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The (lack of) distortionary effects of proxy-means tests: Results from a nationwide experiment in Indonesia[☆]

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ABSTRACT

Many developing country governments determine eligibility for anti-poverty programs using censuses of household assets. Does this distort subsequent reporting of, or actual purchases of, those assets? We ran a nationwide experiment in Indonesia where, in randomly selected provinces, the government added questions on flat-screen televisions and cell-phone SIM cards to the targeting census administered to 25 million households. In a separate survey six months later, households in treated provinces report fewer televisions, though the effect dissipates thereafter. We find no change in actual television sales, or reported or actual SIM card ownership, suggesting that consumption distortions are likely small.

1. Introduction

The past few decades have seen a dramatic expansion in government-run anti-poverty programs in developing countries, so that today at least 67 low- and middle-income countries have programs targeted to poor households (World Bank, 2015). A key challenge for these programs, however, is identifying which households are poor and hence eligible for the programs. Unlike in the developed world, where governments can target based on incomes reported through the tax system, in developing countries, with large informal sectors, the vast majority of households pay no tax. This means that governments have to come up with other means of identifying the poor.

Instead, in a process called “proxy-means testing”, developing country governments often use infrequently conducted censuses of assets and demographics, predict incomes based on these assets, and then create beneficiary lists based on these predicted incomes.¹ This is a substantial undertaking: every few years, the government sends thousands of enumerators door-to-door throughout the entire country, collecting data firsthand on the assets of, in many cases, millions of households. While households can infer from the questionnaire which assets the

government is asking about, and therefore which assets may affect targeting decisions, the precise formula used to map from the listed assets to eligibility is almost always kept secret (Brown et al., 2018). This type of proxy-means testing is quite common, used in both large countries such as Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and in smaller countries, ranging from Burkina Faso to Ecuador to Jamaica (Fiszbein et al., 2009). There is a substantial literature evaluating the targeting performance of these types of programs (e.g., Alatas et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2018); see Hanna and Olken (2018) for a discussion).

An important policy concern with this approach is that, by conditioning benefits on which assets households own as measured by the proxy-means census, these tests implicitly place a tax on ownership of these assets. Prior work has shown that households may strategically misreport on the targeting census itself (see, e.g., Martinelli and Parker, 2009; Camacho and Conover, 2011). For example, anecdotally, one often hears that households hide their TV and motorcycles under a tarp when they see surveyors approaching to conduct the targeting censuses. However, to the best of our knowledge, a critical and as yet unanswered question is whether this type of asset-based targeting

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¹ Other methods used for targeting in developing countries include community-based targeting (see, for example Alderman, 2002; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Dupas et al., 2018; Alatas et al., 2012) and ordeal mechanisms (Dupas et al., 2016; Alatas et al., 2016). See Coady et al. (2004) for an overview.

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tax spills over beyond the targeting census itself, and in particular, whether it distorts actual consumption behavior. Such real distortions are particularly important in thinking about the design of anti-poverty programs since they could have real economic effects if the assets themselves are productive (e.g., livestock, cell phones) or if they have potential health effects (e.g., better toilets for sanitation).

In the extreme, these types of distortions could certainly occur. For example, in the 18th and 19th century, England and Scotland taxed windows as an easily observable proxy for the wealth of households, and this famously led to windows being boarded up and countless dark houses (Oates and Schwab, 2015). However, modern proxy-means tests use a large number of assets – 34 different types of housing characteristics and assets in our Indonesian example – and as described above, governments deliberately keep the formulas that relate assets to eligibility opaque to try to prevent manipulation around their results. On net, if households fully understood and responded to the incentives inherent in the Indonesian proxy-means-test, the implied marginal tax rate on consumption would be about 15 percent (Hanna and Olken, 2018), which certainly seems large enough that it could cause distortions in aggregate.² However, the fact that the relationship between assets and eligibility for benefits is complex and non-transparent may mean that the distortionary effects could be small in practice (Chetty et al., 2009b; Finkelstein, 2009). Indeed, some have argued that on balance the distortions from targeted programs may be small in the developing country context due to these reasons (Ravallion, 2003). Whether these censuses cause actual distortions in asset ownership is therefore ultimately an empirical question. These distortions are welfare-relevant to the degree they affect who will receive the program in the future.³

To answer this question, we conducted a unique, nationwide randomized experiment that tested whether Indonesia's *real* targeting census has an impact on subsequent asset acquisition, building the experiment into the real targeting process. Indonesia's targeting census occurs approximately every 3–4 years, with enumerators going door-to-door to interview 25 million households – generating data on 92 million individuals – to determine citizens' eligibility for transfer programs and subsidies. We randomized two additional new questions onto the 2015 version of questionnaire, launched in June of that year. To keep the number of questions on the census constant, each randomized question had one of two options. In half the provinces, households received (1) either a question on flat-screen television ownership or a question on the number of rooms in their house and (2) either a question on the number of active cell-phone SIM card numbers the household had or whether they had a modern toilet installed. We deliberately chose our two key treatment questions – flat-screen televisions and SIM card ownership – because we had access to independent data sources on actual asset ownership that did not rely on household self-reports. Questions (1) and (2) were cross-randomized to create 4 versions of the census, randomized across Indonesia's 34 provinces to create a nationwide experiment.

The randomization was done at such a large scale – nationwide in scope, and with randomization province by province – in order for the experiment to be as real and natural as possible, both by being representative at the national level (by construction) and by conducting the experiment at a national scale (Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2017; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2017). In particular, the Indonesian statistics bureau

² A 15 percent tax is quite large and has the potential to distort behavior. For example, Chetty et al. (2009b) showed that consumers responded in the magnitudes predicted by theory to a sales tax of 7.375 percent when the tax was posted.

³ Note that if households are optimizing rationally, the extent to which real distortions matter for aggregate welfare depends on the degree to which they actually affect who receives the program (Feldstein, 1999; Chetty, 2009). If there are optimization frictions and the envelope theorem does not directly apply, the distortions themselves may be of independent interest (Finkelstein and Notowidigdo, 2019).

that administers the targeting census is organized provincially, and hence each province's statistics office, field staff, and data entry team worked with the same version of the targeting census. Moreover, since the government rarely removes questions from one targeting census to the next – for example, 26 of the 29 asset questions (i.e., 90 percent) from the 2011 targeting census were indeed asked again on the 2015 targeting census, and the three that were not included directly were asked again in a slightly different form⁴ – households could reasonably forecast that these new questions would continue to be asked in future targeting censuses as well. Citizens were given the information about this targeting census in the same manner as had been done in all previous targeting censuses.

We then test whether these questions led to differences in both *reported* asset ownership, as measured by subsequent government household sample surveys that have no link to targeting, and in *actual* asset ownership, as measured by independent data on television sales that we obtained from retailers and from administrative data on the number of SIM cards active in each province that we obtained from the telecommunications providers.

To test the effect on reported ownership, we worked with the National Statistics Agency (BPS) to include all four of these questions on the Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey (“SUSENAS”), administered annually to over 250,000 households. (For clarity, we hereafter refer to the targeting census of the poor – which is our treatment – as the ‘census,’ and the subsequent SUSENAS survey data that we use for outcomes as the ‘survey.’) Even though the SUSENAS is not used for targeting – and in fact, the government agencies that conduct targeting cannot even access identifiable data from it – it is possible that individuals may still (wrongly) worry that the government may use it and therefore try to misreport and/or hide their assets. The fact that targeting based on assets may cause misreporting more generally in government data is a substantial concern in itself, as this data is used for calculating descriptive measures of the economy, including the local and national poverty rates.

Analyzing the national sample survey data about six months after the targeting was complete (March 2016), we find that households who live in the provinces where the targeting census asked about flat-screen televisions were in fact 15 percent less likely to report owning a flat-screen television in the SUSENAS. The fact that households change their reported behavior in the SUSENAS survey in response to the targeting census experiment suggests that they are, indeed, paying attention to the implied tax on these assets. We do not observe any effect of the other questions (toilets, rooms, or SIM cards) on reported ownership, but the effect on flat-screen televisions nevertheless survives multiple-inference adjustment. One year later (March 2017), we no longer observe any differences in flat-screen TV ownership across the experimental groups, nor do we observe differences across the other asset variables.

To test whether the targeting questionnaire has distortionary effects on actual asset ownership, we obtained data on television sales from a monthly retailer survey conducted by a leading Indonesian marketing firm, and administrative data on yearly SIM card subscribers from all major Indonesian telecommunications companies through the Ministry of Communications and Information (KeMenKomInfo). We find no evidence of lower television sales or fewer SIM cards owned in the provinces in which these questions were asked on the proxy-means census. Moreover, we can strongly reject a decline in *actual* television sales that would be required to produce the 15 percent decline in reported television ownership detected in the March 2016 SUSENAS; indeed, our estimates suggest that at least 96 percent of the decline we observe in the 2016 SUSENAS is due to reporting, not

⁴ For example, one of the three questions not asked verbatim was as follows: the 2011 targeting census asked about 12 kg or above LPG (cooking gas) cylinders, whereas the 2015 targeting census asked about 5.5 kg or above LPG cylinders.

actual changes. We find no detectable changes in cell phone ownership, though the confidence bands are somewhat larger. The results suggest, therefore, that observed differences in the survey data based on the experimental groups are largely due to effects on reporting, rather than real distortionary effects on asset purchases.

These findings contribute to the policy debate on whether targeted transfers are an effective tool in the fight against poverty. One common argument brought about by critics of targeted programs is that targeting distorts real behavior and choices, and this in turn could have implications for poverty and growth. Providing experimental evidence that was naturally embedded into Indonesia's real nationwide targeting system, this paper suggests that while there may be strategic responses on subsequent surveys potentially affecting some targeting outcomes, the real consumption distortions from avoiding assets that are included in government proxy-means tests are indeed likely to be small.

Section 2 provides the setting, experimental design, and data. We discuss our findings in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.

2. Setting, experimental design and data

2.1. Setting

In developed countries, the selection of the beneficiaries for social protection programs ("targeting") is often accomplished through means-testing: only those with incomes below a certain threshold are eligible. However, for many lower income countries, it is challenging to conduct conventional means-testing, as many people work in agriculture or in the informal sector and thus lack verifiable records of their income.

Instead, to determine program eligibility, many governments conduct "proxy" means-testing, where they use demographic and asset ownership data to predict poverty status. Typically, they conduct periodic quasi-censuses of the poor where government enumerators go door-to-door – visiting millions of households – to acquire information about pre-existing household demographic composition and assets, such as the type of material used in the roof or the walls, whether a household owns a refrigerator or a motorcycle, and so on. The government then takes these variables and uses them to predict incomes, usually based on a formula derived from a prediction exercise using survey data. Program eligibility is then determined by predicted income or per capita expenditures.

Indonesia is no exception. The government has conducted nationwide targeting censuses of the poor approximately every three years since 2005 and has then used proxy-means testing to determine each household's eligibility for targeted transfer programs ranging from cash transfers to health insurance for the poor.⁵ The government canvassed 25 million households, generating data for about 92 million individuals, in the most recent national targeting census – called the *Pemutakhiran Basis Data Terpadu*, or PBDT – in June through August 2015 (see Appendix Figure 1). The three-page targeting questionnaire consisted of three sections: one on basic housing characteristics (e.g., type of roof material, type of floor material, etc.), one on demographics, and one on the assets owned by the household, including items such as refrigerators, A/C, motorbikes, land, and livestock.

The government ran socialization meetings in each village and urban neighborhood prior to conducting the targeting census in which the link between the targeting census and subsequent receipt of government programs was explained. The primary reason for these meetings was that the government wanted to solicit local input to make sure they canvassed all potentially poor households. The briefing materials

⁵ To derive the enumeration frame for the census of the poor, Indonesia, like other countries, uses a combination of methods (e.g., past PMT score, community targeting) to exclude rich households from the data collection. Thus, the census of the poor, in practice, covers 25 million households, or about 40 percent of the population.

described the targeting purpose of the survey but did not contain any details on which questions would be used for targeting or the precise formula.⁶

The information about the use of the proxy-means questions in our setting thus follows the government's normal practice. Indeed, more generally, while the specific questions on proxy-means test surveys are public information, governments around the world, including Indonesia, typically keep the precise formulas used a tightly-held secret (see, e.g., Coady et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2018; Kurdi et al., 2018; see also Camacho and Conover, 2011 for a discussion of an unusual case when the formula became public), and in Indonesia the PMT formula has never been publicly released for this or any previous census of the poor. The parameters we identify in the analysis below are therefore likely a reasonable approximation to the actual policy process.

2.2. Experimental design

We worked with the Government of Indonesia to test whether adding additional questions onto the actual 2015 PBDT questionnaire would incentivize households to reduce asset acquisition in order to maintain their eligibility in the future. We randomized two additional questions onto the actual PBDT questionnaire, reaching 92 million individuals, so that while everyone canvassed received the same number of questions, they were randomly asked different asset questions depending on which province they lived in.

Specifically, each household received (1) either a question on flat-screen television ownership or a question on the number of rooms in their house and (2) a question about the number of active SIM cards the household owns or whether they had a 'swan neck' toilet (henceforth "WC") installed (see Appendix Table 1 for the complete breakdown of question assignments).⁷ These questions were added to the forms at BPS Jakarta and were treated no differently by the regional offices administering the PBDT targeting census from any other questions. We verified in person that the forms used in the field followed the randomization protocol in a number of selected provinces.

There are at least two reasons to think that adding questions to the census could distort real behavior. First, as described above, the questions on the poverty census generally do not change much from wave to wave, so a reasonable way to forecast what will be asked on the next poverty census is through the questions on the current census. Second, households may also be concerned that the government may verify their assets if eligible for the program. For either reason, households may reduce their consumption of these assets following the addition of these questions to the targeting census.

It is important to clarify that there is no mechanical effect on our results through differential selection of beneficiaries. This is for two reasons. First, the additional questions were not actually used by the final PMT formula to select beneficiaries for government programs. The fact that these questions were not used was not public; the formula is kept secret and is known only to a few select staff members in Jakarta. Indeed, we confirmed this with an extensive media search, which indeed revealed no mentions of the formula or what variables

⁶ For example, a village newspaper from Central Java reporting on the socialization meeting explained that the targeting census "is a collection of direct data to determine beneficiaries of social programs." Beyond that, they explained that the statistics agency is "only doing the data collection, and the determination of who will receive benefits will be made by the relevant government agencies" and did not provide any additional details on which variables would be used. See, for example, <https://www.wlaharwetan.desa.id/desa-wlahar-wetan-bersama-bps-gelar-forum-konsultasi-publik-pemutakhiran-data-terpadu/>. This echoes the messages in the central government's brochure on the survey: (<http://www.tnp2k.go.id/images/uploads/downloads/leaflet-pbd-t-alternatif-tiga%20reduced.pdf>).

⁷ A 'swan neck' toilet is the common Indonesian term for any toilet with a modern plumbing trap (typically known as a P-trap) installed to prevent the venting of sewer gasses back into the house.

were or were not included, anywhere in the Indonesian press. Second, in any case, this could not have *been* publicly known at the time of the 2016 household survey that we use to measure outcomes because the formula was still being refined internally in 2016, and the final list of beneficiaries was not used until early 2017. However, as described above, it was widely known that the PBDT targeting census, in general, would be used for determining program eligibility (and indeed the government held tens of thousands of meetings, in every village and urban neighborhood of Indonesia, to explain this prior to the survey), and hence a reasonable presumption for a normal household is that all questions in it, including the randomly added questions, would have been used.

The randomization was conducted across the 34 provinces, since the enumerator training and forms used occurred at the province level (Fig. 1). The high level of randomization was intended to minimize spillovers across individuals. We stratified by 5 regions corresponding to the main Indonesian island groups for additional statistical precision.⁸ The fact that the experiment spans all of Indonesia increases external validity, overcoming the fact that there are significant differences in culture and institutions across Indonesia (Dearden and Ravallion, 1988).

2.3. Data

We use three main datasets for this paper. First, we obtained household-level data from the Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS), a semi-annual national survey, representative of the population at the district-times-urban/rural level, conducted by the Government of Indonesia. We use SUSENAS data from after the PBDT targeting occurred – specifically, March 2016 and March 2017, comprising about 300,000 households in each round – to measure whether households report owning fewer of a particular asset if they were asked questions on ownership of that asset on the PBDT (see timeline in Appendix Figure 1). Importantly, not all of our outcomes of interest were initially included on the SUSENAS prior to our study, and thus, we worked with Statistics Indonesia (BPS) to make sure all four questions were included. We also obtained earlier years of the SUSENAS data – from 2005 to 2015 – in order to include baseline control variables at the district-times-urban/rural level to gain additional statistical precision. For our purposes, we treat the SUSENAS as repeated cross-sections.⁹

The SUSENAS is a sample survey where households are interviewed to collect their information. If there is an effect of the treatment on asset acquisition using this data, it could be due to two factors. First, treatment households could actually reduce their asset acquisition or choose not to invest in new assets. Second, their asset ownership may not actually change, but they may lie about it to the surveyors (i.e., “hide their income”). In fact, this is a common concern that one often hears about during the targeting census—people hiding their televisions or motorcycles under a cloth when an enumerator is arriving.

Therefore, for two of our questions, we chose variables that we would be able to verify using independently sourced data that does not rely on household reports. This allows us to shut off the “lying channel” and only measure real effects on asset acquisition.

First, we obtained data on monthly television sales of flat-screen televisions – from January 2013 through December 2016 – from an Indonesian market research firm. The data captures all flat-screen televisions with screens 30 inches or larger, thus matching exactly the question we added to the targeting census questionnaire. The market research firm collects monthly TV sales data directly from their network of retailers in 20 regions in Indonesia, and accounts for between 85 to 90 percent of total sales of flat-panel TVs 30 inches and above. Given

⁸ The strata are Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumatra, and all other provinces.

⁹ A small number of SUSENAS households constitute a panel in some years, but this is not useful in the study period.

contractual restrictions between the market research firm and the retail firms that supply them data, we were not able to obtain province-by-province data; instead, the firm was able to provide us with monthly data on total sales in each of our four randomized groups of provinces (i.e., TV–phone, TV–toilet, room–phone, room–toilet).¹⁰

Second, we obtained yearly data on active SIM cards, by province, for 2015, 2016, and 2017, from the Indonesian Government Ministry of Information and Communications (KeMenKomInfo), who compiled it from administrative data supplied by each of Indonesia’s telephone providers.¹¹

2.4. Randomization check

We report a balance check using data from the March 2014 SUSENAS, i.e., data from the year before the intervention. We focus on demographics (e.g., urbanization status, household size) and variables that are similar to our intervention questions. As shown in Appendix Table 2, out of the 16 coefficients that we consider, 1 is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, which is consistent with what we would expect based on random chance. Nonetheless, in our regression analysis, we control for district-times-urban/rural baseline characteristics using a double-LASSO procedure (Belloni et al., 2014) to account for any differences across treatment groups in the sample and to increase statistical power.

3. Results

3.1. Effects on self-reported asset acquisition

We begin by examining the impact of receiving the randomized asset questions in the PBDT on each of the four considered assets. Specifically, we estimate:

$$Asset_{hdp} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TVTreat_p + \beta_2 CellTreat_p + X'_{dp}\gamma + \alpha_r + \varepsilon_{hdp} \quad (1)$$

where $Asset_{hdp}$ is the self-reported asset measure in the post-period for household “h” in district “d” in province “p”. We include two dummy variables to indicate which of the randomized questions households received on the targeting questionnaire. Therefore, β_1 provides the causal effect of being randomized to the “TV question” rather than the “rooms” question, while β_2 provides the causal effect of being randomized to the “SIM card” question rather than the “toilet” question. We report standard errors clustered at the province level, our level of randomization. We also report *p*-values computed using randomization inference at the province level (our unit of randomization), with counterfactuals generated using our original randomization programs. The fact that we use randomization inference to construct *p*-values means that the inference we report is valid even with 34 provinces (see Young, 2019).

While the randomization should ensure balanced groups, one can gain additional statistical precision by including controls of two types. First, we include fixed effects for the 5 regional strata (α_r). Second, we include baseline control variables to account for any differences across treatment groups and to improve statistical power. Typically, one would include the baseline data of the outcome variable for a

¹⁰ Broadly speaking, the SUSENAS and retail sales estimates provide similar magnitudes of televisions owned. The SUSENAS estimates that about 11 percent of households own at least one flat-screen television, equivalent to 7.84 million households. Adding up the total television sales from the market research firm from January 2013 to March 2016 yields about 7.4 million TVs sold in that period. These will not be exact since some flat-screen televisions were sold before 2013, they acknowledge that they cover about 85 to 90 percent of the market, some people will own more than one TV, etc. However, the fact that the magnitudes appear broadly similar provides reassurance on the consistency of the datasets.

¹¹ This includes data from Telkomsel, Sampoerna, 3, and Smartfren. Data from XL and Indostat are for 2017 only.




Fig. 1. Map of Randomization. Notes: This map shows the treatment assignment (i.e., which questions were asked within the 2015 targeting census) of each of Indonesia's 34 provinces.

given observation. However, in this case, we could not do that for two reasons—first, the SUSENAS is a repeated cross-section of households within a given district rather than a panel, and second, we added new questions onto subsequent SUSENAS for the purpose of this study, so pre-period values of these controls are not available. Thus, we instead first coded a total of 1,388 asset variables from the 2007 to 2015 SUSENAS, constructed averages by district and urbanization status (the smallest level at which we can merge this data to the outcome data), and merged these averages into the household survey data. To avoid specification searching, we then selected control variables from this set automatically using the double-LASSO approach of Belloni et al. (2014).¹²

Table 1 provides these results. Panel A does so for our four asset outcome variables from the March 2016 SUSENAS, while Panel B reports results using the March 2017 data.¹³ In Columns 1 and 2, we report coefficients on $TVTreat_{hdp}$ (β_1) and $CellTreat_{hdp}$ (β_2); in Columns 3 and 4, we report coefficients on the Rooms treatment ($1-TV\text{Treat}_{hdp}$) and the WC treatment ($1-Cell\text{Treat}_{hdp}$). We hypothesize that each treatment question would have the potential to influence the ownership of the asset in question (i.e., randomized TV question on TV ownership, randomized WC question on WC ownership, etc.), while using the control questions in each column act as a placebo test (i.e., one would not expect the randomized WC question to necessarily have direct effects on TV ownership). In the next to last row, we report the mean of the dependent variable for interpretation, and in the final row, we report p -values adjusted to correct for the family-wise error rate (FWER) to correct for multiple inference across the four key hypotheses (TV variable affects TV ownership; cell variable affects SIM card ownership, etc.) following Westfall and Young (1993) and

¹² The LASSO-selected controls vary from column to column, and are listed in Appendix Table 3. Appendix Table 4 replicates Table 1 with the strata fixed effects, but no baseline controls. The findings are qualitatively similar, but we obtained additional statistical precision with the included controls. In the specification with no controls, the coefficient on television ownership in the 2016 SUSENAS remains statistically significant without controls (randomization inference p -value 0.018 without LASSO-selected controls, compared to 0.003 with LASSO-selected controls), but the FWER-adjusted p -value is no longer statistically significant.

¹³ In the March 2017, one of our questions (number of SIM cards) was dropped from the SUSENAS, and instead there is a different question on number of people with active cell phones. We, therefore, use number of people with active cell phones as the outcome in 2017. In Appendix Table 5, we show that using this same question in the 2016 data yields similar conclusions as when one uses the number of SIM cards variable as the outcome in 2016 (Panel A, Column 2 of Table 1).

Anderson (2008). FWER-adjusted p -values are also calculated using a randomization inference procedure at the province level, so they are correct even in finite samples with 34 provinces.

We first turn to the March 2016 SUSENAS (about six months after the targeting census was completed), the first survey round post-treatment that includes our added questions (Panel A). We find that being randomized to the flat-screen television question on the targeting census leads to a reduction in reported flat-screen TV ownership, but the other randomized questions (WC, rooms, and SIM cards) do not lead to any changes in the ownership of the respective assets. The effect on TV ownership in 2016 is both statistically significant and large in magnitude—being randomized to receive the TV question in the PBDT targeting census leads to about a 15 percent (1.7 percentage point) reduction in reported flat-screen TV ownership in subsequent surveys; this is individually significant at the 1 percent level and has a FWER multiple-inference adjusted p -value of 0.003.

By March 2017 (Panel B), we no longer observe any significant effects of the experimental treatments on any of the asset questions. In fact, we can easily reject that the magnitude of the treatment effect of the TV treatment in 2017 is the same as in 2016 (p -value=0.006). This implies that any observed effects of the treatments on reported assets may be short-lived.

While households were not told the precise PMT formula – and hence did not know the exact return from lying on any particular question – they may have formed a reasonable inference that televisions were an important criteria. To quantify this, we re-estimated the Indonesian government's PMT model, augmented to include each of the 4 new variables, using the 2016 SUSENAS in control areas (i.e., for the television variable, we use provinces which were not asked the television question, and so on).¹⁴ We then calculate, for each household that actually owns the asset in question, the increase in probability of being below the eligibility cutoff that households would receive by simply changing their response on that one variable.¹⁵ The results, shown in Fig. 2, show that lying about television ownership has the highest return for the household, increasing the probability of being eligible for benefits by 12 percentage points for a large number of households; the remaining asset variables would yield between a

¹⁴ Specifically, we estimate the PMT regression in the 2016 SUSENAS and calculate the fraction of households eligible in each province/rural-urban unit equal to the percentage of households under 1.5 times the official poverty line. We use the estimated prediction errors in the Indonesian PMT system from Alatas et al. (2016).

¹⁵ For count variables (SIM cards and number of rooms), we calculate the change by reducing one's response by one unit.

Table 1
Treatment effect on self-reported asset ownership.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Own TV	Nb. Sim Cards	Nb. Rooms	Own WC
<i>Panel A: 2016 Outcome Data</i>				
TV Treatment	-0.0168*** (0.00473) (0.003)	-0.0129 (0.0338) (0.801)		
Cell Treatment	-0.00325 (0.00462) (0.658)	0.00409 (0.0334) (0.952)		
Room Treatment			-0.140 (0.179) (0.344)	0.00237 (0.00416) (0.670)
WC Treatment			0.129 (0.160) (0.369)	0.00459 (0.00435) (0.405)
Observations	291,414	291,414	291,414	291,414
Controls	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso
Strata FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Dep. Variable Mean	0.110	2.183	6.150	0.672
FWER-adjusted <i>p</i> -value	0.002	0.925	0.727	0.727
	Own TV	Nb. People with Phones	Nb. Rooms	Own WC
<i>Panel B: 2017 Outcome Data</i>				
TV Treatment	-0.00413 (0.00574) (0.474)	-0.00931 (0.0333) (0.897)		
Cell Treatment	0.00248 (0.00493) (0.698)	-0.0316 (0.0345) (0.603)		
Room Treatment			-0.180 (0.157) (0.201)	-0.00340 (0.00843) (0.812)
WC Treatment			0.0576 (0.142) (0.682)	0.0121 (0.00926) (0.331)
Observations	297,276	297,276	297,276	297,276
Controls	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso
Strata FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Dep. Variable Mean	0.116	1.957	6.229	0.696
FWER-adjusted <i>p</i> -value	0.728	0.728	0.727	0.682

Notes: This table provides estimates of the treatment effects of the different targeting questions in the PBDT on household-reported assets in subsequent surveys. Panel A uses outcome data from the March 2016 SUSENAS, while Panel B uses data from the March 2017 SUSENAS. Each regression is estimated using OLS and includes strata fixed effects and pre-experiment control variables selected using the double-LASSO procedure described in the text. Standard errors, clustered by province, are shown in parentheses; randomization inference *p*-values are shown in brackets. The FWER-adjusted *p*-value is calculated within each panel following the free step-down resampling method from Westfall and Young (1993), as described in Anderson (2008) using 1000 replications. ****p* < 0.01 ***p* < 0.05 **p* < 0.1.

3.5 and 7 percentage point increase. Of course, as already noted – households do not know the precise PMT formula, so they would not know exactly the gains from lying on a particular variable – and it is possible that *de facto* program receipt would not precisely match the theoretical predictions from our estimated model (Ravallion and Chen, 2015). However, this analysis does suggest that households may have had a rough sense that, among the variables in the PMT, flat-screen televisions were the kind of asset that could have a big effect on their eligibility, and more generally, the fact that the SUSENAS survey results changed suggests that households were responsive to the treatment.¹⁶

Moreover, the number of rooms and presence of a WC are more easily observed since the government enumerators typically walk from room to room during the surveys, and hence are harder to hide. In contrast, televisions and cell phones are more easily hidden (e.g., hide the TV under a tarp or in a box, keep your cell phone in your pocket). It

¹⁶ It is also worth noting that only about 40 percent of households nationwide received the targeting census, while the SUSENAS survey aimed to be representative of the population. However, it is possible that households discussed the targeting census questions, especially since they were discussed at village-wide meetings (see above).

is also worth noting that cell phones are very common, with households on average reporting about 2.2 SIM cards per household. In contrast, flat-screen televisions are rarer, with only about 11 percent of households owning one, and are more likely to be perceived as a marker of a wealthy household. While this discussion is of course speculative, it is notable that it is consistent with the patterns we find in the data.

3.2. Effects on asset acquisition measured in independent data

The findings from the household survey could be driven by real changes in assets, or they could simply reflect hiding assets from or misreporting assets to the survey enumerators. We therefore turn to the independent data to study real outcomes, thereby shutting off the second channel.

TV Sales Data: Given privacy concerns about releasing province-level data, the firm instead generated for us monthly data on sales by each of our four randomized groups of provinces (i.e., TV–cell, TV–toilet, room–cell, room–toilet). Due to the difference in the data structure (only 4 groups of provinces, but with monthly time series data for each of the 4 groups), we cannot analyze the data using the same specifications as above, but instead estimate:

$$\text{LogSales}_{mg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{TVTreat} \times \text{POST}_{mg} + \beta_2 \text{CellTreat} \times \text{POST}_{mg}$$




Fig. 2. Effect of Misreporting Asset Ownership on Probability of Receiving Benefit. Notes: This figure illustrates households' increase in probability of receiving benefits if they were to misreport asset ownership. Four different proxy-means test (PMT) scores are constructed in the control group of each respective outcome, each time using the same categories of variables used in Hanna and Olken (2018), as well as the single relevant asset, as predictors of log per capita consumption. We then calculate the probability of being below the poverty line (defined for each province and for rural and urban areas separately) and thus receiving a benefit, under actual reported assets and under misreporting ownership of the relevant asset. We then graph the difference in these two probabilities as a function of the PMT score, limited to the households that report owning at least one of the relevant assets so that we do not double-count the effect of not owning the asset in the PMT score.

$$+ \beta_3 POST_{mg} + \alpha_g \times m + \epsilon_{gm} \tag{2}$$

where $LogSales_{mg}$ is the sales in group “g” at month-year “m”, $TVTreat \times POST_{mg}$ and $CellTreat \times POST_{mg}$ are indicator variables that equal 1 if the person received that respective question and it is the post-period, and $\alpha_g \times m$ is a group-by-month linear trend. The α_g are group dummies, which absorb the main effects of $TVTreat_g$ and $CellTreat_g$. We use the full data set of data available to us: January 2013 to December 2016.¹⁷

Table 2 provides the results. In Column 1, we estimate Equation (2) using OLS with robust standard errors. However, to account for the time-series structure of the data, we provide two other specifications to deal with potential serial correlation. First, in Column 2, we compute Newey and West (1987) standard errors with 3 lags. Finally, in Column 3 (our preferred specification), we estimate a panel-corrected model with AR(1) disturbances, which accounts for AR(1) serial correlation within panels and allows for correlations in a given month across panels.¹⁸ In the end, all three models produce similar results: we do not observe a reduction in TV sales for those in the treatment group—in fact, the coefficient is positive.

It is important to note that in Table 2, we are measuring a flow (sales of new televisions), whereas in Table 1 we are measuring a stock (does the household have a flat-screen television). To compare the two

¹⁷ In Appendix Table 6, we truncate the data to March 2016 for greater comparability with the time period in Panel A of Table 1 (March 2016 SUSENAS). The findings are unchanged, so we use the full data for the main table.

¹⁸ This model, estimated via the *xtpcse* command in Stata, specifies the functional form for the Ω matrix to compute standard errors correctly in the presence of serial correlation within panels and contemporaneous time correlation across panels, and deals with auto-correlation using the Prais-Winsten correction. It does not use the Ω matrix fully for estimation in FGLS, and is more conservative than FLGS in small-samples (Beck and Katz, 1995). We also consider specifications with month and month-year fixed effects (see Appendix Tables 7a and 7b); results are similar.

magnitudes, we note that to obtain a 15 percent reduction in the stock of televisions reported by households in treatment areas in Table 1 by March 2016, just about 6 months after treatment, the flow of television sales in treatment areas would need to have declined by 61 percent, equivalent to a decline in log sales of -0.95 . We, therefore, test whether we can reject a decline in log sales of 0.95 (last two rows of Table 2). We can easily rule out declines of that magnitude; indeed, under our preferred specification, we can rule out any decline in log television sales larger in magnitude than about 0.04. In short, the vast majority of the effect – at least 96 percent of the decline – seems to be on reported television ownership, not on actual sales.

SIM Card Subscribership Data: For SIM card ownership, we have annual data (as of December of each year) for each of the 34 provinces from 2015 to 2017. For each year, we estimate:

$$LogSubscribers_p = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CellTreat_p + \beta_2 TVTreat_p + \epsilon_p \tag{3}$$

where $LogSubscribers_p$ is the log of the number of SIM card subscribers in province p , and $CellTreat_p$ and $TVTreat_p$ are the experimental treatments. Standard errors are robust, and we have one observation per province (the level of randomization) in each panel.

These results are shown in Table 3.¹⁹ We show results from December 2015 (about 4 months post-treatment) in Panel A, and those from 2016 (about 16 months post-treatment) in Panel B, and those from 2017 (about 28 months post-treatment) in Panel C. Column 1 estimates equation (3) above. To obtain greater statistical precision, in Column 2, we add log population in the province as a control, and we additionally add strata fixed effects in Column 3. Across all specifications, the effect of the cell treatment is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, given that we saw no effects on reported cell phone ownership, with

¹⁹ In Appendix Table 8, we replicate Table 3 dropping Jakarta because Jakarta SIM cards are easier to obtain elsewhere in the country. The conclusions remain unchanged. In Appendix Tables 9 and 10, we repeat these analyses pooling all three years (2015–2017); results are qualitatively similar.

Table 2
Treatment effect on actual television sales.

	(1) Log Sales	(2) Log Sales	(3) Log Sales
TV Treatment × Post	0.0540 (0.0563)	0.0540 (0.0806)	0.0517 (0.0475)
Cell Treatment × Post	0.190*** (0.0563)	0.190** (0.0806)	0.0771 (0.0505)
Observations	192	192	192
Model/Standard Errors	Robust	Newey	Panel-Corrected AR(1)
Dep. Variable Mean	10.77	10.77	10.77
TV coef. = -0.95 F-statistic / chi-squared	318.2	155.1	445.4
TV coef. = -0.95 p-value	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001

Notes: This table provides estimates of the treatment effects of the different targeting questions in the PBDT on actual television sales. Television sales data are reported monthly from January 2013 to December 2016 for each of the four treatment groups. Column 1 provides simple OLS estimates, while column 2 provides Newey–West corrected errors with a lag of 3. Column 3 provides panel-corrected estimates with an AR(1) structure. The TV sales outcome in this table is a flow, while the TV ownership in Table 1 is a stock. To compare these two findings, in the final two rows, we also provide a test against the decrease in log TV sales (-0.95) that we would need to observe to generate the TV ownership effect observed in Table 1. F-statistics for this test are reported in columns 1 and 2, and a chi-squared statistic is reported in column 3; p-values for this test are reported for all columns.

***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1.

Table 3
Treatment effect on SIM card ownership.

	(1) Log Subscribers	(2) Log Subscribers	(3) Log Subscribers
<i>Panel A: 2015 Data</i>			
Cell Treatment	-0.225 (0.406) (0.372)	-0.102 (0.146) (0.664)	-0.106 (0.153) (0.678)
TV Treatment	-0.258 (0.418) (0.323)	-0.192 (0.156) (0.263)	-0.189 (0.148) (0.255)
Observations	34	34	34
Log population control	N	Y	Y
Strata FE	N	N	Y
Dep. Variable Mean	14.95	14.95	14.95
<i>Panel B: 2016 Data</i>			
Cell Treatment	-0.251 (0.401) (0.335)	-0.129 (0.148) (0.583)	-0.135 (0.159) (0.569)
TV Treatment	-0.249 (0.414) (0.356)	-0.184 (0.159) (0.366)	-0.175 (0.152) (0.387)
Observations	34	34	34
Log population control	N	Y	Y
Strata FE	N	N	Y
Dep. Variable Mean	15.17	15.17	15.17
<i>Panel C: 2017 Data</i>			
Cell Treatment	-0.173 (0.403) (0.383)	-0.0478 (0.129) (0.618)	-0.0529 (0.109) (0.595)
TV Treatment	-0.0445 (0.408) (0.823)	0.0227 (0.127) (0.817)	0.0121 (0.103) (0.899)
Observations	34	34	34
Log population control	N	Y	Y
Strata FE	N	N	Y
Dep. Variable Mean	15.55	15.55	15.55

Notes: This table provides estimates of the treatment effects of the different targeting questions in the PBDT on actual active SIM card subscribers. Subscriber data are reported at the province-year level from 2015 to 2017. All regressions are estimated using OLS. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; randomization inference p-values are shown in brackets.

***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1 shown computed using the clustered standard errors.

much tighter standard errors (we can reject a decline in the number of reported SIM cards of more than 3 percent in 2016 and more than 5

percent in 2017; see Table 1), a reasonable conclusion is that cell phone SIM ownership did not change either.

4. Conclusion

While targeted transfer programs have been shown to confer significant benefits, particularly on the health and education of children, as well as directly on household consumption, much of the debate surrounding transfers often revolves around whether or not they distort the economic behavior of households. The previous literature has shown that the likely effects of targeted transfers on work behaviors in developing countries are indeed low to non-existent. However, given that much of the targeting is based on asset ownership (rather than income) in these countries, it is of key importance to understand whether these transfers distort household consumption behavior.

Using a nationwide experiment built into Indonesia's real targeting system, covering 92 million individuals, we show that while the targeting may affect short-run reporting of assets, it does not distort real consumption behavior in aggregate. The findings here apply to the types of complex, deliberately opaque targeting systems used in proxy-means test regimes throughout the world. While a few programs use simple rules (such as the early versions of the NGO GiveDirectly's programs, which originally targeted on the basis of whether a household had a thatched roof), which may induce more distortion, the multi-dimensional formulas we study here are the norm throughout the world. Indeed, perhaps one reason these systems are so common is precisely because they are less likely to induce distortion than more simple rules. Understanding this better is an important dimension for future research.

These results are consistent with results from other aspects of targeted transfers. In particular, while there is some evidence that targeted transfers can affect the decision of whether to work in the formal or informal sector (e.g., Camacho et al., 2014), these programs do not appear to greatly reduce actual total labor supply in developing countries (see, e.g., Haushofer and Shapiro 2016; Banerjee et al., 2017; Baird et al., 2018). This paper likewise suggests that on the asset side, while reporting of assets used in proxy-means test formulas could be an issue at least in the short run, concerns about actual distortionary effects of targeting in developing countries do not appear to be supported by the data, especially relative to the potential gains from redistribution.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubecp.2020.100001>.

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