Courses | MIT Economics

14.472 Graduate Public Economics II: Government Expenditures

Finkelstein Lectures:

Lecture 1: Introduction

Lecture 5: In-Kind Transfers: Empirics

Lectures 6-7: Take-up and Self-Targeting

Lecture 12: Asymmetric Information: Theory

Lecture 13: Asymmetric Information: Testing

Lecture 14: Asymmetric Information: Empirical Welfare Analysis with Revealed Preference

Lecture 15: Asymmetric Information: Empirical Welfare Analysis without Revealed Preference

Lecture 16: Asymmetric Information: Empirical Welfare Analysis without Markets

Lectures 20-21: Optimal Health Insurance for Low-Income Individuals

Lecture 22: Health Insurance Reform (part 1 and part 2)

Lecture 23: Choice of Instrument

Lecture 24: Targeting Government Programs

Lecture 26: Partial Wrap-up: Summary of Hendren Lectures

II_a Asymmetric Information: Theory

II_bc Asymmetric Information: Testing and Welfare

II_d Asymmetric Information: Welfare Analysis without revealed preference

II_e Asymmetric Information: Welfare analysis when there is no market

III_a Optimal Level of Social Insurance Benefits: Theory

III_b Optimal Level of Social Insurance Benefits: Empirics

III_c Optimal Level of Social Insurance Benefits: More on moral hazard

IV Choice of Instrument

VA Redistribution: Frameworks

VB: Redistributive Instruments: Theory

VC: Redistribution Application: Cash vs In Kind

VD: Redistribution Application: Take up and Self Targeting

VI Synthesis: Subsidizing Health Insurance for Low Income Adults