(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support*

Daron Acemoglu† Nicolás Ajzenman‡ Cevat Giray Aksoy§
Martin Fiszbein¶ Carlos Molina‖

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Abstract

Using large-scale survey data covering more than 110 countries and exploiting within-country variation across cohorts and surveys, we show that individuals with longer exposure to democracy display stronger support for democratic institutions, and this effect is largely driven by individuals who have been exposed to democracies that have performed well in terms of fostering economic growth, avoiding political instability, and providing public goods. We bolster these baseline findings using an instrumental-variables strategy exploiting regional democratization waves and focusing on immigrants' exposure to democracy before migration. In all cases, the timing and nature of the effects are consistent with a causal interpretation. We also show that support for democratic institutions matters: when there is greater support for democratic institutions, democratic political instability and coups are less likely, and democracies perform better in the face of negative shocks.

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†Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics. E-mail: daron@mit.edu
‡São Paulo School of Economics-FGV. E-mail: nicolas.ajzenman@fgv.br
§European Bank for Reconstruction and Development & King's College London. E-mail: aksoyc@ebrd.com
¶Boston University, Department of Economics. E-mail: fiszbein@bu.edu
‖Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics. E-mail: camolina@mit.edu

1 Introduction

> "Our nation stands for democracy and proper drains." John Betjeman (Poet Laureate of the UK, 1972-1984).

With many voters expressing increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic system, misinformation and extremism spreading rapidly (e.g., Sunstein, 2018; Marantz, 2020 and Castillo, Silver, & Wike, 2019), and authoritarian-leaning populist parties on the rise in many Western countries (e.g. Judis, 2016; Müller, 2017; Edwards, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020), concerns about the future viability of democracy have multiplied.[1] Repucci and Slipowitz (2021) reports that there have now been 15 consecutive years during which democracy has been in retreat globally. Are we witnessing the twilight of democratic institutions around the world? A critical factor that may shape the future of democracy is the support from those who have lived under democratic institutions (see Easton, 1965; Booth, Seligson, et al., 2009 and Norris, 2011, and general discussions in Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019 and Iversen & Soskice, 2019).

The idea that democracy needs to be defended, if it is to survive, goes back at least to ancient Athens (Ober, 2015), and in modern times, to Benjamin Franklin's reported quip when asked whether the new country had a republic or a monarchy: "A Republic, if you can keep it"(Anishanslin, 2019). Naturally, if citizens have a good experience with democracy, they should be more willing to support it. This was one of the main arguments for President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal program. In his April 14, 1938 fireside chat, he argued:

> "In recommending this program I am thinking not only of the immediate economic needs of the people of the Nation, but also of their personal liberties—the most precious possession of all Americans. I am thinking of our democracy and of the recent trend in other parts of the world away from the democratic ideal.
>
> Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations—not because the people of those nations disliked democracy, but because they had grown tired of unemployment and insecurity, of seeing their children hungry while they sat helpless in the face of government confusion and government weakness through lack of leadership in government"(Peters & Woolley, 2022).

President Joe Biden returned to the same theme in 2021, motivating his infrastructure and fiscal plans with the arguments that:

[1] Prominent books articulating this concern include: Applebaum (2020), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) and Snyder (2017), while others such as Deneen (2019) and Mishra (2017) have come to view the (liberal) democratic project as a failure. Some have even argued that we are in the midst of a fascist revival (e.g., Stanley, 2018).

"We have to prove democracy still works—that our government still works and we can deliver for our people.

In our first 100 days together, we have acted to restore the people's faith in our democracy to deliver"(Biden, 2021).

Despite their long pedigree, these ideas have not been systematically investigated, and to the best of our knowledge, little is known on whether there is truly more public support for democratic institutions when they are more successful. In this paper, we show that those who live under democracy tend to support democracy and oppose authoritarian and army rule, and document that these effects are driven almost entirely by those who have personal experience of good performance of democratic institutions in terms of GDP growth, political stability, and public good provision.

Our empirical strategy focuses on within-country between-age group variation. Put simply, we look at whether age groups that have been exposed to longer (successful) democratic spells express greater support for democracy relative to other age groups in the same country and the same age groups in other countries. This strategy exploits differences in the timing of democratization and democratic reversals, and variation in economic and social outcomes under democracy,[2] which generate variation in the exposure of different individuals in the same country to the history of democratic institutions and successful democratic performance.[3]

Though this empirical strategy zeroes in on an attractive source of within-country variation in democratic exposure, it does not dispel all endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. We deal with these concerns in four distinct and complementary ways. First, we document that a country's overall or successful democratic experience before an individual is born has no impact on their support for democracy or views about autocracy.

Second, we show that exposure to democracy or successful democracy has no impact on a number of non-political attitudinal questions related to family and neighbors. These two exercises alleviate concerns about our results being driven by broad social changes that affect both democratization and political views.

Third, we estimate very similar effects with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) strategy exploiting exposure to regional democratization waves (as in Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2019, but adapted to focus on individual exposure). These 2SLS results are particularly reassuring, since they rely on a very different source of variation and should be immune to the typical reverse causality concerns (whereby it is support for democracy causing democracy,

[2]When this causes no confusion, we use "successful democratic performance" to mean successful performance in terms of economic growth, political stability, and public good provision.

[3]When exploiting variation in exposure to successful democracy, we control for exposure to overall successful performance, so that our results are not driven by a direct effect of good outcomes on political attitudes, regardless of whether they are taking place in democratic or nondemocratic countries. These results also imply that exposure to successful or unsuccessful nondemocracies does not have a similar impact on attitudes.

rather than the other way around). We additionally show that the source of variation exploited by our 2SLS strategy affects attitudes towards democracy with the right timing and has no predictive power for non-political views.

Finally, we document analogous results in a sample of immigrants whose democratic exposure is a function of the age at which they migrate as well as the evolution of democratic institutions in their host country.

Our estimates are broadly similar with each of our six different measures of support for democracy. They are also fairly robust with different measures of democracy, in datasets covering different continents and different survey questions, and across a variety of additional specification checks.

The effects we estimate are not just statistically significant and stable, but quantitatively meaningful as well. In terms of exposure to overall democracy, our baseline estimates imply that 20 more years of exposure to democracy increases support for democracy by about 8% of its standard deviation—approximately the difference in the support for democracy between Hong Kong and mainland China, and more than half of the difference between the US and Argentina. The effects of exposure to successful democracy are similar, and if anything larger. Additionally, we show that our exposure to democracy results are almost entirely explained by exposure to successful democracy. In particular, exposure to unsuccessful democracy does not increase support for democratic institutions, while 20 more years of exposure to economically successful democracy increases support for democratic institutions between 8% and 16%.

Overall, we interpret our results as showing robust evidence that citizens who experience successful operation of democratic institutions tend to support democracy.

In the last section of the paper, we complement our main results by providing evidence that support for democracy matters for the functioning of democratic institutions. Specifically, we use a strategy related to Nunn, Qian, and Wen (2018), but focusing on the population's support for democracy, rather than the trust measures in their work. We find that greater support for democracy makes political instability and coups less likely and democratic economic performance more robust in the face of negative economic shocks. Although these results should be interpreted as suggestive correlations, we show that no similar relationship exists between support for democracy and economic and political outcomes in nondemocratic regimes. This bolsters our interpretation that survey responses on support for democracy are relevant for the public's actual support for democracy.

Our paper is related to several literatures. First, there is by now a sizable literature on democratic consolidation and coups against democracy. The early theoretical literature in this area is summarized in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Fearon (2011), Bidner and François (2013), and Svolik (2013) develop models in which collective action by citizens is critical for the defense of democracy, while Maeda (2010), Svolik (2015) and

Bermeo (2016) provide related empirical evidence. Some of the more recent work in this area focuses on the emergence of electoral authoritarianism and hybrid regimes because of democratic failures (e.g. Geddes, 2005; Schedler, 2006; Gandhi, 2008). We contribute to this literature by highlighting the importance of experience of successful democracy for the population's support for democratic institutions.

A long-running empirical debate focuses on whether high-education and high-income countries are insulated from coups and democratic collapse. The modernization literature spearheaded by Lipset (1959) emphasized the link between economic modernization and democracy, and the subsequent literature, especially Przeworski et al. (2000), claimed that high income countries do not suffer coups. Yet this conclusion has not withstood the test of time and evidence. The recent literature, cited in footnote 1, starts from the premise that democracies in advanced nations are vulnerable as well, and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008, 2009) documented that the oft-claimed relationship between country income per capita and democracy (or income and lack of coups) is due to a failure to control for country heterogeneity. Indeed, including fixed effects or other types of country-level controls removes any relationship between income per capita or education and democracy (or its survival). The literature on populism and other anti-democratic movements in industrialized nations also embraces the perspective that these countries' democracies can be fragile, despite their very high levels of income (see, e.g., Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2016, 2020, and Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020). Relevant to these debates, we provide novel evidence that what matters for support for democracy is not so much the level of income or education, but time spent under democratic institutions that deliver in terms of economic growth, political stability, and public goods.

The general themes explored in this paper are also related to the determinants of civic culture. The more common perspective in the literature emphasizes the role of civic culture in the emergence and functioning of democracy (e.g. Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). Nevertheless, an argument going back to at least Inglehart and Welzel (2005) hypothesizes that democratic institutions impact civic culture as well, and several empirical works have found an association between democratic experiences and prosocial preferences (Bardhan, 2000; Grosjean & Senik, 2011; Rustagi, 2018). We contribute to this literature by providing systematic evidence on the importance of exposure to democracy on one important aspect of political attitudes: support for democracy. Several scholars, for example, Easton (1965), Lipset (1959), William and Rose (1999), Booth et al. (2009) and Norris (2011), discuss the role of people's attitudes to and support for democracy in the survival of democratic regimes. Although the earlier literature did not find a clear relationship between self-reported support and political behavior (e.g., Welzel, 2007), there is some recent work that estimates such a link (see, e.g., Claassen, 2020a). Our last set of results on the positive effects of support for democracy for economic and political performance contribute to this emerging literature.

Most importantly, we build on a number of prior works exploring the relationship between democratic experience and support for democracy. This idea is related to Persson and Tabellini's (2009) notion of "democratic capital", which they proxy with the number of years a country spends as a democracy. They then report cross-country correlations between this measure and democratic consolidation. Recent papers by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015), Brum (2018) and Besley and Persson (2019) are even more closely connected as they go beyond cross-country analysis and explore the cross-cohort relationship between exposure to democracy and political preferences. Our main contribution relative to this literature is to focus on the effects of exposure to *successful* democracies and show that this accounts for almost the entire association between exposure to democracy and support for democracy. In addition, our empirical strategy is different from this previous literature, as we exploit detailed age group-specific variation (by including a large number of interactive fixed effects) and estimate IV models that isolate exogenous variation in exposure to democracy (and we also report an extensive set of placebo exercises).

Another paper exploring similar themes is Buera, Monge-Naranjo, and Primiceri (2011), who develop a Bayesian framework in which a representative agent within each country learns from her own experience as well as the experiences of neighboring countries about whether an open or closed economy is better for economic growth. A similar framework applied to democracy would imply that more successful democratic experience increases support for democracy—one of our main results. We are not aware of other works that develop this perspective in the context of democracy (though Brender & Drazen, 2009, provide a related model). We do not impose an explicit Bayesian framework, since we believe that there are multiple channels at work here and some of the patterns we find, such as fairly constant effects throughout an individual's life, are not straightforward to reconcile with the Bayesian perspective (which would predict, on average, less learning as an individual accumulates experience under a political regime and thus has less room for updating).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our main data sources. Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy and describes the construction of our exposure to democracy variable. Section 4 presents our results on the relationship between exposure to democracy and and exposure to successful democracy on the one hand and various measures of support for democracy on the other. Section 5 documents the robustness of these main estimates, provides several placebo exercises, presents our 2SLS results, and also explores the same relationships on a sample of immigrants. Section 6 explores the implications of support for democracy for economic and political outcomes under democratic institutions. Section 7 concludes, while the (online) Appendix contains several additional robustness checks and estimates.

2 Data

In this section, we describe our main data sources and the construction of our measures of democracy.

2.1 Survey Data on Democratic Values

Our analysis uses individual survey data from eleven waves of the Integrated Value Surveys (IVS), which harmonizes the European Values Study and the World Value Survey. The resulting data set provides nationally representative surveys from 113 countries, covering around 540,000 respondents between 1981 and 2018. Interviews are conducted in the local languages and questions are designed to assess respondents' attitudes on a range of issues, including attitudes toward democracy and social and economic attitudes.

We focus on five measures of support for democracy that are present in multiple waves of the IVS.[4] The first is the level of agreement of the respondent with the statement "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government". The other four questions are based on the individual's assessment on how well various types of political systems would work. These are: "Having a democratic political system", "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections", "Having the army rule" and "Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country". We normalize the respondent' answers to these questions so that higher values indicate higher support for democratic values and refer to this questions as *Democracy is better*, *Democratic system*, *Opposes strong leader*, *Opposes army rule* and *Government above experts* respectively (see Appendix Table A-1).[5] We also combine the latter four measures into an index, which we refer to as *Support for democracy index*.[6]

We additionally use information on a range of respondent personal characteristics, including country of birth, country of residence, year of birth, year of interview, and year of migration to construct individual exposure to democracy. We also utilize information on gender, language, size of town as controls, and use variables on educational attainment and the year in which education was (or will be) completed in the last part of the paper.

Finally, we confirm our results using complementary measures from from the Asianbarometer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the Latinobarometer. The

[4]Although there are a few more outcomes measuring support for democracy, these are asked in less than four of the eleven waves of the IVS. Since in some of our key specifications we compare the same age group at different points in time, having sufficiently many waves is important for our empirical strategy. All of the questions we focus on were introduced to the IVS in 1994 or later.

[5]As noted in the Introduction, this question is useful because it contrasts non-elected *technocracy* to democratically-elected governments. This type of "rule by experts" was in the past used as a justification for dictatorships (e.g., in Chile under Pinochet; see Silva, 2009).

[6]We do not include the first measure in this index since it is available only for a smaller sample.

Asianbarometer covers 14 Asian countries and 70,693 individuals surveyed between 2000 and 2016. LAPOP covers 33 countries from Latin America and 305,838 respondents between 2004 and 2019, and the Latinobarometer covers 19 countries from the same region and 407,945 respondents from 1995 to 2017.

2.2 Data on Democracy

It is a priori unclear whether the intensive or the extensive margin of democracy, or both, matter in shaping support for democracy. For this reason, we present two complementary measures of exposure to democracy, one constructed from a dichotomous index of democracy, thus focusing on the extensive margin, and the other based on a continuous measure of democracy, so that we are exploiting both intensive and extensive margin variation. In an effort to reduce measurement error, our dichotomous variable combines information from several datasets, including Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2018), Acemoglu et al. (2019), Freedom House and Polity IV. We construct an (unbalanced) panel that comprises 185 polities (including all countries with data on the IVS) with information from 1800 to 2018, though the earliest date we use is 1891.[7] In Appendix A.1, we explain in more detail the construction of this measure.

Our continuous index of democracy comes from Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset, a recent project that has constructed comparable and high-quality measures of the extent of democracy for more than 200 countries for the last two centuries.[8] Compared to other available measures, V-DEM collects information on a wide range of characteristics ($\approx$ 400 indicators), including factual information directly coded from official documents, such as constitutions and government records, and more subjective assessments on topics like political practices and compliance with de jure rules coded from multiple experts.[9]

These indicators are used as input for building five indices, each ranging between zero and one and identifying a distinct dimension of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian.[10] We construct our continuous measure of democracy by averaging

[7] Only 4% of the respondents in our sample are exposed to political regimes before 1930. The results are very similar if we exclude this 4% and start the analysis from those exposed to post-1930 democracies.

[8] V-DEM was released in 2014 for 68 countries, and it has gradually expanded to 202 polities (version 10). Despite its recent release, the dataset has been widely used in political science research (Dahlum, Knutsen, & Wig, 2019; Singh, 2019; Claassen, 2020a, 2020b; Lührmann, Marquardt, & Mechkova, 2020).

[9] For more information on variable construction, see Coppedge et al. (2020). For a more detailed comparison of V-DEM with other democracy indices (including the ones used for our dichotomous measure) in terms of definition, sources, coverage and reliability, see Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, and Teorell (2017).

[10] The *electoral* component incorporates measures of whether leaders are appointed through popular elections, the share of population with suffrage, the absence of electoral irregularities (registration fraud, electoral violence, vote buying), and the extent at which parties (including opposition), press and civil organizations are able to form and operate freely. The *liberal* principle comprises measures of the capability of government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, judiciary) to exercise oversight over the executive and act independently, the extent of the executive respect for the laws, citizen access to justice, secure property rights,

these five components.

These dichotomous and continuous measures have independent and relevant information on the evolution of democracy around the world. For example, the United States is coded as a democratic country throughout the 20th century according to our dichotomous measure. However, as we show in Appendix Figure A-1, V-DEM captures more fine-grained information about US institutions: its democracy score increases from 59% in 1900 to 84% in 2000. Part of this increase (about 12.4 percentage points) takes place during the late 1960s in conjunction with the 24th Amendment and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which removed barriers to the electoral participation of Black Americans in the South. There is also a 6.1 percentage point increase driven by the egalitarian component during the 1930s and early 1940s as *New Deal* reforms reduced inequities in access to public services. The same figure also illustrates granular information in the V-DEM scores of the United Kingdom, Spain and Argentina.

2.3 Other Data

We homogenize (when available) information from several sources to construct a panel data set of different measures of performance, spanning the lifetime of our survey participants. Our measure of real GDP growth relies on information from the Maddison Project (Bolt & Van Zanden, 2020), the Penn World Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015) and the World Bank national accounts data. This measure is available for 188 countries and 18,760 country/year pairs.[11]

Data on conflict are from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Harbom, Melander, & Wallensteen, 2008). Our main variable of interest is the number of internal conflicts producing at least 25 battle-related deaths in a given country/year where at least one party is the government of a state and is available since 1946. This variable is available for 169 countries (12,337 country/year pairs) and indicates that there is conflict during 14% of our sample.

freedoms of religion, forced labor, movement and physical integrity rights, and the number of chambers that the legislature contain. The *participatory* principle measures the involvement of civil society organizations, the decentralization of candidate selection empirical parties and this can nation against women therein, the extent to which the direct popular vote is utilized (e.g., referendums, plebiscites) and whether there exist elected local and regional governments and their degree of freedom from unelected officials. The *deliberative* component combines information on how open public deliberations for important policy changes are, how public and reasoned elite's justifications for their positions are, whether they justify their arguments in terms of the common good and whether they acknowledge and respect counterarguments. The *egalitarian* principle measures the percentage of the population not living in areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly weaker, whether some social groups are in favorable positions in terms of such liberties or political power, and how universal mean-tested programs, education, healthcare and infrastructural spending are in the national budget.

[11]The bulk of the variation of our main measure of real GDP growth comes from GDP growth rates from the GDP per capita in 2011US$ from the Maddison project (the source with the highest coverage). When information in Maddison is not available, we typically impute growth rates from the other sources following a similar procedure to the dichotomous measure of democracy discussed in Appendix A.1. Our results are robust to exclude imputed observations and to use Penn World Tables as the primary measure.

We also rely on a measure of government expenditure relative to GDP that combines information from the International Monetary Fund Fiscal Affairs Departamental Data and The UNESCO Institute for Statistics. This variable is typically available for a comparable number of countries (170 countries) but for a shorter period of time (5,514 country/year pairs).

We also use secondary measures of successful performance including measures of redistribution from the World Inequality Database and Inflation from the International Monetary Fund.

3 Exposure to Democracy and Empirical Strategy

We now describe the construction of our exposure to democracy and exposure to successful democracy variables and introduce our main empirical strategies.

We define Exposure to Democracy$_{c,s,a}$ for an individual of age a in country c observed in (interview) year s is as:

$$\text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^{s} D_{c,t}, \tag{1}$$

where D_{ct} is either our dichotomous or continuous measure of democracy for country c in year t (see Section 2.2). The summation is over the lifetime of an individual of age a, starting when they were k year-old all the way to the present year, s. This measure therefore represents an individual's total time under democracy in their country. In our baseline data, we set $k = 6$ so that democratic exposure starts being measured from the time an individual is six years old and begins schooling.[12]

Our empirical strategy relies on exploiting age group-country-year-level variation in the history of democracy in order to estimate the relationship between exposure to overall or successful democracy and support for democratic institutions. Let us illustrate this strategy first with the case in which we focus on (overall) exposure to democracy. In this case, our estimating equation is

$$\text{Outcome}_{i,w,c,s,a} = \beta \text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a} + \gamma' X_{i,w,c,s,a} + \varepsilon_{i,w,c,s,a}, \tag{2}$$

where i, w, c, s and a denote, respectively, individual, wave-survey, country, year of interview and age. *Outcome* is one of the measures of contemporaneous democratic support discussed in the previous section. In addition, $X_{i,w,s,a}$ is a vector of individual controls always included

[12]The results are very similar if we set $k = 0$, so that an individual is allowed to be influenced by exposure to democracy from the time of his or her birth, or if we set it as $k = 18$ so that it is exposure during an individual's adult life that matters. We prefer $k = 6$, since exposure during the first years of life is less likely to be understood or internalized by individuals, and our evidence shows that schooling experience is important. Our results are also robust if we allow exposure to democracy to depreciate as in Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015).

in our empirical specifications: a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city. In additional specifications we also include country × year of interview and age × subregion fixed effects or age×country and age×year×subregion fixed effects, in all cases will broadly similar results.[13] The inclusion of country, cohort and age fixed effects in these specifications ensures that we are comparing a particular age group to individuals from the same age group in other countries, to other age groups from the same country, and to itself over time as its own experience of democracy evolves.

Our full model separates exposure to successful and unsuccessful democracies (where success is defined on the basis of economic performance, political stability and public good provision, as explained below). This model can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Outcome}_{i,w,c,s,a} &= \beta^{good}\text{Exposure to Democracy}^{good}_{c,s,a} + \beta^{bad}\text{Exposure to Democracy}^{bad}_{c,s,a} \\ &\quad +\gamma' X_{i,w,c,s,a} + \varepsilon_{i,w,c,s,a}, \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where Exposure to Democracy$^{good}_{c,s,a}$ and Exposure to Democracy$^{bad}_{c,s,a}$ represent, respectively, exposure to successful and unsuccessful years of democracy. Specifically, these two variables are computed analogously to (1), but separating periods of successful performance from those of unsuccessful performance according to various metrics. In particular:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Exposure to Democracy}^{good}_{i,c,s,a} &= \sum_{t=s-a+k}^{s} D_{c,t} \times M_{i,c,t} \\ \text{Exposure to Democracy}^{bad}_{i,c,s,a} &= \sum_{t=s-a+k}^{s} D_{c,t} \times (1 - M_{i,c,t}), \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where "good" and "bad" are shorthands for successful and unsuccessful, $M_{i,c,t}$ is a dummy variable taking the value of one when according to the chosen criterion, country c is successful at time t (e.g., economic expansion vs. severe recession). In the rest of this section, we report estimates of equation (3), using these two variables with $M_{i,c,t}$ corresponding to economic growth, political stability, and public good provision. We also control for the main effect of success by separately controlling for exposure to periods of successful performance, regardless of whether a country is democratic or nondemocratic. Analogously to (4), this variable is defined as:

$$\text{Exposure to Successful Performance}_{i,c,s,a} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^{s} M_{i,c,t}. \tag{5}$$

[13] Throughout we use 23 subregions as specified by the ISO 3166 classification.

In estimates of equation (3), we focus on exposure measures constructed from our dichotomous index of democracy and relegate results that use the continuous index of democracy to the Appendix. This is both for brevity and because the interpretation of the two variables in equation (4) is more straightforward in this case. In any case, we find very similar results using both definitions.

The key identifying restriction in both (2) and (3) is that, absent differences in exposure to overall or successful democracy, the same age groups across countries would be on similar trends over time in terms of their support for democracy. Although there is no foolproof way of checking this identifying restriction, we deploy several strategies to probe it further. First, we show that our estimates are very similar across different specifications, regardless of whether we control for interactive fixed effects at the level of age×year×subregion or age×country. Second, we document that pre-birth exposure to either successful or overall democracy of an age group has no correlation with support for democracy, bolstering our confidence that these groups are on parallel trends. Third, we verify that a battery of non-political variables are uncorrelated with our exposure to democracy variable. Fourth, we utilize an instrumental-variables strategy, exploiting individual's exposure to regional democratizations waves, which leads to very similar estimates. Finally, we also report similar results in the subsample of immigrants, whose exposure to democracy is in their country of birth.

We additionally allow the error term in (2) and (3) to be correlated among individuals within the same country and within the same year of interview, and compute the standard errors allowing for these two sources of clustering (random effects).

4 Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy

In this section, we present our main estimates from equations (2) and (3). We explore the robustness of these estimates to alternative strategies, including instrument variables estimation, and various placebo exercises in the next section.

4.1 Exposure to Overall Democracy

Table 1 reports our baseline estimation for β from equation (2). In this analysis, our sample excludes immigrants, whom we study separately later. The first column of Table 1 is for our *Support for democracy index*, while the second column provides results for the *Democracy is better* measure. The remaining four columns present the results separately for the four components that make up the *Support for democracy index*, which are: *Democratic system*,

Opposes strong leader, *Opposes army rule,* and *Government above experts* (see Section 2).

Panel A reports results for our main specification with exposure to democracy constructed from our dichotomous measure of democracy. Panel B depicts estimates with an exposure to democracy measure constructed from the continuous index of democracy from V-DEM. Throughout, to ease comparison across variables and specifications, we report beta coefficients (computed in standard-deviation units for a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable).

The pattern revealed by Table 1 is clear: exposure to democracy has a stable and statistically significant effect on all our measures of support for democracy across all panels (the estimates are significant at less than 5% except for *Opposes strong leader* and *Opposes army rule* variables in Panel A, which is at the margin of significance at 10%). The implied effects are quantitatively sizable as well. For example, for the *Support for democracy index* in column 1, we have a coefficient of 0.069 (standard error=0.019) in Panel A. The same coefficient estimate is larger and slightly less precise in Panel B, 0.123 (standard error = 0.024).

The estimated effects are not just statistically significant and stable, but also quantitatively meaningful. For example, focusing on the *Support for democracy index* variable and the estimate in Panel A, a 20-year difference in exposure is predicted to increase this variable by 8% of its standard deviation. This magnitude is similar to the difference in average *Support for democracy index* between Hong Kong and mainland China (9%) or between South Korea and China (12%), and more than half of the difference between the US and Argentina (13%).

Our results suggest that both the dichotomous and continuous democracy indices contain useful information. We confirm this point in Appendix Table A-2, where we include exposure to democracy constructed from the dichotomous and continuous measures at the same time, and show that, in general, they both matter.

Figure 1 reports binned scatterplots (with 15 bins) of the conditional relationship between the two measures of exposure to democracy in Table 1 and the various measures of support for democracy. The figure confirms the positive relationship documented in Table 1, and also shows that our results are not explained by outliers. Additionally, the fairly linear progression in the figure clarifies that our estimates are not driven by a comparison of individuals that were never exposed to democracy to those that lived mostly under democracy. Put differently, partial exposure leads to more support for democracy than no exposure but less than full exposure.

Finally, although our sample has a relatively broad coverage (including 108 countries between 1994 and 2018), it is tilted towards European countries because of the inclusion of the European Values Surveys in IVS. To confirm that this sample frame is not responsible for our results and to underscore their external validity, we estimated similar models on questions related to support for democracy from the Asianbarometer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the Latinobarometer. These estimates, summarized in Table 2, are very

similar to our baseline results.

4.2 Successful Democracies Breed Their Own Support

We now establish that the relationship between exposure to democracy and support for democracy is almost entirely accounted for by individuals with exposure to democratic institutions that have functioned well and led to economic growth, political stability, and high levels of public good provision.[14] In contrast, exposure to democracies that are unsuccessful in these dimensions does not increase support for democracy. In this subsection, we focus on exposure measures constructed from the dichotomous indices of democracy, which facilitates the interpretation of the estimates.

4.2.1 Economic Growth

We start by distinguishing periods of severe economic recessions from normal times. Specifically, we set $M_{i,c,t} = 0$ in equations (4) and (5) if country c's GDP growth rate at time t is more than one standard deviation below the average growth rate in our sample, and $M_{i,c,t} = 1$. Thus, our first measure captures a contrast between periods of bad economic performance vs. normal times.

Panel A Table 3 presents the results. The coefficient on exposure to successful democracy is positive and statistically significant in all specifications (the estimates are significant at less than 5% except for *Opposes strong leader* and *Opposes army rule* variables in Panel A, which are significant at 9%). The coefficient on exposure to unsuccessful democracy is much smaller and indistinguishable from zero in all specifications. The quantitative magnitude of the effects of exposure to successful democracy is sizable. For example, the coefficient estimate for *Support for democracy index* is 0.069 (standard error = 0.020).

Recall that with our main estimates from Table 1, 20 more years of exposure to democracy increases support for democracy by about 8% of its standard deviation. This is also exactly the effect of 20 more years of exposure to successful democracy (relative to 20 years of exposure to autocracy). This sizable impact highlights the importance of experience of successful economic performance under democracy for garnering support for democratic institutions.

Alternately, we can evaluate the importance of successful democratic performance on support for democracy by comparing the marginal effect of one additional year of exposure to successful democracy times the relative likelihood of successful democracy (compared to overall democracy) to the marginal effect of one additional year of exposure to democracy. This cal-

[14] Another relevant dimension is whether democracies are redistributing and reducing inequality. We explore this dimension in Panels A and B of Appendix Table A-3. Because inequality data are noisier and less reliable, we present these results as supplemental evidence and put less weight on them.

culation implies that exposure to successful democracy explains 98% of the quantitative effect of overall exposure to democracy in Table 1.

These magnitudes, and the much smaller or zero effects of unsuccessful democracies, are the basis of our claim that the relationship between exposure to democracy and support for democracy is almost entirely driven by the effect of *successful* democracies. We will see that this is the case when we focus on other dimensions of democratic success as well.

Interestingly, exposure to successful performance is insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that economic growth by itself does not make people more pro- or anti-democratic. Rather, it is experience with successful democracy that influences people's political attitudes.[15]

Overall, these results suggest that successful economic performance under democracy is important for the legitimacy of a democratic regime and has long-lasting effects on citizens' support for democracy. However, economic growth is unlikely to be the only thing citizens expect from a democratic regime. We next turn to other dimensions of successful performance.

4.2.2 Political Stability

Political stability may be one of the other outcomes citizens expect from a democratic regime. For example, the Philippines is classified as a democracy for most of the last 40 years, but has been mired by an ongoing armed conflict between government forces and Maoist rebels. Even though the Filipino economy has performed well for most of this period, many citizens may have formed an unfavorable opinion of its democracy. Indeed, support for democracy in the Philippines today is one of the lowest in our sample. We now explore whether in other cases, too, lack of peace and political stability is associated with lower support for democracy.

To investigate this question, we set $M_{i,c,t}$ in equations (4) and (5) to be equal to 1 if country c at time t does not experience a conflict. The estimation results are presented in Panel B of Table 3 and show very similar pattern to the one we saw in Panel A: all of the coefficients for exposure to successful democracy are positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients for exposure to unsuccessful democracy are much smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, when the relevant metric is political stability, what builds support for democracy once again appears to be the successful functioning of democracy in the past.

The quantitative magnitudes are once again sizable. For example, the estimate in column 1 is 0.086 (standard error = 0.020), which implies that 20 more years of exposure to successful democracy (again relative to 20 years of exposure to autocracy) increases support for democracy

[15]Instead of exposure to successful performance overall, we could include exposure to successful nondemocracies. Appendix Table A-4 adopts this parameterization and confirms that exposure to successful nondemocracy does not have a stable or statistically significant impact. This suggests, in particular, that individuals do not become less likely to support democracy when they live under economically competent autocratic regimes. This finding goes against the common presumption that people in China do not demand democracy because growth under the Communist Party has been rapid.

by about 10% of its standard deviation, similar and if anything larger than the effect of overall exposure to democracy. Indeed, with a similar calculation to the one reported for economic growth in the previous subsection, the successful democracy effect again accounts for almost all of the impact of exposure to democracy on support for democracy, documented in Table 1.[16]

4.2.3 Public Expenditure

Besides economic growth and peace and political stability, most citizens also expect public services from a democratic government. Because we do not have access to a comprehensive measure of the quantity and quality of public services a government provides, we focus on whether there is a high level of public expenditure relative to GDP. As in the case of GDP, we set $M_{i,c,t} = 1$ in equations (4) and (5) when country c's government expenditure (as proportion of GDP) at time t is more than one standard deviation below the average level in our sample, and $M_{i,c,t} = 0$ otherwise.

The results from this exercise are presented in Panel C and show another strong contrast between exposure to successful and unsuccessful democracy. Exposure to democracy with high expenditure is always positive and statistically significant (with the exception of the variable *Opposes strong leader*), while exposure to democracy with low expenditure is typically small and mostly insignificant. The quantitative magnitudes are once again sizable and explain the relationship between overall exposure to democracy and support for democracy. For example, the estimate in column 1 is 0.136 (standard error = 0.030), which implies that 20 more years of exposure to successful democracy increases support for democracy by about 16% of its standard deviation, and the effects of exposure to democracy estimated in Table 1 are once again explained by the impact of successful democracies on support for democracy.

4.2.4 Asian and Latin American Data

Table 4 explores the role of successful and unsuccessful democratic performance with data from the Asianbarometer and the two Latin American data sets we used above. The results are broadly similar to those from our main sample. Seventeen of the 24 coefficient estimates for successful democracy are significant at 5% or less. In contrast, only five of the 24 estimates for unsuccessful democracy are significant, and in all cases these estimates are smaller than those for successful democracies.

Overall, the results in this subsection show that most of the statistical association between

[16] Panels C and D of Appendix Table A-3 explore a different dimension of political stability: maintaining low levels of inflation. The coefficients for exposure to successful democracy are positive and in all cases larger than the coefficients for exposure to unsuccessful democracy, though in this case they are noisier and thus only six out of the 12 estimates reported are statistically significant at the 5% or less.

exposure to overall democracy and support for democracy documented is driven by exposure to *successful* democracy. Put differently, individuals—and only those individuals—who experience a democratic regime that delivers economic growth, political stability, public services, and redistribution become more positive about democracy and are much more likely to support it.

5 Robustness, Placebo Checks and IV Estimates

In this section, we demonstrate the robustness of the estimates from equations (2) and (3) to various alternative empirical strategies and samples and present placebo exercises as well as instrumental-variables (IV) estimates.

5.1 Robustness of Baseline Estimates

The results reported in Tables 1 and 3 are robust across a variety of different specifications, different samples and controls, and are not driven by outliers.

We start with the robustness of the results on overall exposure to democracy. Appendix Table A-5 documents that the results are similar when we focus on even more fine-grained variation by including either country × year of interview and age × subregion fixed effects, or age×year×subregion, or age×country fixed effects. Unsurprisingly, some of the estimates are a little noisier, but they are quite consistent with the results reported in Table 1.[17] Estimates from specifications that include country × year of interview and age × subregion fixed effects are also depicted in Figure 2 alongside our main estimates (we will use this figure to additionally depict our placebo exercises, discussed below).

Appendix Table A-6 shows that the results are similar if we cap the number of years in democracy to 40, so that there is "saturation" in exposure to democracy after a while. The coefficient are very similar to our baseline specification. Appendix Table A-7, in turn, breaks down the exposure to democracy variable into a number of components representing exposure at different ages and shows that it is not exposure just during "impressionable years" or youth in general, but throughout an individual's life that matters for support for democracy. This result also implies that, in contrast to the implications of a Bayesian framework as in Buera et al. (2011), there is no evidence that the effects are getting smaller as an individual accumulates more information during his or her lifetime.

All of the results reported so far are based on standard fixed effect estimates that combine variation from 182 democratizations events. Recent literature has pointed out that the fixed

[17] Seven of the 36 coefficients are not distinguishable from zero at the 95% level (*Democracy system,* Panel E; *Opposes strong leader,* Panels A and C; *Opposes army rule* Panels B, D and F; and *Government above experts,* Panel E), but the estimated effects are positive in all cases.

effect estimator could be biased when such events produce heterogeneous effects (e.g. across events or time; for a review of this literature see De Chaisemartin & D'Haultfoeuille, 2022 and Roth, Sant'Anna, Bilinski, & Poe, 2022). We investigate this possibility in Appendix Table A-8. In our setting, variation in exposure to democracy can be driven by multiple regime transitions. As a simple check against these concerns, we limit the sample to individuals who have experienced at most one regime transition, which make up about 89% of our baseline sample. Panel A of Appendix Table A-8 shows that our results are highly robust in this smaller sample; estimates are always positive and significant, and similar in magnitude to those presented in Table 1. Additionally, in Panel B of Appendix Table A-8 we estimate an extended version of equation (2), allowing the effects of exposure to democracy to be heterogenous by event, as in Wooldridge (2021). We then aggregate these event-specific estimates using inverse variance weights, and the results are once again very similar to those in Table 1.[18]

Appendix Figure A-2 additionally verifies that our results are robust to dropping each subregion one at a time, so that no single subregion is critical for our results.

Next, we repeat similar robustness checks. Appendix Table A-9 shows consistent estimates using the continuous version of democracy. Appendix Table A-10 presents analogous estimates to Table 3 and Appendix Table A-9, but now also including country $\times$ year of interview and age $\times$ subregion fixed effects, with very similar results. Appendix Tables A-11 and A-12 additionally includes age$\times$year$\times$subregion or age$\times$country fixed effects and additionally shows analogous specifications with exposure measures computed from continuous democracy indices. Once again, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 3, and the specifications including country $\times$ year of interview and age $\times$ subregion fixed effects are depicted in Figure 4.

In Appendix Table A-13, we also show that the effects of exposure to successful democracy are fairly uniform during different stages of an one's life. Therefore, individuals become more supportive of democracy, regardless of their age or their past experiences with democracy. We note that this pattern is also not easy to reconcile with a Bayesian learning channel (where we would expect learning to slow down after an individual has enough information), but is consistent with more behavioral theories where the population becomes more satisfied with and improves its assessment of democratic institutions, whenever democracy performs better.

Finally, in Appendix Table A-14 we verify that the exact manner in which the thresholds for successful performance are defined does not matter for our results. For economic growth, Panel A confirms that the results are similar when $M_{i,c,t}$ for economic growth is defined relative to each country's own average growth rate in the sample rather than the sample average. Panels B through D show that they are also broadly similar when we define economic failure as periods with negative growth; with growth rate less than -1%; or with growth rate less than -2%.

[18]The results are also similar, though somewhat noisier, without weights.

Panel E confirms that the results of political stability are broadly consistent when we define unsuccessful performance as periods of civil wars (conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths). For public expenditure, Panel F shows analogous results when $M_{i,c,t}$ is defined relative to a country's own level of public expenditure, rather than in comparison to the whole sample. Panels G and H verify that they are also broadly similar when we define the threshold in the level of public expenditure in terms of the mean or the median (rather than using the threshold of one standard deviation below the sample mean).

Overall, we conclude that the results presented in the previous section are quite robust to a variety of reasonable variations.

5.2 Placebo Checks

In this subsection, we report two sets of placebo exercises, bolstering the case that our results are not driven by failure of cross-cohort parallel trends or because of some other concurrent social changes.

A salient concern with our empirical strategy is that different age groups within the same country may be on differential trends in terms of their social and political views, even absent differences in exposure to democracy. We check for this possibility by investigating whether there are individual-level pre-trends—that is, whether pre-birth "exposure" has an effect an individual's support for democracy. Specifically, we extend equation (2) by including a variable constructed analogously to our exposure to democracy measure, but from information on the democratic experience of a country during the 10 years before the individual in question is born (the results are very similar if we use a window of 25 years). If our estimates were capturing differential secular trends in the democratic and social views of different age groups across countries, then we would expect to find pre-birth exposure to be correlated with these trends.

Figure 2, reassuringly, shows that this is not the case, starting with overall exposure is in the regressions in Table 1. This figure depicts our placebo point estimates (as well as the 95% confidence interval) for each of our left-hand side variables and the two specifications in Table 1. For comparison, the point estimates from our main regressions in Table 1 are plotted as well. The results show no pre-trends in any of our specifications. All coefficients associated to pre-birth exposure are insignificant and in all cases the magnitude is much smaller than our estimates in Table 1.[19]

Another concern is that our estimates of the effects of exposure to democracy could be confounded by general social changes, which may be correlated with transitions to democracy. To

[19]These results also imply that there is limited intergenerational transmission of support for democracy, since pre-birth exposure for an individual tends to be correlated with the exposure of his or her parents and extended family.

address this concern, our second placebo exercise turns to a number of non-political attitudinal questions related to neighbors, family and general social attitudes. These include questions on whether individuals dislike their neighbors depending on their characteristics (such as religion, race immigration status, ethnicity, civil status, etc), as well as a group of questions on living arrangements and family relations.[20] We then include these variables on the left-hand side of equation (2). The results reported in Figure 3 confirm that there is no relationship between these variables and exposure to democracy in any of our specifications (corresponding to each one of the panels in Table 1). Out of the 24 estimates, only one is marginally significant, which is consistent with sampling variation. We therefore conclude that the association between exposure to democracy and support for democracy is unlikely to be related to other social changes and is caused by democratic experience.

Figures 4 and 5 present analogous placebo exercises for exposure to successful democracy, focusing on the same three dimensions of success and two specifications (the baseline in Table 3 and the one that additionally includes country $\times$ year of interview and age $\times$ subregion fixed effects). These placebo exercises confirm that years of successful democracy before one's birth have no impact on one's support for democracy. For non-political attitudes, out of 216 estimates, 29 are significant at 5% or less. This is more than what we would expect from a two-sided test on the basis of sampling variation. We suspect, however, that this is because of multiple hypothesis testing in these placebo exercises. Indeed, we next show that most of the placebo estimates are no longer significant once we take into account the expected fraction of type I errors generated from multiple hypothesis testing (and in fact, this correction does not affect standard errors for our baseline results).

Finally, we explore whether multiple hypothesis testing is generating spurious significant estimates, either for our baseline results or for the placebos. In columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A-15, we account for the fact that we are testing a family of hypotheses (both with overall exposure and exposure to successful democracy). Specifically, we look at the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values, which follows Anderson (2008) and takes into account the expected fraction of type I errors (for reference, we also report the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using conventional p-values). Using this approach, exposure to democracy has a robust and statistically significant impact on support for democracy, with rejection rates very similar to conventional p-values used in our baseline analysis. In contrast, we find no statistically significant impact of exposure to overall or successful democracy on pre-treatment outcomes and non-political attitudinal questions. These results bolster our confidence in the reliability of the source of variation we are exploiting.

[20] We did not consider political questions, such as attitudes towards neighbors depending on political alignment, since these could plausibly be impacted by democracy.

5.3 IV Estimates

Our placebo exercises notwithstanding, the main concern remains that exposure to democracy may be correlated with deeper social changes that are the root cause of changes in democracy. As an alternative line of attack against this concern, we exploit a potentially exogenous source of variation in democracy coming from regional democratization waves, as in Acemoglu et al. (2019). We adapt their approach to our setting, generating sources of variation in an age group's exposure to democracy oor exposure to successful democracy. We first describe the construction of the instrument for overall exposure to democracy.

Specifically, following Acemoglu et al. (2019), we define $I_c = \{c' : c' \neq c, R_{c'} = R_c, D_{c',t_0} = D_{c,t_0}\}$ as the set of candidate countries to influence democracy of country c, which are defined as those in the same region R_c that share a similar political history D_{c,t_0}. Let $Z_{c,t} = \frac{1}{|I_c|}\sum_{c' \in I_c} D_{c',t}$ be the average level of democracy for this set of countries. Our baseline instrument is constructed as:

$$Z_{c,s,a,j} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^{s} Z_{c,t-j}. \tag{6}$$

Intuitively, $Z_{c,s,a,0}$ represents the predicted exposure to democracy that an individual would have had during her life if living in a different country from the same region and with the same political history as her actual country. In our 2SLS model, we estimate (2) using the predicted values of our main regressor from the following first-stage specification:

$$\text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a} = \sum_{j=1}^{p} \alpha_j Z_{c,s,a,j} + \pi' X_{i,w,c,s,a} + v_{i,w,c,s,a} \tag{7}$$

This amounts to instrumenting democratic exposure of each individual with the regional democratization waves faced by age groups preceding this individual. The exclusion restriction is that, conditional on our controls, past regional democratization waves among countries with the same political history in the same region do not have a direct impact on an individual's social attitudes and support for democracy. We provide evidence consistent with this exclusion restriction below. We note, too, that this is analogous to the exclusion restriction exploited in Acemoglu et al. (2019), for which they additional supporting evidence, falsification exercises, and variations.

Instruments for exposure to successful democracy can be constructed following equation (2) and interacting the predicted exposure to democracy with our measures of the relevant $M_{i,c,t}$ variable measuring success.

The first-stage relationships that underlie our 2SLS estimates are shown in Appendix Table A-16. Since the sample size varies across outcomes, we replicate the first stage for each

subsample. The sizable F-statistics for the excluded instruments indicate that the regional waves of former cohorts have a high degree of predictive power for an individual's exposure to democracy.

Table 5 presents our 2SLS estimates of equation (2) with overall exposure to democracy instrumented according to equation (7).[21] The 2SLS estimates corroborate our OLS results. The coefficient estimates are stable across specifications reported in the two panels of the table (for dichotomous and continuous measures of democracy), across different measures for support for democracy and in different samples. In all cases, the coefficients are comparable to the OLS estimates in Table 1. For example, the estimate in column 1, Panel A of Table 5, for the *Support for democracy index*, is 0.098 (standard error =0.021), which is slightly larger than the column 1, Panel A estimate in Table 1, 0.069. Correspondingly, the implied quantitative magnitudes are comparable, but a little larger with the 2SLS estimates. The general pattern throughout Table 5 is similar, though the results for the *Opposes strong leader* variable are slightly weaker in these IV specifications.

Table 6 presents 2SLS estimates of the effects of exposure to successful democracies. The three panels again correspond to the three dimensions of success studied above (focusing on the dichotomous measure of democracy). The results are once again very similar to the OLS estimates reported in Table 3 and indicate that exposure to successful democracy has a sizable impact on support for democracy, while exposure to unsuccessful democracy or exposure to overall successful performance does not. Moreover, with these IV estimates, too, the effects of exposure to democracy are almost entirely explained by exposure to successful democratic performance.

Although we find regional democratization waves to be an attractive source of variation for our purposes, there are several reasons why our exclusion restriction may be violated. Most importantly, different regions may be on differential trends in terms of their social attitudes. Or economic or political developments in neighboring polities may have a direct impact on a country's democracy and the population's support for democratic institutions. The placebo exercises for these IV estimates are reassuring in this respect: they indicate that pre-birth exposure to regional democratization waves have no impact on support for democracy and exposure to regional democratizations waves does not influence non-political social attitudes, and thus they suggest that countries impacted by different regional waves are not on differential social trends. In particular, Appendix Figures A-3 and A-5 show no evidence of a systematic relationship between instrumented pre-birth exposure to democracy (or exposure to successful democracy) and support for democracy. For example, only 11 out of the 120 estimates using the instrumented pre-birth exposure in these two figures significantly predict support for democracy,

[21] We focus on the most parsimonious 2SLS model using one lag of the instrument. We find sizable F-statistics and similar first-stage and second-stage estimates when we control for more lags.

and only one of those is numerically as large as our main estimates. In addition, Appendix Figures A-4 and A-6 confirm that the vast majority of the non-political social attitudes are unrelated to instrumented exposure to overall or successful democracies (though in this case there are more imprecise). In columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Tables A-15 we show that correcting for joint-hypothesis testing tends to corroborate, and if anything strengthen, our results: once again, exposure to democracy has a robust and statistically significant impact on support for democracy and no statistically significant influence on pre-treatment outcomes and non-political attitudinal questions.

To further investigate whether our IV estimates are confounded by changes in political views and attitudes that are correlated within a region or across neighbors, we also separately control for shocks that affect a country's neighbors, neighbors' exposure to democracy, and the evolution of neighbors' support for democracy. Following Acemoglu et al. (2019), in these exercises we use inverse distance weights to aggregate across characteristics and outcomes of neighbors. Specifically, in Appendix Table A-17, we control for natural disasters, political and economic shocks in neighboring countries during an individual's lifetime. In Appendix Table A-18, we control for neighbors' (inverse distance-weighted) exposure to democracy for the same cohort as the individual in question. Since this "neighbors' exposure to democracy" variable might itself be endogenous, we also instrument it in the same way as the own exposure to democracy, using regional democratization waves.[22] Finally, in Appendix Table A-19, we additionally control for neighbors' (inverse distance-weighted) support for democracy, again for the same cohort and instrumented by regional democratization waves. In each case, the relevant variable for support for democracy is the same one as the dependent variable. In all three tables, including these controls has very little impact on 2SLS estimates of the effect of own exposure to democracy, and in fact, the parameter estimates remain quite similar to those in Tables 5 and 6. In addition, these controls are themselves insignificant, as shown by the p-value statistics reported. We therefore conclude that our 2SLS results are robust to controlling for the direct effect of neighbors' experiences. Moreover, these results also imply that, despite the importance of regional waves of democratization, the experiences of a country's neighbors do not appear to have a major impact on its population's support for democracy.

Finally, Appendix Tables A-20, A-21 and A-22 document that the 2SLS results are similar when we focus on the more fine-grained variation including either country×year and age× subregion, age×year×subregion or age×country fixed effects.

[22]Namely, we use past democratization waves in the region of each neighbor as an instrument for its exposure to democracy, exactly as in equation (6).

5.4 Immigrants

Finally, we report results from a complementary empirical strategy focusing only on immigrants. This strategy is useful for our purposes because it exploits a different source of variation, for a different sample of individuals, generated by differences in the political institutions of their country of birth and their year of migration.

For this exercise, we use information from two waves of the IVS, in which it is possible to identify the country of birth of individuals as well as their year of migration. To isolate the source of variation coming from their home country institutions, we further restrict the sample to individuals who emigrated to a European country that has been a democracy throughout our sample.[23] We also restrict the sample to respondents that were at least 12 years old when they moved to the host country to ensure sufficient exposure to the institutions of the country of birth (which we start counting from the age of six as before).

The estimating equations are identical to (2) and (3), except that we now additionally control for country of birth and language fixed effects. We further include a full set of country of residence× subregion of birth×year of migration.[24] We additionally allow standard errors to be clustered at the level of country of residence. The exposure to democracy and to successful democracy variables are defined analogously, but only from variations in the country of birth of an individual.[25] We focus on the same specifications as in Tables 1 and 3, except that we only consider successful performance according to the economic growth and political stability dimensions, since the sample becomes very small when we look at public expenditure.

Despite the very different sample and the distinct source of variation, the estimates for our immigrant sample are broadly similar to our baseline estimates, though considerably less precise given the smaller sample size in this case. For example, in Appendix Table A-23, only seven out of the 12 estimates for exposure to democracy are statistically significant at 10% or less. In Appendix Table A-24, the pattern is similar. In most cases, exposure to successful democracy has a larger coefficient estimate than exposure to unsuccessful democracy, but only 10 out of the 18 estimates are statistically significant. Overall, we view these results as broadly consistent with and supplementing our main results.

[23]This list comprises Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Austria, Iceland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.

[24]The inclusion of these controls has little effect over the point estimates.

[25]Namely, Exposure to Democracy$_{c_b,s,s_m,a} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^{s_m} D_{c_b,t}$, where $D_{c_b,t}$ is our measure of democracy in country c_b at year t, and s_m is the year of migration. This implies that we are not including exposure to the democratic institutions of the country of residence. This is without loss of generality when using the dichotomous measure of democracy, since by our sample selection, the democratic institutions of the host country are at their maximal level, and thus conditional on age effects, there is no useful variation coming from exposure to these institutions.

6 Does Support for Democracy Matter?

In this section, we explore whether our self-reported support for democracy measures actually impact the functioning of democratic institutions. To do this, we follow Nunn et al.'s analysis of the consequences of political trust. Like in their paper, we consider a country-year panel and look at interactions between the variable of interest for us (support for democracy) and negative economic shocks. We then trace the effects of these on the continuation of democratic institutions and economic outcomes. Our main estimating equation is

$$\text{Outcome}_{ct} = \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \alpha \text{Negative shock}_{i,t-1} + \beta \text{Negative shock}_{i,t-1} \times \text{Support Democracy}_i + \varepsilon_{ct} \tag{8}$$

where c and t denote, respectively, country and year. *Outcome* is an indicator of growth of GDP per capita, conflict and coups against democracy. For brevity, we focus on the support for democracy index and define negative shocks as periods with negative economic growth. α_c and γ_t represent country and year fixed effects. Our main coefficient of interest is the one for the interaction term, β. We estimate separate regressions for historical democracies and historical nondemocracies, with the expectation that support for democratic institutions should not matter much in historical non-democracies.[26]

Our main results are presented in Table 7. Panel A shows the results for the sample of democratic country-year pairs. The interaction between support for democracy and negative shocks is positive and significant for the growth of GDP per capita and negative and significant for coups and conflict, indicating that, in established democracies, coups and conflict become less likely during economic downturns and GDP per capita does not drop as much in the face of negative shocks when there is greater support for democracy. These estimates are quantitatively sizable. For example, an increase in support for democracy equal to the difference between the United States and Argentina (about a quarter of this variable's standard deviation) ameliorates the effect of a negative economic shock on GDP declines, conflict and coups by 20%, 16% and 33%, respectively.

Panel B shows that, consistent with our expectations, greater support for democratic institutions and historical nondemocracies does not translate into better economic or political performance in the face of negative economic shocks. Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically insignificant and considerably smaller than the estimates in Panel A for historical democracies.

Robustness checks for these specifications are presented in the Appendix. First, Appendix Table A-25 presents an additional placebo exercise: it shows that interactions with leads of the

[26] We classify countries that have been democratic for less than the median duration of democracy between 1920 and 2000 as historical nondemocracies. The rest are historical democracies.

negative shock and support for democracy are insignificant and have much smaller magnitudes. Appendix Table A-26 documents that controlling for the interaction between negative shocks and trust, as in Nunn et al.'s analysis, does not change the overall pattern, though the estimates become noisier in this case.

Overall, we view this set of results as providing preliminary evidence that support for democracy matters for the functioning and longevity of democratic institutions, and thus successful democracies not only breed their own support but also improve their own functioning.

7 Conclusion

Many commentators view our age as the twilight of democracy (e.g., Deneen, 2019 and Mishra, 2017) and surveys reporting dwindling support for democratic institutions have multiplied recently. This is despite the fact that democracies have performed well both in terms of economic growth and investing in education and health of the general population (see Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2015; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019). There is no consensus on why attitudes towards democracy have become more negative during recent decades, and this may be related to the fact that democracies now have to deal with more complex problems caused by rising aspirations, rapid automation and globalization, and new patterns of political communication brought about by the spread of social media. Regardless of the exact cause of democracies' problems, the public support they receive may be critical for their survival.

In this paper, we have documented that support for democracy increases significantly when individuals have been exposed to democratic institutions and especially when these democratic institutions have delivered in terms of economic growth, peace and political stability, and public services.

We have built this case by using several different empirical strategies, approaches and datasets. Our baseline approach compares individuals in the same age group that have had different democratic experiences—both in terms of length and in terms of whether democracies perform well—across different countries as well as different age groups within the same country and the same age group across different points in time. In all cases, an increase in exposure to (successful) democracy makes an individual more likely to support democracy, oppose a strong leader, oppose army rule, become more willing to defend the democratic system, and put more trust in the government rather than non-elected experts.

We obtained very similar results using an IV strategy where an individual's exposure to overall or successful democracy is driven solely by regional democratization waves. The results are also similar in a sample of immigrants, whose exposure to democracy is a function of their birth country political institutions and time of immigration (thus enabling us to exploit a very

different source of variation).

For all of our empirical strategies, we have further documented that the timing of the effects are consistent with a causal interpretation—with pre-birth exposure having no effect on support for democracy. We have additionally shown that exposure to overall or successful democracy has no impact on non-political social attitudes. These placebo exercises as well as our IV estimates assuage concerns about our results being driven by general social changes that simultaneously impact a country's democratic status and its citizens' views about democracy.

We see our paper as a first step in uncovering the impact of political institutions on general political attitudes, values and culture. There are at least three important directions for future research within this broad area. First, although we presented some preliminary evidence that support for democracy matters for the survival and efficient functioning of democratic institutions, much more work on this linkage is necessary to obtain a more holistic understanding of what types of attitudes matter more. One could explore, for example, whether individuals who become more supportive of democracy take actions to actively protect democracy or engage in greater democratic discourse.

Second, the specific mechanisms linking exposure to democracy and support for democracy need to be explored further. Our results suggest that the main channel may be through exposure to successful policies and public good provision by democracies, but these mechanisms need to be investigated using more extensive microdata on which individuals and communities benefit more from democratic institutions.

Third, another important research area is to explore whether information about the performance of democratic institutions presented by the media and other sources matters for support for democracy, and whether the spread of misinformation by various media outlets and in social media may alter the relationship between successful democratic performance and support for democracy.

Finally, it would be interesting to exploit within-country variation, since in many cases the quality of democratic institutions and their success varies greatly across different parts of the country.

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Figure 1: Binned Scatterplots of the Relationship between Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy



Note: This figure presents binned scatterplots of the relationship between our various measures for support for democracy and exposure to democracy. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) in the text. Each panel uses one of our five measures of democracy or the index of support for democracy combining four of these measures and either the dichotomous or the continuous measure of democracy. Each panel's plots the residualised values of the relevant outcome using the set of covariates as in regression equation (2) from our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. See text for details on the construction of Exposure to Democracy and sources.

Figure 2: Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (1) (see text for details). The left-hand side panel uses the dichotomous democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show the placebo estimate from both our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles) and another specification which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side (blue triangles). Estimates from post-birth exposure (our main variable of interest) are also reported for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure 3: Exposure to Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for various non-political attitudinal questions. Exposure to Democracies is defined in equation (1). The left-hand side panel uses the dichotomous democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show the estimate from our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure 4: Pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (4) (see text for details). Each panel present the result for a measure of Successful Performance (growth of GDP per capita in panels 1 and 4, peace in panels 2 and 5 and expenditure in panels 3 and 6) and for both Exposure to Successful (first three panels) and Unsuccessful (last three panels) Democracy (see Section 4.2). For each outcome, in each panel, we show the placebo estimate from both our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles) and another specification which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side (blue triangles). Estimates from post-birth exposure (our main variable of interest) are also reported for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure 5: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful (left-hand side) and Unsuccessful Democracy (right-hand side) in equation (3) for various non-political attitudinal questions. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy is defined in equation (4) (see text for details). Each panel present the result for a measure of Successful Performance (growth of GDP per capita in panels 1 and 4, peace in panels 2 and 5 and expenditure in panels 3 and 6) and for both Exposure to Successful (first three panels) and Unsuccessful (last three panels) Democracy (see Section 4.2).For each outcome, in each panel, we show the estimate from our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Table 1: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous.						
Support for Democracy	0.069	0.097	0.048	0.031	0.037	0.080
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Observations	343,115	188,479	390,349	386,476	385,830	377,214
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
Panel B. Continuous.						
Support for Democracy	0.123	0.130	0.080	0.055	0.075	0.126
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Observations	344,722	187,858	391,990	388,091	387,490	378,934
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 2: Effect of Exposure to Democracy on Support for Democracy across Different Surveys — Asianbarometer, Lapop and Latinobarometer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Asianbarometer				**Lapop**		**Latinobarometer**	
	Opposes one man rule	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts	Democracy is better	Opposes strong leader	Democracy is better	Democracy preferable
Panel A. Dichotomous.								
Support for Democracy	0.154	0.207	0.236	0.184	0.094	0.020	0.055	0.010
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Observations	57,717	52,690	55,558	56,004	272,276	153,143	269,738	357,999
Countries	14	14	14	14	33	26	19	19
Panel C. Continuous.								
Support for Democracy	0.172	0.219	0.244	0.191	0.058	0.025	0.048	0.031
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.000)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Observations	57,714	52,687	55,556	56,002	272,276	153,142	269,738	357,999
Countries	14	14	14	14	33	26	19	19

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using samples constructed from Asianbarometer, Lapop and Latinobarometer. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of measures of support for democracy available in the indicated data set. Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 3: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.069	0.106	0.061	0.034	0.027	0.078
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.028	-0.008	-0.018	-0.035	0.011	-0.020
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.036	-0.174	-0.098	-0.040	0.137	-0.017
	(0.101)	(0.171)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.100)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Peace and Political Stability.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.086	0.085	0.049	0.046	0.038	0.105
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.013	-0.026	-0.016	0.025	0.010	0.018
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.052	-0.159	-0.042	-0.039	-0.013	-0.058
	(0.082)	(0.100)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.075)
Observations	305,709	160,147	346,394	342,759	341,494	335,132
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel C. Public Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.136	0.091	0.079	0.050	0.089	0.137
	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.010	0.000	0.008	0.011	0.007	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.024	-0.019	0.007	-0.002	0.012	-0.033
	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.030)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 4: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Asianbarometer, Lapop and Latinobarometer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Asianbarometer				**Lapop**		**Latinobarometer**	
	Opposes one man rule	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts	Democracy is better	Opposes strong leader	Democracy is better	Democracy preferable
Panel A. Economic Growth.								
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.197	0.225	0.272	0.194	0.102	0.032	0.065	0.016
	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.001	-0.006	0.028	0.051	-0.026	-0.027	-0.042	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.408	0.012	-0.075	0.159	0.007	-0.102	-0.175	-0.385
	(0.188)	(0.084)	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.122)	(0.206)	(0.143)	(0.198)
Observations	55,254	50,843	53,199	53,576	241,894	151,046	268,582	356,510
Countries	14	14	14	14	33	26	19	19
Panel B. Peace and Political Stability.								
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.214	0.218	0.251	0.184	0.104	0.028	0.058	0.004
	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.073	0.018	0.011	0.050	0.006	-0.069	0.063	-0.044
	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.090)	(0.050)	(0.084)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.056)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.153	-0.058	-0.037	-0.010	-0.041	-0.152	0.051	-0.090
	(0.072)	(0.027)	(0.070)	(0.043)	(0.141)	(0.097)	(0.106)	(0.110)
Observations	53,215	48,556	50,963	51,475	238,608	146,780	254,258	327,428
Countries	13	13	13	13	28	26	19	19
Panel C. Public Expenditure.								
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.105	0.176	0.205	0.102	0.133	0.028	0.045	-0.005
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.047)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.023	0.018	0.035	0.015	0.063	0.027	0.015	0.021
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.026	0.002	-0.059	0.012	-0.030	-0.005	-0.010	0.013
	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.033)
Observations	19,049	18,721	19,081	19,140	70,717	61,276	133,666	193,209
Countries	13	13	13	13	19	18	16	16

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using samples constructed from Asianbarometer, Lapop and Latinobarometer. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of measures of support for democracy available in the indicated data set. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 5: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.098	0.137	0.089	0.040	0.050	0.094
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Observations	341,921	188,187	389,029	385,201	384,543	375,944
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Continuous.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.123	0.164	0.100	0.033	0.071	0.130
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Observations	343,851	187,210	390,992	387,113	386,507	377,990
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 6: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.104	0.129	0.091	0.062	0.040	0.098
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.028)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.025	0.052	0.018	-0.045	0.014	-0.020
	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.004	-0.061	-0.054	-0.095	0.125	-0.047
	(0.099)	(0.166)	(0.096)	(0.087)	(0.101)	(0.109)
Observations	319,149	185,373	362,878	359,239	359,169	350,809
Countries	105	80	105	105	105	105
Panel B. Peace and Political Stability.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.122	0.111	0.081	0.065	0.059	0.122
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.019	0.079	0.026	0.043	-0.027	0.042
	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.065)	(0.044)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.063	-0.054	-0.009	-0.029	-0.068	-0.040
	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Observations	305,210	159,892	345,819	342,218	340,936	334,601
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel C. Public Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.262	0.205	0.199	0.134	0.219	0.178
	(0.079)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.099)	(0.050)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.148	-0.148	-0.069	-0.081	-0.280	-0.019
	(0.594)	(0.291)	(0.262)	(0.370)	(0.936)	(0.165)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.295	-0.246	-0.168	-0.167	-0.394	-0.091
	(0.632)	(0.212)	(0.267)	(0.384)	(0.985)	(0.174)
Observations	123,369	80,944	137,941	136,035	138,249	133,081
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3). Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 7: Support for Democracy and Economic and Political Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	GDP growth	Conflict	Coup
A. Historical democracies.			
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$	-0.005	0.019	0.007
	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.004)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	0.004	-0.025	-0.011
	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Observations	7,097	3,434	5,205
Countries	53	49	49
B. Historical nondemocracies.			
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$	-0.011	0.049	0.021
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	-0.001	0.012	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Observations	5,301	3,442	3,282
Countries	53	52	52

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of the relationship between GDP growth, dummies for conflict and coups against a negative economic shock and its interaction with support for democracy, as specified in equation (8) in the text. The main coefficient of interest is the one on the interaction term. Units of observation are country/year pairs. The regression is estimated separately for historical democracies (countries that have been democratic for more than the median duration of democracy between 1920 and 2000, Panel A) and historical nondemocracies (countries that have been democratic for less than the median duration of democracy between 1920 and 2000, Panel B). A negative shock is defined as a negative growth rate of real GDP per capita in the previous year. The conflict variable is defined as in Section 2.3 and the coup dummy is from Marshall and Marshall (2022). All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Support for democracy is standardized, and standard errors are computed with clustering at the country and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

A Appendix Additional Results

A.1 Construction of the Dichotomous Democracy Measure

We construct an (unbalanced) panel that comprises 185 polities with information from 1800 to 2018. While we use information form several sources, the bulk of the variation comes from Boix et al. (2018) (henceforth BMR), which has the largest coverage in our sample, accounting for information in 94% of all polities from 1800 to 2015.[27] The long period covered by this source is particularly important for this paper, for it allows us to construct comparable measures of democratic values from 1800 to 2018. BMR classify a country at a given time as a democracy if it meets two criteria: high political contestation (the decisions to govern the state are taken through voting procedures that are free and fair), and high participation (a minimal level of suffrage).[28]

In cases where data from BMR are not available, we rely on various sources including Cheibub et al. (2010); Acemoglu et al. (2019), Freedom House and Polity IV. Compared to BMR, these sources cover either a shorter time horizon, a smaller number of polities, or both.

Our dichotomous measure of democracy $D_{ct} \in \{0, 1\}$ for country c at time t is coded as follows:

1. In countries/periods where BMR is defined (so that a country is classified either as a democracy or as a nondemocracy), our variable is equal to theirs. In total, 73% of our countries/years are classified in this step, thus generating the bulk of the variation in our democracy measure.

2. Since BMR is only available until 2015, our dichotomous measure of democracy for the period 2016-2019 is constructed in two steps. First, we identify transitions (either from democracy to nondemocracy or from nondemocracy to democracies) during 2016-2019. To do so, we use both the Freedom House score, ranging from 1 to 7, and the Polity IV score, ranging from -10 to 10 (higher values of these indices indicate greater extent of democracy).[29] In particular, we use two cutoffs k_{fh} and k_{pol} for Freedom House and Polity IV, respectively, for this classification. We code a country as experiencing a transition from nondemocracy (democracy) to democracy (nondemocracy) at year t if it was a nondemocracy (democracy) at time $t-1$ and both the Freedom House score and the Polity IV scores between years $t-1$ and t increased (decreased) by an amount larger than their respective cutoffs. We choose k_{fh} and k_{pol}, such that they are equal to the average change in the respective score during periods of transition (according to BMR) between

[27] This database extends Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013), which was available for 175 polities until 2008.
[28] BMR thus extend the classic measure of Przeworski et al. (2000), which is based only on the first dimension.
[29] We recode the Freedom House scores to ensure that higher values mean greater extent of democracy.

1972-2015.[30] We find that the (absolute) change in any of these scores during periods of transition (as defined by BMR) is at least nine times larger compared to periods of no-transition. Second, we code a country in 2016 as a democracy (nondemocracy) either (i) when the country is classified as a democracy (nondemocracy) in 2015 and no transition took place in 2016, or (ii) when the country is classified as a nondemocracy (democracy) in 2015 and a transition occurred in 2016. We repeat this procedure for subsequent years until 2019. Using these criteria, we find that only three transitions took place between 2016 to 2019: Gambia (from nondemocracy to democracy in 2017), Turkey (from democracy to nondemocracy in 2016), and Nicaragua (from democracy to nondemocracy in 2016). In total, 4% of our country-years are classified in this step.

3. In 9% of the sample BMR is not available but at least one of the complementary sources is. This could be either because BMR does not report information for country c, or because country c is only partially covered in a period of time. In the former case, we simply use information from whichever available source has the largest coverage for this country.[31] In the latter case, we use the complementary source (the one with the largest coverage) to differentiate transitions from non-transitions and use this to extend the series to cover the gaps in BMR (similar to the procedure in step 2).

4. The remaining 14% consist of cases where neither BMR nor other source are available. Common cases of this type include non-sovereign territories available in the surveys but not in the sources.[32] We deal with these cases by assigning them the same democratic score as the main territory (i.e., Denmark in the case of Faroe Islands or Greenland). Other common issues include recent dissolutions (e.g., post-Soviet countries, ex-Yugoslavian states, Korea). In cases of dissolutions, such as post-Soviet countries, we inpute the value of democracy corresponding to the original country (URSS) during the years in which these countries were part of the union (e.g., Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Estonia, and Croatia).

Overall, our dichotomous measure is available for 203 countries and covers the period from 1800 to 2019. Out of the 23,269 country/year observations, we code 7,327 periods of democracy and 15,942 periods of nondemocracy. Out of the 203 countries, 34 are always democratic, 52 are always nondemocratic, and the rest transition in and out of democracy. We thus have a total

[30]We choose 1972-2015, because this is the largest time window in which BMR, Freedom House and Polity IV are all available.

[31]For non-binary indices such as Freedom House and Polity IV, we apply the usual practice in the literature of classifying a country as a democracy when the Freedom House score is greater than three (countries classified as "Free" or "Partly Free") or when the Polity IV score is positive (see Persson & Tabellini, 2006; Giavazzi & Tabellini, 2005; Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2019).

[32]Examples of these cases include Faroe Islands, Greenland, Isle of Man and Gibraltar.

of 182 democratizations and 105 reversals, which provide significant within-country variation in our democracy measure.

The correlation between our dichotomous measure and (countries and years of coverage in parenthesis): the continuous measure from V-DEM is 0.79 (176 countries from 1900 to 2019), Cheibub et al. (2010) is 0.92 (184 countries from 1946 to 2008), Acemoglu et al. (2019) is 0.90 (184 countries from 1960 to 2010), Freedom House is 0.75 (199 countries from 1972 to 2019), and Polity IV is 0.77 (167 countries from 1800 to 2018).

Figure A-1: Evolution of Dichotomous and Continuous Measures of Democracy for Selected Countries

B Appendix Additional Results

B.1 Additional Tables and Figures



Note: This figure plots the evolution over time of the dichotomous and continuous measures of democracy as well as each of the components that make up the later (the electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian components described in footnote 10).

Figure A-2: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Robustness to Excluding each Subregion



Note: This figure reports OLS coefficient estimates of the effect of Exposure to Democracy on support for democracy when each subregion is excluded. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column uses one of our five measures of democracy or the index of support for democracy combining four of these measures. Rows 1 and 2 use the dichotomous democracy score, while rows 3 and 4 use the continuous democracy score. Rows 1 and 3 report estimates from our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while rows 3 and 4 additionally include fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Figure A-3: Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates



Note: This figure plots 2SLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (1) (see text for details). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). The left-hand side panel uses the dichotomous democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show the placebo estimate from both our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles) and another specification which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side (blue triangles). Estimates from post-birth exposure (our main variable of interest) are also reported for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-4: Exposure to Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables — 2SLS Estimates



Note: This figure plots 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for various non-political attitudinal questions. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). For each outcome, in each panel, we show the placebo estimate from our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-5: Pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates



Note: This figure plots reduced form coefficients of pre-birth Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (4) (see text for details). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Each panel present the result for a measure of Successful Performance (growth of GDP per capita in panels 1 and 4, peace in panels 2 and 5 and expenditure in panels 3 and 6) and for both Exposure to Successful (first three panels) and Unsuccessful (last three panels) Democracy (see Section 4.2). For each outcome, in each panel, we show the placebo estimate from both our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles) and another specification which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side (blue triangles). Estimates from post-birth exposure (our main variable of interest) are also reported for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-6: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables — 2SLS Estimates



Note: This figure plots reduced form coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for various non-political attitudinal questions. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy is defined in equation (4). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). (see text for details). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Each panel present the result for a measure of Successful Performance (growth of GDP per capita in panels 1 and 4, peace in panels 2 and 5 and expenditure in panels 3 and 6) and for both Exposure to Successful (first three panels) and Unsuccessful (last three panels) Democracy (see Section 4.2). For each outcome, in each panel, we show the placebo estimate from our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Table A-1: Variable Definition and Sources

Variable	Description
	Panel A. Integrated Value Survey
Main outcomes	
Support for democracy index	Average of *Democratic system*, *Opposes strong leader*, *Opposes army rule* and *Government above experts*. (see definition of these variables below).
Democracy is better	Equals 1 if "Disagree strongly", 2 if "Disagree", 3 if "Agree" and 4 if "Agree strongly" to the question "I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I reach each of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government".
Democratic system	Equals 1 if "Very bad", 2 if "Fairly bad", 3 if "Fairly good" and 4 if "Very good" to the question "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system".
Opposes strong leader	Equals 1 if "Very good", 2 if "Fairly good", 3 if "Fairly bad" and 4 if "Very bad" to a question with the same framing as in *Democratic system* but asks instead for "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections".
Opposes army rule	Equals 1 if "Very good", 2 if "Fairly good", 3 if "Fairly bad" and 4 if "Very bad" to a question with the same framing as in *Democratic system* but asks instead for "Having the army rule the country".
Government above experts	Equals 1 if "Disagree strongly", 2 if "Disagree", 3 if "Agree" and 4 if "Agree strongly" to a question with the same framing as in *Opposes one man rule* but asks instead for "We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people".
Non-political Attitudinal Variables (in alphabetical order)	
Care about family	Equals 1 if "Very much", 2 if "To a certain extent", 3 if "Not so much" and 4 "Not at all" to the question "To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of ...your immediate family"
Church family problems	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "Yes" to the question "Generally speaking, do you think that the churches in your country are giving adequate answers to ...the problems of family life".
Family friendly job	Indicator equals one if respondent mentions "Family friendly" as a response to the question "Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job?".
Family not important	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "Not important" to the question "Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life: Your family"
Lived with parents at age 14	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "yes, with both parents" to the question "When you were 14, did you live with your parents?". Zero if "only with father", "only with mother" or "no, did not live with parents"
Marriage outdated	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "Yes" to the question "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Marriage is an out-dated institution."
Mother (Father) liked to read books	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "Yes" (zero if "No", "A little bit" or "to some extent") to the question "When you think about your parents when you were about 14 years old, could you say whether these statements correctly describe your parents? My mother (father) liked to read books"
Neighbors-related questions	Indicator equals one if respondent mentions any of the following groups in the question "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?" (1) Neighbors of different race, (2) Gypsies neighbors, (3) Neighbors with a criminal record, (4) Drug-addict neighbors, (5) Neighbors who have AIDS, (6) Emotionally unstable neighbors, (7) Heavy-drinkers neighbors, (8) Homosexuals neighbors, (9) Muslim neighbors, (10) Christians neighbors, (11) Jews neighbors, (12) Immigrant neighbors, (13) Neighbors with large families, respectively.
Parents do best for children	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being" to the question "Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents' responsibilities to their children?". Zero if "Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children" or "Neither".

Continued on next page

Table A-1 – Variable Definition and Sources (Continues from Previous Page)

Relationship working mother	Equals 1 if "Agree strongly", 2 if "Agree", 3 if "Disagree" and 4 if "Disagree strongly" to the question "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with...: A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.".
Spend time with parents	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "Weekly" (zero if "once or twice a month", "only a few times a year" or "Not al all") to the question "I'm going to ask how often you... spend time with parents or other relatives".

Panel B. Asianbarometer

Opposes one man rule	Indicator equals one if respondent answers "disagrees" with the statement "If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything."
Opposes strong leader	Indicator equals zero if respondent answers "disagrees" or "disapproves" the statement "We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things."
Opposes army rule	Indicator equals zero if respondent answers "disagrees" or "disapproves" the statement "The army (military) should come in to govern the country."
Government above experts	Indicator equals zero if respondent answers "disagrees" or "disapproves" the statement "We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people."

Panel C. Lapop

Democracy is better	Indicator equals one if respondent answer above the median in a score from 1 to 7 where 1 means "Strongly disagrees" and 7 "Strongly agrees" in the question "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?"
Opposes strong leader	Indicator equals one if respondent disagrees with statement "We need a strong leader non-elected through a democratic process".

Panel D. Latinobarometer

Democracy is better	Equals 1 if "Disagree strongly", 2 if "Disagree", 3 if "Agree" and 4 if "Agree strongly" to the question "I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I reach each of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government".
Democracy is preferable	Indicator equals one if respondents agrees with statement "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government". Zero if "Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one" or "For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime"

Table A-2: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Extensive versus Intensive Margins

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous vs Continuous, baseline specification.						
Dichotomous	-0.054	0.065	-0.023	-0.031	-0.047	-0.019
	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Continuous	0.190	0.052	0.110	0.094	0.130	0.151
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Observations	337,272	184,421	383,748	380,043	379,301	371,033
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel B. Dichotomous (V-DEM) vs Continuous, baseline specification						
Dichotomous (V-DEM)	-0.067	0.003	-0.036	-0.053	-0.083	-0.029
	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.057)	(0.062)
Continuous	0.208	0.125	0.126	0.121	0.179	0.162
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.084)
Observations	344,722	187,858	391,990	388,091	387,490	378,934
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel C. Dichotomous vs Continuous, subregion×age.						
Dichotomous	0.025	0.065	0.014	0.011	0.029	0.027
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Continuous	0.100	0.031	0.071	0.052	0.031	0.083
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Observations	337,248	184,392	383,729	380,022	379,279	371,013
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel D. Dichotomous (V-DEM) vs Continuous, subregion×age						
Dichotomous (V-DEM)	0.077	0.016	0.053	0.091	0.028	0.035
	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Continuous	0.045	0.090	0.034	-0.034	0.035	0.066
	(0.059)	(0.069)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.054)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of dichotomous and continuous measures of Exposure to Democracy included simultaneously in equation (2), using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and C use our baseline dichotomous democracy score, while Panels B and D use a dichotomous democracy score constructed from V-DEM. Panels A and B report the estimate from our baseline specification, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels C and D additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side.

Table A-3: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Additional Measures of Successful Performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous, Equal redistribution.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.137	0.130	0.066	0.079	0.068	0.168
	(0.043)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.086	0.010	-0.052	0.008	-0.108	-0.017
	(0.058)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.041)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.112	-0.319	-0.104	-0.048	-0.029	-0.088
	(0.102)	(0.154)	(0.087)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Observations	174,235	74,231	193,658	192,225	192,397	188,782
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel B. Continuous, Equal redistribution.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.250	0.214	0.110	0.192	0.110	0.281
	(0.064)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.059)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.168	0.106	-0.096	0.025	-0.214	-0.006
	(0.132)	(0.051)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.123)	(0.097)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.428	-0.180	-0.266	-0.112	-0.339	-0.192
	(0.203)	(0.136)	(0.150)	(0.167)	(0.198)	(0.166)
Observations	173,691	74,231	193,114	191,677	191,850	188,234
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel C. Dichotomous, Stable inflation.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.060	0.060	0.033	0.056	0.028	0.077
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.027)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.041	-0.015	-0.011	-0.057	-0.051	0.006
	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.033	-0.054	-0.038	-0.072	-0.073	0.062
	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.039)
Observations	223,391	105,363	251,922	249,029	247,346	244,024
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel D. Continuous, Stable inflation.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.138	0.080	0.063	0.114	0.086	0.135
	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.034)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.007	0.024	0.017	-0.047	-0.022	0.051
	(0.051)	(0.112)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.044	-0.033	-0.026	-0.145	-0.103	0.089
	(0.131)	(0.148)	(0.082)	(0.119)	(0.110)	(0.094)
Observations	222,180	104,653	250,570	247,739	246,056	242,772
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and C uses the dichotomous democratic score and Panels B and D use the continuous democratic score. Panels And B define Successful Performance in terms of equality (equals one if the share of wealth of the richest 10% is below the median). Panels C and D define Successful Performance in terms of stable levels of inflation (see Section 4.2). All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-4: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Alternative Parametrization Controlling for Exposure to Unsuccessful Nondemocracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.120	0.146	0.095	0.054	0.062	0.123
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.010	0.000	0.002	-0.018	0.012	-0.002
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Autocracy	0.011	0.032	0.019	0.019	-0.016	0.012
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Observations	319,812	184,176	363,455	359,839	359,743	351,550
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel B. Peace and Political Stability.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.163	0.119	0.083	0.093	0.093	0.170
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.024)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.082	0.063	0.019	0.077	0.035	0.104
	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.027)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Autocracy	0.011	0.037	0.015	-0.001	0.011	0.002
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Observations	307,729	160,888	348,518	344,908	343,695	337,293
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel C. Public Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.185	0.103	0.113	0.055	0.149	0.184
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.028)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.041	0.011	0.019	0.025	0.012	0.039
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Autocracy	0.010	0.008	0.001	-0.009	0.016	0.014
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.010)
Observations	123,859	81,114	138,523	136,574	138,811	133,608
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Instead of controlling for Exposure to Successful Democracy as in Table 3, we control for Exposure to Unsuccessful Autocracy. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-5: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Within-Age, Within-Age-Cohort and Within-Country Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous, controlling for region×age.						
Support for Democracy	0.064	0.070	0.043	0.031	0.038	0.062
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Observations	343,090	188,449	390,329	386,454	385,807	377,193
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
Panel B. Continuous, controlling for region×age.						
Support for Democracy	0.131	0.108	0.093	0.067	0.066	0.105
	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel C. Dichotomous, controlling for region×age×year.						
Support for Democracy	0.067	0.060	0.038	0.037	0.048	0.051
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.023)
Observations	342,805	188,312	390,060	386,180	385,542	376,911
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
Panel D. Continuous, controlling for region×age×year.						
Support for Democracy	0.131	0.108	0.093	0.067	0.066	0.105
	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel E. Dichotomous, controlling for country×age.						
Support for Democracy	0.096	0.121	0.055	0.065	0.124	0.042
	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Observations	342,947	188,338	390,200	386,319	385,676	377,060
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
Panel F. Continuous, controlling for country×age						
Support for Democracy	0.131	0.108	0.093	0.067	0.066	0.105
	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Values Survey under more demanding specifications. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, C and E use the dichotomous democracy score, while Panels B, D and F use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and B include a full set of fixed effects for each region and age and for each country and year of interview. Panel C and D include a full set of fixed effects for each region, age and year of interview and for each country and year of interview. Panels E and F include a full set of fixed effects for each country and age and for each country and year of interview. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-6: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Capping Exposure to Democracy at 40

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.050	0.085	0.037	0.027	0.021	0.074
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Observations	343,115	188,479	390,349	386,476	385,830	377,214
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
Panel B. Continuous.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.130	0.118	0.083	0.081	0.077	0.126
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	344,722	187,858	391,990	388,091	387,490	378,934
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but is capped at 40. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-7: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Exposure to Democracy at Different Ages

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous.						
Exposure to Democracy [0, 5]	0.009	0.009	0.006	-0.000	0.013	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Exposure to Democracy [6, 17]	0.015	0.031	0.006	0.009	0.011	0.024
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Exposure to Democracy [18, 25]	0.010	0.026	0.005	0.006	-0.003	0.026
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Exposure to Democracy [26, 32]	0.026	0.011	0.019	0.009	0.015	0.016
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Exposure to Democracy [33, 40]	0.015	0.019	0.007	0.006	0.012	0.023
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Exposure to Democracy [41, 50]	0.010	0.026	0.008	0.007	0.001	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Exposure to Democracy [51, 60]	0.007	0.012	0.009	-0.002	0.008	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Exposure to Democracy [61, 70]	0.014	0.024	0.015	0.008	0.018	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Exposure to Democracy 71+	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.009	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Observations	343,115	188,479	390,349	386,476	385,830	377,214
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
Panel B. Continuous.						
Exposure to Democracy [0, 5]	0.012	0.014	0.008	0.005	0.004	0.015
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Exposure to Democracy [6, 17]	0.022	0.024	0.014	0.011	0.015	0.034
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Exposure to Democracy [18, 25]	0.018	0.026	-0.002	0.015	0.004	0.032
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Exposure to Democracy [26, 32]	0.042	0.013	0.030	0.017	0.028	0.027
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Exposure to Democracy [33, 40]	0.023	0.026	0.013	0.005	0.016	0.030
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Exposure to Democracy [41, 50]	0.027	0.041	0.024	0.015	0.004	0.029
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Exposure to Democracy [51, 60]	0.031	0.023	0.016	0.012	0.026	0.032
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Exposure to Democracy [61, 70]	0.013	0.069	0.030	-0.006	0.024	0.004
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Exposure to Democracy 71+	-0.012	-0.020	-0.009	0.009	-0.012	-0.029
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Observations	344,722	187,858	391,990	388,091	387,490	378,934
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but independently constructed for each age interval. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-8: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy —Event-specific Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Excluding individuals with multiple regime transitions.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.073	0.104	0.052	0.030	0.037	0.089
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Observations	308,625	166,042	350,947	348,442	346,996	339,973
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
Panel B. Excluding individuals with multiple regime transitions; Inverse-variance-weighted event-specific estimates.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.094	0.126	0.093	0.037	0.052	0.072
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Observations	308,625	166,042	350,947	348,442	346,996	339,973
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107

Note: This table reports estimates of Exposure to Democracy on Support for Democracy. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A estimate our baseline regression of Panel A in Table 1 and from equation (2), but for the subsample of individuals whose variation on exposure to democracy comes from up to one transition to democracy (see Section 5). Panel B reports the inverse-variance-weighted average of the event-specific estimates resulting from an extended version of equation of (2) that allows the effect of Exposure to Democracy to be heterogenous by event (a unique spell of democracy in a country; see Wooldridge, 2021). All regressions are based on the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity in both panels. The standard errors for the inverse-variance-weighted average of the event-specific estimates reported in Panel B are computed based on the delta method.

Table A-9: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy –Continuous Democratic Score

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.120	0.146	0.095	0.054	0.062	0.123
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.019	-0.025	-0.012	-0.033	0.024	-0.011
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.034)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.114	-0.327	-0.192	-0.194	0.165	-0.125
	(0.183)	(0.268)	(0.151)	(0.177)	(0.148)	(0.179)
Observations	319,812	184,176	363,455	359,839	359,743	351,550
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel B. Peace and Political Stability.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.163	0.119	0.083	0.093	0.093	0.170
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.024)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.071	0.027	0.005	0.078	0.024	0.102
	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.038)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.039	-0.137	-0.053	0.003	-0.040	-0.006
	(0.092)	(0.102)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.077)
Observations	307,729	160,888	348,518	344,908	343,695	337,293
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel C. Public Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.185	0.103	0.113	0.055	0.149	0.184
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.028)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.034	0.005	0.018	0.032	-0.001	0.028
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.030	-0.025	-0.004	0.026	-0.049	-0.041
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.031)
Observations	123,859	81,114	138,523	136,574	138,811	133,608
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the continuous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-10: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Within Age Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Economic Growth).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.067	0.075	0.048	0.031	0.040	0.066
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.010	0.003	-0.010	-0.006	-0.007	-0.004
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.010	-0.106	-0.077	0.035	0.059	-0.046
	(0.074)	(0.115)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.082)	(0.040)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Continuous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Economic Growth).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.121	0.115	0.088	0.056	0.056	0.114
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.027)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.041	-0.017	0.012	0.031	0.038	0.011
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.161	-0.196	-0.034	0.152	0.236	-0.034
	(0.140)	(0.206)	(0.116)	(0.107)	(0.161)	(0.105)
Observations	319,798	184,151	363,444	359,826	359,730	351,537
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel C. Dichotomous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Peace).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.058	0.057	0.035	0.023	0.041	0.059
	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.069	-0.003	0.043	0.044	0.043	0.047
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.088	-0.062	0.047	0.052	0.058	0.059
	(0.021)	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Observations	305,706	160,143	346,391	342,756	341,491	335,129
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel D. Continuous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Peace).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.123	0.074	0.073	0.071	0.076	0.097
	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.123	0.027	0.087	0.082	0.059	0.083
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.038)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.111	-0.034	0.081	0.071	0.048	0.072
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.048)
Observations	307,723	160,884	348,512	344,902	343,689	337,287
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel E. Dichotomous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Expenditure).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.121	0.056	0.068	0.068	0.085	0.120
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.013	-0.002	-0.008	0.029	0.007	0.022
	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.053	-0.040	-0.050	0.015	-0.027	-0.033
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Observations	123,430	80,999	138,035	136,111	138,336	133,154
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
Panel F. Continuous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Expenditure).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.194	-0.048	0.098	0.151	0.101	0.182
	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.033)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.009	-0.002	0.019	0.029	-0.046	0.033
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.099	0.018	-0.015	-0.031	-0.126	-0.043
	(0.033)	(0.087)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.031)
Observations	123,857	81,112	138,521	136,572	138,809	133,607
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys under a more demanding specification. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each region and age and for each country and year of interview. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-11: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Within-Age-Cohort Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Economic Growth).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.073	0.065	0.046	0.037	0.050	0.063
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.030	0.002	-0.030	-0.020	-0.018	-0.013
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.044	-0.097	-0.045	0.080	0.086	-0.067
	(0.101)	(0.155)	(0.095)	(0.076)	(0.108)	(0.059)
Observations	320,027	185,459	363,881	360,194	360,148	351,766
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Continuous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Economic Growth).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.155	0.102	0.087	0.083	0.090	0.128
	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.045	-0.007	0.030	0.036	0.014	0.014
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.021)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.236	-0.126	0.132	0.234	0.149	-0.034
	(0.210)	(0.248)	(0.181)	(0.199)	(0.255)	(0.139)
Observations	319,521	184,013	363,184	359,560	359,477	351,266
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
Panel C. Dichotomous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Peace).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.065	0.049	0.020	0.031	0.052	0.059
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.026)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.098	0.015	0.102	0.088	0.012	0.062
	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.118	0.021	0.123	0.103	0.040	0.059
	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.033)
Observations	305,685	160,140	346,372	342,739	341,474	335,113
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel D. Continuous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Peace).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.158	0.066	0.068	0.099	0.108	0.120
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.045)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.195	0.056	0.168	0.140	0.046	0.126
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.025)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.223	0.094	0.213	0.155	0.040	0.131
	(0.075)	(0.026)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.064)
Observations	307,700	160,881	348,491	344,883	343,670	337,269
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel E. Dichotomous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Expenditure).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.103	0.004	0.053	0.044	0.068	0.116
	(0.042)	(0.056)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.025	-0.028	0.013	0.024	-0.009	0.046
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.047)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.001	0.033	-0.043	0.046	0.045	-0.035
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.018)	(0.083)
Observations	123,425	80,998	138,030	136,108	138,333	133,152
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
Panel F. Continuous, Exposure to Successful Democracy (Expenditure).						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.223	-0.354	0.111	0.169	0.106	0.210
	(0.062)	(0.095)	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.061)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.013	-0.062	-0.003	0.019	-0.011	0.042
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.042)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.068	0.123	-0.068	-0.029	0.015	-0.056
	(0.090)	(0.118)	(0.050)	(0.094)	(0.022)	(0.097)
Observations	123,851	81,110	138,515	136,568	138,806	133,604
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys under a more demanding specification. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each region, age and year of interview and for each country and year of interview. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-12: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Within-Country Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous, controlling for country×age.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.084	0.107	0.025	0.043	0.116	0.066
	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.044)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.002	0.022	0.007	0.008	-0.009	-0.002
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.053	0.083	0.018	0.034	-0.039	0.102
	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.118)	(0.113)	(0.126)	(0.086)
Observations	320,164	185,509	364,019	360,329	360,275	351,909
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Continuous, controlling for country×age.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.084	0.107	0.025	0.043	0.116	0.066
	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.044)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.002	0.022	0.007	0.008	-0.009	-0.002
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.053	0.083	0.018	0.034	-0.039	0.102
	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.118)	(0.113)	(0.126)	(0.086)
Observations	320,164	185,509	364,019	360,329	360,275	351,909
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel C. Dichotomous, controlling for region×age×year.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.102	0.116	0.046	0.083	0.105	0.043
	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.031	-0.009	0.041	0.014	0.041	0.017
	(0.026)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.083	-0.110	0.004	-0.069	-0.100	0.001
	(0.055)	(0.139)	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.046)
Observations	305,685	160,140	346,370	342,732	341,472	335,109
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel D. Continuous, controlling for region×age×year.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.102	0.116	0.046	0.083	0.105	0.043
	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.031	-0.009	0.041	0.014	0.041	0.017
	(0.026)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.083	-0.110	0.004	-0.069	-0.100	0.001
	(0.055)	(0.139)	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.046)
Observations	305,685	160,140	346,370	342,732	341,472	335,109
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel E. Dichotomous, controlling for country×age						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.162	0.151	0.128	0.050	0.107	0.136
	(0.049)	(0.104)	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.067)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.014	0.043	-0.039	0.043	-0.010	-0.003
	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.075	-0.071	-0.154	0.059	-0.053	0.064
	(0.090)	(0.160)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.078)
Observations	123,429	80,998	138,035	136,109	138,336	133,152
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
Panel F. Continuous, controlling for country×age						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.162	0.151	0.128	0.050	0.107	0.136
	(0.049)	(0.104)	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.067)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.014	0.043	-0.039	0.043	-0.010	-0.003
	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.075	-0.071	-0.154	0.059	-0.053	0.064
	(0.090)	(0.160)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.078)
Observations	123,429	80,998	138,035	136,109	138,336	133,152
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys under a more demanding specification. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each country and age and for each country and year of interview. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-13: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Exposure to Democracy at Different Ages

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[0, 5]$	-0.001	0.006	0.003	-0.001	0.003	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[6, 17]$	0.008	0.015	-0.003	0.005	0.005	0.020
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[18, 25]$	0.005	0.020	0.002	0.003	-0.006	0.023
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[26, 32]$	0.025	0.012	0.017	0.009	0.013	0.018
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[33, 40]$	0.008	0.015	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.020
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[41, 50]$	0.012	0.017	0.007	0.010	0.001	0.013
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[51, 60]$	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.008	-0.001	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[61, 70]$	0.011	0.021	0.020	0.008	0.008	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Exposure to Successful Democracy 71+	-0.006	-0.004	0.006	0.003	-0.018	-0.016
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Continuous.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[0, 5]$	0.012	0.019	0.009	0.005	0.003	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[6, 17]$	0.024	0.016	0.013	0.010	0.017	0.034
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[18, 25]$	0.017	0.024	-0.008	0.018	0.006	0.032
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[26, 32]$	0.047	0.019	0.037	0.017	0.031	0.031
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[33, 40]$	0.017	0.021	0.008	0.012	0.013	0.025
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[41, 50]$	0.019	0.038	0.027	0.000	0.002	0.025
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[51, 60]$	0.026	0.019	0.008	0.021	0.014	0.042
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Exposure to Successful Democracy $[61, 70]$	0.004	0.040	0.014	-0.007	0.013	0.004
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Exposure to Successful Democracy 71+	-0.031	-0.046	-0.011	-0.012	-0.039	-0.035
	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Observations	319,812	184,176	363,455	359,839	359,743	351,550
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4) but independently constructed for each age interval. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. All Panels define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-14: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Robustness to Alternative Definitions of Successful Performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Successful Performance defined in terms of GDP growth relative to each country's own average growth rate.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.058	0.096	0.049	0.033	0.018	0.071
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.008	0.008	0.007	-0.017	0.030	0.002
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.001	-0.169	-0.057	-0.114	0.041	0.055
	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.090)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.087)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Successful Performance defined as GDP growth above 0%.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.061	0.088	0.041	0.021	0.021	0.079
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.002	0.028	0.024	0.003	0.018	-0.015
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.025	-0.082	-0.022	0.005	0.086	0.055
	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.057)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel C. Successful Performance defined as GDP growth above -1%.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.049	0.062	0.020	0.012	0.018	0.082
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.019	0.057	0.045	0.013	0.024	-0.014
	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.016	0.036	0.035	0.029	0.009	0.012
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.060)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel D. Successful Performance defined as GDP growth above -2%.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.061	0.088	0.041	0.021	0.021	0.079
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.002	0.028	0.024	0.003	0.018	-0.015
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.025	-0.082	-0.022	0.005	0.086	0.055
	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.057)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
Panel E. Successful Performance defined as periods where no civil wars episodes took place.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.087	0.088	0.048	0.044	0.037	0.106
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.063	-0.087	-0.048	0.033	-0.030	-0.060
	(0.056)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.044	-0.496	-0.188	0.110	0.055	-0.054
	(0.112)	(0.240)	(0.118)	(0.130)	(0.117)	(0.078)
Observations	305,709	160,147	346,394	342,759	341,494	335,132
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel F. Successful Performance defined in terms of expenditure as percentage of GDP relative to each country's own level.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.146	0.075	0.085	0.070	0.097	0.139
	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.004	0.014	0.007	-0.008	0.006	0.000
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.012)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.061	-0.021	-0.026	-0.004	-0.074	-0.031
	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.035)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
Panel G. Successful Performance defined in expenditure as percentage of GDP above the mean.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.183	0.125	0.112	0.045	0.111	0.172
	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.027)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.031	0.012	0.021	0.009	0.025	0.042
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.002	0.012	0.007	0.043	0.029	-0.020
	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.025)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
Panel H. Successful Performance defined in expenditure as percentage of GDP above the median.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.190	0.122	0.119	0.058	0.098	0.184
	(0.046)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.029)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.021	0.012	0.014	0.005	0.023	0.033
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.017	-0.002	-0.002	0.024	0.036	-0.039
	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.028)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A defines Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita being equal or more than one standard deviation below each country's average growth rate. Panels B, C and D define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita being equal or more than 0%, -1% and -2%. Panels E defines Successful Performance as periods where no civil wars episodes took place (civil wars are defined as conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths). Panels F defines Successful Performance in terms of government expenditure as percentage of GDP being equal or more than one standard deviation below each country's average level. Panels G and H define Successful Performance in terms of government expenditure as percentage of GDP being equal or more than the mean and the median level. All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-15: Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy — Multiple Hypothesis Testing

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		OLS		*2SLS*	
	Statistic	*Dichotomous*	*Continuous*	*Dichotomous*	*Continuous*
A. Exposure to Democracy and Successful Democracy.					
Overall Democracy	p-value	83.3	100.0	83.3	83.3
Overall Democracy	sharpened q	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Successful Democracy (Growth)	p-value	66.7	100.0	83.3	83.3
Successful Democracy (Growth)	sharpened q	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Successful Democracy (Stability)	p-value	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Successful Democracy (Stability)	sharpened q	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Successful Democracy (Expenditure)	p-value	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3
Successful Democracy (Expenditure)	sharpened q	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
B. Pre-Birth Exposure to Democracy and Successful Democracy.					
Overall Democracy	p-value	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7
Overall Democracy	sharpened q	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Successful Democracy (Growth)	p-value	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0
Successful Democracy (Growth)	sharpened q	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Successful Democracy (Stability)	p-value	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0
Successful Democracy (Stability)	sharpened q	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Successful Democracy (Expenditure)	p-value	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0
Successful Democracy (Expenditure)	sharpened q	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0
C. Exposure to Democracy and Successful Democracy on Non-Political Attitudinal Variables.					
Overall Democracy	p-value	4.2	8.3	4.2	12.5
Overall Democracy	sharpened q	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2
Successful Democracy (Growth)	p-value	20.8	12.5	0.0	8.3
Successful Democracy (Growth)	sharpened q	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Successful Democracy (Stability)	p-value	29.2	29.2	16.7	16.7
Successful Democracy (Stability)	sharpened q	12.5	12.5	4.2	0.0
Successful Democracy (Expenditure)	p-value	8.3	12.5	29.2	20.8
Successful Democracy (Expenditure)	sharpened q	0.0	0.0	12.5	4.2

Note: This table reports summary results statistics from the estimates of exposure to democracy on support for democracy (Panel A), estimates of pre-birth exposure to democracy on support for democracy (Panel B) and estimates of exposure to democracy on various non-political attitudinal questions (Panel C) using two different approaches comparing our results to account for the fact that we are testing a family of hypotheses. In each panel, we report (i) the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using conventional p-values and (ii) the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values (see Anderson, 2008), which takes into account the expected fraction of type I errors. Columns 1 and 2 reports the results for the OLS specifications and Columns 3 and 4 report the results for the 2SLS specifications. Columns 1 and 3 reports the results for our dichotomous democratic score and Columns 2 and 4 reports the results for our continuous democratic score. All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-16: First-Stage Estimates of the Instrument on Exposure to Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent variable is Exposure to Democracy (as defined in the header of the panel)					
Panel A. Dichotomous.						
Support for Democracy	0.856	0.849	0.847	0.857	0.854	0.858
	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.081)
Observations	341,921	188,187	389,029	385,201	384,543	375,944
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
F-stat excluded instruments	108.90	94.09	98.26	109.30	102.97	111.73
Panel B. Continuous.						
Support for Democracy	0.882	0.844	0.867	0.882	0.878	0.882
	(0.090)	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.090)
Observations	343,851	187,210	390,992	387,113	386,507	377,990
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
F-stat excluded instruments	96.70	60.04	78.08	94.65	86.61	96.10
Subample with available information for...	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Democratic system	Government above experts

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of the instrument in equation (7) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). The Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds the subsample for which each of our measures of support for democracy is defined. Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. All regressions include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. The first-stage F-statistic is reported below the coefficient estimates. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-17: Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates, Controlling for Other Shocks from Neighboring Countries During Lifetime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Exposure to Democracy.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.115	0.115	0.084	0.071	0.049	0.118
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Observations	287,133	158,020	325,127	321,825	320,833	314,785
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
P-value neighbors	0.81	0.53	0.90	0.20	0.19	0.69
Panel B. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.122	0.133	0.088	0.076	0.053	0.127
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.026	0.056	0.026	-0.025	-0.017	-0.013
	(0.045)	(0.097)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.041)
Observations	286,271	157,416	324,076	320,792	319,794	313,808
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
P-value neighbors	0.80	0.59	0.95	0.31	0.22	0.65
Panel C. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Peace.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.121	0.108	0.084	0.065	0.061	0.122
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.025	0.087	0.022	0.077	-0.034	0.038
	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.049)
Observations	284,613	157,822	322,446	319,205	318,183	312,148
Countries	100	78	100	100	100	100
P-value neighbors	0.71	0.36	0.96	0.13	0.19	0.51
Panel D. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.310	0.212	0.225	0.163	0.276	0.207
	(0.111)	(0.090)	(0.061)	(0.094)	(0.116)	(0.076)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.183	-0.193	-0.083	-0.099	-0.258	-0.062
	(0.479)	(0.293)	(0.206)	(0.280)	(0.558)	(0.216)
Observations	117,158	75,582	130,591	128,966	131,000	126,135
Countries	63	51	63	63	63	63
P-value neighbors	0.86	0.47	0.75	0.28	0.40	0.33

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) (Panel A) and Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) (Panels B-D). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to (Successful/Unsuccessful) Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panels B, C and D define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All regressions additionally include other shocks (crisis, coups and natural disasters) that neighboring countries receive during the respondent lifetime. P-value neighbors is the P-value associated to the null hypothesis that these shocks are statistically insignificant. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-18: Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates, Controlling for Neighbors Exposure to Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Exposure to Democracy.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.106	0.127	0.107	0.065	0.037	0.103
	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	-0.020	0.019	-0.040	-0.055	0.027	-0.018
	(0.063)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.052)
Observations	340,993	188,187	387,979	384,198	383,516	374,913
Countries	105	81	105	105	105	105
P-value neighbors	0.76	0.65	0.44	0.30	0.54	0.73
Panel B. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.120	0.115	0.108	0.089	0.035	0.116
	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.036)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.024	0.051	0.019	-0.044	0.013	-0.018
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.032)
Observations	318,221	185,373	361,828	358,236	358,142	349,778
Countries	104	80	104	104	104	104
P-value neighbors	0.57	0.49	0.47	0.26	0.75	0.40
Panel C. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Peace.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.125	0.098	0.095	0.087	0.055	0.120
	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.021	0.075	0.033	0.053	-0.029	0.041
	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.045)
Observations	305,210	159,892	345,819	342,218	340,936	334,601
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
P-value neighbors	0.90	0.60	0.50	0.37	0.84	0.92
Panel D. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.271	0.205	0.200	0.154	0.249	0.167
	(0.153)	(0.106)	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.197)	(0.075)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.135	-0.147	-0.068	-0.052	-0.237	-0.034
	(0.425)	(0.236)	(0.200)	(0.210)	(0.608)	(0.174)
Observations	123,369	80,944	137,941	136,035	138,249	133,081
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
P-value neighbors	0.92	0.99	0.99	0.67	0.81	0.78

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) (Panel A) and Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) (Panels B-D). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to (Successful/Unsuccessful) Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panels B, C and D define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All regressions also control for the instrumented spatial lag of Exposure to Democracy (Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy), the weighted average across countries of the Exposure to Democracy that a person with the same year of birth and date of interview had in a different country, where the weights are a function of the inverse of the distance between countries. P-value neighbors is the P-value associated to the null hypothesis that the Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy is statistically insignificant. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-19: Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates, Controlling for Neighbors Support for Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Exposure to Democracy.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.087	0.119	0.083	0.038	0.046	0.084
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	0.277	0.150	0.110	0.241	0.241	0.262
	(0.206)	(0.147)	(0.152)	(0.121)	(0.178)	(0.251)
Observations	340,993	188,187	387,979	384,198	383,516	374,913
Countries	105	81	105	105	105	105
P-value neighbors	0.19	0.33	0.48	0.06	0.19	0.31
Panel B. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.092	0.115	0.085	0.061	0.036	0.090
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.021	0.053	0.018	-0.047	0.018	-0.020
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.038)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	0.329	0.111	0.091	0.281	0.238	0.287
	(0.230)	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.282)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.015	-0.044	-0.051	-0.095	0.131	-0.109
	(0.109)	(0.165)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.106)	(0.144)
Observations	318,221	185,373	361,828	358,236	358,142	349,778
Countries	104	80	104	104	104	104
P-value neighbors	0.17	0.49	0.56	0.11	0.17	0.32
Panel C. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Peace.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.100	0.105	0.072	0.052	0.058	0.102
	(0.047)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.022	0.076	0.008	0.046	-0.043	0.028
	(0.073)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.044)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	0.534	0.059	0.231	0.354	0.211	0.278
	(0.844)	(0.288)	(0.337)	(0.273)	(0.237)	(0.278)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.100	-0.055	-0.015	-0.012	-0.093	-0.044
	(0.097)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.077)
Observations	305,210	159,892	345,819	342,218	340,936	334,601
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
P-value neighbors	0.53	0.84	0.50	0.21	0.38	0.33
Panel D. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.267	0.264	0.199	0.130	0.229	0.170
	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.074)	(0.126)	(0.057)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.144	-0.146	-0.070	-0.072	-0.299	-0.047
	(0.575)	(0.281)	(0.262)	(0.340)	(1.035)	(0.238)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	-0.063	-0.196	0.005	0.086	-0.086	0.207
	(0.175)	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.315)	(0.314)	(0.277)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.297	-0.294	-0.169	-0.151	-0.426	-0.113
	(0.617)	(0.197)	(0.264)	(0.363)	(1.111)	(0.258)
Observations	123,369	80,944	137,941	136,035	138,249	133,081
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
P-value neighbors	0.72	0.20	0.97	0.79	0.79	0.47

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) (Panel A) and Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) (Panels B-D). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to (Successful/Unsuccessful) Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panels B, C and D define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All regressions also control for the instrumented spatial lag of Exposure to Support for Democracy (Neighbors' Support for Democracy), where the weights are a function of the inverse of the distance between countries. P-value neighbors is the P-value associated to the null hypothesis that the Neighbors' Support for Democracy is statistically insignificant. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-20: Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates, Within-Age Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Exposure to Democracy.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.080	0.100	0.079	0.040	0.031	0.065
	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.040)
Observations	341,896	188,157	389,009	385,179	384,520	375,923
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.077	0.088	0.067	0.041	0.025	0.076
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.040)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.007	0.053	0.024	-0.008	0.015	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.040	-0.013	-0.016	0.027	0.117	-0.034
	(0.078)	(0.136)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.057)
Observations	319,136	185,352	362,868	359,227	359,157	350,797
Countries	105	80	105	105	105	105
Panel C. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Peace.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.056	0.039	0.047	0.036	0.027	0.045
	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.037)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.133	0.023	0.100	0.083	0.057	0.095
	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.034)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.173	-0.026	0.117	0.101	0.078	0.126
	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.051)
Observations	305,207	159,888	345,816	342,215	340,933	334,598
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel D. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.202	0.036	0.097	0.162	0.152	0.126
	(0.061)	(0.089)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.039	-0.003	0.022	0.053	-0.102	-0.026
	(0.049)		(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.186	-0.030	-0.019	0.002	-0.244	-0.114
	(0.094)	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.148)	(0.097)
Observations	123,367	80,942	137,939	136,033	138,247	133,080
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) (Panel A) and Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) (Panels B-D) under a more demanding specification. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to (Successful/Unsuccessful) Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panels B, C and D define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of fixed effects for each region and age and for each country and year of interview. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-21: Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates, Within-Age-Cohort Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Exposure to Democracy.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.085	0.096	0.062	0.041	0.053	0.059
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.048)
Observations	341,616	188,021	388,741	384,908	384,256	375,643
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.078	0.079	0.054	0.040	0.041	0.070
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.051)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.005	0.067	0.018	-0.036	0.035	-0.013
	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.028)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.090	0.035	0.033	0.067	0.181	-0.071
	(0.089)	(0.170)	(0.101)	(0.075)	(0.112)	(0.077)
Observations	318,889	185,219	362,634	358,989	358,929	350,556
Countries	105	80	105	105	105	105
Panel C. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Peace.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.069	0.045	0.023	0.040	0.040	0.067
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.044)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.173	0.038	0.158	0.119	0.016	0.147
	(0.057)	(0.019)	(0.049)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.048)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.217	0.059	0.197	0.139	0.044	0.172
	(0.087)	(0.024)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.086)
Observations	305,187	159,885	345,798	342,199	340,917	334,583
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel D. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.264	0.326	0.200	0.205	0.099	0.172
	(0.057)	(1.210)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.076)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.052	0.006	-0.108	-0.024	0.015	0.017
	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.104)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.180	-0.037	-0.268	-0.099	0.059	-0.099
	(0.076)	(0.308)	(0.090)	(0.065)	(0.024)	(0.154)
Observations	123,362	80,941	137,934	136,030	138,244	133,078
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) (Panel A) and Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) (Panels B-D) under a more demanding specification. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to (Successful/Unsuccessful) Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panels B, C and D define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of fixed effects for each region, age and year of interview and for each country and year of interview. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-22: Exposure to (Successful) Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates, Within-Country Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Exposure to Democracy.						
Exposure to Democracy	0.399	0.357	0.150	0.286	0.373	0.179
	(0.117)	(0.166)	(0.074)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.092)
Observations	341,755	188,048	388,881	385,046	384,390	375,792
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
Panel B. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.391	0.283	0.123	0.261	0.346	0.224
	(0.138)	(0.148)	(0.084)	(0.115)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.019	0.023	0.022	-0.028	-0.016	-0.015
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.040)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.085	0.034	0.053	-0.160	-0.120	0.018
	(0.205)	(0.170)	(0.148)	(0.166)	(0.172)	(0.158)
Observations	319,025	185,269	362,772	359,123	359,057	350,699
Countries	105	80	105	105	105	105
Panel C. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Peace.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.258	0.159	0.106	0.211	0.280	0.040
	(0.069)	(0.158)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.075)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.116	0.155	0.130	0.040	0.003	0.154
	(0.092)	(0.131)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.118)	(0.088)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.018	0.212	0.105	-0.082	-0.221	0.194
	(0.114)	(0.324)	(0.095)	(0.140)	(0.144)	(0.155)
Observations	305,188	159,885	345,796	342,193	340,915	334,579
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
Panel D. Exposure to Successful Democracy: Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.677	0.108	0.399	0.357	0.606	0.330
	(0.273)	(0.482)	(0.200)	(0.314)	(0.230)	(0.327)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.136	0.112	-0.147	0.287	0.020	0.132
	(0.116)	(0.166)	(0.142)	(0.108)	(0.095)	(0.087)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.246	0.061	-0.455	0.134	-0.349	0.089
	(0.224)	(0.510)	(0.161)	(0.253)	(0.201)	(0.192)
Observations	123,366	80,941	137,939	136,031	138,247	133,078
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) (Panel A) and Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) (Panels B-D) under a more demanding specification. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. The instrument for Exposure to (Successful/Unsuccessful) Democracy is constructed as in equation (6), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Panels B, C and D define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score and include a full set of fixed effects for each country and age and for each country and year of interview. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-23: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Dichotomous.						
Support for Democracy	0.176	0.022	0.176	0.100	0.038	0.176
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.052)
Observations	1,726	779	1,989	1,905	2,013	1,872
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
Panel B. Continuous.						
Support for Democracy	0.342	0.076	0.146	0.382	0.153	0.235
	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.115)
Observations	1,706	782	1,969	1,883	1,992	1,850
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using a sample of immigrants available for two waves of the Integrated Values Survey. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1), but exploiting only an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth (see footnote 25). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panel A and B uses the dichotomous and the continuous democratic score respectively. In addition to the controls in our baseline specification (a full set of country of residence, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey, gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city) we control for a full set of fixed effects for each country of birth, for each language and for each country of residence, subregion of birth and year of migration. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-24: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army rule	Government above experts
Panel A. Economic Growth.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.140	0.115	0.170	0.084	0.047	0.182
	(0.059)	(0.088)	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.072)	(0.053)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.027	-0.437	-0.011	0.017	-0.182	-0.035
	(0.112)	(0.275)	(0.048)	(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.058)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.854	-2.851	0.037	0.214	0.185	0.080
	(0.716)	(1.032)	(0.406)	(0.807)	(0.634)	(0.385)
Observations	1,723	779	1,986	1,902	2,010	1,869
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
Panel B. Peace and Political Stability.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.137	0.017	0.153	0.080	0.000	0.166
	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.068)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.386	0.365	0.153	0.268	0.212	0.298
	(0.111)	(0.210)	(0.162)	(0.118)	(0.107)	(0.088)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.594	0.917	-0.048	0.534	0.422	0.243
	(0.163)	(0.282)	(0.292)	(0.256)	(0.273)	(0.161)
Observations	1,627	738	1,869	1,795	1,889	1,759
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
Panel C. Public Expenditure.						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.281	0.046	0.234	0.187	0.060	0.338
	(0.047)	(0.278)	(0.076)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.059)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.233	-0.033	0.015	0.505	0.146	0.125
	(0.175)	(0.102)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.134)	(0.270)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.388	0.033	-0.201	1.336	0.285	0.231
	(0.345)	(0.310)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.239)	(0.585)
Observations	848	499	943	922	968	893
Countries	15	13	15	15	15	15

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using a sample of immigrants available for two waves of the Integrated Values Survey. Exposure to Successful and Unsuccessful Democracy are defined in equation (4), but exploiting only an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth (see footnote 25). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A, B and C define Successful Performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita, peace, and expenditure respectively (see Section 4.2). All regressions use the dichotomous democratic score. In addition to the controls in our baseline specification (a full set of country of residence, year of interview, age, cohort and wave-survey, gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city) we control for a full set of fixed effects for each country of birth, for each language and for each country of residence, subregion of birth and year of migration. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-25: Support for Democracy and Democratic Outcomes — Controlling for Leads of the Negative Shock

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	GDP growth	Conflict	Coup
A. Historical democracies.			
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$	-0.005	0.029	0.011
	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.005)
Negative shock$_{c,t+1}$	-0.007	0.006	0.012
	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	0.004	-0.024	-0.010
	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Negative shock$_{c,t+1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	0.001	-0.010	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Observations	6,985	3,336	5,203
Countries	53	49	49
B. Historical nondemocracies.			
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$	-0.011	0.047	0.018
	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.010)
Negative shock$_{c,t+1}$	-0.007	0.016	0.018
	(0.005)	(0.021)	(0.011)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	-0.000	0.003	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.010)
Negative shock$_{c,t+1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	-0.007	0.031	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.009)
Observations	5,185	3,338	3,273
Countries	53	52	52

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of the relationship between GDP growth, dummies for conflict and coups against a negative economic shock and its interaction with support for democracy as specified in equation (8) in the text. We also include, as a placebo, the interaction between a lead of the negative shock and its interaction with support for democracy. The units of observation are country/year pairs. The negative shock is defined as a negative growth rate of real GDP per capita. Support for democracy is a time-invariant variable. Each column corresponds to a different outcome as reported in the title. Panel A and B estimate the effects for the subset of historical democracies and non-democracies respectively. Countries that have been democratic for less than the median duration of democracy between 1920 and 2000 are classified as historical nondemocracies (the rest are historical democracies). All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Support for democracy is standardized. Standard errors are computed with clustering at the country and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-26: Support for Democracy and Democratic Outcomes — Controlling for Trust

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	GDP growth			Conflict			Coup		
A. Historical democracies.									
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	0.004		0.003	-0.025		-0.024	-0.011		-0.009
	(0.002)		(0.003)	(0.011)		(0.015)	(0.005)		(0.008)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Trust$_c$		0.003	0.001		-0.014	-0.002		-0.008	-0.003
		(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.009)	(0.012)		(0.003)	(0.006)
Observations	7,097	7,097	7,097	3,434	3,434	3,434	5,205	5,205	5,205
Countries	53	53	53	49	49	49	49	49	49
B. Historical nondemocracies.									
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	0.049	0.050	0.049	0.021	0.021	0.021
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Support for Democracy$_c$	-0.001		-0.002	0.012		0.012	0.004		0.004
	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.017)		(0.019)	(0.008)		(0.008)
Negative shock$_{c,t-1}$ × Trust$_c$		-0.006	-0.006		-0.002	0.000		0.001	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.020)	(0.022)		(0.008)	(0.007)
Observations	5,301	5,301	5,301	3,442	3,442	3,442	3,282	3,282	3,282
Countries	53	53	53	52	52	52	52	52	52

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of the relationship between GDP growth, dummies for conflict and coups against a negative economic shock and its interaction with both support for democracy and trust as in equation (8) in the text. The units of observation are country/year pairs. The negative shock is defined as a negative growth rate of real GDP per capita. Support for democracy is a time-invariant variable. Our measure of trust represents the proportion of people in a country that answer "Most people can be trusted" in the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people". For each of the three outcomes, we report three specification either including (i) the negative shock and its interaction with support for democracy, (ii) the negative shock and its interaction with trust and (iii) the negative shock and its interaction with both support for democracy and trust. Panel A and B estimate the effects for the subset of historical democracies and non-democracies respectively. Countries that have been democratic for less than the median duration of democracy between 1920 and 2000 are classified as historical nondemocracies (the rest are historical democracies). All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Support for democracy is standardized. Standard errors are computed with clustering at the country and are robust against heteroscedasticity.