Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching (with Anton Kolotilin)
Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming.
Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport (with Roberto Corrao and Anton Kolotilin)
Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming.
Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes (with Drew Fudenberg)
American Economic Review: Insights, Forthcoming.
Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding: Imperfect Information and Conflict Dynamics
(with Daron Acemoglu)
Handbook of the Economics of Conflict, Forthcoming.
Cooperation in Large Societies
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Twelfth World Congress, Forthcoming.
Mediated Collusion (with Juan Ortner and Takuo Sugaya)
Journal of Political Economy, 132: 1247-1289 (2024).
Bad Apples in Symmetric Repeated Games (with Takuo Sugaya)
Theoretical Economics, 18: 1345-1373 (2023).
Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games (with Takuo Sugaya)
Econometrica, 91: 1727-1761 (2023).
Unobserved-Offers Bargaining
American Economic Review, 113: 136-173 (2023).
Reputational Bargaining (with Jack Fanning)
Bargaining: Current Research and Future Directions, Palgrave MacMillan (2022).
Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies (with Daniel Clark and Drew Fudenberg)
Review of Economic Studies, 88: 2179-2209 (2021).
Communication and Community Enforcement (with Takuo Sugaya)
Journal of Political Economy, 129: 2595-2628 (2021).
A Theory of Equality Before the Law (with Daron Acemoglu)
Economic Journal, 131: 1429-1465 (2021).
The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games (with Takuo Sugaya)
Review of Economic Studies, 88: 1503-1540 (2021).
A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (with Takuo Sugaya)
American Economic Review, 110: 3817-3835 (2020).
Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution (with Sandeep Baliga and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita)
American Political Science Review, 114: 1155-1178 (2020).
Indirect Reciprocity with Simple Records (with Daniel Clark and Drew Fudenberg)
PNAS, 117: 11344-11349 (2020).
(supplementary information)
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Anonymous Random Matching (with Joyee Deb and Takuo Sugaya)
Econometrica, 88: 917-964 (2020).
(earlier version with additional proofs)
Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement (with Daron Acemoglu)
Journal of the European Economic Association, 18: 1078-1122 (2020).
Maintaining Privacy in Cartels (with Takuo Sugaya)
Journal of Political Economy, 126: 2569-2607 (2018).
Learning from Others' Outcomes
American Economic Review, 108: 2763-2801 (2018).
Bounding Payoffs in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: n-Player Games (with Takuo Sugaya)
Journal of Economic Theory, 175: 58-87 (2018).
Bounding Equilibrium Payoffs in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (with Takuo Sugaya)
Theoretical Economics, 12: 691-729 (2017).
Capital Taxation under Political Constraints (with Florian Scheuer)
American Economic Review, 106: 2304-2328 (2016).
Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application to Bilateral Trade
Theoretical Economics, 11: 971-1004 (2016).
Communication with Tokens in Repeated Games on Networks
Theoretical Economics, 10: 67-101 (2015).
Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model (with Daron Acemoglu)
American Economic Review, 104: 1350-1367 (2014).
Endogenous Institutions and Political Extremism
Games and Economic Behavior, 81: 86-100 (2013).
Cooperation with Network Monitoring
Review of Economic Studies, 80: 395-427 (2013).
Correction
Reputational Bargaining with Minimal Knowledge of Rationality
Econometrica, 80: 2047-2087 (2012)
A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation (with Glenn Ellison)
RAND Journal of Economics, 43: 417-441 (2012).
Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts
B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions), 12 (2012).
Indeterminacy of Reputation Effects in Repeated Games with Contracts
Games and Economic Behavior, 73: 595-607 (2011).
The Economics of Labor Coercion (with Daron Acemoglu)
Econometrica, 79: 555-600 (2011).
Correction
Dynamic Monopoly with Relational Incentives
Theoretical Economics, 5: 479-518 (2010).
Fully Sincere Voting
Games and Economic Behavior, 67: 720-735 (2009).