) than under \((G, G)\), causing agent 1 to prefer \((G, G)\).

\(^10\)The case in which \( \tau \) is less than 0 or greater than 1 corresponds to tournaments or coordination games which
Communication. – After observing his signal of project quality, each agent sends a public message, \( m_i \), about his observed information.

Delegation. – Before agents search for information, the principal can formally delegate authority to an agent. If the principal does so, the delegatee agent will later choose which project to implement. Otherwise, the principal will retain authority, which we call centralization. We refer to this choice as the governance choice.

3 Delegation, Motivation, and Optimality

In this section, we first solve the model under each of delegation and centralization. Afterwards, we show that centralization induces higher effort than delegation does when principal alignment is high. We show that centralization is also Pareto optimal in such contexts. After giving necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality, we show that delegation is optimal for only low or intermediate principal-agent alignment, if ever.

3.1 Equilibrium Decision Making

Without loss of generality, the principal will delegate the decision right to agent 1 if she chooses to delegate at all. We can now solve the game by backwards induction. We assume a truthful equilibrium. To see why such an equilibrium exists, recall that the undesirability of (B,B) projects sufficiently disincentivizes suggesting a random project. Furthermore, concealing information cannot increase the likelihood of any desirable outcome.

Given truthful communication, we now show the decision rules as a function of information discovered. First, under centralization, the principal accepts the best project if and only if both implementation is costless and at least one agent is informed. At least one agent being informed prevents a (B,B) outcome, ensuring the project yields positive expected profit. Second, under delegation, agent 1 (the delegatee) accepts the best project if and only if he is informed. Table 3 gives the resulting conditional expected payoffs.

may be of interest, but are not in line with the message of this paper.
Table 3: Expected Utilities Conditional on Governance and Information

Gov corresponds to governance structure (Centralized or Delegated). The second and third columns correspond to if Agent 1 and Agent 2, respectively, had a successful search. The fourth through sixth columns give the expected payoffs of each player.

Here are the resulting expected payoffs under delegation, as a function of effort.\(^\text{11}\)

\[ U_1^d = e_1 e_2 + (1 - \tau)e_1(1 - e_2) - g(e_1) \tag{1} \]
\[ U_2^d = e_1 e_2 - g(e_2) \tag{2} \]
\[ U^p_d = (2 - M(1 - \alpha))e_1 e_2 + ((1 - \tau) - M(1 - \alpha))e_1(1 - e_2) \tag{3} \]

Similarly, here are the (symmetric) payoffs as a function of efforts under centralization.

\[ U^c_i = \alpha e_i e_{-i} + (1 - \tau)e_i(1 - e_{-i}) - g(e_i) \tag{4} \]
\[ U^p_i = (2\alpha)e_1 e_2 + \alpha(1 - \tau)(e_1(1 - e_2) + e_2(1 - e_1)) \tag{5} \]

Now we compare the two agents' efforts via their reaction curves. First, under centralization, the first order condition of agent \(i\)'s payoffs yields the following

\[ g'(e_i) = \alpha(\tau e_{-i} + 1 - \tau). \tag{6} \]

\(^{11}\)The subscript on the utility functions denotes the governance choice with \(c, d\) denoting centralization, delegation, respectively.
As discussed in the following paragraph, we impose the following assumptions on \( g(\cdot) \) to simplify the analysis.

**Assumption 1** The cost of acquiring information, \( g \), satisfies \( g'(0) = 0 \), \( g'(1) > 1 \), \( g''(x) > 1 \) and \( g''(x) > g'(x) \) for all \( x \in [0,1] \), and \( g' \) is log concave.

The conditions on \( g'(0) \) and \( g'(1) \) ensures the equilibrium efforts correspond to a probability. Assuming \( g'' > 1 \) implies that the first-order approach yields the unique maximum of the agents’ problem.\(^{12}\) Finally, the conditions of \( g' < g'' \) and log concavity of \( g' \) are sufficient to establish that the principal’s utility is convex in \( \alpha \).\(^{13}\)

Under delegation, the reaction curves are asymmetric, as follows.

\[
g'(e_1) = \tau e_2 + 1 - \tau \quad (7) \\
g'(e_2) = e_1 \quad (8)
\]

Information complementarity leads both reaction curves to be upward sloping, as under centralization. In other words, complementary information is the foundation for the buy-in effect, which we define as the increased marginal utility of effort for one agent when his coworker agent works harder.

**Definition 1** The **buy-in effect** for agent \( i \) is the marginal effect of an increase in \( e_{-i} \) on agent \( i \)'s marginal utility of effort at equilibrium levels. Hence the buy-in effect is \( \frac{\partial^2 U_i}{\partial e_{-i} \partial e_i} \).

In our model, the buy-in effect is caused by agent \( j \)'s information improving the likelihood that agent \( i \)'s information yields a (G,G) project, increasing the benefit of search to agent \( i \).\(^{14}\) By contrast, information is substitutable across teammates in many other models (e.g., in AT97 if we

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\(^{12}\)The study of equilibrium selection amongst multiple equilibrium is of interest, e.g. Halac et al. (2021a), but is beyond the scope of this paper.

\(^{13}\)The final two conditions are sufficient for convexity of the principal’s profit function. A necessary and sufficient condition is the following ODE: \( g'g''' + \frac{2g'g''}{e + \frac{1}{e}} < 2(g'')^2 \). It is worth noting that any cost functions satisfying this ODE, when applied to the AT97 framework, yields a unique cutoff, with delegation being optimal if and only if principal alignment is above said cutoff. Finally, note that many explicit functional forms satisfy this condition such as any quadratic \( g(e) = \frac{k}{2} e^2 \) where \( k > 1 \).

\(^{14}\)Hence, while the ability to generate information is not complementary, the value of information is complementary across agents.
frame the principal and agent as teammates), causing a negative buy-in effect. The complementary efforts that undergird our results are a feature of many real world environments.\footnote{For instance, Apple Design cannot independently learn the technical difficulties of building a specific phone.}

3.2 When Delegation Demotivates

We now compare the effort incentives of centralization and delegation. Under delegation, agent 1 approves projects if and only if his search was successful. Meanwhile the centralized principal rejects projects when implementation costs are high. Because the centralized decision rule results in successful searches not influencing project selection, centralization can disincentivize effort from agent 1. However, centralization’s advantage is that the principal’s intermediate preferences allow her to accept agent 2’s preferred projects when agent 1 would not. By accepting more of agent 2’s proposed projects, the principal increases the value of agent 2’s information, thereby directly motivating him and indirectly motivating agent 1 through the buy-in effect.

Centralization is motivational when the second agent’s temptation to shirk undermines the first agent’s success more than the principal’s temptation to not implement projects does, which happens for high \( \tau \) and \( \alpha \). The intuition is formalized in Lemma 1 below.

**Lemma 1** There exists an \( \alpha^* < 1 \) such that both agents exert more effort under centralization than delegation when \( \alpha \), the principal alignment, is larger than \( \alpha^* \). Moreover, \( \alpha^* \) is decreasing in \( \tau \), the relative value of teamwork, when \( g(\cdot) \), the cost of acquiring information, is quadratic.

The proof for the above lemma and all further statements are in the Appendix. The intuition for Lemma 1 is that centralization motivates agent 1 when (i) it motivates agent 2 and (ii) the buy-in effect is strong enough for this motivation to empower agent 1. For (i) to hold, the principal’s preferences must be closer to those of agent 2 than the preferences of agent 1 are, which happens for high \( \alpha \). For (ii) to hold, buy-in must matter, so \( \tau \) must be large.

3.3 Optimal Governance

To help understand when centralization is optimal more generally (i.e. maximizes joint surplus), we first analyze when it is Pareto optimal.\footnote{Here, Pareto optimal refers to all parties preferring centralization without any side-transfers.} More specifically, when centralization induces higher
effort (high $\alpha$), all parties prefer it to delegation. By contrast, in a single-agent model, delegation is optimal for high $\alpha$. Notice that because effort costs are convex, if agents exert higher effort then they have higher utility. Hence, under high principal alignment, both agents prefer centralization. The principal similarly prefers centralization because it leads to better ex-post decision making (for the principal) and the agents find more information. This argument is formalized as follows.

**Corollary 2** If $\alpha > \alpha^*$, centralization Pareto-improves upon delegation.

However, because parties often prefer different governance choices, we now analyze when delegation or centralization maximizes total surplus. Remember, we assume that the principal can contract only on governance choice. Thus the principal’s choice of governance maximizes total surplus. Given the effort choices derived by Equations 6 and 7, one can calculate profits under each governance structure.

To analyze the principal’s governance choice, we consider how profits vary with $\alpha$ under delegation and centralization. Under delegation, decision making and agent utilities are invariant to $\alpha$. However, the principal’s utility function is linear in $\alpha$ as $\alpha$ influences the conditional probability of the implementation cost $M$, implying profits are linear in $\alpha$.

Meanwhile, Assumption 1 implies that profits are convex in $\alpha$ under centralization. The intuition is that effort choices increase in $\alpha$ and the conditional probability of implementation cost $M$ decreases in $\alpha$. Since these forces interact multiplicatively, profit is convex. Finally, Corollary 2 shows profit is higher at $\alpha = 1$. Combining these results, we get that delegation is optimal for only intermediate or low levels of principal alignment, if ever, as follows.

**Proposition 3** There exists an $\alpha_1 \geq 0$ and $\alpha_2 < \alpha^* < 1$ such that the principal prefers to delegate if and only if her alignment, $\alpha \in (\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$. Note that $\alpha_1$ need not be less than $\alpha_2$ (i.e., the interval may be empty).

To see why delegation is optimal for low or intermediate levels of alignment, first consider Corollary 2, which implies that delegation is suboptimal for high principal alignment. Furthermore, delegation may be suboptimal for low principal alignment when implementation costs, $M$, are large because delegation leads the principal to pay these costs often.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17}Recall that single-agent models have delegation being optimal for high principal alignment.
Below, we parameterize the cost of acquiring information to generate comparative statics. Let the cost be \( g(e) = \frac{k}{2} e^2 \) where \( k > 1 \).

**Proposition 4** When the cost to acquire information is \( g(e) = \frac{k}{2} e^2 \) the comparative statics of \( \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \) w.r.t. the parameters \( M, \tau, k \) are as follows.

\[
\text{sgn}\left( \frac{\partial \alpha_1}{\partial M} \right) = \text{sgn}\left( \frac{\partial \alpha_1}{\partial k} \right) \geq 0 \tag{9}
\]

\[
\text{sgn}\left( \frac{\partial \alpha_2}{\partial M} \right) = \text{sgn}\left( \frac{\partial \alpha_2}{\partial k} \right) \leq 0 \tag{10}
\]

Further, the partial derivatives of \( \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \) are unsigned with respect to \( \tau \), however \( \lim_{\tau \to 1} \alpha_2 = 0 \).

Delegation is less advantageous when there is an increase in either the implementation cost (\( M \)) or the ease of acquiring information (\( k \)). To see why, notice that while the delegatee’s moral hazard increases in implementation costs, profits under centralization are invariant to implementation costs.\(^{18}\) Additionally, motivating agents is harder when effort costs (\( k \)) increase. Because delegation’s only benefit is its potential motivational influence, delegation becomes relatively less profitable in \( k \). Finally, \( \tau \) has a non-monotonic effect on governance choice because of the following two countervailing effects, as shown in the figure below.

![Figure 1: Profits under Delegation and Centralization](image)

We fix \( \alpha = \frac{1}{2}, k = \frac{13}{32}, \) and \( M = \frac{9}{2} \). Centralization is in Orange and delegation in Blue.

To see why \( \tau \) has a non-monotonic effect on governance choice, consider the following countervailing effects of \( \tau \) on profit. Both of these effects are mediated by the demotivational effect of high

\(^{18}\)Implementation costs are paid only off-path under centralization.
τ, which happens because τ decreases payoffs when only one party is successful. First, effort decreases more with respect to τ under centralization than it does under delegation. Remember that τ directly influences both agents' ex-ante payoffs under centralization, whereas it directly influences only the delegatee's payoffs under delegation. As a result, delegation creates relatively better effort incentives as τ increases.

Second, low effort hurts profits more under delegation than under centralization. Notice that low effort makes a (GG)/(GB) gamble much more likely than a certain (GG) project, reducing the expected benefit of implemented projects under both centralization and delegation. However, because the principal also pays an expected implementation cost \((1 - \alpha)M\) under delegation, the reduction in expected benefit of implemented projects is proportionally greater under delegation than under centralization. This second force benefits centralization as τ gets large, and it dominates the first force for high τ. Hence, centralization is optimal for high τ as stated in Proposition 4.

In this subsection we showed how the underlying logic behind when a principal chooses to delegate changes when we introduce multiple agents. Namely, delegation need not increase effort, and it is suboptimal when it does not. Thus the intuition of many single-agent models does not extend to the many real-world scenarios where a manager oversees multiple employees working on inter-related tasks.

To see how considering our argument would change analysis of when to delegate, consider the problem of how to manage higher skilled workers, i.e. a lower k in Proposition 4.19 The intuition from single agent models suggests that managers should delegate to such workers to increase motivation.20 However, with high-skilled workers in collaborative settings, the buy-in effect is particularly strong, suggesting that delegation may decrease motivation in these settings.

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19Low k means the agent can relatively easily accomplish a task. We choose the interpretation that the agent is highly skilled. An alternative interpretation of a low k is that the task is routine. However, the model does not seem to apply to routine tasks because all actors in the model are ex-ante uncertain about the best course of action to take. That is, the principal relies on the agents for key information about what projects to pursue. By contrast, routine tasks are definitionally tasks that are regularly done in a fixed way. A manager of employees doing routine tasks should thus have little to no uncertainty about how these tasks should be done.

20For example, Lo et al. (2016) models and empirically documents this within sales forces.
4 Motivation and Standards

Our main analysis explains why delegation may demotivate by preventing the employee from succeeding. However, our analysis does not describe some important management practices exemplified in the Apple case. Like many managers, Steve Jobs empowered his employees while holding them to a high standard. Here, we extend our model to explain why high standards may be motivational. More importantly, we give the manager a new role in motivating employees.

In Section 3, we show that the principal may motivate by retaining the decision right and serving as an intermediary, generally siding with the interests of both parties when they agree. Here the manager instead motivates employees by holding them to high standards to ensure that each employee can trust that his collaborators will do their part. To be precise, high standards on agent 1 allow agent 2 to know that agent 1 will do high-quality work. Because of complementary efforts, this knowledge motivates agent 2, which in turn encourages agent 1 to put forth more effort.

The motivational effect of high standards is striking because (i) it is the opposite of rubber-stamping (i.e. informal delegation) and (ii) it is fails to motivate in a single-agent environment. As with delegation, low standards may demotivate in a multi-agent environment because of the buy-in effect.

4.1 Modeling Standards

To model standards, we need to make one primary change to the model. Namely, we give the agents the ability to do high or low quality work. Previously we assumed agent $i$, at cost $g(e_i)$ could observe $Q_i$ for all the projects with probability $e_i$. We call this a complete search. We will now assume that, instead, agent $i$ can at cost $g(e_i)/2$ discover one project where $Q_i = G$ with probability $e_i$, which we call an incomplete search.\(^{21}\) Now, when the agents choose how much information to acquire, they simultaneously choose which type to acquire.\(^{22}\) We frame the complete search as being high-quality work because it yields more information and is costlier.

We simplify our analysis by assuming the organization is centralized. These results are robust to allowing delegation so long as $M$, $\tau$, or $\alpha$ are sufficiently high.\(^{23}\) The principal sets a high standard

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\(^{21}\) We set the cost of an incomplete search to be half the cost of a complete search because it yields half the information. This is related to Axiom 2 in Pomatto et al. (2018).

\(^{22}\) For simplicity, we assume they can only acquire one or the other.

\(^{23}\) We show this in Appendix Section 6.3 and also formally analyze the interaction between standards and delegation.
by implicitly demanding complete searches.\textsuperscript{24} She sets a low standard by implicitly letting the agent choose the search type. We use the word ‘implicitly’ because, while the agent explicitly chooses the search type, the principal can implicitly choose the search type by her choice of whether to enact standards. We describe this mechanism in the following paragraph.

Because the principal can ignore communication under high standards, high standards require no commitment assumptions. Here, the high-standards equilibrium corresponds to one where the principal assumes all messages are noise unless the agent suggests two projects to implement. In that case, the principal believes the message to be true. To see why high standards implicitly force the agent to choose a complete search, notice that a successful incomplete search results in only one project to be recommended. Under high standards, the agent must also suggest another (random) project if he wants for the information from his search to be used. However, he would not do so in fear of a (B,B) project. As a result, any information from an incomplete search is useless under high standards. Meanwhile, under low standards the equilibrium corresponds to complete truth telling as in Section 3.

Before analyzing the full model, we summarize an analysis of a single-agent version. In such a model, low standards always induce more effort, but are not always optimal. Here, low standards motivate because they allow the agent to choose the incomplete search, which he prefers. However, the principal prefers complete searches, and high standards fix this externality. In what follows, we show that, first, having two agents allows high standards to induce more effort and, second, high standards are always optimal when they do so.

To ensure analytical tractability, we assume $g(e) = \frac{k^2}{e^2}$. Furthermore, we make a minor change to the permissible values of $k$. Previously assuming $k > 1$ was sufficient to ensure an interior value of $e$. Given the lower effort costs under low quality searches, we further restrict to $k > \frac{(3-\tau)(1+\sqrt{2})}{4}$.

4.2 When Standards Motivate

We will now analyze the equilibrium under low standards. We solve the game via backwards induction. The principal continues to approve projects whenever implementation is costless and at least one agent successfully communicates information. Additionally, there always exists a truthful equilibrium of the cheap talk messaging game.

\textsuperscript{24}One can show that, within this model, imposing high standards on only one agent is never optimal.
Consider the case when implementation is costless. Irrespective of the type of search, if only one agent is successful in his search, one of his suggested projects will be approved. If the search was incomplete, there will be only one project suggested. However, if the search was complete, i.e. results in two projects, both projects are a-priori identical so it is without loss to assume the principal randomizes.

If both agents are successful and their discovered projects overlap, then the mutually-suggested project must be \((G, G)\), so it will be implemented. However if the discovered projects do not overlap, each agent would prefer to implement his own project. Now, consider the case where one agent conducted a complete search, the other agent conducted an incomplete search, and the sets do not overlap. Here, the principal will accept one of the projects from the complete search, now knowing the incomplete search must be a \((Q_i, Q_{-i}) = (G, B)\) project. However, when both agents conduct an incomplete search and the sets do not overlap, both projects give the principal the same expected utility. Hence, we model the principal as randomizing evenly between these projects.\(^{25}\)

Given the decision rules, we can now calculate the magnitude and types of information discovered in equilibrium.

Note that for a given agent, \(i\), complete information is, at most, twice as valuable as incomplete information. Intuitively, this is the case due to linearity in expectation and the fact that two pieces of incomplete information replicates all the value of one piece of complete information.\(^{26}\)

Depending on how complementary the information is, there may be equilibria where both agents pursue complete searches and/or both agents pursue incomplete searches. Since the equilibrium with complete searches was analyzed in the previous section, we proceed by solving the game under the equilibrium with incomplete searches.

We now calculate the agents’ efforts under low standards by solving the agents’ (symmetric) first-order conditions, as follows

\[
g'(e_i)/2 = e_{-i}(1/4 + 3/8(1 - \tau)) + (1 - e_i)(1 - \tau). \tag{11} \]

\(^{25}\)Under fairly general assumptions on \(g(e_i)\), this is in fact optimal. For a detailed analysis on the incentives to bias towards one unit over the other see Rantakari (2021).

\(^{26}\)To be more concrete, consider the case when agent \(i\)'s counterpart is informed. Agent \(i\)'s complete information is exactly twice as valuable as incomplete information (to agent \(i\)) because it doubles the likelihood of (i) overlapping information of a \((G, G)\) project and (ii) agent \(i\) receiving a \((G, G)/(G, B)\) gamble when the counterpart’s incomplete information is not about a \((G, G)\) project. However when agent \(i\)'s counterpart is uninformed, incomplete and complete information are equally valuable.
The first part of the right hand side corresponds to the case when both agents are successful. With probability $\frac{1}{4}$, the information sets overlap, revealing the $(G, G)$ project. With complementary probability, the information sets are disjoint and the principal chooses agent $i$’s project with probability $1/2$. Finally, he receives a GG/GB lottery when his partner is unsuccessful. Note that low standards are motivational for an individual agent when holding fixed his partner’s effort magnitude and search type. However, low standards destroy the buy-in effect, even making it negative for $\tau < \frac{3}{5}$. When both agents pursue incomplete searches, agent 2’s information can be used as either (i) a complement with agent 1’s to find the $(G, G)$ project or (ii) a substitute to suggest a competing GG/GB lottery. The latter outweighs the former when $\tau$ is low.

Because high standards always discourage effort when holding the second agent’s effort fixed, they only encourage effort when doing so motivates significant buy-in to the collaboration. Note that the effort choices under centralization and delegation involve different searches. We compare the two types of effort based on how much personal cost of effort each agent expends. The following proposition outlines when such buy-in on a collaboration is achieved.\(^\text{27}\)

**Proposition 5** *Under centralization, the agents exert more effort under high standards compared to any equilibrium under low standards whenever* $\alpha > \frac{4k}{3(1+\tau)}$, *where* $g(e_i) = \frac{k}{2}e_i^2$.

The intuition behind the proposition is that when $\tau$ or $\alpha$ are low, the buy-in effect is small, so high standards do not induce buy-in. Similarly when $k$ is high, neither agent will ever exert high effort, killing buy-in.

### 4.3 Optimality of Standards

The trade-off between high and low standards depends on the effects of each choice on both ex-ante effort incentives and the link between search types and payoffs. In the previous paragraph, we analyzed the effort incentives. Here, we combine this analysis with a discussion of the relationship between search type and payoffs to the actors.

Complete searches are especially profitable when both efforts are high. In this case, there is a high probability that both agents’ searches are successful, wherein complete searches guarantee a $(G, G)$ project. By contrast, low efforts yield a low probability of joint success. If only one search

\(^{27}\)As mentioned in footnote 23, it is without loss of optimality to consider centralization alone.
is successful, complete information is no more valuable than incomplete information. Thus the principal prefers high standards when effort levels are high (minimal chance of wasting information) and when $\tau$ is high (maximal value of complementary information).

Notice that these conditions are, qualitatively, the same as when high standards induce higher effort (Proposition 5), because efforts are high when $k$ is low and $\alpha$ is high. Hence, the intuition behind when standards induce effort, mirrors the intuition behind when they are optimal. The formal proposition is stated below.\textsuperscript{28}

**Proposition 6** *Under centralization, joint surplus under high standards is weakly higher than any equilibrium with low standards whenever $\alpha > \alpha^*(k, \tau)$, where $g(e_i) = \frac{k}{2} e_i^2$. Further, $\frac{\partial \alpha^*}{\partial k} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \alpha^*}{\partial \tau} < 0$.\textsuperscript{29}*

The above inequality is weak because, for certain parameter values, one equilibrium under low standards corresponds to the equilibrium under high standards. However, there also exists the equilibria in which agents utilize incomplete searches. As shown in Figure 2, this equilibrium can have strictly lower payoffs than high standards when $\alpha > \alpha^*(k, \tau)$.\textsuperscript{29}

Below we plot the equilibrium effort levels and profits under both high and low standards as a function of $k$ fixing $\tau$ and $\alpha$. To highlight the possible differences between high and low standards, we focus on the equilibrium under low standards in which the agents choose incomplete searches. In Subfigure (a) we plot the equilibrium effort levels under high and low standards in blue and orange, respectively. In Subfigure (b) we plot the equilibrium profits using the same color scheme. As the cost to acquire information decreases, one can see that high standards first become optimal and then eventually also become empowering.

\textsuperscript{28}The statement can be extended with similar results for any monomial.

\textsuperscript{29}In such cases, any ambiguity aversion or adversarial equilibrium selection rule would result with the principal having a strict preference for high standards.
Notice that introducing a second agent changes the underlying logic behind when high standards are motivational/optimal. With a single agent, high standards are always demotivational. However, when adding a secondary agent, high standards may motivate, and, when they motivate, they are also optimal.

Additionally, our notion of standards is different than in the classic literature. This literature frames lower standards as accepting projects the principal would prefer not to accept but that the agent wants (i.e. Baker et al., 1999). However, in our setting the principal is in fact committing to reject projects that an agent wants implemented and so does the principal. Unlike the previous literature, this implies “the bar” is not only non-negative, but, notably, is positive.

5 Conclusion

We showed that adding collaborative agents can cause delegation to demotivate, when it is otherwise motivational. We then analyzed the influence of this logic on when principals choose to delegate and performed a similar analysis for the principal’s decision to set high or low standards on employees. This analysis informs our understanding of how managers empower employees to succeed.
The empowering effect of different management practices depends on the source of obstacles to an employee accomplishing her goals. When the manager is the source of such obstacles, delegation (low standards) is relatively empowering. When coworkers are the source of these obstacles, centralization (high standards) is relatively empowering. We outlined this argument through the lens of a multi-agent model with complementary agent efforts. While the demand for parsimony forces us to analyze the empowering effects of only delegation and standard setting, managers empower employees using a varied set of managerial approaches. Here, we include a brief discussion of possible extensions on these topics and how they might relate to collaborative teams.

Managers also empower by selecting interventions that benefit one group at the expense of another. For example, former Apple CEO Steve Jobs chose a competitive strategy and organizational processes that advantaged the design division over the engineering division, empowering the designers. Our model can easily be extended to give the principal the ability to choose a strategy when we frame the firm’s strategy as the relative alignment of the principal with each agent. Such a model can yield that the maximally empowering strategy to an agent prioritizes his interests, but not maximally so. That is, agent 1 wants a strategy emphasizing his output. However, if the strategy completely devalued agent 2’s output, agent 2 would become demotivated, which would disempower agent 1. As the efforts of the two divisions become more complementary, the maximally empowering strategy becomes more balanced.

The manager’s hiring decisions influence employee empowerment in ways that interact with the decision to set high standards. Specifically, imagine a manager choosing between hiring a specialist, who is extremely competent but is only partially interested in collaboration, and a generalist, who is less competent but wants to collaborate. If the manager hires a specialist, empowering a collaborative coworker will require setting high standards because the specialist will not internalize externalities on his own. However, if the manager hires a generalist, high standards may be redundant because the generalist will autonomously collaborate. Hiring generalists may thus serve as a substitute for setting high standards when it is either too costly or difficult to hold employees to high standards.

Our analysis on standard-setting contributes to the economic literature trying to understand the roles of a manager. Many economic models allow for managers to play an unrealistically limited role in at least one of the following senses. First, many models narrow the scope of a manager’s
role to be such that it is equally suited to managing one employee as to managing many (e.g. monitoring or assigning a decision right). These models preclude the managerial role of actively helping a team better collaborate, a role often emphasized in popular discussions of management. Second, in many models, the manager acts as a mechanism designer, meaning the manager creates a productive working environment and has little further involvement (e.g. writing incentive contract or choosing the boundary of the firm). Our model on standards overcomes both limitations as it allows the manager the roles of setting and enforcing high standards to ensure that teammates collaborate.

References


Wilson, Mark, “4 myths about Apple design, from an Ex-Apple designer,” May 2014.
6 Appendix

6.1 Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. Let us first show that under delegation to agent 1 the effort by agent 1 is greater than the effort by agent 2. Suppose not, then

\[ e_1^d < e_2^d \implies g'(e_2^d) > g'(e_1^d) \implies e_1^d > \tau e_2^d + 1 - \tau \]  
\[ \implies \tau(1 - e_2) > 1(1 - e_1) \implies \tau > 1 \iff \]  

Where the implications come from convexity of \( g \), substituting the FOC of the agents, and then algebraic simplifications, respectively. This generates a contradiction since \( \tau \) was assumed to be less than one.

Now for the main proof, proceed by contradiction: assume that the effort for agent 1 under centralization with \( \alpha = 1, e^* \), is less than his effort under delegation, \( e_1^d \). We can now show that \( e^* \) must also be less than agent 2’s effort under delegation, \( e_2^d \). Using equation 7, which corresponds to the FOC for an agent under delegation, we note

\[ e_1^d > e^* \implies g'(e_1^d) > g'(e^*) \implies \tau e_2^d + 1 - \tau > \tau e^* + 1 - \tau \implies e_2^d > e^* \]  

Now note Equation 6 states

\[ g'(e^*) = \tau e^* + 1 - \tau. \]  

Let us now replace \( e_2^d \) with \( e^* \) in the above equation. Note that

\[ g'(e_2^d) - g'(e^*) > \tau(e_2 - e^*), \]  

because for any \( e \geq e^* \), \( g''(e) > \frac{1}{2} \). This assertion follows from Assumption 1. Now, note this equation implies

\[ g'(e_2^d) > \tau e_2^d + 1 - \tau, \]  

25
but $g'(ed1) > g'(ed2)$ from step 1 of this Lemma. This implies

$$g'(ed1) > \frac{\tau}{2}e2d2 + 2 - \tau$$

which contradicts equation 7. Thus, the effort when $\alpha = 1$ is strictly higher under centralization.

Next, note that the effort under delegation is independent of $\alpha$. Furthermore, the effort under centralization is increasing in $\alpha$. This can be seen by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Equation 4. Thus, there exists a cutoff value $\alpha^*$ such that for all $\alpha > \alpha^*$ agent 1 works harder under centralization than delegation.

Further, note that since the effort for agent 2 is strictly lower than agent 1 under delegation, but the same under centralization, the region where agent 2 works harder is a strict super set of the region where agent 1 works harder. Hence for all $\alpha > \alpha^*$ both agents work harder under centralization than delegation.

Proof of Corollary 2. Given Lemma 1, both agents’ effort are higher under centralization when $\alpha > \alpha^*$. Additionally, there is better ex-post decision making since the principal never approves projects that give her negative utility. Hence, the principal prefers centralization to delegation when $\alpha > \alpha^*$.

Lemma 7 The payoff to the principal is convex whenever $g'g'' + \frac{2g'g'''}{e^{1 + \frac{2}{\tau}}} < 2(g'')^2$.

Proof of Lemma 7. The profit to the principal under centralization is

$$\Pi = 2\tau\alpha e(\alpha)^2 + (1 - \tau)\alpha e(\alpha).$$

Note that if $\alpha e(\alpha)$ is convex in $\alpha$ then $\alpha^2 e(\alpha)$ will be convex in $\alpha$ since

$$\frac{\partial^2(\alpha^2 e(\alpha))}{\partial \alpha^2} = 2\left(\alpha e'(\alpha) + e(\alpha)(ae''(\alpha) + 2e'(\alpha))\right) = 2\left(\alpha e'(\alpha) + e(\alpha)\frac{\partial^2(\alpha e(\alpha))}{\partial \alpha^2}\right).$$

Hence, it suffices to show that $\alpha e(\alpha)$ is convex. Given that $\alpha \in (0,1)$, this is equivalent to showing
that \( \frac{e''(\alpha)}{e'(\alpha)} > \frac{2}{\alpha} \). Here, \( e(\alpha) \) is determined by the FOC from Equation 6 as

\[
g'(e) = \alpha(\tau e + 1 - \tau) \iff F := g'(e) - \alpha(\tau e + 1 - \tau) = 0. \tag{21}
\]

Using the implicit function theorem can yield solutions for both the first and second derivatives of \( e(\alpha) \).

\[
e''(\alpha) = \frac{-F^2F_{\alpha\alpha} + 2F_{\alpha}F_{\alpha\epsilon}F_{\epsilon} - F_{\alpha}^2F_{\epsilon\epsilon}}{F'_{\epsilon} F_{\epsilon}} > \frac{-2}{\alpha} \tag{22}
\]

\[
\iff \frac{F_{\alpha}F_{\epsilon\epsilon} - 2F_{\epsilon}F_{\epsilon\alpha}}{F'^2_{\epsilon}} \geq \frac{-2}{\alpha} \tag{23}
\]

\[
\iff \frac{g'g'''' - 2\tau \alpha F_{\epsilon}}{F'^2_{\epsilon}} < 2 \tag{24}
\]

\[
\iff g'g'''' < 2F_{\epsilon}(g'' - \alpha(\tau + \alpha)) \tag{25}
\]

\[
\iff g'g'''' + \frac{2g'g''}{e + \frac{1}{\tau} - 1} < 2(g'')^2 \tag{26}
\]

The expressions in Equation 22 come from the implicit function theorem for first and second derivatives, and the fact that \( F_{\alpha,\alpha} = 0 \). All remaining expressions are simplifications.

**Lemma 8** All functions, \( g \), satisfying Assumption 1 satisfy the differential inequality in Lemma 7.

**Proof.** Note that since \( g' < g'' \), it suffices to show

\[
g'g'''' < (g'')^2 \tag{28}
\]

since we know \( e < 1 \). Manipulating the above condition generates

\[
0 < 1 - \frac{g'g''''}{(g'')^2} \tag{29}
\]

\[
\iff 0 < \frac{\partial}{\partial x} \frac{g'}{g''} \tag{30}
\]

\[
\iff 0 > \frac{\partial}{\partial x} g'' = \frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2} \log(g'). \tag{31}
\]

Where the last condition is the definition of log concavity.
Lemma 9  The value to the agents under centralization is convex in $\alpha$ for any function satisfying Assumption 1.

Proof. We know the agents’ first order condition is the solution to

$$g'(e) = \alpha(\tau e + 1 - \tau).$$

(32)

Hence, we can think of the agents’ effort as being derived from the following single agent optimization problem

$$U = \frac{\alpha \tau}{2} e^2 + \alpha(1 - \tau)e - g(e).$$

(33)

We can view this as a function of $\alpha$ as

$$U(\alpha) = \max_e \frac{\alpha \tau}{2} e^2 + \alpha(1 - \tau)e - g(e).$$

(34)

Note that each item in the maximand is convex in $\alpha$ (in fact it is linear), hence the maximum will also be convex. Thus we know

$$\frac{\alpha \tau}{2} e(\alpha)^2 + \alpha(1 - \tau)e(\alpha) - g(e(\alpha))$$

(35)

is convex. However, the agents payoff in equilibrium, is $\alpha \tau e(\alpha)^2 + \alpha(1 - \tau)e(\alpha) - g(e(\alpha))$. Thus it suffices to show that $\alpha e(\alpha)^2$ is convex. However, by Lemma 7 we know that Assumption 1 implies $\alpha e(\alpha)^2$ is convex. Hence, the payoff to the agent under centralization is also convex for any cost function satisfying Assumption 1. 

Proof of Proposition 3. The proof will proceed in three parts: first we will show that the payoffs under delegation are linear in $\alpha$, second we will show the payoffs under centralization are convex in $\alpha$, and finally we will show that centralization is preferred by the principal when $\alpha = 1$. Combining these three results shows that if delegation is ever optimal it can only be optimal for low or intermediate values of $\alpha$. Furthermore, we know centralization is strictly better than delegation at $\alpha^*$ so the relevant upper bound must be strictly less than $\alpha^*$.

Step 1: Lemma 1 implies that the efforts under delegation are independent of $\alpha$. Hence, the
payoff to the principal is linear in \( \alpha \) since \( \alpha \) only impacts the payoff conditional on effort.

**Step 2:** Lemma 7 shows this is true.

**Step 3:** At \( \alpha = 1 \), Corollary 2 implies the principal has a higher payoff under centralization.

Proof of Proposition 4.

**Changes in \( M \):** Changing \( M \) does not affect the effort incentives of either agent under either governance structure. Moreover, the payoff under centralization is independent of \( M \). Hence, it suffices to consider what a change in \( B \) does to delegation. Increasing \( M \), decreases the principal’s profit under delegation for any \( \alpha \). Hence, if delegation was optimal for \( M \), it will be optimal for \( M - \epsilon \) for any positive \( \epsilon \). Using this, the result immediately follows.

**Changes in \( k \):** Using the explicit functional form of the effort costs one can compute the efforts under delegation as

\[
\begin{align*}
\epsilon_1^d &= \frac{k(1 - \tau)}{k^2 - \tau} \\
\epsilon_2^d &= \frac{1 - \tau}{k^2 - \tau}.
\end{align*}
\]

(36) (37)

Meanwhile, under centralization the efforts are

\[
\begin{align*}
\epsilon_1^c &= \epsilon_2^c = \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau)}{k - \alpha \tau}.
\end{align*}
\]

(38)

From here, one can get an explicit form of the profit function under both delegation and centralization as follows

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi^c &= \frac{3\alpha^2 k(-1 + \tau)^2}{(k - \alpha \tau)^2} \\
\Pi^d &= \frac{k(-1 + \tau)(-3 + (3 + 2(-1 + \alpha)M)\tau + k^2(-3 + 2M - 2\alpha M + 3\tau))}{(2(k^2 - \tau)^2)}.
\end{align*}
\]

(39) (40)

One can note that the \( k \)'s in the numerator cancel in both expressions. Thus upon simplifying the expression, we will be able to conclude that centralization results in a higher payoff if a
polynomial that is of at most fourth order in $k$ is positive. Denote this polynomial by $f$ as follows.

$$f(k) = c_0 + c_1k + c_2k^2 + c_3k^3 + c_4k^4. \quad (41)$$

For our monotonicity result we want to show that if $f(k) > 0$ and $k' > k > 1$ then $f(k') > 0$. Below are the coefficients for $f(k)$

$$c_4 = -3 + 2M - 2\alpha M - 6\alpha^2(-1 + \tau) + 3\tau \quad (42)$$
$$c_3 = \alpha \tau(3 + 2(-1 + \alpha)M - 3\tau) \quad (43)$$
$$c_2 = (-3 + (3 - 12\alpha^2 - 2M + 2\alpha M)\tau + \alpha^2(9 + 2M - 2\alpha M)\tau^2 + 3\alpha^2\tau^3) \quad (44)$$
$$c_1 = -2\alpha \tau^2(3 + 2(-1 + \alpha)M) \quad (45)$$
$$c_0 = \alpha^2\tau^2(\tau(2(\alpha - 1)M - 3) + 3). \quad (46)$$

One can show that $c_4 > 0$ for all parameter values. Further, $c_2 \leq 0$ for all parameter values. The signs of the other coefficients are as follows

$$sgn(c_3) = sgn(3(1 - \tau) - 2(1 - \alpha)M) \quad (47)$$
$$sgn(c_1) = -sgn(3 - 2(1 - \alpha)M) \quad (48)$$
$$sgn(c_0) = sgn(3(1 - \tau) - 2\tau(1 - \alpha)M). \quad (49)$$

We can now proceed by casework based on the signs of these terms. Denote by, e.g. $(-,-,-)$ the case where the sign of $c_0$ is negative, the sign of $c_1$ is positive, and the sign of $c_3$ is negative. There are now eight cases to consider.

1. $(-,-,-)$: The polynomial is monotonic and we have our result.

2. $(-,+,+)$: The polynomial is monotonic and we have our result.

3. $(-,+,+)$: Note that Descartes rule implies that there either 3 or 1 zeros. If there is only one then the function is monotonic and we are done. Hence, assume there are three. Given the parameter restrictions implied by the model, we know that $f(1) < 0$ and $f'(1) > 0$. Hence, 2 of the zeros occur when $k < 1$. Thus, in the relevant region of parameter space the function
has a single crossing of the x-axis.

4. (−,+,+): This case is impossible as $c_3 > 0 \implies c_1 < 0$.

5. (+,−,−): Descartes rule implies that there are only 2 or zero zeros. If there are zero, then centralization is more profitable than delegation for all $k$. If there are 2, one can show the parameter restrictions imply that $f(1) < 0$, and hence the argument mirrors before.

6. (+,−,+): Again, there will be two or zero zeros. If there are zero, then, again, centralization is always preferred. If there are two, one can show the parameter restrictions imply that $f(1) < 0$ as before.

7. (+,+ ,−): Here, there are two zeros as well and the argument is similar to that above.

8. (+,+,+): Is impossible because $c_3 > 0$ implies $c_1 < 0$.

**Changes in $\tau$:** Using the explicit form above, one can again compare the expressions for profit under centralization and under delegation and reduce this inequality to when a polynomial is positive. Here, this polynomial is at most third order. However, before analyzing this polynomial directly, it is helpful to make the following change of variables

$$ t = \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau}. \quad (50) $$

Now, instead of looking to zeros of the polynomial when $\tau \in (0,1)$, we can look for zeros when $t \in \mathbb{R}^+$. This polynomial will again be a third order polynomial which is as follows

$$ g(t) = 6\alpha^2(t - k^2(1 + t))^2 + (k - \alpha t + kt)^2(-3 + 2(-1 + \alpha)Mt + k^2(-3 - 2(-1 + \alpha)M(1 + t))) \quad (51) $$

$$ := a_0 + a_1 t + a_2 t^2 + a_3 t^3 \quad (52) $$

One can check that $a_3 > 0$ which will imply that as $t \to \infty$, or equivalently $\tau \to 1$, centralization will yield higher profits than delegation. ■

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Using the parametric assumptions, one can solve for the effort levels
under both low and high standards as written below.

\[
e^l = \frac{8\alpha(1 - \tau)}{4k - 5\tau\alpha + 3\alpha} \quad \text{(53)}
\]

\[
e^h = \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau)}{k - \alpha\tau} \quad \text{(54)}
\]

From here one can use algebraic simplifications to derive high standards are more empowering whenever

\[
\alpha > \frac{4k}{3(1 + \tau)}. \quad \text{(55)}
\]

Proof of Proposition 6. Using the efforts derived in Proposition 5 one can compare the profits to the principal under both high and low standards and derive the unique cutoff rule. Through tedious calculations, one can then show the cross partials needed for the result.

6.2 Extension With Pay

In this subsection, we consider an extension to the model presented in the main text where the principal can both perfectly observe and contract on effort. Note that in this model if the principal could contract on project implementation decisions, then the payoffs under centralization and delegation would be identical.

We now consider a pay scheme where the principal is able to contract on effort, \(e_i\), and governance choice, \(g\). Here, contracts are of the form

\[
w_i = f(e_i, e_{-i}, g). \quad \text{(56)}
\]

In cases like these it is hard to think about when an agent is more empowered under centralization or delegation as workers that have steep pay-for-performance contracts are not necessarily empowered. However, one result that we can carry over with only slight modifications is Proposition 4, namely that the principal does not delegate when alignment is high. In the case with performance pay we need a slight modification.
**Proposition 10** Suppose that effort is contractible, then for all $\alpha > \alpha^*_{\text{p}}$ the principal weakly prefers centralization with a strict preference whenever first-best effort levels are strictly below 1.

This condition is necessary, but not sufficient. To begin, notice that when $\alpha = 1$, the principal accepts all projects the agent would under delegation, in addition to accepting projects only agent 2 wants accepted (which do not effect agent 1’s effort incentives). If the projects that only agent 2 wants approved occur with positive probability, this strictly increases $e_2$ which weakly increases $e_1$ and thus strictly increases payoffs. These projects occur with zero probability under delegation only when $e_2 = 1$, which also implies $e_1 = 1$, which cannot happen so long as first best effort levels are below 1. Hence, if first best effort levels are 1, then delegation and centralization yield identical payoffs for $\alpha = 1$. However, when first best efforts are below 1 the proposition holds. The $\alpha^*_{\text{p}}$ is then derived from continuity in the payoff functions.

### 6.3 Delegatees with Standards

The analysis in the main text analyzes standards only under centralization. Here we extend the analysis to standards under delegation. Our main assumption is that an agent cannot hold himself to a high standard. Standards in our model come from a commitment to an uninformative strategic-communication equilibrium. However, this would not apply between a decision maker and himself. Further, as noted in Footnote 24, standards are only optimal if applied on both agents. Hence, standards are never optimal under delegation.

Thus under delegation both agents choose incomplete searches. If both agent’s information sets overlap, this is the GG project and will be implemented. If both agents are successful but they do not overlap, agent 1 will pick his own project as this grants him strictly larger utility. Further, if agent 1 is successful but agent 2 is not this will be a GG/GB gamble that will be implemented. Finally, if agent 1 is unsuccessful, irrespective of agent 2, no project will be implemented. This yields the following payoffs under delegation.

\[ g'(1) > 4 \] is enough to imply the necessary condition.

Note that when effort is contractible, under any assumption of the cost functions, the aggregate payoffs under both delegation and centralization are convex. Hence, in general, there can be countably many disjoint intervals in which the principal prefers centralization.

The analysis in Section 3 holds under the assumption that incomplete searches are not feasible. Else, a version of delegation that is not feasible is being compared to centralization.

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30Note that $g'(1) > 4$ is enough to imply the necessary condition.
31Note that when effort is contractible, under any assumption of the cost functions, the aggregate payoffs under both delegation and centralization are convex. Hence, in general, there can be countably many disjoint intervals in which the principal prefers centralization.
32The analysis in Section 3 holds under the assumption that incomplete searches are not feasible. Else, a version of delegation that is not feasible is being compared to centralization.
\[ u_1 = e_1 e_2 \left( \frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{4} (1 - \tau) \right) + e_1 (1 - e_2) (1 - \tau) - g(e_1)/2 \]  
\[ u_2 = e_1 e_2 \left( \frac{1}{4} \right) - g(e_2)/2 \]  
\[ u_p = e_1 e_2 \left( \frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{4} (1 - \tau) - (1 - \alpha)M \right) + e_1 (1 - e_2) (1 - \tau - (1 - \alpha)M) \]  
(57)  
(58)  
(59)

When restricting to \( g(e) = \frac{k}{2} e^2 \), as the main analysis does, one can see that the effort of agent 1 under delegation with low standards is

\[ e_1^d = \frac{8k(1 - \tau)}{4k^2 - \tau}. \]  
(60)

Recall that the effort under centralization with low standards is

\[ e_1^c = \frac{8\alpha(1 - \tau)}{3\alpha + 4k - 5\alpha\tau}. \]  
(61)

Note that a sufficient condition for centralization yielding higher profits is that the effort of agent 1 is higher under centralization. One can now compare the above two expressions to see this occurs whenever \( \alpha, k, \) or \( \tau \) is large enough. Further, when \( \alpha = 1 \) the condition simplifies to

\[ \tau < \frac{3k}{5k - 1}. \]  
(62)

Finally, note that if \( M \) is sufficiently large the added effort is societally wasteful under delegation as effort yields to the implementation cost being used on path.