Publications

Forthcoming

Fudenberg D and Karreskog G. Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Online Appendix, Slides

Fudenberg D, Lanzani G, and Strack P. Pathwise Concentration Bounds for Bayesian Beliefs, Theoretical Economics

Fudenberg D and Lanzani G. Which Misspecifications Persist?, Theoretical Economics

2022

Clark D, Fudenberg D, and He K. Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models. Journal of Economic Theory, 2022 (206): 105569 

Fudenberg D and Levine DK. Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 (14): 353-77. Online Appendix.

Fudenberg D, Gao Y, and Pei H. A Reputation for Honesty, Journal of Economic Theory, 2022 (204): 105508.

Fudenberg D and Puri I. Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2022 (112): 421-25. 

Fudenberg D, Kleinberg J, Liang A, and Mullainathan S. Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models, Journal of Political Economy, 2022 (130): 956–990. 

2021

Fudenberg D and Levine DK. Intervention with Limited Information, International Journal of Game Theory, 2021 (51): 379-389.

Fudenberg D, Geogiadis G, and Rayo L. Working to Learn, Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 (179): 105347.

Clark D, Fudenberg D and Wolitzky A. Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies, Review of Economic Studies, 2021 (88): 2179–2209. This paper combines two previous papers and removes some of the details. The original, lengthier papers are linked here: "Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games, I: Trigger Strategies in General Stage Games and II: Coordination-Proof Strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma."

Clark D and Fudenberg D. Justified Communication Equilibrium, American Economic Review, 2021 (111): 3004-34. Online Appendix.

Fudenberg D and He K. Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 (194): 105238.

Fudenberg D, Lanzani G and Strack P. Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning, Econometrica, 2021 (89): 1065-1098. Supplemental Material.

2020

Fudenberg D, Strack P, Strzalecki T, and Newey W. Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2020 (117): 33141-33148. Supplementary Information.

Fudenberg D and Liang A. Machine Learning for Evaluating and Improving Theories, SIGecom Exchanges, 2020 (18).

Clark D, Fudenberg D, and Wolitzky A. Indirect Reciprocity with Simple Records, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2020 (117): 11344-11349. 

Fudenberg D and He K Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 (120): 96-120.

2019

Fudenberg D and Rayo L. Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship, American Economic Review, 2019 (109): 3780-3812. Online Appendix.

Fudenberg D and Liang A. Predicting and Understanding Initial Play, American Economic Review, 2019 (109): 4112-41. Additional section on crowd data from working paper.

Fudenberg D and Vespa E. Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019 (11): 186-215.

Block J, Fudenberg D, and Levine DK. Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory, Theoretical Economics, 2019 (14): 135-172.

2018

Fudenberg D, Strack P and Strzalecki, T. Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices, American Economic Review. 2018 (108): 3651-3684. Online Appendix

Fudenberg D, He K. Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games, Econometrica. 2018 (86): 1215-1255.  Supplement to the Paper

Fudenberg D, Kamada Y. Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs, Games and Economic Behavior. 2018 (109): 364-381. 

2017

Fudenberg D, Romanyuk G, and Strack P. Active learning with a misspecified prior, Theorectical Economics. 2017 (12): 1155-1189. 

Arechar AA, Dreber A, Fudenberg D, and Rand DG. “I’m just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior. 2017 (104): 726-743. 

Fudenberg D, He K, and Imhof LA. Bayesian Posteriors for Arbitrarily Rare Events. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2017 (114): 4925-4929.
Supplementary Appendix

2016

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2016 (30): 151-170.

Ellison G, Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment: A Lyapunov Approach. Journal of Economic Theory. 2016 (161): 1-36.

2015

Fudenberg D, Iijima R, Strzalecki T. Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility. Econometrica. 2015 (83): 2371-2409. Older version with additional results.

Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG. It's the Thought That Counts: The Role of Intentions in Noisy Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2015 (116): 481-499.

Fudenberg D. Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2015 (117): 771-800.

Fudenberg D, Kamada Y. Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium. Theoretical Economics. 2015 (10): 775-806.

Fudenberg D, Strzalecki T. Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion. Econometrica. 2015 (83): 651-691.

2014

Fudenberg D, Peysakhovich A. Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem. Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. 2014.
Extended Version published in ACM: TEAC 2016

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning with Recency Bias. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2014 (111): 10826-10829.

Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG. Who Cooperates in Repeated Games: The Role of Altruism, Inequity Aversion, and Demographics. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2014 (98): 41-55.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maniadis Z. An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2014 (41): 55-67.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays. Journal of Dynamics and Games. 2014 (1): 45-56.

Fudenberg D, Ishii Y, Kominers SD. Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags. Journal of Economic Theory. 2014 (150): 487-514.

2012

Fudenberg, D. and Villas-Boas, J.M., 2012. Price Discrimination in the Digital Economy. The Oxford handbook of the digital economy, p.254.

Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. 2012 (74): 399-421.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maniadis Z. On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2012 (2): 131-145.

Aghion P, Fudenberg D, Holden R, Kunimoto T, Tercieux O. Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2012 (127): 1843-1881.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Timing and Self-Control. Econometrica. 2012 (80): 1-42.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2012 (81): 606-612.

Fudenberg D, Rand DG, Dreber A. Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World. American Economic Review. 2012 (102): 720-749. Web Appendix.

2011

Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory. 2011 (146): 1664-1683.

Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 2011 (146): 1733-1769.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2011 (3): 34-68.

Fudenberg D, Olszewski W. Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011 (72): 86-99.

Fudenberg D, Takahashi S. Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011 (71): 100-120.

Archetti M, U'beda F, Fudenberg D, Green J, Pierce NE, Yu DW. Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms. The American Naturalist. 2011 (177).

2010

Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown. Econometrica. 2010 (78): 1673-1710.

Anderson RM, Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010 (69): 2-23.

Fudenberg D, Pathak P. Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation. Journal of Public Economics. 2010 (94): 78-86.

2009

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique. Journal of Economic Theory. 2009 (144): 2354-2371.

Rand DG, Dreber A, Ellingsen T, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation. Science. 2009 (325): 1272-1275.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning and Equilibrium. Annual Review of Economics. 2009 (1): 385-420.

Ellison G, Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics. Games and Economic Behavior. 2009 (66): 98-114.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Repeated Games with Frequent Signals. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2009 (124): 233-265.

2008

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maskin E. Erratum to "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information". Econometrica. 2008.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Introduction. In: A Long Run Collaboration on Long-Run Relationships. World Scientific Publishing Company. 2008.

Dreber A, Rand D, Fudenberg D, Nowak M. Winners Don't Punish. Nature. 2008 (452): 348-351.

Fudenberg D, Imhof L. Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations. Journal of Economic Theory. 2008 (140): 229-245.

Ely J, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. When Is Reputation Bad?. Games and Economic Behavior. 2008 (63): 498-526.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games. World Scientific Publishing Company; 2008.

2007

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. Review of Economic Dynamics. 2007 (10): 173-192.

Fudenberg D. The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 (132): 461-73.

Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M. Tit-for-tat or Win-stay, Lose-shift?. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2007 (247): 574-80.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning. Artifical Intelligence. 2007 (171): 378-381.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Takahashi S. Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players Are Patient. Games and Economic Behavior. 2007 (61): 27-49.

Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Morris S. Interim Correlated Rationalizability. Theoretical Economics. 2007 (2): 15-40.

Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Morris S. Completion of the Proof of Proposition 4 in "Interim Correlated Rationalizability". Theoretical Economics. 2007 (2): 15-40.

Fudenberg D, Villas-Boas MJ. Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition. In: Economics and Information Systems, Volume 1. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 2007.

Fudenberg D, Mobius M, Szeidl A. Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 (133): 550-567.

2006

Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M, Taylor C. Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations with Strong Selection and Weak Mutations. Theoretical Population Biology. 2006 (70): 352-63.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control. American Economic Review. 2006 (96): 1449-1476.

Fudenberg D. Advancing Beyond “Advances in Behavioral Economics". Journal of Economic Literature. 2006 (44): 694-711.

Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Morris S. Topologies on Types. Theoretical Economics. 2006 (1): 275-309.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Superstition and Rational Learning. American Economic Review. 2006 (96): 630-651.

Fudenberg D, Imhof L. Imitation Processes with Small Mutations. Journal of Economic Theory. 2006 (131): 251-262.

2005

Fudenberg D, Nowak M, Sasaki A, Taylor C. Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. 2005 (66): 1621-44.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning and Belief Based Trade. The Latin American Journal of Economics. 2005(42): 199-297.

Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M. Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2005 (102): 10797-10800.

2004

Nowak M, Sasaki A, Taylor C, and Fudenberg D. Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations. Nature. 2004 (428): 646-650.

Banerjee A, Fudenberg D. Word of Mouth Learning. Games and Economic Behavior. 2004 (46): 1-22.

Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning to Play Bayesian Games. Games and Economic Behavior. 2004 (46): 282-303.

Ellison G, Fudenberg D, Mobius M. Competing Auctions. Journal of the European Economics Association. 2004 (2): 30-66.

2003

Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003 (118): 1249-1278.

2002

Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Subjective Uncertainty about Behavior Strategies: A Correction. Journal of Economic Theory. 2002 (104): 473-8.

2000

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good. Journal of Industrial Economics. 2000 (48): 373-90.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Customer Poaching and Brand Switching. Rand Journal of Economics. 2000 (31): 634-57.

Ellison G, Fudenberg D. The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades of Computer Software. Rand Journal of Economics. 2000 (31): 253-72.

Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Learning Purified Equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory. 2000 (90): 84-115.

1999

Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory. 1999 (89): 165-85.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. An Easier Way to Calibrate. Games and Economic Behavior. 1999 (29): 131-7.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Conditional Universal Consistency. Games and Economic Behavior. 1999 (29): 104-30.

1998

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning in Games: Where Do We Stand. European Economic Review. 1998 (42): 631-9.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Trade-Ins, Upgrades, and Buy-Backs. Rand Journal of Economics. 1998 (29): 235-58.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Pesendorfer W. When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible. Journal of Economic Theory. 1998 (79): 46-71.

Fudenberg D. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1998.

1997

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Measuring Player's Losses in Experimental Games. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997 (112): 479-506.

1996

Celentani M, Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Pessendorfer W. Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent. Econometrica. 1996 (64): 691-701.

1995

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play. The Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 1995 (19): 1065-89.

Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Word of Mouth Communication and Social Learning. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1995 (110): 93-126.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents. Journal of Political Economy. 1995 (103): 75-93.

Fudenberg D, Kreps DM. Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior. 1995 (8): 20-55.

1994

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maskin E. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information. Econometrica. 1994 (62): 997-1039.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players. Journal of Economic Theory. 1994 (62): 103-35.

1993

Fudenberg D, Kreps DM. Learning Mixed Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior. 1993 (5): 320-67.

Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Rules of Thumb for Social Learning. Journal of Political Economy. 1993 (101): 612-43.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica. 1993 (61): 547-74.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Self-Confirming Equilibrium. Econometrica. 1993 (61): 523-46.

Fudenberg D. Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships. In: Laffont JJ Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press ; 1993.

1992

Fudenberg D, Harris C. Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks. Journal of Economic Theory. 1992 (57): 420-41.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed. Review of Economic Studies. 1992 (59): 561-81.

1991

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991 (54): 26-47.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991 (53): 236-60.

Fudenberg D, Maskin E. On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991 (53): 428-38.

 

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1991.

1990

Dekel E, Fudenberg D. Rational Play with Payoff Uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory. 1990 (52): 243-67.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts. Econometrica. 1990 (58): 1279-1320.

Fudenberg D, Kreps DM, Maskin E. Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players. Review of Economic Studies. 1990 (57): 555-573.

Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1990 (51): 194-206.

Fudenberg D, Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships. Journal of Economic Theory. 1990 (51): 1-32.

Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games. American Economic Review. 1990 (80): 274-9.

1989

Diamond P, Fudenberg D. Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy. 1989 (97): 606-19.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Game Theory for Industrial Organization: Introduction and Overview. In: Schmalansee D, Willig R Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam, New York: North Holland; 1989. Ch. 5.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Single Long-Run Player. Econometrica. 1989 (57): 759-778.

Diamond P, Fudenberg D. An Example of Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy. 1989 (97): 606-19.

1988

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players. Journal of Economic Theory. 1988 (44): 1-18.

Fudenberg D, Kreps DM, Levine DK. On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements. Journal of Economic Theory. 1988 (44): 354-80.

1987

Fudenberg D, Kreps DM. Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents. Review of Economic Studies. 1987 (54): 541-568.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Uses of Game Theory in Industrial Organization. American Economic Review. 1987 (77): 176-83.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Tirole J. Incomplete-Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1987 (52): 37-50.

1986

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. A Signal-Jamming Model of Predation. Rand Journal of Economics. 1986 (17): 366-76.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. A Theory of Exit in Duopoly. Econometrica. 1986 (54): 943-60.

Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica. 1986 (54): 533-554.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Limit Games and Limit Equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory. 1986 (38): 261-79.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Dynamic Models of Oligopoly. Harwood Academic Publishers; 1986.

1985

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Tirole J. Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information. In: Roth A Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press; 1985. pp. 73-98.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology. Review of Economic Studies. 1985 (52): 383-402.

1984

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look. American Economic Review. 1984 (74): 361-6.

1983

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information. Review of Economic Studies. 1983 (50): 221-247.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Learning by Doing and Market Performance. Bell Journal of Economics. 1983 (14): 522-30.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility. Journal of Economic Theory. 1983 (31): 227-50.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1983 (31): 251-268.

Fudenberg D, Tirole J, Gilbert R, Stiglitz J. Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Co­mpetition in Patent Races. European Economic Review. 1983 (22): 3-31.

Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Ruud P. Negotiations, Strikes, and Wage Settlements, in NBER Conference on Trade Unions. NBER; 1983.