Working Papers
“The Granular Origins of Agglomeration” (with Daniel G O’Connor)
A few large firms dominate many local labor markets. How does that granularity affect the geography of economic activity? And what does it mean for the efficiency of firm entry? To answer these questions, we propose a new economic geography model featuring granular firms subject to idiosyncratic shocks. We show that average wages increase in the size of the local labor market due to that granularity and provide sufficient statistics for the contribution of our mechanism. We further prove that too few firms enter in equilibrium. Using Japanese administrative data on manufacturing, we provide evidence that is consistent with our mechanism and quantify it. Our mechanism implies that markets with around 2 firms per sector have an elasticity of wages to population of 0.05 and firms capture only 85% of their contribution to production in profits. In large markets like Tokyo, the elasticity is around 0.001, and firm entry is approximately efficient. Enacting optimal place-based industrial policy would increase the number of firms in modest-sized cities by more than 30% and actually decrease the number of firms and people in Tokyo.
“Decomposing the Rise of the Populist Radical Right” (with Oren Danieli, Noam Gidron, and Ro’ee Levy)
Reject & Resubmit at Journal of Political Economy
Support for populist radical right parties in Europe has dramatically increased in recent years. We decompose the rise of these parties from 2005 to 2020 into four components: shifts in party positions, changes in voter attributes (opinions and demographics), changes in voter priorities, and a residual. We merge two wide datasets on party positions and voter attributes and estimate voter priorities using a probabilistic voting model. We find that shifts in party positions and changes in voter attributes do not play a major role in the recent success of populist radical right parties. Instead, the primary driver behind their electoral success lies in voters’ changing priorities. Particularly, voters are less likely to decide which party to support based on parties’ economic positions. Rather, voters—mainly older, non-unionized, low-educated men—increasingly prioritize nativist cultural positions. This allows populist radical right parties to tap into a preexisting reservoir of culturally conservative voters. Using the same datasets, we provide a set of reduced-form evidence supporting our results. First, while parties’ positions have changed, these changes are not consistent with the main supply-side hypothesis for populist support. Second, on aggregate, voters have not adopted populist right-wing opinions. Third, voters are more likely to self-identify ideologically based on their cultural rather than their economic opinions.
Media: VOXEU
“Welfare Effects of Polarization: Occupational Mobility over the Life-cycle” (with Sagiri Kitao)
What are the welfare effects of polarization: wage and employment losses of middle-class workers relative to low- and high-skill groups? We build a model of overlapping generations who choose consumption, savings, labor supply, and occupations over their life cycles, and accumulate human capital. We simulate a wage shift observed since the early 1980s and investigate individuals’ responses. Polarization improves welfare of young individuals that are high-skilled, while it hurts low-skilled individuals across all ages and especially younger ones. The gain of the high-skilled is larger for generations entering in later periods, who can fully exploit the rising skill premium.