(For published papers, please click here. For a complete list, please click here.)
Culture and Communication
with Rajiv Sethi
Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks
with Stephen Morris
Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining
with Alp Simsek
(earlier version)
Pretrial Negotiations under Optimism
with Susana Wasserman
Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Infinite Games
with Jonathan Weinstein
Forthcoming in Journal of Mathematical Economics
Communication with Unknown Perspectives
with Rajiv Sethi
Econometrica, 84(6), pp.2029–2069, November 2016
This is a longer version
Common Belief Foundations of Global Games
with Stehen Morris and Hyun Shin
(Accepted to Journal of Economic Theory)
Durable Bargaining Power and Stochastic Deadlines
with Alp Simsek; mostly incorporated in "Durability, Deadline and Election Effects in Bargaining"
Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World
with Daron Acemoglu and Victor Chernozhukov
(Mostly incorporated in TE paper "Fragility of Asymptotic Agrreement under Bayesian Learning")
Generic Uniqueness of Rationalizable Actions
Most results have been published in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007): "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability...", Econometrica.
Finite-order Implications of Any Equilibrium [Substantially revised]
with Jonathan Weinstein
Most results have been published in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007): "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability...", Econometrica.
Optimism, Deadline Effect, and Stochastic Deadlines
Obsolete: incorporated into "Durable Bargaining Power and Stochastic Deadlines" by Simsek and Yildiz
Sequential Bargaining Without a Common Prior on the Recognition Process
Muhamet Yildiz