Imperfect Macroeconomic Expectations: Evidence and Theory

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State of The Art

Lots of lessons outside representative agent, rational expectations benchmark But also a "wilderness" of alternatives

- Rational inattention, sticky info, etc. (Sims, Mankiw & Reis, Mackowiak & Wiederholt)
- Higher-order uncertainty (Morris & Shin, Woodford, Nimark, Angeletos & Lian)
- Level-K thinking (Garcia-Schmidt & Woodford, Farhi & Werning, Iovino & Sergeyev)
- Cognitive discounting (Gabaix)
- Over-extrapolation (Gennaioli, Ma & Shleifer, Fuster, Laibson & Mendel, Guo & Wachter)
- Over-confidence (Kohlhas & Broer, Scheinkman & Xiong)
- Representativeness (Bordalo, Gennaioli & Shleifer)
- Undue effect of historical experiences (Malmendier & Nagel)

Contributions:

- Use a parsimonious framework to organize existing evidence and various theories
- Provide new evidence
- Identify the "right" model of expectations for business cycle context

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- New fact: expectations under-react early but over-shoot later
- Best model: dispersed info + over-extrapolation
- Little support for FIRE, cognitive discounting, level-k thinking

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Three Existing Facts, with Conflicting Message

An "Umbrella Theory"

A New, Unifying Fact: Delayed Over-shooting in Aggregate Forecasts

Lessons for Theory

Going GE

Conclusion

Fact 1: <u>Under</u>-reaction in Aggregate Forecasts

Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015)

$$\left(x_{t+k} - \overline{\mathbb{E}}_t x_{t+k}\right) = a + \mathbf{K}_{\mathsf{CG}} \cdot \left(\overline{\mathbb{E}}_t x_{t+k} - \overline{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1} x_{t+k}\right) + u_t$$

Fact 1: Under-reaction in Aggregate Forecasts

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
variable	Unemp	Unemployment		Inflation	
sample	1968-2017	1984-2017	1968-2017	1984-2017	
Revision _t (K _{cc})	0.741	0.809	1.528	0.292	
R ²	0.111	0.159	0.278	0.016	
Observations	191	136	190	135	

Notes: The dataset is the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the observation is a quarter between Q4-1968 and Q4-2017. The forecast horizon is 3 quarters. Standard errors are HAC-robust, with a Bartlett ("hat") kernel and lag length equal to 4 quarters. The data used for outcomes are first-release.

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
variable	Unemployment		Inflation	
sample	1968-2017	1984-2017	1968-2017	1984-2017
Revision _t (K _{cg})	0.741 (0.232)	<mark>0.809</mark> (0.305)	1.528 (0.418)	<mark>0.292</mark> (0.191)
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Bad news for: RE + common information

Good news for: (i) RE + dispersed noisy information

(ii) under-extrapolation, cognitive discounting, level-K

Fact 2: Over-reaction in Individual Forecasts

Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2018); Kohlhas and Broer (2018); Fuhrer (2018)

$$(x_{t+k} - \mathbb{E}_{i,t}x_{t+k}) = a + \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{BGMS}} \cdot (\mathbb{E}_{i,t}x_{t+k} - \mathbb{E}_{i,t-1}x_{t+k}) + u_t$$

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variable	Unemp	Unemployment		Inflation	
sample	1968-2017	1984-2017	1968-2017	1984-2017	
Revision _{i,t} (K _{BGMS})	0.321 (0.107)	<mark>0.398</mark> (0.149)	<mark>0.143</mark> (0.123)	- <mark>0.263</mark> (0.054)	
R ²	0.028	0.052	0.005	0.025	
Observations	5383	3769	5147	3643	

Notes: The observation is a forecaster by quarter between Q4-1968 and Q4-2017. The forecast horizon is 3 quarters. Standard errors are clustered two-way by forecaster ID and time period. Both errors and revisions are winsorized over the sample to restrict to 4 times the inter-quartile range away from the median. The data used for outcomes are first-release.

BGMS argue that $K_{BGMS} < 0$ is more prevalent in other forecasts. If so, then:

Bad news for: under-extrapolation, cognitive discounting, and level-K thinking

Good news for: over-extrapolation and over-confidence (or "representativeness")

Facts 1 + 2 \Rightarrow Dispersed Info

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sample	1968-2017	1984-2017	1968-2017	1984-2017	
K _{cg}	0.741	0.809	1.528	0.292	
К _{вбмs}	0.321	0.398	0.143	-0.263	
$K_{_{CG}} > K_{_{BGMS}}$	1	 Image: A second s	1	✓	

Q: What does $K_{CG} > K_{BGMS}$ mean?

A: My forecast revision today predicts your forecast error tomorrow

Evidence of dispersed private information

combined regression

Fact 3: Over-reaction in Aggregate Forecasts

Kohlhas and Walther (2019)

$$(x_{t+k} - \overline{\mathbb{E}}_t x_{t+k}) = a + \mathbf{K}_{\mathsf{KW}} \cdot x_t + u_t$$

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
variable	Unemployment		Inflation	
sample	1968-2017	1984-2017	1968-2017	1984-2017
x _t (K _{KW})	- <mark>0.061</mark> (0.056)	<mark>-0.036</mark> (0.038)	<mark>0.111</mark> (0.075)	- <mark>0.068</mark> (0.068)
R ²	0.016	0.007	0.058	0.012
Observations	194	136	193	135

Notes: The dataset is the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the observation is a quarter between Q4-1968 and Q4-2017. The forecast horizon is 3 quarters. Standard errors are HAC-robust, with a Bartlett ("hat") kernel and lag length equal to 4 quarters. The data used for outcomes are first-release.

Bad news for: noisy REE that generates sluggishness and inertia

Good news for: over-extrapolation

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Bad news for: noisy REE that generates sluggishness and inertia

Good news for: over-extrapolation

But: hard to reconcile with Fact 1

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An "Umbrella Theory"

Physical Environment

Noisy signal

$$s_{i,t} = x_t + u_{i,t}/\sqrt{\tau}$$

Process for unemployment or inflation

$$x_t = \rho x_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

An "Umbrella Theory"

Physical Environment

Two non-rational Ingredients

Perception of signal

over- or

 $s_{i,t} = x_t + u_{i,t}/\sqrt{\hat{\tau}}$ under-confidence?

Noisy signal

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Physical Environment Two non-rational Ingredients Noisy signal over- or Perception of signal $s_{i,t} = x_t + u_{i,t}/\sqrt{\hat{\tau}}$ under-confidence? $s_{i,t} = x_t + u_{i,t}/\sqrt{\tau}$ Process for unemployment or inflation over- or Perception of process $x_t = \hat{\rho} x_{t-1} + \eta_t$ under-extrapolation? $x_t = \rho x_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$ later: $\hat{\rho} < \rho$ in GE \approx cognitive discounting, level-K thinking

Proposition. The theoretical counterparts of the regression coefficients are:

$$\mathcal{K}_{CG} = \kappa_1 \hat{\tau}^{-1} - \kappa_2 (\hat{\rho} - \rho) \tag{Fact 1}$$

$$K_{\text{BGMS}} = -\kappa_3(\hat{\tau} - \tau) - \kappa_4(\hat{\rho} - \rho)$$
 (Fact 2)

$$K_{\rm KW} = \kappa_5 \hat{\tau}^{-1} - \kappa_6 (\hat{\rho} - \rho) \tag{Fact 3}$$

for some positive scalars $\kappa_1, ..., \kappa_6$ that depend on the deeper parameters.

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- Moments of average forecasts depend on perceived, not actual, precision
- Actual level of noise matters only for moments of individual forecasts
- Fact 2 conflates over-confidence and over-extrapolation
- Facts 1 and 3 conflate noise and over-extrapolation (in different ways)

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Is there a better way to understand what's going on both in the theory and in the data?

The Missing Piece: Impulse Response Functions

Proposition. Let $\{\zeta_k\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ be the IRF of the average, one-step-ahead, forecast error. (i) If $\hat{\rho} < \rho$, then $\zeta_k > 0 \ \forall k$.

(ii) If $\hat{\rho} > \rho$ and $\hat{\tau}$ large enough relative to $\hat{\rho} - \rho$, then $\zeta_k < 0 \ \forall k$

(iii) If $\hat{\rho} > \rho$ and $\hat{\tau}$ small enough relative to $\hat{\rho} - \rho$, then $\zeta_k > 0 \ \forall k < k_{\text{IRF}}$ and $\zeta_k < 0$ for $\forall k > k_{\text{IRF}}$, for some $k_{\text{IRF}} \in (1, \infty)$.

That is, average forecasts under-react early and overshoot later if and only if there is both over-extrapolation and sufficiently slow learning

Key idea:

- When shock hits: everything is noisy, forecasts under-react
- Many quarters after shock: noise is gone, tendency to over-extrapolate takes over







Bonus: regression coefficients deconstructed $K_{CG} \sim Cov(errors, revisions) \sim IRF_{errors} \times IRF_{revisions}$ $K_{KW} \sim Cov(errors, outcome) \sim IRF_{errors} \times IRF_{outcome}$



Bonus: regression coefficients deconstructed $K_{CG} \sim Cov(errors, revisions) \sim IRF_{errors} \times IRF_{revisions}$ $K_{KW} \sim Cov(errors, outcome) \sim IRF_{errors} \times IRF_{outcome}$ Facts 1 and 3 ($K_{CG} > 0$ and $K_{KW} < 0$) consistent with noise and over-extrapolation and so is Fact 2 ($K_{BGMS} < 0$)

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Estimation Strategy

Shocks: usual suspects (e.g., Gali tech); or DSGE shocks (e.g., JPT inv); or "main business cycle shocks" (Angeletos, Collard & Dellas, 2020)

Estimation method: plain-vanilla linear projection; or big VARs; or ARMA-IV (novel approach) details

Moments of interest:

$$\left(\frac{\partial \mathsf{ForecastError}_{t+k}}{\partial \mathsf{BusinessCycleShock}_t}\right)_{k=0}^{K} = \mathsf{Pattern of mistakes}$$

Fact 4: Delayed Over-Shooting in Response to Main BC Shocks



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Fact 4: Same Pattern with Other Identified Shocks



Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010): Investment Shock → Unemployment



Fact 4: Same Pattern in Structural VARs

13-Variable Model: macro "usual suspects" + unemployment and inflation forecasts (SPF) (IIII)

ACD, 2020 (max-share for BC) 0.4 0.4 0.3 n - forecast error 0.3 - forecast error outcome 0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 forecast n 0.2 unemployment: 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 forecast -0.1 outcome -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 0.6 0.8 ik; 0.6 numal inflation: 0.4 ^I⊧ 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0 0 -0.2 -0.2 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20

Cholesky (one-step-ahead Error)

Corroborating Evidence: Over-extrapolation in the "Term Structure"

$$\overline{\mathbb{E}}_t[x_{t+k}] = \alpha_k + \beta_k^f \cdot \epsilon_t + \gamma' W_t + u_{t+k}$$
$$x_{t+k} = \alpha_k + \beta_k^o \cdot \epsilon_t + \gamma' W_t + u_{t+k}$$

Expectation from t = 0Reality from t = 0



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Need to Combine Frictions to Explain Facts

	Models	Facts			
		1	2	3	4
Information	Noisy common information	No	No*	Yes	No
	Noisy dispersed information	Yes	No*	Yes	Yes
Confidence	Over-confidence or representative- ness heuristic	No	Maybe	No	No
	Under-confidence or "timidness"	No	Maybe	No	No
Foresight	Over-extrapolation	No	Maybe	Yes	Yes
	Under-extrapolation or cognitive discounting or level-K	Yes	Maybe	No	No

Need to Combine Frictions to Explain Facts: A Winning Combination

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Familiar Ingredients

 $\mathsf{Euler}\ \mathsf{equation}/\mathsf{DIS}$

$$c_t = \mathbb{E}_t^*[c_{t+1}] - \varsigma r_t + \epsilon_t$$

Market clearing

 $c_t = y_t$

Demand shock

$$\xi_t \equiv -\varsigma r_t + \epsilon_t = \rho \xi_t + \epsilon_t$$

Familiar Ingredients

New Ingredients: noise + irrationality

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$$s_{i,t} = \xi_t + u_{i,t}/\sqrt{\tau}$$

New Ingredients: noise + irrationality

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Familiar IngredientsNew Ingredients: noise + irrationalityEuler equation/DISNoisy signal $c_t = \mathbb{E}_t^*[c_{t+1}] - \varsigma r_t + \epsilon_t$ $s_{i,t} = \xi_t + u_{i,t}/\sqrt{\tau}$ Market clearingPerception of signal $c_t = y_t$ $s_{i,t} = \xi_t + u_{i,t}/\sqrt{\tau}$

Demand shock

 $\xi_t \equiv -\varsigma r_t + \epsilon_t = \rho \xi_t + \epsilon_t$





Transparent Mapping between Data and Theory

Proposition: Mapping to Forecast Data Closed-form expressions: F1. $K_{CG} = \mathcal{K}_{CG}(\hat{\tau}, \rho, \hat{\rho}; mpc)$ F2. $K_{BGMS} = \mathcal{K}_{BGMS}(\tau, \hat{\tau}, \rho, \hat{\rho}; mpc)$ F3. $K_{KW} = \mathcal{K}_{KW}(\hat{\tau}, \rho, \hat{\rho}; mpc)$ F4. $\left\{ \frac{\partial \overline{\text{Error}_{t+k}}}{\partial \eta_t} \right\}_{k \ge 1} = F(\hat{\tau}, \rho, \hat{\rho}; mpc)$

Proposition: Equilibrium Outcomes

As-if representative, rational agent with

$$c_t = -r_t + \frac{\omega_f}{\mathbb{E}}_t^* [c_{t+1}] + \frac{\omega_b}{c_{t-1}} c_{t-1}$$

 $(\omega_f, \omega_b) = \Omega(\hat{\tau}, \rho, \hat{
ho}, \mathsf{mpc})$

myopia and anchoring

Transparent Mapping between Data and Theory

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F1. $K_{CG} = \mathcal{K}_{CG}(\hat{\tau}, \rho, \hat{\rho}; \mathbf{mpc})$
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myopia and anchoring

- General equilibrium matters through mpc = slope of Keynesian cross
- Key behavior pinned down by $(\hat{\tau}, \rho, \hat{\rho})$
 - Moments of average forecasts are key; moments of individual forecasts (BGMS) less so
 - Our evidence helps pin down ω_b, ω_f and resulting dynamics

Transparent Mapping between Data and Theory



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New Keynesian Model Calibrated to Expectations Evidence

Full model: add NKPC (with imperfect expectations) and Taylor rule



Good fit for demand shock, mediocre for supply shock

Right qualitative ingredients but no abundance of free parameters

Counterfactuals: Interaction of Forces Matters



Counterfactuals: Interaction of Forces Matters





Noise smooths and dampens IRF ("stickiness/inertia and myopia")

Counterfactuals: Interaction of Forces Matters





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Limitations/Future Work:

- Context: "regular business cycles" vs. crises or specific policy experiments
- *Forecast data*: ideally we would like expectations of firms and consumers, and for the objects that matter the most for their choices

Facts 1 + 2: Showing Under-reaction and Dispersion

 $\mathsf{Error}_{i,t,k} = a - \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{noise}} \cdot (\mathsf{Revision}_{i,t,k} - \mathsf{Revision}_{t,k}) + \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{agg}} \cdot \mathsf{Revision}_{t,k} + u_{i,t,k}$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
variable	Unemployment		Infla	ation
sample	1968-2017	1984-2017	1968-2017	1984-2017
Revision _{i,t -} Revision _t (-K _{noise})	-0.166 (0.043)	<mark>-0.162</mark> (0.053)	- <mark>0.346</mark> (0.042)	- <mark>0.410</mark> (0.041)
$\text{Revision}_{t}(\text{K}_{agg})$	0.745 (0.173)	0.841 (0.210)	1.550 (0.278)	0.412 (0.180)
R ²	0.103	0.152	0.211	0.072
Observations	5383	3769	5147	3643

Notes: The observation is a forecaster by quarter between Q4-1968 and Q4-2017. The forecast horizon is 3 quarters. Standard errors are clustered two-way by forecaster ID and time period. Both errors and revisions are winsorized over the sample to restrict to 4 times the interquartile range away from the median. The data used for outcomes are first-release.

Estimation Strategy

Overall goal: allow flexibility for dynamics to be "shock-specific"

ARMA-IV: two-stage-least-squares estimate of

$$x_t = \alpha + \sum_{p=1}^{P} \gamma_p \cdot x_{t-p}^{\mathsf{IV}} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \cdot \epsilon_{t-k} + u_t$$
$$X_{t-1} = \eta + \mathcal{E}'_{t-1}\Theta + e_t$$

where $X_{t-1} \equiv (x_{t-p})_{p=1}^{P}$, $\mathcal{E}_{t-1} \equiv (\epsilon_{t-K-j})_{j=1}^{J}$ and $J \ge P$. Main specification: P = 3, J = 6. **Projection**: OLS estimation at each horizon h of

$$x_{t+h} = \alpha_h + \beta_h \cdot \epsilon_t + \gamma' W_t + u_{t+h}$$

where the controls W_t are x_{t-1} and $\overline{\mathbb{E}}_{t-k-1}[x_{t-1}]$.

Estimation Strategy

Back



Figure 1: *

Forecast error estimation with projection method (grey) and ARMA-OLS(1,1) (green).



 $10\ usual\ suspects:$ real GDP, real investment, real consumption, labor hours, the labor share, the Federal Funds Rate, labor productivity, and utilization-adjusted TFP

3 forecast variables: three-period-ahead unemployment forecast, three-period annual inflation forecast, one-period-ahead quarter-to-quarter inflation forecast

Back

As-if Representation (builds on Angeletos & Huo, 2018):

```
c_t = -r_t + \frac{\omega_f}{\mathbb{E}} \mathbb{E}_t^* [c_{t+1}] + \frac{\omega_b}{C_{t-1}} c_{t-1}
```

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```

Only Dispersed Info $\Rightarrow \omega_f < 1 \omega_b > 0$

- ω_f < 1 : captures noise plus myopia due to HOB (Angeletos & Lian, 2018)
 → resolution to forward guidance puzzle etc
- $\omega_b > 0$: captures learning, or momentum in beliefs

 \rightsquigarrow resembles habit or adjustment costs

- both distortions disciplined by moments of average forecasts (CG or ours)
- both distortions increase with MPC, or Keynesian multiplier (HANK connection)

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The Role of Under/Over-Extrapolation

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- myopia but not habit/momentum
- consistent with CG but rejected by BGMS and our fact
- same applies for cognitive-discounting and level-K thinking

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 $\mbox{Over-extrapolation plus enough noise} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \omega_f < 1 \quad \omega_b > 0$

- matches all facts about expectations
- quantitative bite disciplined by our evidence

Model Parameters

Table 1: Exogenously Set Parameters

Parameter	Description	Value	
θ	θ Calvo prob		
κ	Slope of NKPC	0.02	
χ	Discount factor	0.99	
mpc	MPC	0.3	
ς	IES	1.0	
ϕ	Monetary policy	1.5	

Table 2: Calibrated Parameters

	$\hat{ ho}$	ρ	au
Demand shock	0.94	0.80	0.38
Supply shock	0.82	0.57	0.15

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